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1he return of “eclectic” to the critical vocabulary of art his-
tory and aesthetics in the eighteenth century signaled both a 
new way of understanding creativity in relation to history and 
an implicitly negative judgment on any work of art deserving the label. 
“Eclectic” and “eclecticism” were concepts that provoked anxiety about 
the possibility for progress in the arts, the consequences of historical belat-
edness, and the use of historical styles in the absence of an appropriately 
modern style. In nineteenth-century Britain, the connotations of eclectic 
were largely negative: to be eclectic was to be mediocre, undiscriminating, 
middle-class, confused, decadent, liberal, mixed, and unoriginal. Works 
of genius were not eclectic. The art of the nineteenth century, if eclectic, 
would not adequately represent the age to itself or to future generations. In 
once again reviving the language of eclecticism, this study aims to restore a 
way of seeing and explaining nineteenth-century culture that was typically 
used to denigrate the period and only rarely to acclaim its contributions to 
the arts. To denominate Victorian literature eclectic might seem, therefore, 
to risk its canonical status; but to ignore the role of eclecticism in shaping 
the canon of Victorian literature we have today is to overlook those quali-
ties that make it continually fresh and accessible, that seemingly collapse 
all the intervening time and distance between our historical moment and 
that of the Victorians.
I n t r o d u C t I o n
r
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 While it is never possible to select a single cause to explain a complex 
series of effects, in following a dominant thread, the problem of author-
ity, one can detect a regular pattern in Victorian culture—a pattern that 
will help to explain the pervasiveness of eclecticism. In every aspect of life, 
certainty had seemingly been replaced by anxiety; reliable guides to belief 
and action no longer waited at the door to experience. The image of being 
pushed into a vast expanse of uncharted territory or onto the trackless sea 
recurs again and again in the literature of the nineteenth century, figuring 
the modern sense of historical ruin and isolation. The Established Church, 
the intellectual elite, the aristocracy, communal traditions—none could 
withstand the onslaught of competing opinions or the deepening sense of 
the individual’s prerogative in shaping his destiny; but looking one’s liber-
ated self in the mirror raised an uncomfortable and persistent question: 
who would validate all the choices one now had to make? If religious dis-
senters had the same rights as those who cleaved to the Church of England, 
then faith was a matter of conscience, the choice of the individual rather 
than an Establishment. If it was no longer the case that a small number 
of educated persons controlled the press or the publication of books, then 
authors would compete in an open marketplace for the attention of read-
ers. If one no longer believed in the absolute right of the aristocracy to 
direct the economic and political forces of the nation, then new persons fit 
to rule would have to be chosen. If the mass migrations from country to 
city and from homeland to colony separated individuals from traditional 
communities, then a new communal fabric would have to be woven from 
the remnants of the old. The sense of authority lost must have been pro-
found. The resulting eclecticism often looked like an admission of defeat 
or surpassing arrogance. What was the principle of selection to be?
 This question was not an idle one, either for the Victorians or for those 
historians determined to give some account of what we now recognize to 
have been the first information age. In his brief preface to Eminent Victo-
rians, Lytton Strachey offers some prescient advice to present and future 
historians of the period: “It is not by the direct method of scrupulous nar-
ration that the explorer of the past can hope to depict that singular epoch. 
If he is wise, he will adopt a subtler strategy. He will attack the subject in 
unexpected places; he will fall upon the flank, or the rear; he will shoot a 
sudden revealing light into obscure recesses, hitherto undivined. He will 
row out over that great ocean of material, and lower down into it, here and 
there, a little bucket, which will bring up to the light of day some char-
acteristic specimen, from those far depths, to be examined with a careful 
curiosity” (9). Strachey’s methodological metaphor addresses the difficulty 
of attaining a position of authority over so extensive a field of inquiry as the 
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sixty-four years of Victoria’s reign. In its framing it manages to align future 
historians with the objects of their study; for surely, the Victorians, too, 
must have been overwhelmed, even “submerged,” by the sheer range and 
quantity of writing, past and present, through which they might attempt 
to telescope their times. In characterizing his efforts as “haphazard,” made 
up of “fragments of truth,” and motivated by “convenience and art” (9), 
Strachey brings into view one aspect of the eclecticism that beset the Vic-
torian Age and his own: it was fraught with a sense of randomness and 
indiscriminate picking and choosing, “here and there”; in emphasizing his 
“careful curiosity,” the necessity “of selection, of detachment, of design,” 
and his goal of writing with “becoming brevity” (9–10), Strachey points to 
another understanding of eclecticism that emerged during the nineteenth 
century: it could also be a self-conscious process of selecting from past and 
present, which might lead to creative synthesis.
 Strachey’s analysis of the situation of the critic and historian speaks to 
the central issues of this study, both how I plan to articulate the problem of 
eclecticism in the Victorian period, and why I think it necessary to erect an 
imposing new conceptual framework in a field of scholarship notable for 
its rigorous historicism. “The burden of the past” invoked by any discus-
sion of eclecticism is a familiar aspect of modernity, particularly in the his-
tory of literature. This study aims to reframe that dynamic, and to place it 
in a much broader context, by examining the rise in the nineteenth century 
of a manifold eclecticism. A potentially protean category, eclecticism may 
be a symptom of decay or renewal—or both. In this study I am especially 
concerned with two broad understandings of eclecticism in the period—
one understood as an unreflective embrace of either conflicting beliefs or 
divergent historical styles, the other a mode of critical engagement that 
ultimately could lead to a rethinking of the contrast between creation and 
criticism, and of the very idea of the original. Eclecticism then and now 
was process and product, accident and necessity. It has never been a singular 
term—an idea with only one meaning consistently applied; it is decidedly 
multifarious, even as it takes in a set of related phenomena. Eclecticism 
and eclectic will not replace the more familiar terms that encompass and 
describe literary history (romanticism, realism, aestheticism, decadence, 
modernism, or postmodernism) or literature in general (hybridity, inter-
textuality, anxiety of influence); eclecticism is valuable as a critical and aes-
thetic category because it helps us to see the problems of literary creation 
more in line with how Victorian writers saw themselves and the dilemmas 
they felt were peculiar to the age in which they lived.
 The secondary aim of this work is to contribute to the emerging field 
of transnational Victorian studies, and, in doing so, to find a way to talk 
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about a broader, post-Romantic nineteenth-century culture. In 2003 the 
editors of Victorian Studies asked Sharon Marcus and Irene Tucker to com-
ment on the potential of “transnational” conceptions of Victorian studies. 
Both writers deplore the tendency of Victorianists to be both provincial 
and untheoretical in their conception of the larger field. Compared with 
other period concepts, such as Romantic, the moniker “Victorian” provides 
no theory of what constitutes a Victorian work of art; something is Victo-
rian simply by virtue of its chronological placement between two dates. 
In her essay “International Whiggery,” Tucker points out the tendency 
of scholars interested in Romanticism to look abroad for an understand-
ing of the theory underlying the field; by its very nature, Victorian studies 
seems to be utterly provincial. My work contributes to this long overdue 
comparative study of Victorian literature and culture. On the one hand, I 
examine the prevalence of an eclectic philosophy in France and the Brit-
ish responses to it. On the other hand, I argue that Victorian eclecticism is 
itself a comparative approach to the study of culture. Eclecticism becomes 
valuable as a critical paradigm because it offers a built-in theory of the 
literary and historical period, much in the way Romanticism does. It is 
particularly vital now, because so much of our language for describing the 
conditions of postmodernity also describes what the Victorians understood 
as eclecticism. In short, by reviving eclecticism as a critical term, I am try-
ing to historicize the theoretical language available to us for describing how 
Victorian culture functioned, to make the terrain of Victorian scholarship 
international and comparative, and to create a place for the Victorians in 
the genealogy of postmodernism. All languages give us access to a particu-
lar way of seeing the world. I am trying to give Victorianists—and other 
students of nineteenth-century literature and culture—a new perspective 
on familiar debates that intersect in crucial ways with issues still relevant 
to literature in an age of multiculturalism and postmodernism, where we 
too seem to be sailing over a vast ocean of writing, pulling up, here and 
there, our little buckets.
X
The journey toward the acceptance and tentative celebration of eclecticism 
was not an easy one. For most of the nineteenth century, British writers 
shied away from using the words eclectic or eclecticism, and when they 
did use them, it was rarely in a positive sense. These words carried strongly 
negative connotations, which would not easily be shed, even in a time and 
place as manifestly eclectic as Victorian Britain. It would be difficult to 
claim that this sense of revulsion for eclecticism was traceable to Victor 
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Cousin, its first modern proponent, or to the juste milieu French culture 
his philosophy had helped to bring about. It is somewhat easier to follow 
the fortunes of eclecticism in the debate on architectural style, and in the 
broader concern of Victorians for the imprint their culture would leave on 
history. But eclecticism was both an intellectual and an aesthetic dilemma, 
arising from a growing awareness of the claims of the past in the present 
and resolvable only through historical synthesis or, as some few imagined, 
a virtually impossible break with history.
 In giving order to the vagaries of history, Victorian writers tended to 
impose models of progress or circularity. Not surprisingly, eclectic thinkers 
wanted to have it both ways. History would alternate between periods of 
contraction and expansion, or periods of analysis and creativity; progress 
would go on apace for a time, before running out of ideas. At the low ebb 
of original ideas, we have eclecticism, the culture of analysis and exces-
sive introspection. For the eclectic this situation was always temporary 
and to be regarded as an opportunity for gathering up the riches of the 
past in order to prepare for the future. Was it so simple as reversing what 
had often been experienced as decadence and ending, and calling it a new 
beginning? No. No one who lives through such an interregnum regards it 
as a blessing. Those writers most deeply affected by the ebb tides of eclecti-
cism were often the most irredeemably pessimistic about the future—their 
own and the nation’s. Eclecticism gave them a thread of hope, a reason 
to go on working, and a way to keep off, as Carlyle might have said, that 
night wherein no man may work.
 Even Cousin, with his philosophical eclecticism, did not expect to 
prepare a summa of human knowledge, with the truth extracted and dis-
played, because he knew that eclecticism was never anything more than 
a method for dealing with the messiness of the past and its tentacle-holds 
on the present. Much like its late-Hellenic and Baroque precursors, nine-
teenth-century eclecticism sought to resolve conflicts between systems of 
thought, not in order to create its own system of the world, but rather 
to establish the conditions under which better and clearer thoughts might 
prevail. With such liberal aims as these, well adapted to the pragmatic spirit 
of the Britain of the Great Reform Bill, it is perhaps somewhat surprising 
that an eclectic philosophy, which based its appeal on common sense, was 
not embraced during Victoria’s reign. While many versions of eclecticism 
can be traced in Victorian thought—and it is the aim of this study to bring 
them to light—the idea of eclecticism was met with disapproval almost 
everywhere, until very late in the century.
 In making these related claims—Victorian culture was eclectic, eclecti-
cism was a problem, this problem had to be resolved through a creative 
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synthesis—I do not mean to argue that the nineteenth century was unique 
in its need to deal with the burden of the past, and therefore uniquely 
eclectic, or that eclecticism had never been perceived as a problem at any 
other point in history, or even that Victorian eclectics were prone to com-
bine the materials of the past in more unlovely fashion than the eclectics 
who had gone before. I want instead to emphasize the degree to which 
the conditions producing eclecticism affected how the culture saw itself 
and its place in history, and became identified with the spirit of the age—
indeed, with the innermost hopes and fears of its most articulate critics 
and apologists. These claims depend on two crucial assumptions, the first 
that eclecticism was pervasive in the culture of the nineteenth century, and 
widely discussed, and the second that literary eclecticism—the focus of this 
study—depended on cultural translation, both across cultures and across 
the arts.
 Two significant inscriptions of the Victorian idea of eclecticism, sepa-
rated by only a few years, show, when brought together, the two sides of 
this peculiarly modern disease—just as Strachey’s preface would do for the 
next generation. George Somerset, the hero of Thomas Hardy’s novel A 
Laodicean (1881), suffers from the “modern malady of unlimited apprecia-
tiveness”; he is indecisive and “lukewarm.” In the essay on “Style” (1888), 
Walter Pater declares that “no critical process can be conducted reasonably 
without eclecticism” (16); and, since he says this about Tennyson’s poetry, 
it is clear that Pater means one cannot write, create literary art, without 
being eclectic. The best writers select from among all the words of the 
language, with all their shades of meaning in view, the words most suited 
to the writer’s purpose. For Hardy, the working out of the novel’s plot 
involves lessening the pressures of plenitude through experiments in eclec-
tic combination; while for Pater, the future of literature depends on the 
willingness of individual writers to engage eclectically (and critically) with 
literary history. What was it about their historical situation that made these 
two very different writers take what seemed on the face of it to be a lam-
entable fact, namely the burden of the past as it weighed on the present, 
and to transform it into the cornerstone of human creativity? Somerset’s 
uncritical inclusiveness and Pater’s critical exclusiveness are symptoms of 
the eclecticism that was already a significant force in nineteenth-century 
European culture. Having choices was both heavy and light; it signified 
not only the burden of responsibility for shaping the future, but also a 
future that was in some sense free-floating, uncertain, and radically con-
tingent.
 In Hardy’s novel, eclecticism comes to be associated with a supple, 
forward-looking liberalism positioned against the backward-looking 
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rigidity of the Gothic Revival. Eclecticism, by definition, cannot be con-
servative, but must remain open to change, and perpetually receptive to 
new influences. For the Victorians, liberalism, in both its humanistic and 
political senses, had already created a connotative conundrum. “Liberal” 
could mean free, open-minded, receptive, and generous of spirit, optimis-
tic and unprejudiced; or it could mean licentious and indulgent, lax and 
lukewarm, middling and makeshift. Likewise in the choice of an archi-
tectural style, “eclectic” might equally describe undiscriminating mixture 
or stylistic synthesis. Here, the choice arises not only from an awareness of 
competing historical styles and their distinct meanings but also from the 
availability of these styles in an open marketplace. As capitalism intensifies, 
individuals have to make more choices commensurate with their finan-
cial standing. The richer and better educated a person is, the greater the 
number of decisions she will have to make. Since most people slide toward 
uncritical inclusiveness, rather than critical exclusiveness, their eclecticism 
is naïve, and driven by nothing more calculated than the happenstance of 
instantaneous preference (probably helped along by clever marketing and 
the desire to show up one’s neighbors).
 Just as the necessity of choosing underlies liberalism and capitalism, it 
becomes a more acute problem of identity with the advent of widespread, 
state-sponsored education. The liberal arts had always been defined eclec-
tically, and the process of learning was necessarily a protracted one; but by 
the time a student reached maturity, he would be able to grasp the inter-
relations among disparate objects of study; that is, he would have a liberal 
viewpoint. For the growing middle classes, however, traditional academic 
subjects were treated (if possible) even more superficially, and the taste or 
sensibility that the upper classes acquired as a matter of course in their 
everyday lives continued to elude those who were scrambling to reach the 
vantage point of their former masters. When the middle class reached the 
summit and captured the castle, they registered their newfound author-
ity and independence by renovating the venerable structure in their own 
image. Not much constrained by taste, they blithely mixed Gothic and 
Greek, Moorish and Byzantine, with old and new vernacular styles. They 
redecorated with paintings and sculptures drawn from every period, and 
artifacts from every place touched by Britain’s empire. It was an age of 
bric-a-brac, supported by the naïve eclecticism of a class that had discov-
ered the past and the world, and dominated them both.
 As the plurality of artistic styles became more widely known, and 
the link between aesthetics and morality more insistent, stylistic prefer-
ence could take on all the weight of religious affiliation. The affective 
force of A Laodicean depends on this link between the aesthetic and the 
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moral; if one is stylistically eclectic, then one is probably shot all through 
with eclecticism and its moral ambiguities. In a conclusion that validates 
his characters’ inconsistency, Hardy rejects the notion that moral princi-
ples must be fixed and unswerving, instead presenting lukewarmth as an 
important transitional phase in one’s moral development. However, this 
liberal approach to morality was generally viewed with suspicion, because 
it seemed to make received wisdom or even revealed truths open to nego-
tiation, allowing individuals to pick and choose the bits of doctrine with 
which they felt comfortable and to discard the rest as inessential or anti-
quated. One could argue that aesthetic standards changed with the times, 
evolving with the societies in which those standards developed; but to say 
that morality was subject to the same shifting proprieties as fashion would 
be to call into question the whole foundation on which Christian morality 
was based. Eclecticism in morality was the inescapable effect of historical 
accumulation, yet it was regarded as a violation of historical progress. The 
Reformation and the Renaissance had shown that it was possible to choose 
both one’s religion and one’s cultural heritage, that organic development, 
in its strictest interpretation, could be circumvented. Before the rise of his-
toricism, such apparent divergences from development were not perceived 
as disruptive; but a deeper awareness of history, and a romantic preference 
for folkloric integrity, gave all such deviations the taint of artifice.
 To claim eclecticism for the nineteenth century is thus paradoxical, 
as it did not express the age in any strictly representational sense and did 
constitute a break with historical development. To claim for eclecticism 
the exalted status of “high” art would be equally misleading. What, then, 
does eclecticism do for the critic and historian? Eclecticism describes a way 
of thinking about the historical inheritance. It gives us a glimpse of the 
aspirations of the middle classes during the period. And it underscores a 
crucial dilemma of the age: the problem of producing an original style that 
would represent the age to itself and to posterity. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, historicism had led to the imitation of historical styles, while ever-
deepening knowledge of these styles contributed to a sense that modern art 
was inauthentic, because inorganic and derivative. Conceptions of the art-
ist had changed, too, which placed a new premium on originality—genius 
became the only acknowledged path to artistic greatness. These romantic-
historicist notions put intense pressure on artists not only to produce works 
of individual genius but also to create a national style that was both organi-
cally coherent and culturally distinctive. But eclecticism was rooted in the 
artistic culture of the nineteenth century, and the only way to get beyond 
a damaging, naïve eclecticism—the only way to develop an individual or a 
national style—was to pursue a more rigorous eclecticism.
Introduction
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	 The literary historian Walter Pater articulated the critical exclusiveness 
of nineteenth-century eclecticism, and overcame the intellectual and aes-
thetic crisis provoked by eclectic historicism, when he redefined style as “a 
peculiar sense of fact,” rather than the exclusive property of genius. In his 
essay on “Style,” the peculiarity of the artist bears only a superficial resem-
blance to the prevailing notion of the genius as a creature born not made. 
While “true art” does express a specific personality—“fact as connected 
with soul,” the literary artist must be a scholar, whose sense of fact depends 
on selecting from a multitude of facts. Within the critical exclusiveness of 
eclecticism, originality becomes possible only through the extreme refine-
ment of the writer’s medium. Under the regime of choice, the writer must 
be both critical and self-critical. The writer finds organic completeness by 
submitting all words, phrases, and sentences to the unity of the internal 
vision, the literary architecture, which is “a single, almost visual image, 
vigorously informing an entire, perhaps very intricate, composition, which 
shall be austere, ornate, argumentative, fanciful, yet true from first to last 
to that vision within” (23). For Pater this submission of expression to idea 
is a truly “eclectic principle” (34), because it borrows from all the forms of 
beauty that have existed throughout time and allows for the contempora-
neous existence of infinitely varied styles.
 Could this rigorous eclecticism, practiced by a select few, overcome 
the prejudice most felt against the naïve eclecticism that continually told 
against progress, as it pilfered history and jumbled together its ill-gotten 
gain in cities and houses whose lineaments were equally confounded? In 
Pater’s account of the sources of style, literary eclecticism coincides with a 
perception of historical belatedness, but does not forestall the emergence of 
fresh and distinctive styles; on the contrary, it is the vital requirement of all 
artistic creation whatever under the conditions of modernity. In this way 
Pater largely put to rest the doubts of his contemporaries who worried that 
the arts could only decline as surely as the sciences progressed. He made 
what looked like ending into a new beginning. The eclectic interregnum 
would be, for Pater, not a time for waiting, but a time for making, because 
analysis was only another aspect of invention.
 It is possible to equate the uncritical inclusiveness of naïve eclecticism 
with bourgeois modernity and the critical exclusiveness of Paterian eclecti-
cism with avant-garde modernity, with the former impelled by a liberal 
faith in “doing as one likes” (as Arnold puts it in Culture and Anarchy) and 
the latter driven by its “high” aestheticist opposition to that “low” form.1 
We can make several further distinctions between the two eclecticisms. 
All eclectics must be open to variety, but not all eclectics discriminate. One 
does not choose to be naïvely eclectic, although one might be content to be 
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uncritical with respect to the historical inheritance, and happy to absorb 
culture from any source. Paterian eclecticism permits no such passivity, 
but demands painstaking scholarship, whether one is the author or reader, 
artist or spectator. This will limit significantly the number of persons 
producing works of eclectic synthesis as well as those who can appreciate 
them. All eclectics believe in progress, but some eclectics believe that prog-
ress happens only fitfully, or cyclically. Naïve eclectics do not recognize 
the burden of the past, or if they do perceive it, they tend to regard it as 
so much flotsam to navigate, but never as a serious threat to progress. By 
contrast, volitional eclectics move forward only by mapping the historical 
terrain, aware of every turning and branching in the road. They believe 
in progress and decadence, in the intricate patterns of corsi and recorsi. 
Volitional eclectics favor synthesis over development, and seek to live in 
synchronic, rather than diachronic, time. This does not mean they will 
exist always in an ahistorical present, but rather that they will exist with 
the synchronous consciousness of past, present, and future. Such volitional 
eclecticism might liberate the artist from the bourgeois “march of prog-
ress” and from Hegelian universal history—we do not have to develop in a 
particular way. All eclectics translate cultural material, but not all eclectics 
respect the distinctiveness of their sources. Naïve eclectics tend to appro-
priate the artifacts of disparate cultures, but in a manner that makes what 
is taken resemble the taker. Imperial plunder tells the tale of the victor 
not the maker; the collection of old masters displays more wealth than 
taste; the neo-Gothic castle or neo-Classical villa inclines to fashion rather 
than to history. In his translations of culture, the naïve eclectic tends to 
level off differences; in his art, he reaches for the readymade, mimicking 
the official culture and flattering national biases. At its worst, this bour-
geois eclecticism, so dependent on capitalism for its circulation, produces 
art that is mechanical, pretentious, and thoughtless, the pap of an imma-
ture society motivated by vanity and greed. At its best, naïve eclecticism 
might promote cross-cultural understanding, greater self-consciousness, 
and an aptitude for social transformation. Creating the potential for 
change is the continual labor of the volitional eclectic. What Wolfgang 
Iser calls “the translatability of cultures” makes true eclecticism possible. 
If one were limited to a single language or perspective on the world, then 
the territory from which one selected “the best that has been thought and 
known”—to borrow another apt expression from Arnold—would be too 
narrow to yield any crop of ideas that could be so denominated. It would 
be as though one tried to draw conclusions about Earth’s terrain without 
ever leaving the mountain valley or sandy isle. Thus the volitional eclectic 
must also be conscientiously cosmopolitan, eschewing the temptations of 
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nationalism and organic historicism in favor of the wider view offered by 
comparison. This might look like a gesture of mastery that depends on an 
impossible erudition. Eclectic synthesis might yield what looks like a syn-
thetic culture—derivative and artificial. But for the volitional eclectic, it is 
no longer a matter of choosing eclecticism, but only of choosing how to be 
eclectic.
 The hard-won insights of Hardy and Pater did have their day; the lit-
erary and artistic culture of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century 
Britain was unabashedly eclectic—an eclecticism that bears a complicated 
relationship to avant-garde modernism, in its “high” form, and to post-
modernism, in its “low” form. In telling the story of getting there, the 
seven chapters of this study are balanced between a general account of the 
aesthetic and intellectual crises of eclecticism, and a more focused account 
of the practices of volitional eclecticism in literature.
 Chapter 1 commences where this introduction began, with the reentry 
of “eclectic” into the critical vocabulary of art history in the second half of 
the eighteenth century. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the con-
ditions giving rise to eclectic art and architecture in the nineteenth century 
and the extent to which these conditions might bear on the production 
of literary texts as well. Eclecticism became a useful concept during the 
nineteenth century, both as an explanation for decline in literature and the 
other arts and as the means for resolving their crisis. This is not to say, 
however, that the effects of eclecticism in literary texts were identical to 
those in the other arts. After all, eclecticism in language, ideas, and literary 
style is not as easy to see as an eclectic building or even an eclectic paint-
ing; nor is an eclectic literature as easy to anatomize as an art museum 
or international exhibition. In order to make literary eclecticism visible, I 
must borrow some of the language, images, and theories of the other arts, 
of architecture, in particular; in chapter 1, then, I aim to create eclectic 
homologies that will carry over into the chapters that follow. By way of 
defining the significance (and slipperiness) of the concept of eclecticism, I 
take up the famous controversy over the eclecticism of the Carracci, a fam-
ily of late-sixteenth-century Italian painters who founded an academy at 
Bologna. The academic art they represent, in its theories and educational 
programs, and in its claim to originality as a style, provides an important 
starting point for an examination of the fortunes of eclecticism in the 
nineteenth century. The dangers of adopting eclecticism as a critical term 
are perhaps best illustrated by the emotional debate carried on by Denis 
Mahon in the 1950s, as he struggled to recover the Carracci reputation by 
dispensing with the idea of eclecticism. With the advent of postmodern-
ism, however, the term is no longer shameful, and the time seems ripe for 
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allowing the eclecticism of the Carracci to be acknowledged and appreci-
ated once more.
 In the second part of chapter 1, I bring the debate on the eclecticism 
of the Carracci into the British context, considering Sir Joshua Reynolds’s 
methods of instruction at the Royal Academy, which essentially follow 
those established by the Carracci at Bologna. In the Discourses, Reynolds 
sets out his eclectic principles and tests their value in relation to emerg-
ing genres such as landscape. Reynolds provides an interesting case study, 
poised as he is on the brink of the Romantic revolution that would reject 
his core notion that the training of the artist depends on assimilation of 
the great masters for the idea that the training of the artist depends on 
immersion in nature. I close the section by considering Ruskin’s compli-
cated rejection of Reynolds in Modern Painters, as part of his defense of the 
Romantic painter Turner.
 Keeping in mind Iser’s rule that cultural translation was unnecessary 
as long as the historical inheritance was taken for granted, eclecticism in 
the modern sense could not be said to have a history before this period. 
Around the end of the eighteenth century, one’s culture could no longer 
be taken for granted; the cultural inheritance was in the process of being 
romanticized and historicized, which accounts for the anxiety that eclecti-
cism produced in all the arts. It is not surprising, then, that “eclectic” was 
the epithet most commonly applied to Victorian architecture, and, because 
architecture was the dominant art of the period conceptually, it became a 
locus of anxious projections about the future. To survey the architecture of 
the Victorian period is to confront the material results of eclecticism: the 
stylistic eclecticism adopted by (and endured by) the middle classes; the 
historical revivals in domestic architecture and decoration; anxiety over 
the status inconsistency represented by copies or imitations; the loss of dis-
tinctness of place; the ever-narrowing range of authenticity and the cor-
responding search for aesthetic novelty and artistic originality. The third 
part of chapter 1 deals with a neglected episode in Ruskin’s career and 
in the history of Victorian medievalism. Ruskin visited Sir Walter Scott’s 
mansion at Abbotsford in 1838 with the intention of describing it in a 
series of essays on “The Homes of the Mighty,” but he was so dismayed 
by what he found there that he determined never to write about it for 
the public. Unlike most visitors to Abbotsford, he could not reconcile the 
character of the building with what he thought he knew of the author’s 
mind. For Ruskin, Scott’s mind was manifested in the novels; in the novels 
only, Ruskin seemed willing to suspend his preference for organic coher-
ence and authenticity. His imagination when reading established the con-
nections among the fragments of Scott’s genius, but his imagination when 
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seeing refused to accept the conflict among the different styles that made 
up Scott’s mansion. Ruskin’s response to Scott’s house is thus character-
ized by desire and constraint: a desire to see the world of Scott’s romances, 
tempered by the knowledge that one cannot recreate the past—except in 
books.
 By the middle of the nineteenth century, medievalists had become 
more idealistic—more concerned with ideas than things—but dissatisfac-
tion remained the keynote. Victorian architects and designers went on try-
ing to imitate the medieval cultures they admired, but critics became more 
exacting; the freedom of the eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century 
revivalists was lost in the effort to rebuild the Middle Ages according to 
the rules discovered by scholars and archaeologists. John Ruskin was natu-
rally a leader of the movement to discover an authentic middle ages, but 
he was intensely pessimistic about the possibility of reclaiming its forms 
for the present age. Ruskin’s position would be widely disseminated later 
in his career through the famous “Nature of Gothic” chapter of The Stones 
of Venice: the nineteenth century can never reproduce the architecture of 
the middle ages, because the culture is too different. It was a statement 
against imitation—against reenactment. Throughout his career, then, 
Ruskin found himself in the peculiar position of advocating the superiority 
of medieval architecture while condemning nearly every effort that was 
made to build it. He established a rule that still constrains neomedievalists: 
it is appropriate to write fictions about the past, but inappropriate to try 
to make them come to life. In spite of Ruskin’s powerful influence, there 
were architects who embraced eclecticism, and it is with a brief consider-
ation of these, and what Sir John Summerson called “the problem of fail-
ure” in Victorian architecture, that I conclude my discussion of eclecticism 
in the arts.
 Chapter 2 explores a particularly influential framing of eclecticism 
as a philosophical system in the work of Victor Cousin. Largely forgot-
ten today, Cousin in the first half of the nineteenth century was the focal 
point of intense debate in both France and Britain. A philosophical method 
that seemed by turns willful and passive, powerfully synthetic and hope-
lessly derivative, eclecticism complemented the historicism of the age and 
strengthened the Romantic movement in France (inspiring Stendhal to 
name eclecticism “the philosophy of the nineteenth century”), but did little 
to repair the crisis of faith that would define nineteenth-century culture. 
On the contrary, eclecticism seemed to promote skepticism and moral con-
fusion, and critics such as Sainte-Beuve and Hippolyte Taine in France 
and William Hamilton and George Henry Lewes in Britain attacked its 
founder, Cousin, as both an intellectual dilettante and a political charlatan.
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 Chapter 3 takes up some of the broad understandings of eclecticism 
that arose in the debate over Cousin’s eclectic philosophy, in particular 
the notion that eclecticism was inherently literary or metaphorical rather 
than philosophical. Turning this notion back on the conditions affecting 
literary creation in the early nineteenth century, I consider several aspects 
of literary modernity as problems of eclecticism. First, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge’s description of the eclectic mind in Biographia Literaria gives 
us a template for interpreting the forms of naïve eclecticism that were 
infecting literary culture. Second, writers of the period were becoming 
increasingly concerned with the multitude of voices trying to be heard 
in the literary marketplace. Southey, Mill, and De Quincey worried that 
there was no reliable method for ordering the vast quantities of printed 
material available and that too often, readers would turn to digested ver-
sions of text—eclectic magazines and the like—rather than encountering 
a work firsthand. The third significant problem of literary modernity, the 
burden of the past, resonates strongly with the dilemma of style typical of 
naïve eclecticism. William Hazlitt and Thomas Love Peacock questioned 
whether poetry (or any of the arts) could progress and whether any further 
development, apart from eclectic imitation, were possible. T. B. Macaulay 
also doubted the possibility for progress in literature, and warned against 
the danger that eclecticism posed for poetry in particular. In his essays on 
Milton and Dryden, Macaulay addressed a fourth aspect of eclectic liter-
ary modernity when he argued that the nineteenth century must be an age 
of criticism. Some of his contemporaries disagreed. In the fourth section 
I consider Thomas Carlyle’s account of the disease of self-consciousness 
in literature, which he recognizes as an outgrowth of historical aware-
ness and eclectic machinery for promoting the arts, such as academies and 
journals, together with Charles Kingsley’s analysis of the negative conse-
quences of widespread, naïve eclecticism in poetry that was largely driven 
by the poet’s diseased self-awareness.
 Collectively, these writers create a picture of the operations of eclecti-
cism in literature and indicate possible solutions for overcoming it, some of 
which are taken up by the writers who are the focus of this study: Tenny-
son, Kingsley, Arnold, Pater, and Hardy. In chapter 4 we see that Tennyson 
offers a model of eclectic poetics that challenges the presumption that liter-
ary eclecticism heralds inevitable decline. In The Princess Tennyson proves 
that the medley form might be original. However, the poem’s reception was 
sharply divided among those critics who believed that the formal experi-
ment was a success and those who did not. I take up the debate between 
two critics in particular, Aubrey De Vere and C. P. Chrétien, who view the 
success or failure of Tennyson’s poem as a judgment not only on the poet’s 
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reputation but also on the eclectic orientation of the nineteenth century. 
Kingsley’s ambivalence about eclecticism (seen in his praise of The Princess 
and his condemnation of eclecticism elsewhere) makes the interpretation 
of his novel Hypatia especially difficult. Set in fifth-century Alexandria, 
the novel dramatizes the conflict among the diverse peoples of the city at 
the moment when Christianity is ascendant. Kingsley’s plot works steadily 
toward a compromise among contending forces and frames Christianity as 
a religion of the via media. Alexandria became a watchword in the Victo-
rian period for eclectic decadence and moral confusion, and Kingsley is at 
least partly responsible for disseminating the idea, which I briefly explore 
in writings about Britain’s imperialist encounters.
 The end of chapter 5 marks a turning point in the study from a focus 
on the problem of eclecticism in Victorian culture toward a focus on the 
role of volitional eclecticism in securing the future of literature. In chapter 
6, I uncover the early influence of Cousin on Matthew Arnold, examine the 
self-conscious eclecticism of Arnold’s poetry and criticism, and conclude by 
considering Arnold’s later writings on literature and culture, which exam-
ine both the negative force of uncritical eclecticism, “doing as one likes,” 
and the positive force of eclectic criticism, “finding the best that has been 
thought and known in the world.” Like its ancient counterpart, modern 
eclecticism would consistently attempt to reconcile the divergent tenden-
cies of Western culture: idealism and materialism, classic and romantic, 
beautiful and sublime, Greek and Gothic, Hellene and Hebrew. Perhaps 
more disturbing to nineteenth-century sensibilities, eclecticism proposed 
a historical model of synthesis in opposition to the preferred and virtu-
ally unquestioned model of development; and, confirming its secondary, 
derivative status, eclecticism seemed to be a critical endeavor preparing 
the way for the future, rather than a productive, creative process in its own 
right. A sense of literature’s decline did not, however, preclude a search 
for solutions, and in spite of widespread opposition to eclecticism, Arnold 
advocated an implicitly eclectic program of literary history and criticism, a 
project that would finally be made explicit in the work of Walter Pater.
 If the “Age of Eclecticism” can be said to begin in 1815 with Victor 
Cousin’s first lectures at the Sorbonne in Paris, then it might be said to 
conclude with the publication of Marius the Epicurean in 1885. The novel 
was a watershed in Pater’s career, a treatise in the form of a romance, an 
answer to the critics who had driven him to suppress, for many years, the 
“Conclusion” to Studies in the History of the Renaissance (1873). In his early 
reviews of Pre-Raphaelite poetry, Pater had discovered the aesthetic of the 
“mixed situation,” which led him to a broad understanding of Renaissance 
as eclectic process. It also brought him to accept, even to prefer, the relative 
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and the tentative to the absolute. For Pater, transitional ages were best, and 
he devoted much of his writing to exploring the peculiar beauties of limin-
ally positioned writers and artists, and since life was always in flux, one 
could find such beauty in every time and place. In chapter 7, I also con-
sider Pater alongside the other writer who haunts this introduction—and, 
in a real sense, the entire book—Thomas Hardy. A Laodicean and Marius 
the Epicurean have both been described as intellectual novels; they are bet-
ter termed philosophical romances, for both thematically and structurally 
they make the formation of the self into a heroic quest. For both writers, 
that self can be triumphant only in his or her mutability—I’m adapting 
Ruskin’s description of modern literature here—and the fulfillment of the 
quest is achieved only through volitional eclecticism, so that eclecticism 
as a philosophy, as a way of living, is actually figured as heroic, the best 
hope for survival under the corrosive conditions of modernity. But after 
1885, after Marius, the problem of how to live is not so often represented 
as a problem of how to choose, or rather, it is taken for granted that the 
modern self is a medley.
 In the concluding afterword, I bring the discussion back to the pre-
sent, paraphrasing Arnold once more, to the function of eclecticism at the 
present time. The historical dilemma embodied by eclecticism has not dis-
sipated; if anything, it has grown more acute with the passage of time, 
as the burden of the past must always do. The urge to encompass vaster 
reaches of geographical space compounds the difficulty of taking in per-
petually receding historical time. The problem of eclecticism for literary 
critics and historians has often been reframed as its solution, just as it was 
for many Victorians. Only by becoming volitional eclectics do we avoid a 
worse fate—being always naïvely eclectic.
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n his brilliant and polemical Studies in Seicento Art and Theory 
(1947), Denis Mahon identified Johann Joachim Winckelmann, 
one of the founders of modern art history, as the propagator of the 
catchword “eclectic”—“that veritable masterpiece of concise meaningless-
ness”—in a small work published in 1763, Abhandlung von der Fähigkeit 
der Empfindung des Schönen in der Kunst, und dem Unterrichte in Derselben. 
Winckelmann employed the term to denote the imitators of classical art; 
like the late Hellenic eclectic philosophers, these classical artist-imitators 
(der Nachahmer) caught reflections of the original masters in the inevita-
ble cyclical movement of styles and forms through the centuries. Draw-
ing an explicit parallel between der Nachahmer of late antiquity and the 
Baroque artists of recent history, Winckelmann initiated what in Mahon’s 
view would become a central misunderstanding in the history of art: the 
Carracci would play the part of the modern Nachahmer. In other words, 
according to Mahon, the dominant figures of Baroque art would carry 
the stigma of eclectic impurity and decadence. Their supposed theory of 
“selection” combined with an “erudite-sounding watchword” doomed the 
Carracci to the category of reactionaries out of touch with their times in 
the modern, individualist romance of the history of art.
 As Mahon saw it, the “legend” of an Eclectic School in the seventeenth 
century arose from a misapplication of classical art theory (on the part of 
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Winckelmann) to actual works of art. Classical theory “should be looked 
upon in light of a propagandist polemic on behalf of a minority preserv-
ing a legitimist descent: an interpretation of art [ . . . ] rather than an active 
principle animating it” (Mahon 197). Reduced to the confusing, imprecise, 
and negative term “eclectic,” the complicated style of the Carracci, devel-
oped from a myriad of influences, was lost, Mahon believed, in a theoreti-
cal fog. He conceded that the confusion over the Carracci’s use of theory 
began almost immediately, with their first biographers, Giovanni Battista 
Agucchi and Giovanni Pietro Bellori. While Mahon attempted to raise 
the reputation of the Carracci family by distancing them from theories 
imposed on their artistic productions after the fact (as he thought), earlier 
critics found reason to praise the Bolognese painters’ profound learning 
and its deployment in their art.
 Mahon’s attitude toward eclecticism, and “classic theory,” was typically 
post-Romantic and widespread by the middle of the twentieth century. 
In 1960, in terms similar to those employed by Mahon in his defense of 
Baroque painting, the art historian Lincoln Rothschild attempted to find 
an interpretation of style that would “establish direct connections between 
the forms of artistic expression and the patterns of human life” (6). In try-
ing to account for those periods in which the arts did not seem to reflect 
the prevailing spirit of the age, Rothschild enumerated four conditions 
under which the link between art and society might be weakened or even 
severed: first, during “transitions of growth” in which extremes of style 
passed through a middle ground; second, “transitions of change, in which 
vestiges of previous sophistication are inevitably involved in the formu-
lation of new expression”; third, provincialism, in which artists tried “to 
reproduce a style away from the metropolitan center”; and fourth, eclec-
ticism (112). While artistic products of the first three categories still fit 
neatly into Rothschild’s evolutionary model, clearly, the offspring of eclec-
ticism did not. Rothschild’s vehement rejection of eclecticism establishes 
an important link between eclecticism and varieties of conservatism on the 
one hand, and between eclecticism and capitalism on the other:
A considerable variety of social maladjustments will support eclectic cul-
tural expression as a mask or shell that may be donned complete, with 
little reference to the inhabitant shape. A ready-made culture suits people 
of immature responsibility, who can enjoy effortless leisure, freedom from 
necessary activity or obligation. Eclectic pretensions also frequently cast 
art in the role of shield or apologist for leadership entrenched beyond the 
limits of its social usefulness, or actively predatory and antisocial, like the 
personal elegance notoriously affected by racketeering gangsters; or the 
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palaces, and collections of old masters owned by the so-called “robber 
barons” of the late nineteenth century. Academic dependence on classical 
models also provides a convenient mode of official generalization, a digni-
fied way of taking a stand against sin and for everything noble without 
committing the management or the regime to any too precise or practical 
program. (114)
Rothschild aimed his righteous indignation at two groups in particular: 
the newly rich, whose adoption of a “ready-made culture” or mimicry of 
an official or, worse, authentic culture proved that they “regard[ed] art as 
a pretentious assertion”; and the aristocracy, whose capacity to produce an 
authentic art had long since evaporated along with its “social usefulness.” 
After ridiculing consumers of culture for preferring eclectic art, Rothschild 
turned his attention back to the producers of culture. Artists who adhered 
to classical models were by definition eclectic and, ultimately, irrelevant. 
Eclecticism was generalizing, uncommitted, and vague; it was hypocriti-
cal, conforming, and weak.
 While critics such as Rothschild and Mahon made “eclectic” and “eclec-
ticism,” for a time, practically unusable terms in the history of art, the 
postmodern sensibility has again made it possible to examine critically the 
significance of eclectic periods in the history of art, architecture, and phi-
losophy. The neglect of the term is not particularly surprising, in light of 
the critical and historical controversy I have just been recounting. What is 
surprising is that no other term has been advanced to replace it that would 
also describe the peculiar conditions surrounding the invention, produc-
tion, and propagation of nineteenth-century art and literature. Rothschild 
wanted to disallow any link between eclecticism and cultural evolution; 
and yet the historical pattern emerging from an examination of eclecti-
cism across cultures and across the arts suggests that it arises consistently in 
those times and places where there is a sense of cultural loss or stagnation 
and that it becomes the method by which artists and thinkers grope their 
way back to confidence and even, finally, to originality.
What Is Eclecticism?
Reconsidering Winckelmann’s Interpretation of the Carracci
The salient facts of the Carracci history tend to support the traditional 
eclectic-theoretical interpretation. Most critics writing before Mahon agree 
that the Carracci rejected the antinaturalistic, or Mannerist, style that 
was popular in the second half of the sixteenth century. They advocated 
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a return to the style and the principles of the High Renaissance and the 
painters they admired: Titian, Correggio, Raphael, and Michelangelo. To 
promote these principles among the young artists of Bologna, Ludovico 
Carracci founded the Accademia degli Incaminati (Enggass xi).1 Accord-
ing to Frank Mather in his 1923 History of Italian Painting, the Carracci 
Academy was influenced and anticipated by the Belgian Denis Calvert’s 
academy founded at Bologna on the same principles and with the same 
fund of “nostalgia for Renaissance grandeur” (458–59). These schools used 
then-progressive methods of comparative study, such as casts and engrav-
ings, in attempting to identify and assimilate the perfections of past mas-
ters.
 Annibale Carracci, considered by most contemporaries to be the greatest 
painter of the family, carefully studied the methods of Raphael, Tintoretto, 
and Correggio, and was “launched on the impossible quest of combining 
with the austere grandeur of the Roman School, the charm of Venetian col-
oring and the emotional instability of Correggio. [ . . . ] [I]t was an attempt 
dictated by the times, and the inevitable choice of any superior spirit who 
wished to reknit the Renaissance tradition” (Mather 459). Lending sup-
port to the Carracci method, Agucchi, a contemporary of the Carracci, 
observed the successful operation of this principle in Renaissance art. Idea 
was the path to perfection for modern artists. As Rensselaer Lee explains, 
“Idea for Agucchi is an image of embellished nature which the painter 
forms in his mind by the empirical process of selecting the best from many 
objects” (206). In Agucchi’s view, the Mannerists precipitated a decline in 
taste because they relied on their own imagination, on fantasia; the Carracci 
restored painting, through idea, by following the antique and assimilating 
its perfections. Bellori closely followed Agucchi’s line on the Carracci, fifty 
years later.2 An intellectual and antiquarian, Bellori was profoundly inter-
ested in artistic theory and praised the Carracci for achieving an idealized 
form of beauty, “nature perfected.” The imitation of the ancients, who had 
“most fully grasped” “eclectical empiricism,” would lead modern painters 
to “the perfect combination of nature and art.” According to Bellori and 
others, Annibale had solved one of the stylistic dilemmas of the seicento 
by uniting disegno and colore, by combining technical perfection with fresh 
painterly colors (Enggass xvi). Carlo Cesare Malvasia praised the Eclec-
tics in 1678 for taking the best from all the best artists, “form[ing] from 
them a brief compendium, rather a precious extract, outside of and beyond 
which little remained for the studious to desire,” and forming from all 
these styles one of their own which had nothing to envy in all the others 
(qtd. in Mather 471). Unlike Mahon, who wants to validate the unique 
style of Annibale by resisting the eclectic interpretation, earlier historians 
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of art approved it and could still allow for the development of a new style 
within the Carracci’s critical endeavor: Baroque Classicism—the perfect 
unity of line and color, painting informed by knowledge.
 As Rensselaer Lee points out in his review of Mahon, neither Winckel-
mann nor the Carracci’s earlier critics would have considered their eclecti-
cism a bad thing. The role of the Nachahmer was, in their view, admirably 
fulfilled: “When all reservations are made, the Eclectics had fairly done 
their work of correcting the disorder of the late Renaissance and of restor-
ing something of the old decorum. They made possible the revival of the 
grand style at Rome, in the eighteenth century. [ . . . ] The Eclectics were the 
bridge by which the classical manner passed over into Western Europe, an 
indispensable link in the chain of the great Hellenistic tradition” (Mather 
469). When Winckelmann explained more fully the use of “Eclectici” to 
describe the Carracci in his Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums (1764), he 
noted their resemblance to the philosophers of late antiquity “who [ . . . ] 
tried to combine the ideas of previous schools, owing to their lack of vital-
ity” (qtd. in Wittkower 152). Far from denouncing the art of the Carracci, 
Winckelmann rather offered up “eclectic” as an interpretation of their par-
ticular historical situation: they collected and summarized the systems of 
their more talented predecessors.
 For centuries the concept of genius was compatible with the practice of 
imitation. This relationship survived as long as imitation remained free of 
the taint of eclecticism. Though Winckelmann may indeed have been the 
first to perceive Carracesque imitation as eclectic, he yet believed that imi-
tation (and, by extension, eclecticism) was the proper course to the revival 
of art. His famous pronouncement—“The only way for us to become 
great or, if this be possible, inimitable, is to imitate the ancients” (Reflec-
tions 5)—bears all the contradictions of his age. As Walter Pater would 
later recognize, Winckelmann’s classicism constituted a form of rebellion 
against the prevailing artistic culture of his day. To return to the source of 
culture (Greece, of course, for Winckelmann) and to partake of its vitality 
even in reflection might suffice to bring beauty back to art. In basic agree-
ment with the theories of selection current for two centuries, Winckel-
mann believed “that the imitation of the Greeks [could] teach us to become 
knowledgeable more quickly, for it shows us on the one hand the essence 
of what is otherwise dispersed through all of nature, and, on the other, the 
extent to which the most perfect nature can boldly, yet wisely, rise above 
itself” (21). The greatest artists of the Renaissance had “to first feel and 
to discover in modern times the true character of the ancients” (39), and 
this recovery of an outlook no longer inevitable in modern times enabled 
them to produce an art both of their age and superior to it. Commentators 
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who wished to denigrate the productions of post-Renaissance artists would 
say that they were mere copyists, never getting at the ideal that the Greeks 
captured and that Michelangelo recaptured. “Imitation” in Winckelmann 
has frequently been understood as the “ancient Greek method by which 
general ideas of beauty led ultimately to the realization of the ideal” (Fried 
90), while “copying” was thought to mean the realistic portrayal of a par-
ticular object. More recently, however, the art historian Michael Fried has 
brought to light an often-overlooked passage from the Reflections that 
should reverse our traditional prioritizing of imitation and copying. In the 
section Henry Fuseli titled (in his translation) “Workmanship in Sculp-
ture,” Winckelmann tries to imagine how the Greeks managed to transfer 
their models from wax to marble, exactly reproducing the form of the wax 
model. The Greeks’ elusive perfection, Winckelmann seems to say, resides 
in a moment of copying, not of imitating, the ideal. Without the ability 
to make the perfect copy, the entire enterprise would have been a failure. 
Fried argues that Winckelmann does not therefore denigrate the “work-
manship” of sculpture, as Fuseli seems to do, but values it as an absolutely 
integral part of the process of creating “inimitable” art—art that is deserv-
ing of imitation (94).
 The theoretical interpretation of the Carracci that has now become so 
disreputable originated with the understanding that in order to accomplish 
the restoration of painting, the Carracci must have followed two impor-
tant precepts: they had to study, copy, and accept as guides the models of 
the past, and they had to draw upon the traditional subject matter supplied 
by poets and historians, whether past or present (Lee 207). The only alter-
natives seemed to be the direct imitation of nature (practiced by Caravag-
gio) or the direct transmission of the image in the mind (practiced by the 
Mannerists). Was painting then only the “poor relation” of literature, des-
tined to remain forever a subordinate art? Mahon affirms that “Whether 
or not [painting] made its mark was to a certain degree contingent on the 
amount of learning and erudition displayed; hence tradition and precedent 
played a considerable part” (159). The “academic” view of painting identi-
fied here was, according to Lee, “an accepted and even prevailing point 
of view among critics and amateurs of art at the beginning of the century 
just as it was Bellori’s at the middle and end” (207). When “academic” is 
equated with “eclectic” and “eclectic” with Annibale, however, Mahon and 
Lee part company: Mahon concludes that the classic-idealist theory was 
retrospective in character, that it could not “have been the driving force 
behind any artistic movement” (196), and that the Carracci were not espe-
cially eclectic compared with Raphael or with Poussin (painters who are 
never saddled with the derogatory term). By contrast, Lee contends that 
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the Carracci were familiar with artistic theory that “counseled the method 
of eclecticism as part of a program for the improvement of the art of paint-
ing in what they considered its present state of decline” and that “Winckel-
mann, who followed Seicento opinion in this matter, was essentially right 
when he first named them eclectics and [ . . . ] there is still justification for 
so regarding them today” (211). Thus, Lee considers eclecticism as a way 
of operating (at a particular moment in history) and the Carracci method 
of painting as eclectic; while for Mahon, the issue turns on whether eclecti-
cism can have any descriptive utility.3
 Conveying little more than a general censure of seicento art, especially 
of the Carracci, the term “eclectic” has for a good many years dropped 
out of use in academic art history. Despite strong evidence pointing to the 
widespread use of eclecticism as a way of operating in sixteenth- and sev-
enteenth-century art, Mahon’s impassioned refusal of “eclectic” as a critical 
term influenced most writers on the Carracci either to remain silent on 
the issue or to repeat his reasons for not employing it.4 But Mahon had 
inadvertently drawn attention to a thorny problem for art historians: when 
is “selective borrowing” eclecticism, and when is it a means for the dis-
play of genius? For Rudolph Wittkower, who is best known for his work 
on the genius and character of artists, Born Under Saturn, the issue hinges 
on whether the artist in question borrows silently or makes his borrow-
ing part of a theoretical program: “the most common empirical procedure 
of art historians is concerned with the tracing of influences and borrow-
ings, [ . . . ]. But when confronted with this very issue as an explicit theory, 
the same art historians paradoxically retract and stigmatize it as eclectic” 
(“Imitation” 154). But as one defender of the apparently discredited idea 
of “eclecticism” put it, we should recognize the courage of the Carracci in 
facing the crisis of late-sixteenth-century art head on. Instead of imitating 
the masters, the Carracci imitated nature with their guidance; they had to 
thoroughly understand the masters and understand nature as well.5
 Defining eclecticism is notoriously difficult since there is no particular 
visual or literary style associated with it. Embracing eclecticism as a theory 
could destroy a reputation, since romantic art history turned the classical 
theory of selective imitation upside down. But practicing eclecticism has 
been unavoidable for writers, philosophers, and artists alike at least since 
the end of the eighteenth century. Derived from the Greek verb eklegein (to 
select) (Dillon and Long 4), “eclectic” names a process, that of selecting the 
best from among a collection of things. “Eclectic” as a negative aesthetic 
judgment can be traced to the particular outlook of Romantic art history in 
the first half of the nineteenth century. In fact, Mahon blames nineteenth-
century art historians such as Henry Fuseli, Franz Kugler, and Charles 
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Blanc for the dissemination of the Carracci “legend” (and for the family’s 
subsequent relegation to secondary status in the story of the progress of 
painting). The Carracci may have served their purpose in the revival of 
taste, conventional wisdom would utter, but they produced nothing really 
original. But the Carracci reputation was still vital in this period, and no 
one writing the history of Italian painting, or tracing the development of 
revived classicism, could afford to ignore them.
 The fragile literary foundation on which the Carracci theory of eclecti-
cism was first erected was little more than an affectionate sonnet presented 
at the funeral of a fellow painter, Niccolò dell’Abate. It is variously attrib-
uted to Annibale, Agostino, or an anonymous friend:
Whoever a goodly painter seeks to be
Should take the Romans’ drawing to his aid,
Movement from the Venetians, and their shade,
And worthy coloring from Lombardy,
The awesome Michelangelo must see,
The truth to nature Titian has displayed,
The pure and sovereign style Correggio had,
And of a Raphael just symmetry,
Tibaldi’s basis, and his decoration,
Invention of learned Primaticcio’s own,
And just a little grace from Parmigianino.
But leaving so much study and vexation,
Set him to imitate those works alone
Which here were left us by our Niccolino. (Holt 73–74)6
Whether a form of conventional praise for an artist (e.g., he combines the 
best qualities of all the best painters) or a glimpse into the “ideas [and] crit-
ical terms” of the Carracci school, the sonnet is certainly the most damning 
evidence of Carracci eclecticism as mere cookery. It has nonetheless, and in 
spite of several incorrect attributions, profoundly influenced the historical 
judgment of the school at Bologna.7 Winckelmann, when he reintroduced 
the term “eclectic” to describe the Carracci method of painting, picked up 
the ingredients of the famous sonnet from Malvasia: “They were eclec-
tics and sought to combine the purity of the ancients and of Raphael, the 
knowledge of Michelangelo, the richness and exuberance of the Venetian 
school, especially of Paolo Veronese, and the gaiety of the Lombard brush 
in Correggio” (“Essay on the Beautiful in Art” 99). Having remarked on the 
decline that preceded the Carracci, Winckelmann contends that although 
they “must be regarded as imitators,” they did “achieve [ . . . ] the fame of 
Chapter 1: History’s Diverse Beauties

their masters” (99). Henry Fuseli, whose translation of Winckelmann in 
1764 introduced the term “eclectic” into English, took a more severe view 
of the eclectic recipe for success in his lectures to the Royal Academy: “Of 
such advice, balanced between the tone of regular breeding and the cant 
of an empiric, what could be the result? excellence or mediocrity? who 
ever imagined that a multitude of dissimilar threads could compose an 
uniform texture, that dissemination of spots would make masses, or a little 
of many things produce a legitimate whole? indiscriminate imitation must 
end in the extinction of character, and that in mediocrity,—the cipher of 
art” (II:108–9). Disgusted by what he judged the mechanization of art and 
the eclipse of originality, Fuseli tried to resist, in his reform of the Royal 
Academy, the “compendiary method [ . . . ] which [ . . . ] has ruined the 
Arts of every country, by reducing execution to a recipè, substituting man-
ner for style, ornament for substance, and giving admission to mediocrity” 
(II:388–89). Eclecticism, the “compendiary method” praised by classic- 
idealist theorists of the previous three centuries, could have played no part 
in the “real progress of Art” (III:4). For Fuseli, only Genius could advance 
the cause of Art by the direct perception of Nature and its imperfect trans-
mission (III:7–8).8 Mere craftsmen should, in his view, be asked to leave the 
Academy (II:388–91). But by making Art the exclusive domain of Genius, 
Fuseli calls into question the very existence of the academy that supports 
him (he’d been made professor in 1799). Founded during the waning years 
of the Renaissance, the academy of art served no purpose but the promo-
tion of another rebirth through its criticism, something Fuseli reluctantly 
admitted: “All, whether public or private, supported by patronage or indi-
vidual contribution, were and are symptoms of Art in distress, monuments 
of public dereliction and decay of Taste. But they are at the same time the 
asylum of the student, the theatre of his exercises, the repositories of the 
materials, the archives of the documents of our art, whose principles their 
officers are bound now to maintain, and for the preservation of which they 
are responsible to posterity, undebauched by flattery, heedless of sneers, 
undismayed by the frown of their own time” (III:58). That the Eclectic 
schools had likewise been involved in the maintenance and preservation 
of the “materials” and “documents” of art apparently escapes Fuseli, who 
reserves his admiration for productive geniuses whose places in the his-
tory of art are secure. That Fuseli recognized in Annibale Carracci the 
standard for academic art (III:119) and despised him for it speaks volumes 
about the Royal Academician’s troubled relationship to the art of his own 
time. He wishes to take up at once the role of the critic and the role of 
the artist, a dual posturing that would become typical of the eclectic dur-
ing the nineteenth century. In the productive slippage between Fuseli’s 
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criticism and his art production emerges a self-conscious, critical art. For 
the Academy to play any role in the future of art, it would have to main-
tain this difficult balance between promotion and invention.
 Like Henry Fuseli, Franz Kugler believed that his art criticism would 
further the recovery of art in his own age. In his preface to the second 
edition of his Handbuch der Geschichte der Malerei seit Constantin dem Gros-
sen (completed by Jacob Burckhardt in 1847), Kugler credits a period of 
“wide-spread dilettantism” early in the century with the rediscovery of the 
art of the Middle Ages and with the subsequent researches into all periods 
of the history of art (iv). Nourished by the “romantic” art thus brought to 
light, modern “romantics” yielded to an aesthetic position as extreme as the 
classical that had preceded it. If he had needed a reminder that style was a 
choice, this was it. Kugler felt that a revised edition of the Handbuch was 
necessary to qualify his early intolerant opinions: “The more the sources 
of knowledge and judgment enlarged, the more it became apparent that 
the modes of conception peculiar to the romantic period had confined our 
views within too limited a space, and that even so late as ten years previ-
ously such views had partaken too much of that contracting influence” (iv). 
First published in 1837, his Handbook of Painting was enormously influen-
tial in categorizing the different regions and periods of Italian art. His aes-
thetic judgments followed from this taxonomy and were thus immediately 
available to amateurs and professionals alike. Though he was not the first 
to observe the divergent tendencies in the art of the seicento, he established 
definitively the existence of two schools: the Eclectics and the Natural-
ists. Just as he was trying to mediate the extremes of the classical and the 
romantic, he tried to lead his readers into a position between eclecticism, 
which he regarded as an intense form of idealism, and naturalism: “Each 
class exercised in its development a reciprocal influence on the other, par-
ticularly the Naturalisti on the Eclectics; and it is frequently impossible to 
distinguish, with perfect precision, the artists of one class from those of the 
other” (II:481).
 But distinguish them he would. Kugler’s definition of eclecticism and 
his classification of the Carracci as Eclectics, derived from Bellori, Malva-
sia, and even Winckelmann, remained unquestioned for over a century. 
“The greater number of artists of this time (that is the end of the sixteenth 
and first half of the seventeenth century) are known by the name of Eclec-
tics, from their having endeavoured to select and unite the best qualities of 
each of the great masters, without however excluding the study of nature. 
This eclectic aim, when carried to an extreme, necessarily involves a great 
misapprehension with regard to the conception and practice of art, for the 
greatness of the earlier masters consisted precisely in their individual and 
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peculiar qualities; and to endeavour to unite characteristics essentially dif-
ferent at once implies a contradiction” (II:481). Not nearly as negative in 
his judgment as Mahon contends he was (219), Kugler actually seems sym-
pathetic to the goals of the Eclectic school. What he describes is a scholarly 
practice that both takes account of the best art of the past and returns for 
inspiration to the original—to Nature. Though the “eclectic aim” might be 
carried too far, Kugler has generally good things to say about all the Car-
racci, even turning them into romantic heroes who “opposed fresh ideas 
to the exaggerated mannerisms then existing” (II:484). Of Ludovico Car-
racci, Kugler writes: “He passed his youth in constant and close attention 
to studies which had become a dead letter among the artists of the time, 
and which thus exposed him to much ridicule and contempt; but this only 
made it the more evident to him that reform was desirable, and that it had 
become necessary to introduce rules and well-understood principles into 
art, to counteract the lawless caprice of the mannerists” (II:482). Kugler 
had reproduced the rise-and-fall pattern of Italian painting established by 
Bellori in his Lives by denoting the fifty years prior to the Carracci as a 
period of decline. In his story of the progress of painting, the three Carracci 
were trailblazers. In youth they might have tried to realize their “patch-
work ideal,” but their extraordinary talent helped them to surpass “mere 
plagiarism” of the great masters and achieve a “thoroughly-understood 
and artistic appropriation of their highest qualities, bearing the character 
rather of rivalry than of imitation” (II:484). Like Winckelmann, Kugler 
saw the Carracci-as-Nachahmer as supplying an urgent need for order and 
as marking a high point in the history of painting. They might never be 
considered artists of the first rank, but they had prepared the way, both 
through their scholarship and through their painting, for another Renais-
sance, the one through which Kugler imagined he was living.
 The popularizing French art historian Charles Blanc, in his Histoire 
des peintres de toutes les écoles (1865–77), also acknowledges the Carracci’s 
role in preparing for the future of painting, but at the same time seems to 
denigrate them as “coldly calculating artists who had simply imitated the 
more truly inspired artists who had preceded them” (Goldstein, Visual Fact 
1). Nonetheless, Blanc, like Winckelmann and Kugler before him, believes 
that what the Carracci produced from their eclectic style was vastly supe-
rior to anything else being done in Italy at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century. They put forth, in systematic fashion, an “eclecticism” that would
[ . . . ] choisir dans chacun des maîtres de premier ordre ce qu’il a eu de 
mieux, étudier le dessin des grands dessinateurs, la couleur des grands col-
oristes, les ordannances de celui-ci, les effets de celui-là, et se composer, de 
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ces qualités diverses, en les combinant, de plus, avec l’étude de la nature, un 
style mixte, qui serait excellent puisqu’il n’y manquerait rien et que toutes 
les parties en aurient été puisées aux meilleurs sources. (xiii–xiv)
[[ . . . ] choose in each of the masters of the first order that which he has 
done best, to study the drawing of the great drawers, the color of the great 
colorists, the rules of these ones, the effects of those ones, and to com-
prise, from these diverse qualities,—combining them, furthermore, with 
the study of nature—a mixed style, which would be excellent seeing that 
it would want for nothing and that all the parts had been drawn from the 
best sources.] (my translation)9
Blanc’s attitude is typical of French thought in the nineteenth century; 
eclecticism as a method always serves a particular historical purpose. Not 
all periods in history are equally creative, and there are some artists whose 
role it is to give birth to genius and to the new age. But he cannot whole-
heartedly endorse the method, any more than Fuseli and Kugler do. The 
romantic ideal of originality was by now firmly entrenched, so even the 
Carracci’s volitional eclecticism seemed to violate the principles of art 
and it could not to be promoted or preferred as an artistic method. By the 
time Blanc was writing his history of painting, many artists were in revolt 
against academic, that is, eclectic, methods of instruction.
 Given this antieclectic tradition, Denis Mahon naturally was at pains 
to recover the reputation of the Carracci (particularly in relation to their 
now more popular contemporary, Caravaggio) via their interaction with 
the art of their own time, in the union of naturalism and imagination 
that he identifies as the essence of the Baroque. By contrast, nineteenth- 
century historians of art constructed a retrospective theory of eclecticism 
to explain a way of operating shared by the Bolognese painters, while still 
acknowledging the pivotal role of the Carracci and their Academy in the 
advancement of art during the seventeenth century. They may not have 
been the recipe eclectics ridiculed by Fuseli, but they did self-consciously 
and deliberately reinterpret the elemental forms of classicism into a living 
language. Undaunted by the inferiority their eclecticism implies, Rensse-
laer Lee recognizes that “Annibale was a scholarly painter who succeeded 
in his eclectic aim” (212). Occupying a central position between the two 
poles of the classical and the Baroque (Mahon 204), the Carracci output 
reveals eclecticism at work, trying to reconcile contradictions and longing 
to hold on to the past even as the present encroaches.
 This dilemma is readily apparent in Annibale’s contribution to the 
then-lowly genre of landscape painting. That Annibale painted landscapes 
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at all might have troubled his classicist admirers, but it no doubt delighted 
those twentieth-century critics who wanted to claim him for the romantic- 
naturalist genealogy. The companion pictures Hunting and Fishing (ca. 
1585, both now in the Louvre) represent some of Annibale’s most ground-
breaking work, despite his clear indebtedness to the tradition of Venetian 
landscape, especially to Titian. At first glance these paintings would seem 
to belong to the genre of mythological landscape that Titian made famous 
(Robert Cafritz sees a close resemblance in Annibale’s work to Titian’s 
Pardo Venus, painted around 1560, certain works of Domenico Cam-
pagnola, and decorative paintings by, among others, Niccolo dell’Abate 
[85–86]). Notably absent from Annibale’s work, however, is a single 
mythological figure. While the landscapes of both Hunting and Fishing are 
ideal, in the sense that they are “calculated to enhance nature aesthetically 
and morally,” they do not allude to “classical gods and heroes to trans-
mute physical reality into poetic invention” (Lagerlöf 7). Instead, Annibale 
imbues ordinary activities with transcendent significance. Collecting food 
becomes the window through which we catch a glimpse of the divine idea 
underlying nature, stretching back to the beginning of time. The men and 
women represent various occupations and classes; dogs and horses are as 
numerous as people. The recessionary planes within both pictures provide 
glimpses of a general prosperity. Even those who are working hardest are 
fully integrated into the scene; in Hunting, the men in charge of refresh-
ment and a poor hunter defending his catch from a dog frame the action of 
the noble riders and beasts, while in Fishing, a woman mending nets, two 
men dragging a net until their muscles bulge, a boatsman, and a fisher-
man occupy the center of the scene, which is framed this time by better-
dressed merchants and leisurely fishermen. Both scenes manage to convey 
a classical sensibility (Annibale’s later landscapes would take up biblical 
and mythological themes), but within a naturalistic framework. They also 
share strong horizontal movement as the actions of hunters and fishermen 
carry them to the left or right of center. Annibale has thus taken from 
Titian his coloring, his composition, and his view of nature as benevolent 
and innocent, and he has given us a composite view, achingly nostalgic and 
Arcadian, and confidently modern.
 In my view, Mahon’s assertion that the principles of selection alleg-
edly employed by the Carracci were commonly known and used by other 
painters does not bolster his subsequent claim that the charge of eclecti-
cism is misplaced. Eclectic methods of instruction were indeed prevalent 
in the academies, and eclectic theories of painting were widely circulated10; 
to disavow the Carracci’s knowledge of theory in order to recover their 
original reputation (based, as we have seen, on the very eclectic method 
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now considered so discreditable) seems profoundly misleading. In the 
debate on the eclecticism of seicento painting, we witness the emergence of 
a discourse simultaneously critical and innovative, retrospective and spec-
ulative. Nineteenth-century critics of the Carracci tend to repeat, while 
denigrating, their eclectic-critical methods. Those who saw in the artistic 
efforts of the Carracci a phenomenon more distinctive than mere imitation 
or simple influence may have been thus predisposed by a series of formula-
tions for coping with the disintegrative forces of coexistent romanticism 
(generally understood) and classicism; in other words, the eclecticism of 
seicento art represented an acceptable compromise between competing 
artistic ideologies.
Sir Joshua Reynolds and Eclectic Education
The history of the idea of eclecticism did not perish with the Carracci, 
nor did the eclectic instruction of young artists remain confined to their 
academy in Bologna. The man who would become the greatest promoter 
of eclectic education in Britain, Sir Joshua Reynolds, stood poised at the 
brink of a transformation in the arts that would overturn the centuries-old 
theory of imitation through selection on which his teaching was based.11 
Though his Discourses delivered before the Royal Academy from 1769 
to 1790 were, in John Ruskin’s words, “not well arranged, and not very 
recherché or original” (I:491), they constitute the major body of art theory 
in Britain with which nineteenth-century critics, including Ruskin, had to 
contend, and contain early arguments against nascent romanticism. Reyn-
olds aimed the Discourses first of all at the students of the newly formed 
Academy. In fulfilling this directive, the first president of the institution 
solidified the course of instruction set out by the prestigious Italian acad-
emies of art. The educational (and status-raising) function of the Academy 
having been firmly established by the Carracci and others, Reynolds had 
primarily to justify adherence to a well-worn path, to argue for the value 
of an eclectic system of education that was already being challenged in the 
eighteenth century by great artists who had broken the rules.12
 To convince students—and the public—that only an Academy could 
secure the progress of the arts, Reynolds promoted a theory of invention 
based on the careful and prolonged study of collected artistic achieve-
ment. A centralized institution, organized under royal patronage, offered 
the surest means for bringing together the greatest painters of the age 
as teachers and contributors of artworks, “to create a repository for the 
great examples of Art” (81): “These are the materials on which Genius 
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is to work, and without which the strongest intellect may be fruitlessly 
or deviously employed. By studying these authentic models, that idea of 
excellence which is the result of accumulated experience of past ages, may 
be at once acquired; and the tardy and obstructed progress of our prede-
cessors may teach us a shorter and easier way. The Student receives, at one 
glance, the principles which many Artists have spent their whole lives in 
ascertaining; and, satisfied with their effect, is spared the painful investi-
gation by which they came to be known and fixed” (II:81). In founding 
the Academy upon these eclectic principles, Reynolds seeks to engage the 
“accumulated experience of past ages” in the service of the future; indeed, 
as Quentin Bell points out, Reynolds’s primary innovation in the Discourses 
consists in his assertion that great painters, building upon “authentic mod-
els,” discover their own styles. Thus, we might view Reynolds’s academic 
project as a form of “creative eclecticism,” an enabling process of selection 
and imitation, rather than the limiting of artistic freedom in the service of 
absolutism as later critics, such as William Blake, would have it.13
 In Discourse II, Reynolds clearly outlines the process whereby the art-
ist, submitting himself to years of study, at last achieves creative indepen-
dence. In the first appearance of what will become one of his main tropes, 
Reynolds compares the acquisition of the mechanical skills of painting to 
that of the grammar of language. Beginning with the most basic skills, 
students would first learn to draw from the flat, then from the round. The 
human body was the subject of almost every study, and students had to 
copy noses, eyes, ears, and mouths, and then separate limbs and entire fig-
ures, from an accepted master such as Raphael. They would memorize 
proportions, the catalogue of human expressions, eventually learning light 
and shade and color, all from antique models. Lectures on anatomy and 
perspective, and the life class, would complete training in the grammar of 
the art, and “when the student’s mind had been so perfectly attuned to the 
beauties of antiquity that the imperfections of Nature would be automati-
cally corrected” (Bell 14), he would graduate to the second degree of profi-
ciency.
 The academies of art did not consider their educational mission con-
cluded until the student had mastered the historical canons of painting, 
sculpture, and architecture—“to learn all that has been known and done 
before his own time” (II:89). The middle period of an artist’s develop-
ment requires, for Reynolds, a sort of full-blown eclecticism. The student 
seeks out the best art works ever produced and discovers their outstanding 
qualities; before he is a master, he must become a critic and a scholar. The 
eclectic synthesis of all that is excellent in each of his models enables the 
student to produce, according to his talent, a superior work of art: “Those 
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perfections which lie scattered among various masters, are now united in 
one general idea, which is henceforth to regulate his taste, and enlarge his 
imagination. With a variety of models thus before him, he will avoid that 
narrowness and poverty of conception which attends a bigoted admira-
tion of a single master, and will cease to follow any favourite where he 
ceases to excel” (II:89). In the discourses that follow, Reynolds continually 
emphasizes the need for comparison and selection as the only sure means 
of avoiding deformity and exaggeration: “A man is as little likely to form 
a true idea of the perfection of the art, by studying a single artist, as he 
would be to produce a perfectly beautiful figure, by an exact imitation of 
any individual living model” (VI:163). This raises, of course, one of the 
problems attendant on an eclectic method—the tendency to deviate from 
nature in the pursuit of excellence; so it was not only the loss of originality 
that troubled critics such as Fuseli but also the loss of truth—a sacrifice that 
would be too great for one of Reynolds’s sharpest critics, John Ruskin.
 The third and final stage of the artist’s training requires still more 
discipline: moving beyond the combination of various excellences to the 
discrimination of incompatible styles. Reynolds in effect answers the crit-
ics of Carraccesque eclecticism who claimed that the Bolognese painters’ 
combination of elements of different styles created monstrous deformi-
ties, Frankenstein’s monster avant la lettre. Students of the RA would be 
trained in the art of “know[ing] how or what to choose, and how to attain 
and secure the object of [their] choice” (VI:160). Far from seeing the Car-
racci as servile imitators (their reputation had not yet suffered Romantic 
attack), Reynolds saw in their “liberal style of imitation” evidence of “men 
who extended their views beyond the model that lay before them, and 
have shown that they had opinions of their own, and thought for them-
selves, after they had made themselves masters of the general principles of 
their schools” (VI:165). In fact, Reynolds invokes the Carracci, especially 
Ludovico, as “model[s] for style in Painting” (II:96), praising his ability to 
take “only as much from each [school] as would embellish, but not over-
power, that manly strength and energy of style, which is his peculiar char-
acter” (V:139); more importantly, Reynolds credits the Carracci with laying 
the foundation of the Grand Style at their Accademia when they revived 
the example of Michelangelo (XV:326–27). As later critics have suggested, 
Reynolds might have been mounting a defense of his own methods and 
demonstrably imitative, eclectic portraits.
 The success of academic eclecticism depended, of course, on Reynolds’s 
belief that all truly great artists learn from the art of the past, that geniuses 
are not born, but made. Central to his refutation of Edward Young’s influ-
ential “Conjectures on Original Composition” (1759) was the notion that 
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“Invention, strictly speaking, is little more than a new combination of those 
images which have been previously gathered and deposited in memory: 
nothing can come of nothing: he who has laid up no materials, can produce 
no combinations” (II:91). Rather than relying on ineffable inspiration, the 
artistic genius sustains himself on “The daily food and nourishment [ . . . ] 
found in the great works of his predecessors” because “There is no other 
way for him to become great himself” (XII:273). Reynolds harshly refutes 
Young’s fashionable assertion that “genius is from heaven, learning from 
man” with practical knowledge: “It is very natural for those who are unac-
quainted with the cause of any thing extraordinary, to be astonished at the 
effect, and to consider it as a kind of magick” (VI:152). Only the “ignorant,” 
“from their entire inability to do the same at once,” could believe that great 
art is produced without effort (VI:152). While Reynolds acknowledges the 
power of imagination at work in his heroes, Raphael and Michelangelo, he 
continually emphasizes their diligent labor, the years of practice their work 
must have cost them. Convinced that “by imitation only, variety, and even 
originality of invention, is produced” (VI:154), Reynolds recommends that 
students follow Raphael’s example. Raphael’s first works reveal his devo-
tion to his master, Pietro Perugino, but, says Reynolds, he soon formed 
“higher and more extensive views” and “imitated the grand outline of 
Michael Angelo; he learned the manner of using colours from the works 
of Leonardo da Vinci, and Fratre Bartolomeo: to all this he added the con-
templation of all the remains of antiquity that were within his reach; and 
employed others to draw for him what was in Greece and distant places. 
And it is from his having taken so many models, that he became himself 
a model for all succeeding painters; always imitating, and always origi-
nal” (VI:164). Reynolds’s reading of Raphael echoes and explains Winck-
elmann’s assertion in Reflections: one becomes great—inimitable—only by 
imitating the ancients. These critical contemporaries would agree: it was 
Raphael’s eclecticism that made him great, and only a falling off from the 
study of the art of the past could have brought the Renaissance to a close 
and ushered in the degeneracy of art that we call Mannerism.
 Eighteenth-century critics such as Reynolds and Winckelmann would 
have seen in those deformed and exaggerated figures the operation of pure 
fantasy, of uncontrolled imagination. The opposite tendency, Reynolds felt, 
also had to be resisted: the Dutch painters produced exact copies of what-
ever appeared before their eyes, but in their servility to reality they made no 
appeal to the mind. And only by appealing to the intellect could painting 
achieve the status of a liberal art. The ascendancy of poetry over painting 
in the hierarchy of the arts had everything to do with the eclectic nature 
of literature compared with the mechanical nature of painting, and with 
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the fact that the production of great literature resulted from prolonged 
study of ancient models and the assimilation of an historical canon, while 
great painting (that is, works appealing to the eyes alone) could be pro-
duced by skilled copyists. In the academic view, painting could be neither 
a divine gift nor a mechanical trade. If painting were to become the equal 
of poetry, then its practitioners had to emulate the poets: Reynolds flatly 
declares, “He can never be a great artist, who is grossly illiterate” (VII:175). 
The store of humanistic learning had to be shared with artists who, in 
addition to mastering the mechanical part of the art and its supporting 
sciences, would be conversant in poetry, philosophy, history, and religion; 
they must be admitted into learned society, where their recreational read-
ing would be supplemented with brilliant conversation (VII:175); and they 
must travel in order to obtain the storehouse of images and ideas necessary 
for the creation of great art.
 One can easily imagine Reynolds’s paternal tone in Discourse XII 
when he addresses youthful art students about to embark on their first trip 
to Italy. Indeed, the Grand Tour was arguably a larger part of the human-
istic training than it was of the artistic. Polonius-like, he enumerates the 
careless habits to be corrected, the forms of inattention to be avoided, the 
dangers of seeing too much, and the necessity of nourishing the mind upon 
variety. At last he arrives at the central issue: “young Students should not 
presume to think themselves qualified to invent, till they [are] acquainted 
with those stores of invention the world already possesses” (XII:277). To 
this iteration of a familiar point Reynolds adds a warning against emu-
lating the Pittori improvvisatori whose spontaneous productions dazzle the 
eye and instead suggests beginning with an exercise called the Pasticcio. 
The student’s pastiche would “encompass the different excellencies which 
are dispersed in all other works of the same kind” (XII:278); not stopping 
there, the student would learn the art of selecting what is excellent in art 
and in nature (XII:279). The Pasticcio, while consistent with Reynolds’s 
eclectic program of education, raises the problem of the element of chance 
in shaping a synthesis of sources. In the introductory paragraphs of the 
twelfth discourse, Reynolds alludes briefly to a general condition of travel: 
“we must take what we can get, and when we can get it” (263). But how 
much more is this true of the process of canonization? How susceptible 
to chance is the selection of the models employed at the Academy itself? 
Though Reynolds never questions the classical norm on which he bases 
his teaching, the eclectic methods outlined in the preceding pages certainly 
could have led students to artworks and styles other than those selected by 
the Academy. Expansively, he admits that the artist must find the beauty 
in all ages and in all schools, in what is great and in what is little, in East 
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and in West (VI:170). Given these conditions, academic eclecticism would 
undermine, eventually, its own standards of imitation and invention, of 
what is perfect in art. Conceding that what is recognized as genius varies 
over time, Reynolds must have entertained some doubt that genius would 
always manifest itself as neoclassical.
 It is likely that Reynolds was aware of the dangers posed by an increas-
ing knowledge of the history of art, and must have guessed that the prob-
lem of creating (or rather choosing) a style to express the age could only 
be compounded by eclecticism. In order to stave off the threat of com-
peting aesthetic systems, the academies established standards of taste by 
promoting an internally coherent style. At first this had meant purging 
the excesses of the Baroque in an attempt to create a purer classical model. 
Selecting the most suitable models for imitation, the academies were able 
to produce a “grand style” or beau ideal that passed as universal. For Reyn-
olds in Discourse III, intellectual dignity and ideal beauty superior to what 
is found in nature define the Grand Style. With a gesture that sweeps away 
Dutch and Flemish and any merely imitative art, Reynolds avers that “a 
mere copier can never produce anything great” and that the “genuine 
painter [ . . . ] must endeavour to improve [mankind] by the grandeur of 
his ideas” (III:103). He proceeds to lay out the path to the Grand Style, a 
road, one might say, cleared of all its random growth and exhibiting only 
enormous landmarks in the form of past masters. As Reynolds repeat-
edly contends throughout the Discourses, the student must engage in a 
“laborious comparison” of these works so that he “acquires a just idea of 
beautiful forms; he corrects nature by herself, her imperfect state by her 
more perfect” (III:106). He learns to see nature through the eyes of the 
ancients and so arrive at a “central form [ . . . ] from which every deviation 
is deformity” (III:107). Though he admits that a variety of figures may be 
beautiful, none of them exhibits the highest perfection. In The Schools of 
Design, Bell agrees that the creation of a composite perfection was central 
to academic training. He recounts the oft-told story of Zeuxis, the Greek 
painter commissioned by the people of Crotona to paint Helen. In order to 
create an image of the legendary beauty, Zeuxis chooses the twelve most 
beautiful girls in town, makes nude studies of each, and eventually picks 
the five most beautiful models of the group. At last he combines their sepa-
rate features to make one figure more beautiful than any individual could 
be (Bell 3–4). Bell, who is favorably disposed to eclecticism, connects such 
a synthetic process with the cosmetic industry: “it is possible to imagine 
the beautification of a form through the readjustment of individual mem-
bers” (4). While most Romantic and post-Romantic critics would reject the 
destruction of organic unity in the individual human body, academicians 
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such as Reynolds regarded the elimination of accidents and deformities 
(in nature as well as in fashion) as the mission of an art addressed to the 
mind.
 In an essay on the Discourses typical of Romantic criticism, William 
Hazlitt exposes inconsistencies in Reynolds’s advocacy of the Grand Style 
and his belief in the power of diligent labor to produce great art. Hazlitt’s 
arguments in favor of the power of genius will be familiar: “all the great 
works of art have been the offspring of individual genius, either projecting 
itself before the general advances of society or striking out a separate path 
for itself; all the rest is but labour in vain” (127). The proof is in Reynolds’s 
pudding, Hazlitt claims, somewhat erroneously: does he not return contin-
ually to those originators who “unfold [ . . . ] new and exquisite powers of 
their own, of which the moving principle lay in the individual mind” (128)? 
So Hazlitt points to all those statements in which the academician notices 
the special genius of one artist or another, and argues that Reynolds is just 
leading his students on when he tells them that hard work will supply any 
deficiency in their natural talent. Much more complicated and important 
for the development of art criticism in the nineteenth century is Hazlitt’s 
contention that Reynolds’s precepts regarding the Grand Style are plainly 
flawed and illogical. Taking issue with the key passage in Discourse III, 
where Reynolds claims that “a mere copier of nature can never produce 
anything great,” Hazlitt poses an argument that Ruskin will expand in 
Modern Painters: Reynolds seems to discount the greatness of effect pos-
sible in nature herself, implying that she “is a heap of disjointed, discon-
nected particulars, a chaos of points and atoms” (Hazlitt 134–35). One of 
Reynolds’s own contemporaries, Edmund Burke, had suggested the extent 
to which a lack of clarity in atmospheric effects gives birth to the sublim-
est views in nature; but Reynolds was not very interested in landscape or 
nature generally because it seemed to him unintellectual, less likely to 
achieve the grandeur of Istoria—or to raise the status of his profession. 
As a recent editor of the Discourses, Pat Rogers, notes, Reynolds seems not 
to have been influenced by Burke’s aesthetic treatise and does not really 
attempt to integrate his famous distinction between the sublime and the 
beautiful into his theory of the Grand Style—a serious omission, and one 
that undoubtedly diminished Reynolds’s influence in the nineteenth cen-
tury.
 In this respect, landscape again makes for an interesting test of eclectic 
principles, as it did in the case of Annibale Carracci. In his 1993 essay “The 
Public Prospect and the Private View,” John Barrell attempts to reconnect 
assumptions about genre to their original context by considering the rise of 
landscape painting in terms of its ability to express public virtues. Taking 
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Reynolds’s comments on landscape as his starting point, where the aca-
demician asks whether landscape has the right to aspire so far as to reject 
depicting what painters call the “accidents of nature,” Barrell points out 
that landscape as a genre had usually been associated with private virtues. 
He summarizes two types of landscape representation that became domi-
nant in the eighteenth century. First, there was the panoramic landscape, 
which was the analogue of the social and the universal, and which is sur-
veyed, organized, and understood by disinterested public men who regard 
objects in the landscape in terms of their relations, and who are enabled 
to do this by their ability to classify and generalize. Second, there was its 
opposite, the occluded (or confined) landscape, belonging to the private 
man, whose experience is too narrow to permit him to abstract from it. 
The occluded view conceals the general view by concealing the distance; a 
characteristic image of this category would be a cottage within a stand of 
trees, whose larger setting appears only in spots through the foliage. For 
Barrell then, landscapes during this period are generally constructed as 
either private or public, and were understood to appeal to private or public 
interests respectively, or to two spheres in the life of a citizen.
 Landscape would first gain in authority as it catered to public inter-
ests. Like history painting, landscape now aimed to appeal to the broad 
and comprehensive vision, and the ability to abstract representative from 
actual nature that would become the chief qualification for citizenship 
(rather than a disposition to perform acts of public virtue). Reynolds was 
profoundly interested in how changing generic distinctions within paint-
ing would affect the status of artists. In his Fourth Discourse, Reynolds 
compares the trends in landscape painting on the Continent. The Dutch 
School, he argues, though adept at producing faithful portraits of particu-
lar places, should not be imitated by students who wish to achieve greatness 
in painting. By contrast, Claude Lorrain had achieved in his landscapes 
something akin to history painting by representing general nature and 
avoiding local detail: his truth is founded on the same principles as those 
by which the history painter achieves perfect form. Reynolds’s advocacy 
of ideal landscape makes sense in terms of Barrell’s argument outlined 
above. Even though Reynolds would admit to liking the more particular-
ized views of his contemporary Gainsborough, as the first president of the 
Royal Academy, Reynolds worked hard to raise the professional status of 
artists in general, and saw that the best way to achieve his goals for art 
would be to ally painting with literature and philosophy. In other words, 
the ideal landscape, informed as it was by literary precedents, provided a 
more certain route to professional acceptance. If a painter was obviously a 
scholar, then he was no longer a craftsman.
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 Throughout his discourses Reynolds acknowledges the tardiness of 
painting compared with its sister art, poetry. Painting must learn to appeal 
to the mind, rather than to the eye; that is why nature must be considered 
in the abstract, for particulars would only distract the eye. The painter, by 
studying the literature of all nations and periods, must divest himself of 
prejudices in favor of his age or country, which could lead him to depict 
the local and the temporary rather than the universal and timeless qualities 
of his subject.14 For a literary model of this process, Reynolds could look 
close to home. In Windsor-Forest (1713), Alexander Pope had described a 
particular place in language that elevated it to a representative type. See-
ing “order in variety,” Pope unified all the parts of the landscape by the 
principle of concordia discors. Undaunted by nature’s incredible variety and 
changeability, the poet made the particular details of the place allude to a 
larger narrative of progress from waste to plenty, and the expansion of a 
nation from the old world to the new.
 In spite of the persuasiveness of Reynolds’s arguments in the Dis-
courses, the seeds of doubt that would make artists permanently anxious 
about eclecticism had already taken root. Depending on the elimination 
of particularities and the “accidental” deformities of nature, the Grand 
Style’s separateness from nature would form the basis of Ruskin’s critique 
of academic authority in Modern Painters. Though Ruskin would even-
tually return in his Lectures on Art to something like Reynolds’s eclec-
tic outlook, he begins his career by tearing down the central theory of 
the Discourses, that in striving after perfection, the Grand Style reaches 
an intellectual dignity equal to the art of poetry, and in its appeal to the 
mind, raises humankind from a lowly condition. By contrast, Ruskin 
would argue that the Grand Style, which is eclectically constructed from 
nature and from the masters of the past, cannot mean anything in the pre-
sent age: “if we are to produce anything great, good, awful, religious, it 
must be got out of our own little island, and out of these very times, rail-
roads and all” (Works III:231). In the preface to the second edition, Ruskin 
attacks even more directly the idealizing ambition of academic painting. 
Painting something as it ought to be, rather than as it appears, is morally 
wrong, and he mounts his defense of modern landscape painting on the 
basis of its truthfulness; before Turner, the landscape painter attempted 
“to modify God’s works at his pleasure, casting the shadow of himself on 
all he sees, constituting himself arbiter where it is honour to be a disciple, 
and exhibiting his ingenuity by the attainment of combinations whose 
highest praise is that they are impossible” (III:25). The Grand Style dis-
played “clumsiness of combination,” and ultimately became a “monstrous 
creature,” opposed to nature. In attempting to perfect the forms of nature, 
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Ruskin complains, the painter has forgotten nature altogether—has left it 
out of the picture.
 Ruskin would overturn Reynolds’s understanding of perfection by 
referring it back to nature: “Now there is but one grand style, in the 
treatment of all subjects whatsoever, and that style is based on the perfect 
knowledge, and consists in the simple unencumbered rendering, of the 
specific characters of the given object, be it man, beast, or flower. Every 
change, caricature, or abandonment of such specific character is as destruc-
tive of grandeur as it is of truth, of beauty as of propriety” (III:25). Even 
while Ruskin rejects any effort to combine separate beauties, he does not 
altogether abandon the Platonic ideal of archetypal forms. The deep study 
of nature will bring the painter “perfect knowledge” of the specific char-
acter of every living thing, a character reaching perfection if not subject to 
accident or disease. Again demonstrating his debt to Reynolds, even as he 
breaks with his core values, Ruskin does not advocate the servile imitation 
of nature, such as he perceives in the Dutch School. He calls them “pro-
fessional landscapists” and “dextrous imitators of certain kinds of nature, 
remarkable usually for [their] perservering rejection of whatever is great, 
valuable, or affecting in the object studied” (III:188). He reacts to one of his 
contemporaries, Constable, much as Reynolds might have done, abhorring 
his “morbid preference” for low subjects, but respects his works for their 
honesty and originality, their manliness of manner. Ruskin cares nothing 
for a descriptive record of a place or a moment, but expects the landscape 
painting to provide him with a glimpse of God. Only by the incorporation 
of mystery, that obscurity he so loves in Turner, can a painter raise a “holy 
thought” in him. Ruskin thus agrees with Reynolds as to art’s mission—
the improvement of the spectator—but eclecticism in its crass assemblage 
of parts fails to capture the essential perfection of a unified creation.15 This 
tendency to infuse style with moral meaning would be Ruskin’s most 
enduring contribution to the history of art, and certainly the feature of his 
writing that helped to make architectural eclecticism a cultural problem.
X
For the early critics of the Carracci, and for academic artists across three 
centuries, eclecticism was not an accident but a necessity, not failure but 
success. Post-Romantic critics uncomfortable with the designation, and all 
that it implied of derivation and recipe mixtures, gradually made the term 
unusable in the history of art, at least through the middle decades of the 
twentieth century. The situation in architecture shared many of the same 
features, but with these significant differences. The awareness of eclecti-
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cism in architecture came later than it did in painting, around the turn of 
the nineteenth century, arising with the Battle of the Styles, which brought 
with it the consciousness of stylistic choice. There was no sustained period 
of acceptance—within a half-century the playfulness of “Gothick” had 
been supplanted by the serious search for a purer, unmixed Gothic. The 
professionalization of the architect naturally played its part in the quest for 
authenticity, bound as it was to expand knowledge of historical forms and 
styles and to create a demand for demonstrable expertise. Debates about 
architecture were inevitably more public than debates about painting, and 
tended to make the issue of style a moral one, an index of national char-
acter. Twentieth-century critics of Victorian architecture did not need to 
overturn the judgments of their predecessors in order to claim their aes-
thetic independence; indeed, when they wished to denigrate the built envi-
ronment of the previous century, they had only to invoke the angry critics 
who had been first on the scene. This is not to say that Victorian architec-
ture was derided solely for its eclecticism, but that eclecticism—especially 
naïve eclecticism—was symptomatic of a lack of progress in the arts, the 
dominance of capitalist values, and the loss of a faith that, in earlier ages, 
had underwritten great architecture.
 As J. Mordaunt Crook argues in The Dilemma of Style, choice has been 
at the root of architectural style, at least since the Renaissance, when it was 
first understood as “a conscious system of design, a visual code, a post- 
vernacular language of forms” (13). This transformation offered both free-
dom and the burden of choice—a burden that became heavier as the Vic-
torians’ “acute awareness of history clashed with the results of evolutionary 
thinking” (131). For some architects this meant trying to recover the line of 
development that had been severed with the rise of classicism by adapting 
Gothic to present uses, but even those architects who embraced a broader, 
synthetic eclecticism had to decide “what to ‘eclect’” (126). Eclecticism as 
idea and practice is often used to explain what John Summerson in 1968 
called “the problem of failure” in Victorian architecture. In accepting that 
it was “horribly unsuccessful” (“The Evaluation of Victorian Architec-
ture” 2), he is relying on “the documented self-criticism of the age itself”; 
to find a point of view from which it all makes sense (and succeeds) would 
be, he argues, a “fraud” (18). Anyone who looks at Victorian architecture, 
therefore, has to confront “the problem of failure,” which is directly trace-
able to the pervasive “doubt” of practitioners and critics in the period, to 
the ambiguities in their conception of architecture, especially the question 
of style: “Every Victorian building of any consequence is a statement of 
stylistic belief—either a belief in one style, or in the peaceful coexistence 
of styles (eclecticism), or in the efficacy of a mixed style” (6). Sir Joshua 
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Reynolds would have recognized in these latter-day, latitudinarian archi-
tects a little of his own prescription with respect to history: “To find excel-
lencies, however dispersed, to discover beauties, however concealed . . . can 
be the work only of him . . . who has extended his views to all ages and 
all schools” (VI:170). But Ruskin’s revulsion for the “monstrous creatures” 
of the Grand Style extended to the “accursed Frankenstein monster of, 
indirectly, [his] own making” (Works X:lvi). Of course, he was referring to 
the usually vulgar imitations of Gothic that had sprung up across England 
after the success of The Stones of Venice (1851–53). As Summerson reminds 
his readers, Ruskin never called for the revival of Gothic, but rather for 
something much harder to define—a new style that would mean the same 
as Gothic, would have the same integrity, both moral and aesthetic. In 
Stones of Venice, his plates were “illustrations of principle, not . . . things to 
copy” (9). Summerson says that Ruskin was looking for modernism, but 
that he did not know what it was. Out of this freedom grew a “latitudinar-
ianism” that was neither Gothic nor eclectic; I would rather describe the 
latitudinarians who looked to Ruskin as volitional eclectics who were self-
consciously mining what Reynolds might have termed “history’s diverse 
beauties” in order put together a new style; and while at first it might have 
looked like “Frankenstein’s monster,” by the end of the century Victorian 
architecture revealed a kind of hybrid beauty entirely its own.
A Thing to Dream of, Not to Build
Ruskin at Abbotsford
For most architectural historians the genealogy of the Gothic Revival in 
Great Britain is interwoven with Romantic literary culture, and popular 
literature is often blamed for the misdirection of national architecture dur-
ing the nineteenth century. Charles Eastlake, one of the movement’s early 
historians, wrote in 1872 that there had been three major influences on 
the Gothic Revival—literary, religious, and antiquarian—and that Wal-
ter Scott had been responsible for “awaken[ing] popular interest in a style 
which had hitherto been associated with ascetic gloom and vulgar supersti-
tion” (113). Drawing attention to the “romantic side of archaeology,” Scott, 
according to Eastlake, kept alive architecture’s “one solitary and flickering 
flame, [ . . . ] the Lamp of Memory” (115). In 1928 Kenneth Clark’s his-
tory of the Gothic Revival sought to correct and restrain Eastlake’s origi-
nal assessment of Scott’s importance.16 While giving a central place in his 
account to literary medievalism, Clark emphasizes that the Gothic Revival 
was well under way before Scott arrived on the scene, and grew out of the 
Part I: Toward an Age of Eclecticism

whole Romantic Movement. But it was indeed the revival of interest in 
national, medieval literature that gave rise to the architectural revival: “Lit-
erary men with no particular architectural bent had started a demand for 
Gothic which was largely satisfied by amateurs” (80). As Megan Aldrich 
points out in Gothic Revival, Scott’s Gothic pushed the Revival in a more 
realistic direction (140). His medievalism was to Walpole’s what Pugin’s 
Gothic was to Strawberry Hill. The eighteenth-century revival had been, 
as Clark admits, a hybrid, bred from classical tastes and “Gothick” fantasy. 
As Eastlake emphasized, Scott’s literary architecture formed part of the 
rich texture of his novels (113). His realistic depiction of character and set-
ting gave his readers a more substantial impression of medieval life, and 
made it, on some level, habitable. (Aldrich believes that the Eglinton Tour-
nament would never have occurred without the example of Ivanhoe.)
 In A Writer’s Britain, Margaret Drabble credits Scott with doing for 
Scotland what Wordsworth had done for the Lakes: “he praised her 
beauties, created a new vision, and encouraged the tourist trade. He also 
restored the country’s history and dignity” (171). With the publication of 
The Lady of the Lake in 1810, the enthusiasm for Scottish travel reached 
epidemic proportions. As Drabble relates, “On all the roads leading to the 
Trossachs was suddenly heard the rushing of many chariots and horse-
men. Inns were crowded to suffocation. Post-hire permanently rose. Every 
corner of that fine gorge was explored, and every foot of that beautiful 
loch was traversed by travellers carrying copies of the book in their hands, 
[ . . . ] repeating passages from it with unfeigned rapture” (172). In his nov-
els Scott “covered the country from coast to coast,” and the tourists fol-
lowed him everywhere he went. Even Queen Victoria pursued the pleasure 
of Scott and Scotland by touring the scenes of the poems and novels, and 
finally purchasing Balmoral as her country retreat. As Ian Ousby points 
out in Literary Britain and Ireland, Scott “wrote at a time when the taste for 
wild landscape and for picturesque evidence of the medieval past was in 
the ascendant, and he gave this taste a local form and shape” (346). Above 
all, Scott made Scottish history fashionable, and set his seal most firmly 
upon its medieval phase when he purchased Abbotsford (a farmhouse with 
classical portico) in 1812 and began to refashion it according to his vision of 
the Gothic, demolishing the original house by 1822.
 Located near ancient Melrose Abbey, Abbotsford “satisfied Scott’s 
ambition of becoming a laird, the founder of a dynasty, and the life he led 
there smacked more of the country gentleman than the relentlessly busy 
novelist” (Ousby 348). Over the years Scott transformed the house into a 
Scottish baronial mansion and filled it with arms, armor, heraldic devices, 
and a diverse collection of mementos of the famous. In 1824 Scott wrote to 
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a friend, “You should come and see Abbotsford which as Augustus said of 
Rome (I love magnificent comparisons) I found of Brick and have left of 
marble. It is really a very handsome old manorial looking place both with-
out and within, with a fine library, a Gothick hall of entrance and what 
not. But in truth it does not brook description any more than it is amenable 
to the ordinary rules of architecture—it is as Coleridge says ‘A thing to 
dream of not to tell’” (qtd. in Daiches 92). Scott’s entire career seems to 
underscore the intimacy between historical romance and the archaeologi-
cal pursuit of history, to make history a “thing to dream of.” In his seminal 
essay “Three Kinds of Historicism,” Alan Colquhoun clarifies the “con-
fusion” surrounding the term “historicism” in this period. It is “a theory 
that all sociocultural phenomena are historically determined and that all 
truths are relative”; it is “a concern for the institutions and traditions of the 
past”; it is “the use of historical forms” (3). As a theory of history, an atti-
tude, and an artistic practice, the Gothic Revival embodies all three kinds 
of historicism. The Revival could not exist without the new theory of his-
tory that saw all time periods as distinct and the artifacts they left behind 
as belonging to them in an organic sense; it could not prosper without an 
attitude of reverence and humility toward the past, and a desire to preserve 
its remains; finally, it could not become a movement if artists did not try to 
make the past live again in the present.
 Ruskin and his contemporaries quickly realized that gathering up the 
fragments of the past with an eye toward rebuilding led inevitably to eclec-
ticism, both in the coexistence of different styles and in the mixing of styles 
from different periods and countries. The growth of these hybrid, eclectic 
“monsters” was, to paraphrase Bruno Latour, a consequence of the mod-
ern effort of classification (to which Ruskin himself contributed); in this 
case, the antiquarianism of the Gothic Revival and its popularization in lit-
erature, painting, and architecture were necessarily at odds, but they inevi-
tably co-evolved. As Colquhoun puts it, “historical thought [ . . . ] clearly 
revert[s] to eclectic practice” (12) when it sets up one period as a paradigm, 
as nineteenth-century historicism did with Gothic. An indelible feature of 
modernity, historicism exists at war with itself, longing to bring the past to 
life, and then despising its own creations.
 Yet reproduction or imitation of the desired object had been a salient 
feature of medievalism since the eighteenth century. The antiquarian Hor-
ace Walpole had his Gothic Revival house, Strawberry Hill, and his Gothic 
romance, The Castle of Otranto; his contemporary William Beckford built 
his Gothic dream house, Fonthill Abbey, and wrote his neomedieval- 
orientalist fantasy, Vathek; and Walter Scott began his career by collecting 
traditional ballads (and writing some better-than-fair imitations), carried 
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on by writing a slew of historical novels including Ivanhoe; and, when he 
had amassed (almost) enough funds, began transforming Abbotsford into 
a medieval castle.
 Most visitors to Walter Scott’s mansion at Abbotsford considered it the 
perfect outward expression of the famous author’s mind. John Ruskin’s 
1838 letter to John Claudius Loudon records a very different experience. 
At this time, Ruskin was writing a series of articles for Loudon’s Architec-
tural Magazine on “The Poetry of Architecture.” This early work already 
hinted at Ruskin’s later preoccupations with nature and authenticity, and 
art as the expression of Zeitgeist. But this first project was also explic-
itly touristic in nature, composed of leisurely pieces meant to delight and 
inform armchair travelers. The ambitious young man—he was only 19 at 
this time—had plans for a further series on “The Homes of the Mighty,” 
in which Scott’s mansion would appear as the first number. Traveling to 
Abbotsford with this project in mind, Ruskin found that Scott’s dream 
house would not make a suitable subject for one of his essays; he was there-
fore not an uncritical tourist but a desiring subject possessed with a long-
ing that Abbotsford could not satisfy. He might have assumed, too, that 
his visit to the author’s house would give him access to the space of the 
Waverley novels consumed in his youth. In his search for this authentic 
experience he was disappointed; but, as Michael Brooks has written, this 
was the first important step for Ruskin in recognizing that his beloved 
Gothic architecture would never be successfully translated into a modern 
setting (13). Instead of finding the embodiment of the literary past, Ruskin 
found a modern, eclectic monument. His bitterness is audible in the let-
ter to Loudon: “Had Abbotsford one point about it deserving of praise, 
or even admitting of toleration—or had it shown the slightest evidence of 
the superintendence of that mind whose plaything, whose sucking coral, 
it had been—the case would have been different; but it does not—and 
what purpose could it possibly serve to endeavour or pretend to cast a stain 
upon a part of Scott’s reputation, insignificant enough, it is true, but which 
might perhaps give pain to some of those whose affections are gathered in 
his memory, and which, while it would have been daring to have hurled 
it at the light of his living name, it would be only base to cast upon the 
marble of his sepulchre?” (Works I:16). In this letter Ruskin both denies the 
connection between the house and the man (he does not see the “slightest 
evidence of that mind whose plaything it had been”) and affirms it when 
he concludes that attacking Abbotsford would be like “pointing out the 
deformity of his limb or triumphing over the one weakness which was the 
cause of his ruin and his death” (I:16). Blaming Abbotsford for bringing 
Scott to the point of bankruptcy in 1826 and for hastening his death, Ruskin 
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regards the house as he would any destructive vice. An air of compulsive-
ness hangs about the place where no sign of discrimination, of “superin-
tendence,” is visible. The garden is classical, an Italian fountain attaches to 
a baronial gateway, the house commences with “a horrible-looking dun-
geon keep”; worst of all, the grand front “is a splendid combination of the 
English baronial, the old Elizabethan, and the Melrose Gothic—a jumble 
of jagged and flanky towers, ending in chimneys, and full of black slits 
with plaster mouldings, copied from Melrose, stuck all over it” (I:17). This 
place of defense, as Ruskin calls it, indicating his displeasure at seeing both 
military and ecclesiastical architecture appropriated for a dwelling place, 
is “fitted up as if it were as large as the Louvre” (I:17). Ruskin is struck 
by the copy of an arch from the cloisters at Melrose: “This arch, designed 
for raising the mind to the highest degree of religious emotion, charged 
with the loveliest carving you can imagine, and in its natural position com-
bining most exquisitely with the heavenward proportions of surrounding 
curves, has been copied by Scott in plaster, and made a fireplace” (I:17). 
For Ruskin this misuse of the sacred arch of the Gothic cathedral in the 
domestic hearth proves “that Scott, notwithstanding all his nonsense about 
moonlight at Melrose, had not the slightest feeling of the real beauty and 
application of Gothic architecture” (I:17).
 By the time he is writing of Scott as “the great representative of the 
mind of the age in literature” in Modern Painters III (1856), Ruskin clearly 
has had time to ponder the relationship between Scott’s literary genius and 
his genius for living in the nineteenth century. In his chapter “Of Mod-
ern Landscape,” Ruskin works hard to justify his elevation of Scott to the 
pantheon of Homer, Dante, and Shakespeare. His argument depends on 
establishing Scott’s modernity, which he does by delineating the charac-
teristics of modern landscape painting, and then tracking them in Scott’s 
work. His comparative study of Greek, medieval, and modern landscape 
art leads Ruskin to conclude that the moderns are expected to take plea-
sure in “things which momentarily change or fade; and to expect utmost 
satisfaction and instruction from what it is impossible to arrest, and dif-
ficult to comprehend” (V:317). Ruskin finds evidence of this “triumph in 
mutability” in the modern obsession with clouds, a preoccupation that sug-
gests, metaphorically, the loss of belief in God. He writes, “[M]uch of the 
instinct, which, partially developed in painting, may be now seen through-
out every mode of exertion of mind,—the easily encouraged doubt, eas-
ily excited curiosity, habitual agitation, and delight in the changing and 
the marvellous, as opposed to the old quiet serenity of social custom and 
religious faith,—is again deeply defined in those few words, the ‘dethron-
ing of Jupiter,’ the ‘coronation of the whirlwind’” (V:318). The worship of 
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wind and clouds—of chance—betrays ignorance, perhaps willful, perhaps 
endemic, of stable facts. As he does throughout his entire corpus, Ruskin 
draws upon the explanatory power of Greek mythology and culture. Refer-
ring to the Clouds of Aristophanes as the only serious study of the subject 
in the ancient world, Ruskin borrows the poet’s conclusions: “[clouds] are 
‘great goddesses to idle men’”; “whoso believes in their divinity must first 
disbelieve in Jupiter, and place supreme power in the hands of an unknown 
god ‘Whirlwind’”; this god makes his disciples “‘to speak ingeniously con-
cerning smoke’” (V:318). The modern age is marked, as no other has ever 
been, by the pervasiveness of unbelief. The love of fog, clouds, smoke, and 
somber colors in modern landscape painting suggests to Ruskin a darkness 
of heart caused by the loss of faith. On the whole Ruskin believes that the 
modern age is properly called the Dark Age, compared to the bright Mid-
dle Ages, because “On the whole, these are much sadder ages than the early 
ones; not sadder in a noble and deep way, but in a dim wearied way—the 
way of ennui and jaded intellect, and uncomfortableness of soul and body” 
(V:321). The positive valence of modern uncertainty is the love of liberty 
and wildness; it is levity, even profanity, before nature; it is the romantic 
love of beauty, which the moderns find in history or nature, but never in 
themselves.
 For Ruskin, Scott exhibits, more than any other modern writer, this 
strange mixture of the “elements of progress and decline” (V:327). There 
are other poets greater than he, whose genius belongs more to the next 
age, but Scott’s genius is peculiarly of the moment. First, Ruskin claims, 
“Nothing is more notable or sorrowful in Scott’s mind than its incapacity 
of steady belief in anything” (V:336). For proof Ruskin takes Scott’s ambiv-
alence toward the supernatural and toward Catholicism (an attitude typi-
cal of Gothic novelists such as Ann Radcliffe). He is Presbyterian, Ruskin 
says, because that is the most sensible thing to be when one wishes to live 
in Edinburgh, even though he finds Roman Catholicism “more pictur-
esque.”17 Second, Scott has the weakness of “looking back, in a romantic 
and passionate idleness, to the past ages, not understanding them all the 
while, nor really desiring to understand them” (V:336). This is the most 
serious charge Ruskin levels against his childhood hero. For many Victori-
ans Scott was the first poet whose use of history had been in the service of 
realism, and not merely as a colorful backdrop. He had also been the first 
in literature (as Georg Lukács has argued in The Historical Novel) to link 
social customs to historical development. Ruskin, however, does not see 
Scott’s treatment of historical material as anything but interested. His best 
characters and scenes are “sketched from nature,” but, Ruskin contends, 
“his romance and antiquarianism, his knighthood and monkery, are all 
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false, and he knows them to be false; does not care to make them earnest; 
enjoys them for their strangeness, but laughs at his own antiquarianism, 
all through his third novel,—with exquisite modesty indeed, but with total 
misunderstanding of the function of an Antiquary. He does not see how 
anything is to be got out of the past but confusion [ . . . ]” (V:337). Ruskin is 
obviously bothered by what he considers Scott’s carelessness toward his his-
torical material (specifically his lack of understanding of architecture), and 
he goes on to reiterate his experience of Abbotsford, to make the point that 
Scott is representative of his age in his ignorance about art. Having only a 
“confused love of Gothic architecture,” Scott cannot “tell the worst from 
the best, and built for himself perhaps the most incongruous and ugly pile 
that gentlemanly modernism ever designed” (V:338). For Ruskin, Abbots-
ford embodies Scott’s modernity in its “mingling of reverence with irrev-
erence” (V:338). By misusing the arch from Melrose Abbey, Scott shows an 
attitude to history that Ruskin has begun to reject: that we can own history, 
consume it indiscriminately. Scott the “pure modern” (as Ruskin calls him) 
“admires, in an equally ignorant way, totally opposite styles” (V:338). Scott 
is eclectic, in the common usage, irreverent even as he is sorrowful, desir-
ing intimacy with a more colorful past that is gone forever. Ruskin instinc-
tively felt, and tried hard to justify his opinion, that Scott’s novels—and 
even his home at Abbotsford—were “adequate” expressions of the age in 
which they were produced, largely because of their eclectic historicism.18
 The fact that Scott’s eclecticism made him essentially, supremely mod-
ern did not, however, lead Ruskin to accept eclectic historicism as the way 
forward in architecture. It was inorganic, and often ignorant; it falsified 
the architectural record; it threatened to extinguish the lamp of mem-
ory. But it was only many years after his visit to Abbotsford that Ruskin 
became truly convinced that Gothic architecture was a thing to dream of, 
and not to build—when he decided that his writing on architecture, in 
assisting the revival of Gothic, had done more to degrade, than to exalt, 
the original. He had made people of varying abilities and insight long for 
what he described, to long, as he and Scott had done, for the chance to 
inhabit a medieval world. Eclecticism was essentially romantic, yes; but 
it was also always acting—playing a part rather than being in time. This 
made Scott’s choice of Gothic an ethical one. It also exposed a tension in 
the period about the proper uses of the past that would not be resolved 
until the end of the century.
 It is significant that another of Ruskin’s idols, Turner, for whom he 
wrote Modern Painters, became the most famous illustrator of Scott. In 
1838, the year of Ruskin’s visit, Turner produced a watercolor of Abbots-
ford. The Gothic Revival mansion is hazily, though distinctly, drawn 
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against a hill in the right of the picture, its towers mimicking the forms 
of trees and rocks. The scene is one of integration, even reconciliation: 
humans in harmony with animals in the foreground, architecture in har-
mony with external nature. Turner’s aesthetic modernity is proven by his 
sympathy with Scott, in a way that might have pleased even that finicky 
tourist, Ruskin.
The “Problem of Failure”
Eclectic Revivals in Architecture
At the same time that John Ruskin was expressing, privately, his dismay at 
Scott’s eclecticism, A. W. N. Pugin, perhaps the most notorious propagan-
dist of the Gothic Revival, who had already converted to Roman Catholi-
cism in order to align his religious and aesthetic values, was making the 
choice of style, very publicly, a moral issue. In Contrasts (1836) he took on 
the entire classical inheritance and the Protestant Reformation that, in 
his view, came along with it. What neoclassicists deemed the elevation of 
taste should have been condemned for what it was, the expression of mod-
ern unbelief: “Almost all the researches of modern antiquaries, schools of 
painting, national museums and collections, have only tended to corrupt 
taste and poison the intellect, by setting forth classic art as the summit of 
excellence, and substituting mere natural and sensual productions in place 
of the mystical and divine” (16). As Pugin recognized, moreover, the mere 
collecting of things did not confer understanding or belief. A society seek-
ing to recover its faith in God by building Gothic churches was doomed to 
fail, because only faith could create such enduring monuments. Religious 
ideas and ceremonies had always had the profoundest influence on the 
development of style, because style was the outward expression of inner 
faith. Therefore, Christianity had found its perfect expression in pointed 
architecture. If “the architecture of the nineteenth century [was] that 
extraordinary conglomeration of classic and modern styles peculiar to the 
day” (v), then it could not express a belief in anything higher than having 
the liberty or the means to choose. Patrons request what they like or what 
they believe will convey their status to others, and that is what architects 
build.
 Pugin strikes against this laissez-faire tendency of modern architecture 
in his “Illustration of the Practise of Architecture in the 19th Century on 
New Improved and Cheap Principles.” Arranged as a collection of adver-
tisements, it satirizes various aspects of the profession, including the spread 
of amateurism that allowed patrons to dictate to designers: “Shortly will 
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be published Architecture Made Easy, or Every Man His Own Architect 
by which Gentlemen Amateurs May Easily Acquire Every Information 
Respecting Design and Practice.” He ridicules public lectures on architec-
ture that promote outlandish styles such as “Mechanicks Institute, A Lec-
ture on Antideluvian, Babylonian, Greek, Roman and Gothic Architecture 
by Mr. Wash Plasterer” or that gloat over the mechanization of design as in 
“Mechanicks Institute, A Lecture on a New Designing Machine Capable 
of Making 1000 Changes with the Same Set of Ornaments by A Composi-
tion Maker.” These mock-lectures highlight for Pugin what had become 
a central problem in the profession: since neither the architects nor their 
patrons had any allegiance to a particular style—proof that they did not 
possess the religious faith Pugin believed ought to underwrite any national 
style of architecture—British architecture could never be more than a 
mishmash of borrowed styles bearing the imprints of vanished believers. 
Architects bragged that they could design “Buildings of Every Descrip-
tion [ . . . ] Gothic or Grecian on Moderate Terms” and such architectural 
freaks as
A Moorish Fish Market with a Literary Room Over an Egyptian Marine 
Villa
A Castelated Turnpike Gate
A Gin Temple in the Baronial Style
A Dissenting Chapel in the Plain Style to Serve Occasionally for a Lecture 
or Reading Room
A Monument to Be Placed in Westminster Abbey—a Colossal Figure in 
the Hindoo Style Would Be Preferred and No Regard Need be Paid 
to Locality
A Saxon Cigar Divan. (Contrasts)
The principal targets of Contrasts are well known—the Renaissance and 
the Reformation—but Pugin’s diagnosis of what was ailing modern archi-
tecture extends to the democratization of taste. While most of his work 
attacks the decadent, sensual, and classical taste of the upper classes, he 
recognizes another threat from below—the indiscriminate mixing of styles 
by the newly wealthy and partially educated. The architectural freaks in 
Pugin’s list were meant to outrage and even disgust his readers, but the 
attack on eclecticism was less likely to persuade than were his illustrations 
of medieval and modern cities and institutions (the “contrasts”). By expos-
ing the weakness of a nation in which belief no longer dictates the choice 
of style, he also forged a connection between style and belief that would 
trump for many the pleasure of having a choice.
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 While Pugin’s Contrasts is properly a work of the Battle of the Styles 
(Greek versus Gothic), to which the satirical attack on professional eclecti-
cism is secondary, his most important successor, Ruskin, eventually moved 
beyond the morality of the styles to an examination of what it means to have 
a choice—the only article of faith that Pugin could discover in nineteenth-
century architecture. Asked by the citizens of the northern industrial city 
of Bradford to assist them in choosing a style for their new Exchange, 
Ruskin begins his 1864 lecture “Traffic” by informing his audience that 
he cannot speak about their new Exchange because he does not care about 
it. Worse yet, he cannot care about it because they do not. They may be 
about to spend £30,000 for an imposing new building, but they mean noth-
ing at all by it: “[You] think you may as well have the right thing for your 
money. You know there are a great many odd styles of architecture about; 
you don’t want to do anything ridiculous; you hear of me, among others, 
as a respectable man-milliner; and you send for me, that I may tell you the 
leading fashion; and what is, in our shops, for the moment, the newest and 
sweetest thing in pinnacles” (Works XVIII:434). Like the eclectic patrons 
scorned by Pugin, these industrialists can afford to purchase whatever 
style they choose, and they are acutely aware that they do, in fact, have a 
choice. Ruskin’s savage tone and outright dismissal of any good intention 
behind inviting him to speak proceed from his unshakeable Romantic con-
viction that “architecture is the expression of national life and character” 
(XVIII:434). Merely asking the question “which style?” betrays the disease 
in a nation in which already several styles vie for ascendance. “I notice that 
among all the new buildings which cover your once wild hills, churches 
and schools are mixed in due, that is to say, in large proportion, with your 
mills and mansions; and I notice also that the churches and schools are 
almost always Gothic, and the mansions and mills are never Gothic. May I 
ask the meaning of this? for, remember, it is peculiarly a modern phenom-
enon. When Gothic was invented, houses were Gothic as well as churches; 
and when the Italian style superseded the Gothic, churches were Italian 
as well as houses. [ . . . ] But now you live under one school of architec-
ture, and worship under another” (XVIII:440). For Ruskin this associa-
tion of style and function, far from indicating a reverence for the space of 
worship, rather indicates that they “have separated [their] religion from 
[their] life” (XVIII:440). By making Gothic the exclusive style of churches, 
but rarely choosing to employ it in other contexts, the citizens of Brad-
ford appear to make religion a surface matter only, not something shot all 
through the fabric of life. The separation further implies that the Sunday 
Gothic-church-goers do not believe that their houses, factories, and hills are 
sacred, too: “in calling your churches only ‘holy,’ you call your hearths and 
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homes ‘profane’” (XVIII:442). Underlying this typology of style, Ruskin 
recognized a convenient compartmentalization of values; on Sundays, we 
believe and act according to these Christian values, and during the week, 
we believe and act according to these economic values.
 Unfortunately for Ruskin, those who heard his lecture thought he 
meant they ought to choose Gothic, in order to affirm their faith, missing 
the vitally important distinction “do you mean to build as honest Chris-
tians or as honest infidels?” (XVIII:443). The eclectic architecture of the 
nineteenth century by its very nature could never proclaim a “common 
purpose”; having a choice only institutionalized doubt. To demonstrate 
effectively the universality of his claim that all great architecture results 
from great religion, Ruskin identifies the three great religions that have 
underwritten the three great European styles: the Greek worship of the 
God of wisdom and power, the medieval worship of the God of judg-
ment and consolation, and the Renaissance worship of the God of pride 
and beauty (XVIII:445). All of these having passed, he argues, the Eng-
lish have now supplied a fourth deity of their own: the “Goddess of Get-
ting-on” or “Britannia of the Market” (XVIII:448). They have a nominal 
religion, Christianity, and an actual religion, capitalism, with its goddess 
of the marketplace, to whom all “great architectural works are, of course, 
built” (XVIII:448): “It is long since you built a great cathedral; and how 
you would laugh at me if I proposed building a cathedral on the top of 
these hills of yours, to make it an Acropolis! But your railroad mounds, 
vaster than the walls of Babylon; your railroad stations, vaster than the 
temple of Ephesus, and innumerable; your chimneys, how much more 
mighty and costly than cathedral spires! your harbour-piers; your ware-
houses; your exchanges!—all these were built to your great Goddess of 
‘Getting-on’; and she has formed, and will continue to form, your architec-
ture, as long as you worship her; and it is quite vain to ask me how to tell 
you how to build to her; you know far better than I” (XVIII:448). Apart 
from the revival styles with their confused attempts to declare allegiance 
to the values of the past, Victorian architecture expressed for the most part 
its faith in profit and progress, and the practical values of getting ahead 
in life by any means necessary. The revived styles of the Greek, medieval, 
and Renaissance gods could be subsumed, as Pugin recognized, under 
the values of commercial culture and would indeed be employed as the 
signs and tokens of success, piety, fidelity, patriotism, liberty, democracy; 
but for Pugin and Ruskin, the very coexistence of these competing deities 
meant that none of the revived styles could truly express the age, because 
the values each expressed would always be in conflict—and no clever rep-
resentation of belief could supply its lack. Eclecticism was thus entirely at 
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odds with the values of the Gothic Revival, as represented by its moralists, 
because it sought to resolve conflict and to preserve the best parts of the 
past for the future, rather than acknowledging that they constituted con-
tradictory views of life.
 In their effort to reestablish a single style for the national expression 
that was architecture, aesthetic purists such as Pugin failed to understand 
that the majority of people would always remake any historical style in 
their own image, as Sir Walter Scott did, never allowing it to express one 
idea only. Like Pugin, the Gothic Revivalist George Gilbert Scott blamed 
the Civil War for breaking up national traditions and hastening the uni-
form adoption of classical styles; but his recommendation that Gothic—as 
“the style whose traditions have the strongest possible claims upon our 
affections”—replace classicism ignored the fact that architects would be 
replacing one imported style with another (6–7). Choosing Gothic over 
Greek was still choosing. And by the end of the century, everyone agreed 
that Gothic was a dead style, which survived only in eclecticism: Gothic 
had become “one ingredient in an ever-evolving eclecticism” (Crook 160). 
Disillusioned Goth J. P. Seddon complained, “Eclecticism! Eclecticism! 
What horrors have been perpetrated in thy euphonious name” (qtd. in 
Crook 179). J. D. Sedding’s diagnosis was more precise: “What we call Vic-
torian architecture is nothing in fact but a retrospective art, an art of pla-
giarism and odds and ends . . . historic art made histrionic” (qtd. in Crook 
180). It was the same charge of inauthenticity that Ruskin had leveled at 
Walter Scott, which pointed to a lingering crisis of identity. The organic 
relationship between style and nation once taken for granted had been lost, 
and that was what rankled most. As Sedding put it, Victorian architec-
ture was “composed of what naturalists call ‘illegitimate crosses’” (qtd. in 
Crook 180). Even when it was intentionally designed, eclectic architecture 
continued to be regarded as monstrous and unnatural, or as histrionic and 
frivolous.
 Balancing the unease about eclecticism, naïve or volitional, was the 
emergence of a new (debased) “native” architecture sprouting like mush-
rooms out of every speculator’s suburb. It was ugly, practical, and cheap: 
the architecture of commercial competition. The only real architecture 
we have, William Morris acknowledged in “The Revival of Architec-
ture” (1888), is laboriously eclectic. Thoughtful architects realized that an 
exotic Gothic style would not thrive in the nineteenth century: the eco-
nomic system was incompatible, and would not allow workers to express 
their individuality; and most builders would opt for cheaper, mass- 
produced materials. So the revivalists would try a Gothic of slightly later 
date, always thinking to get closer to the “spirit of the age” the later they 
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chose to dig for style. It was not a crazy idea, but it should have pointed 
out the essential problem with Revival styles: they did indeed belong to 
their ages, and the saddest thing about the nineteenth century—but also 
its compensatory gift, Morris thought—was its awareness of history. Like 
Hardy’s Laodiceans, they all knew too much; they could not invent, but 
could only adapt—the debate on architectural style had made this clear. 
Ruskin’s essay on “The Nature of Gothic” marked the beginning of the 
end of the Revival for Morris, by making the contrast between the nine-
teenth century and the fourteenth century so great that it was obviously 
impossible to bridge the gap. In sharp contrast to eclectics such as Mor-
ris, James Fergusson, in the History of the Modern Styles of Architecture 
(1891), despaired of their ever matching the forms and tendencies of their 
art to the greatness of their engineering. Whether in the revivalist or the 
modernist camp, most critics shared the conviction that nineteenth-cen-
tury architecture went horribly wrong when it revived historical styles; 
this revulsion only deepened as ever-cheaper and less-authentic imitations 
spread across the landscape.
 The aesthetic revisionism that had commenced with the Gothic Revival 
of the eighteenth century was brought to fruition in 1834 when the Brit-
ish government called for a competition to rebuild the destroyed Houses 
of Parliament and asked only for Gothic or Elizabethan designs. Their 
reasons were compelling: the new buildings would be on the site of the 
ancient Palace of Westminster, and could incorporate what remained of it; 
they would also be close to Westminster Abbey, one of the great medieval 
monuments; and, finally, Gothic was thought to be a truly English style 
and thus would best represent the nation to the world (Clark 108–21). With 
this grand gesture, the competition signaled the end of the dominance of 
varieties of classicism across the spectrum of English culture. Though the 
disciples of Gothic would attempt a takeover of style as complete as Neo-
classicism had once enjoyed, never again would any style of architecture, 
painting, or the decorative arts achieve such ubiquity.
 Several factors contributed to the end of the tyranny of a single style. 
While the confrontation of Gothic and Greek styles had energized sup-
porters on both sides, moderates found a productive, if controversial, 
middle road. By selecting elements from various historical styles, from 
the beautiful and the sublime, the ideal and the natural, architects satis-
fied an apparently contradictory desire for individual freedom within 
the social order. “Picturesque,” the peculiar growth of the Revolutionary 
period, exemplifies this eclectic aim to reconcile cultural extremes. In its 
most popular forms the picturesque aesthetic exhibited the best qualities of 
the new moderate liberal outlook, what was termed in French politics the 
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juste milieu or middle course. For many intellectuals of the day, the eclectic 
juste milieu was less a philosophical system than a sensibility and an aes-
thetic. In his study of the French painter Thomas Couture, Albert Boime 
emphasizes that the artist under the influence of eclecticism wished not to 
overthrow classicism but to infuse it with passion and imagination by look-
ing everywhere for inspiration and meaning (16): “Nothing is given but 
everything is assembled (and open potentially to reassembly). The eclectic 
borrows variously and pieces together representative elements in another 
place. All ideas in this system have value not by virtue of any single writer 
or thinker, but by virtue of their ready-made distinctiveness and capacity 
to be reconciled as an ensemble” (22). In this view the styles of the past 
and of other countries were equally available for incorporation into living 
works of art, an art that would express a new relationship to history, to 
country, to colony—an art tolerant, open, and already meaningful.
 Coming only two years after the Great Reform Bill, the rebuilding of 
Westminster in accordance with popular taste marked the opening up of 
the rarefied realms of personal style and the fine arts to the middle classes. 
As the knowledge of historical and foreign styles increased through pub-
lic museums, exhibitions, pamphlets, and periodicals, the newly empow-
ered classes gained access to the intricacies of the languages of style—to a 
vocabulary that could be deployed in self-representation. The picturesque 
developed into a complicated, eclectic, aesthetic mode whose elements 
were easily adapted to differing economic conditions.
 No architect was more successful than John Claudius Loudon in dis-
seminating the picturesque at all levels of British society. Throughout his 
life, Loudon was preoccupied by the two fundamental questions of his 
profession: use and beauty. Initially a disciple of Uvedale Price (author of 
Essay on the Picturesque, one of the most important treatises on the subject), 
he adapted the principles of landscape painting as guides for designing 
and laying out real landscape. But he had also “imbibed the principles of 
utility” from Bentham, and he liberalized Price’s teachings by taking into 
account the needs of those cottagers whose dwellings had been appropri-
ated (and neglected) as elements of picturesque scenery (Simo 6). Accord-
ing to his biographer, Melanie Louise Simo, Loudon believed that true 
taste in the British rural style should be founded on the best of indigenous 
cottages, castles, and villas; but his Encyclopedia of Cottage, Farm, and Villa 
Architecture, which went through numerous editions during the century 
after its initial publication in 1833, presented designs that showed him to 
be impartial on the question of style. The fitness of the style—its charac-
teristic elements designed for particular uses—was more important than 
its being Gothic or Greek.
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 The first section of the Encyclopedia offers designs of “Cottage Dwell-
ings in Various Styles.” Alongside the numerous Gothic and Italianate or 
classical designs, Loudon gives space to German Swiss, Elizabethan or 
Old English, Indian Gothic, and Chinese. Many of the designs are hybrid 
creations, but Loudon accepts even these awkward contributions into the 
Encyclopedia, as long as the architect has made the house fit for living in. 
For example, in his Remarks to Design XIX Loudon wonders, “What 
then, is the style attempted? Those who have viewed the buildings of 
all the countries of Europe with an architectural eye, or those who have 
studied the cottage buildings in the pictures of the Italian landscape paint-
ers, will best be able to determine this question” (82). Allowing for the 
understanding of picturesque principles that some readers will bring to 
the design, Loudon concedes that “no characteristic of any style or manner 
ought to be servilely imitated, when that imitation would prove inconsis-
tent with utility,” but the spirit of the original ought to be retained even 
as the architect adapts the structure to its new location (82–83). Loudon 
seems unable to explain how the strange, domed cottage might be deemed 
a legitimate occupant of English soil, but it is his particular genius to allow 
any style at all that is beautiful and functional into his pantheon of models 
without trying to rationalize its inclusion on moral grounds, as the aco-
lytes of Gothic or Greek were wont to do. Loudon’s eclecticism encourages 
liberal practice in a profession just emerging from its long dependency on 
aristocratic patronage. He sums up this way one of the most important 
factors in his own approach to design: “The time has gone by for one class 
of society to endeavour to mark another with any badge whatever; and 
therefore we could wish all architects, when designing cottages, to aban-
don their received ideas” (1183). In 1805, he goes on, a prominent architect 
wrote that the moldings and ornaments of the “regular” styles of architec-
ture should never be applied to cottages, but now, in 1840, we see progress 
in the moldings and ornaments carefully placed in the smaller dwellings. 
Thinking and reading beings, clearly, all have the right to style.
 Unlike Loudon, who saw eclecticism as the by-product of a rational 
architecture, George Wightwick built an altogether different foundation 
for his eclecticism—it would be “Beautiful,” “Poetical,” and “Romantic.” 
In this endeavor he tried to emulate Walter Scott: his “romance”—which 
he named The Palace of Architecture (1840)—would be to architecture what 
Scott’s novels were to history (vii). As Wightwick recognized, much of the 
pleasure of reading Scott was attributable to his powerful evocation of 
the architecture and landscapes of the past. Scott’s readers could occupy 
the historical spaces opened up by his novels, both imaginatively through 
reading and physically by traveling to the famous places he described. By 
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making the most scientific and mathematical of the arts into a romance 
and bringing to life the entire history of architecture as a single eclectic pal-
ace, Wightwick encouraged his readers to inhabit imaginatively whatever 
pavilion or room they fancied after being guided through by the “Prince 
Architect.” Just as the Great Exhibition of 1851 would collect the decorative 
arts of the world under a single roof, so Wightwick collected the world’s 
architecture into a single book, having faith that such a “congress” would 
conspire to create a brighter future for the art: “You will see, within this 
domain, an epitome of the Architectural world. Mine is, as it were, a palace 
of congress, wherein you will be successively addressed by humble (but, it 
is hoped, characteristic) representatives of the great families of Design in 
ancient and Mahomedan India, China, Egypt, Greece, ancient and modern 
Italy, Turkey, Moorish Spain, and Christian Europe” (3). On their journey, 
Wightwick’s readers would learn to recognize the importance of architec-
ture as a vehicle of association—its pictorial romance and material poetry 
(4). As a precursor to his ambitious program, the Prince Architect claims 
Hadrian’s villa at Tivoli, where the emperor, after traveling for six years 
around his empire, “resolved on imitating all the monuments, the magnifi-
cence or splendour of which had excited his imagination” (5). Preoccupied 
with architecture as testimony to the character of nations, as (to paraphrase 
Pugin) the history of the world, Wightwick bravely acknowledges, “The 
numerous architectural abortions to be found in many a modern city, how-
ever detestable in themselves, are, nevertheless, testimonies to the existence 
of that spirit, and of those means, which, under the guidance of knowledge, 
would produce monuments worthy of pretension, instead of gew-gaws, 
manifesting pretension only” (10). Part of Wightwick’s eclectic purpose is 
to learn from this sometimes bewildering accumulation of styles the true 
path for the future of architecture: “in every new work, we seek to express, 
not only the limited excellence of what now is, but the anticipated virtue 
of a day not yet arrived” (11). By selecting and comparing what he imag-
ines to be the most characteristic structures of various nations, Wightwick 
hopes to uncover what links spirit, means, and beauty; and ultimately, in 
the testing of new combinations, perspectives, and groupings, to find at 
last a suitable dwelling place for his country and his age.
 Like Wightwick, A. J. Beresford Hope, who would eventually become 
president of the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), as well as a 
leader in the revival of the Church of England, based his aspirations for the 
future of architecture as a fine art on the adoption of an eclectic program. 
In his 1858 lecture “The Common Sense of Art,” Beresford Hope makes 
the essential unity of all architecture—all the styles of different lands—his 
first principle, but he also recognizes local significance and development 
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and so chooses the Gothic as the pattern of future architecture. This choos-
ing of a particular style, he knows, makes him eclectic: “the only style 
of common sense architecture for the future of England, must be Gothic 
architecture, cultivated in the spirit of progression founded upon eclecti-
cism” (10). The progressive architect must search everywhere for mate-
rial and for inspiration; all of England’s Gothic, all the Gothic in Europe 
will not be sufficient for the task: “To be truly eclectic, we must be uni-
versally eclectic—we must eclect from everything that has been collected; 
and we must assimilate and fuse everything that we eclect, for without 
such fusion the process remains after all only one of distributive collec-
tion” (13). Like the eclectic philosophers in France, Beresford Hope had 
faith in the common sense that would guide his choices. Common sense 
would tell him to stop “eclecting” when he could no longer assimilate the 
style. If the architecture of the past—mixed and hybrid as it was—was the 
natural and spontaneous response of human beings to their environment, 
then the architecture of the future would be responding to an environ-
ment that included the architecture of other ages and other nations, as 
well as new materials and new technologies for building. Believing that 
only primitive societies developed “total styles,” he embraced a theory of 
evolution for the arts that incorporated the vital feelings of association on 
which successful architecture depended. The Crystal Palace was a great 
building because its ornamentation was continuous with English “Perpen-
dicular” Gothic; it inspired patriotic feelings because it embodied English 
history and carried it forward in time. The rational latitudinarianism that 
informed Beresford Hope’s judgment made “Progressive Eclecticism” a 
mid-Victorian catchphrase (Crook 161).
 Proceeding on assumptions similar to those adopted by Sir Joshua 
Reynolds in the training of young artists, the eclectic revivalists adopted 
an “art for art’s sake” position, against Pugin and Ruskin, who insistently 
linked eclecticism with degraded morality. In France the theorist, restorer, 
and Gothic revivalist Eugène Viollet-le-Duc reached a similar conclu-
sion that the architect’s education must proceed from the careful analysis 
of the masterpieces of the past to an original synthesis of those achieve-
ments, allowing for the conditions of, and using the materials dictated by, 
his own age (Summerson, “Viollet-le-Duc” 141). This analytical process 
often began with the simplest structures and progressed to the most orna-
mentally complex. The primitive hut had been a favorite instructive image 
since the eighteenth century in which architects had hoped to discover 
absolute structural necessity, a pure and unadorned response to the laws 
of nature (Viollet-le-Duc 23). Viollet-le-Duc imagines that the first shel-
ter was a tree, and that when storms became strong enough to disturb its 
Part I: Toward an Age of Eclecticism
0
protective canopy, people heaped more material over the spreading 
branches. For Ruskin, as for Viollet-le-Duc, this spontaneous, rational 
development of the primitive dwelling underscores the connection between 
national landscape and architectural forms, and, as Ruskin would have 
it, “the prevailing turn of mind by which the nation who first employed 
it is distinguished” (Works I:5). Such a conclusion ordinarily leads to the 
rejection of eclecticism. For example, in The Poetry of Architecture Ruskin 
argues for the specificity of architectural language; it cannot be translated 
across cultures or exported indiscriminately without a calamitous loss of 
meaning. Indeed, his desire to prohibit the exportation or mechanical 
revival of any style would make the primitive hut or the picturesque cot-
tage impossible for all nonpeasants. Writing of the search for a style of 
the nineteenth century, Viollet-le-Duc also tries to link style to language; 
just as language is something all human beings possess, we all have style, 
or inspiration (215); but Viollet-le-Duc acknowledges the loss in transla-
tion even while imagining the recovery of meaning. Though we have pro-
gressed far beyond the rudiments of language, “those simple and true ideas 
that lead artists to invest their conceptions with style,” we need only recall 
the want our art was created to satisfy in order to have true style again. 
Pushed to their extremes, both Ruskin and Viollet-le-Duc signal the com-
ing end of historical (eclectic) styles; but Ruskin and Viollet-le-Duc reach, 
via similar theoretical and historical models, the same conclusion: the new 
style will be the child of eclectic historicism.
 Ruskin devotes half of The Poetry of Architecture series, which he 
wrote, significantly, after his visit to Abbotsford, to the study of the cot-
tages of various nations, but not in order to recommend them as homes 
for the middle classes. Like most of Ruskin’s output, Poetry is meant to 
be instructive, not prescriptive. And as is usually the case, his intention 
is enthusiastically misunderstood. Ruskin acknowledges only three cases 
in which a cottage might be designed by an architect: when a nobleman 
or man of fortune erects dwellings for his domestics on his own property, 
when a landlord exercises influence over the houses of tenants for the sake 
of improvement, and finally “when ornamental summer-houses, or mim-
icries of wigwams, are to be erected as ornamental adjuncts to a prospect 
which the owner has done all he can to spoil, that it may be worthy of the 
honour of having him to look at it” (Works I:66–67). While he is willing 
to advise interested parties in the first two cases, he considers the third 
circumstance to be barbarous and not worthy of his consideration. This 
prohibition against a cottage ornée as a kind of substitute for the primitive 
hut (“wigwam”) is particularly severe, since Ruskin’s ideal cottage closely 
resembles the designed version, and completely disregards the reality of 
most laborers’ cottages: “A few square feet of garden and a latched wicket, 
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persuading the weary and dusty pedestrian, with excessive eloquence, to 
lean upon it for an instant and request a drink of water or milk, complete 
a picture, which, if it be far enough from London to be unspoiled by town 
sophistications, is a very perfect thing in its way. The ideas it awakens are 
agreeable, and the architecture is all that we want in such a situation. It is 
pretty and appropriate; and if it boasted of any other perfection, it would 
be at the expense of its propriety” (I:12). The “proper” features of English 
picturesque cottages were thought to be smallness, rusticity, and simplicity; 
the shape and color of the dwelling had to be harmonious with the land-
scape from which the materials for building were extracted; and the inter-
nal necessities were to determine its irregular, external boundaries. Ruskin 
calls forth a host of images associated with rural pleasures, and betrays a 
continued infatuation with “the presumed innocence and simplicity of a 
‘primitive’ life, passed in harmony with nature” (Archer 68).
 Why then does Ruskin disallow this more perfect form of dwelling for 
members of his own class? Because the cottage ornée has been torn from 
its social fabric. Ruskin recognizes that the period of the primitive hut has 
passed him by, and although he purchases a whitewashed cottage on the 
shores of a beautiful English lake, he improves and enlarges the original 
structure until it is an appropriate and typical dwelling for a member of 
his own class. It seems that Ruskin found his way to authentic dwelling by 
incorporating—eclecting—past forms into the contemporary. The ambiv-
alent transition between the cottage and villa sections of his first book is 
revealing:
And now, farewell to the cottage, and with it, to the humility of natural 
scenery. We are sorry to leave it; not that we have any idea of living in a 
cottage, as a comfortable thing; not that we prefer mud to marble, or deal 
to mahogany; but that, with it, we leave much of what is most beautiful of 
earth, the low and bee-inhabited scenery, which is full of quiet and pride-
less emotion, of such calmness as we can imagine prevailing over our earth 
when it was new in heaven. We are going into higher walks of architecture, 
where we shall find a less close connexion established between the building 
and the soil on which it stands, or the air with which it is surrounded, but 
a closer connexion with the character of its inhabitant. We shall have less 
to do with natural feeling, and more with human passion; we are coming 
out of stillness into turbulence, out of seclusion into the multitude, out of 
the wilderness into the world. (I:73)
The peculiar relation of the cottage to the primitive hut, enshrined by 
architects as the first dwelling, is strongly evident in Ruskin’s delinea-
tion of the territory of the two houses. The evocation of a building that no 
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architect has ever seen, and which the peasants themselves do not use for 
their own cottages, locates the artificial cottage not in the wilderness but in 
the suburbs. Built into the form of the cottage is a longing for the (small) 
space of childhood, what architects regarded as the childhood of the whole 
race. In the small dwelling one is more vulnerable and, at the same time, 
more aware of one’s security. Taking pleasure in the experience of vulner-
ability, the inhabitants of the cottage ornée shed their heavy clothes, their 
formal speech, and renew physical contact. Gaston Bachelard recognizes 
the original house as an unchanging space that is always familiar; the orna-
mented cottage, although inauthentic, can be understood as an attempt to 
rebuild the primitive hut. Situated on the boundary between the primi-
tive hut and familiar domestic space, the cottage ornée opens onto memory, 
onto memories of houses. The villa opens onto other memories—of travel, 
literature, and painting. The villa not only contains collections of experi-
ences and artifacts, like those Ruskin saw in Abbotsford, but is also itself 
an eclectic form, the imitation of the memory of a house built somewhere 
else. Evaluated against the characterization of the primitive hut as a pure, 
unadorned response to nature, the copy cottage can only fail. But the villa 
is always already dissociated from its national origin. The key difference 
for Ruskin is in the inhabitant of each:
Man, the peasant, is a being of more marked national character than man, 
educated and refined. For nationality is founded, in a great degree, on 
prejudices and feelings inculcated and aroused in youth, which grow invet-
erate in the mind as long as its views are confined to the place of its birth; 
its ideas moulded by the customs of its country, and its conversation limited 
to a circle composed of individuals of habits and feelings like its own; but 
which are gradually softened down, and eradicated when the mind is led 
into general views of things, when it is guided by reflection instead of habit, 
and has begun to lay aside opinions contracted under the influence of asso-
ciation and prepossession, substituting in their room philosophical deduc-
tions from the calm contemplation of the various tempers, and thoughts, 
and customs, of mankind. (I:74–75)
For Ruskin this displacement of national feelings in favor of general ideas 
opens the way to eclecticism in art: “the more polished the mind of its 
designer, the less national will be the building” and the less unified will be 
the building and its scenery (I:75). The implications of Ruskin’s analysis 
are significant for the larger questions raised in this chapter: the growth of 
the middle classes came about as a result of massive displacement from the 
land. Living in cities where no native style prevailed, and confronted with 
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unfamiliar aesthetic systems, ordinary citizens created a profoundly ordi-
nary, symbolic-ornamental, and eclectic architecture.19 These newly avail-
able languages of art encouraged novel expressions, what Eagleton might 
call aesthetic bonding, an imaginative exchange of identities (24).
 While the seemingly ideal synthesis of styles represented by the pictur-
esque did not satisfy the guardians of high culture, it has been consistently 
employed in domestic architecture for two centuries. For commentators 
such as Ruskin, the picturesque could never create a true juste milieu 
because it corrupted the essential character of each style from which it bor-
rowed. The liberalization of style would lead to the bastardization—the 
mongrelization—of artistic style generally; the lack of any one style to rep-
resent the character of the age was proof of its corruption, its surrender 
to the pressures of supply and demand in the market of culture. Rather 
than adhering to a single style (as one might to a single religion), archi-
tects would design buildings in any style their patrons demanded, however 
inappropriate or ridiculous.
 It is tempting to conclude by saying that the common-sense eclecticism 
envisioned by Loudon and Beresford Hope won the day—that architects 
such as Norman Shaw, C. F. A. Voysey, and Edwin Lutyens represented 
the future. But the eclectic synthesis they achieved proved temporary with 
the advent of modernism, when the stars of purity and authenticity were 
again in ascendance. It may be, however, that modernism itself was the 
interregnum—an anomalous moment in which we pretended not to have 
a choice.
 As proof, it is worth pointing out that two of the most influential archi-
tectural writers of the early twentieth century were apostates when it came 
to the Victorians. Both Kenneth Clark and John Betjeman began their 
careers by despising Victorian architecture, and ended by respecting—if 
not loving—it. Clark wrote his “classic” (Crook’s word in the 1995 preface) 
The Gothic Revival just after his graduation from Oxford. When his pub-
lisher suggested reprinting the 1928 edition, Clark responded nervously: “I 
expected to find the history inaccurate, the entertainment out of date, the 
criticism relatively sound. But it is the criticism which has worn least well” 
(1). In the letter, reprinted in later editions, Clark explains how he had set 
out to validate the architectural doctrines that were current in the 1920s 
but had ended up being “persuaded by what [he] set out to deride” (2). He 
worried that later generations could not possibly understand the hatred of 
Victorian architecture that had once existed—it was universally ridiculed. 
Even in the 1920s Clark knew that he was doing something radical in 
mounting even a half-hearted defense—it was “interesting” though never 
“agreeable”—of the aesthetic and moral positions of the Victorian built 
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environment. The best to be hoped from a reprinting, he concluded in 
1949, would be to show the “very great change which my attitude towards 
all the arts has undergone in the last twenty years, and which began with 
my reading of Ruskin’s The Nature of Gothic” (4). Though Ruskin had 
been a devastating critic of his own age, Clark recognized that Ruskin had 
guided the best architects toward a reconsideration of the moral meaning 
of architecture, and to the production of a few works of enduring genius. 
Even Summerson would ask in 1968 whether “failure” was a fair label 
when the Victorians had labored so hard, and with such seriousness, to 
improve the art of architecture.
 For steering the larger populace toward an appreciation of Victorian 
architecture, Clark assigns the most credit to John Betjeman. In his 1970 
introduction to Ghastly Good Taste (originally published in 1933), “An Aes-
thete’s Apologia,” Betjeman tells of the incipient fascination with Victo-
rian art and literature that blossomed in his youth but was restricted in one 
important sense: “Their architecture I thought then was not to be taken 
seriously, as it was purely imitative and rather vulgar” (xxi). Indeed, the 
book concludes (in both editions) with this death knell: “Except for the 
fine streak in domestic architecture [ . . . ] building ceased to be of anything 
but commercial importance in England after 1860” (105). Betjeman had 
blamed the lamentable fall of a great art on “self-conscious stylism”—in 
other words, architecture declined because it lost its organic connection to 
the society that produced it. It fell because it was eclectic. And yet, in the 
revised edition, in a footnote, the apostate Betjeman acknowledges that 
Norman Shaw, whose work he had once derided as “sham classicalism,” 
“was our greatest architect since Wren, if not greater” (104). The only 
other part of Ghastly Good Taste to be altered for 1970 was the huge fold-
out “Street of Taste,” which was originally dominated by the nineteenth 
century, stretched between two principal modes, “Educated Class State- 
Conscious” and “Middle-Class Self-Conscious.” The architectural mode 
of the twentieth century up to 1933 was still worse—“Big Business and 
Chaos.” Modernism, for Betjeman, had been “A misinterpretation of sim-
plicity” and not the salvation of the art. Things became bleaker still in 
1961 (in the extended version of the “Street”), when one of the icons of 
Victorian self-consciousness, Euston Station, was demolished. This sec-
tion Betjeman titled “In Memoriam.” The Victorian Society that Betjeman 
helped to found in 1958 lost the battle for Euston, but it went on to win 
public opinion and countless other battles, notably for the eclectic, aesthetic 
suburb of Bedford Park.20 After Euston, the “problem of failure” would be 
no longer in the Victorians, but in ourselves.
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f Victor Cousin had looked to his legacy, he might have been 
wiser not to connect his name with an idea that was in the air, 
everywhere in Europe, by 1816. Though both the man and the word 
were largely forgotten by the end of the nineteenth century, Cousin would 
forever be linked with the idea of eclecticism. It is unlikely that an eclec-
tic philosophy would have attracted any followers or exerted any influ-
ence were it not for Cousin’s extraordinary gift for propaganda and for the 
predisposition of his contemporaries toward a nondogmatic philosophy. 
Hippolyte Taine, who was no admirer either of Cousin or of eclecticism, 
wrote, “Ce n’est point faire injure à un siècle ni à une race que d’expliquer 
ses croyances par ses inclinations primitives et par ses habitudes générales; 
ce n’est point faire injure à l’éclectisme que d’expliquer sa réussite par le 
génie et par les inclinations de son pays et de son temps” (290). [“It insults 
neither a century nor a race to explain its beliefs by its primitive inclina-
tions and its general habits; neither does it insult eclecticism to explain its 
success by the genius and by the inclinations of its country and its time”] 
(my translation). Most accounts of the period, including Cousin’s own 
reflections on his early career, invoke the spirit of the age to explain the 
brief but sweeping popularity of eclecticism.
 Cousin would often tell the story of his life as an exemplary tale of the 
revolutionary generation; in many points, it also exemplifies the eclectic 
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mentality of the age. As his first biographer and sometime student Jules 
Simon explains, Cousin always believed he had a great destiny to ful-
fill. He was born in 1792 in comparative poverty but was elevated to the 
middle class and won a chance at an education when he saved a richer 
boy from bullies. He must have felt like a necessary man, plucked as he 
was from the very cradle of his studies and transformed almost overnight 
into a professor of philosophy. After the revolutionary wars, the dearth of 
capable scholars meant that anyone with potential was drafted into imme-
diate service. France and French culture had to be reconstructed. This 
would become the keynote of Cousin’s philosophy; if the previous age had 
brought about this necessary and destructive revolution, then the mission 
of his generation would be rebuilding. The spirit of the age also led him 
to question the primacy of French philosophy—of all philosophical tradi-
tions—and to leave his country in search of new resources. By the time 
he went to Germany in 1820, exiled by the restored monarchy for being 
rather too popular a teacher, Cousin had already formulated his eclecti-
cism. He had to make eclecticism seem to be destiny, to be natural, because 
he saw the justification for any system in its existence. For Cousin success 
was the proof of greatness, and when his eclecticism was threatened, or 
even challenged, by an articulate opponent, he readily adapted to the new 
conditions, ensuring its survival. In philosophy and in life, he chose what 
was true for his own use, much as one highlighting or annotating a text 
might note only those points memorable or important to oneself, rather 
than trying to discover the purpose or overall argument of the author. In 
spite of his limitations as a thinker or a cultural hero, Cousin is important 
because his eclectic philosophy forced his generation to confront the prob-
lems of originality, progress, and history.
 Wherever it appears, eclecticism has always been associated with pick-
ing and choosing from seemingly opposed systems of thought; in Cousin 
it was also a search for lost treasures and a political faith in compromise. 
Eclecticism became, by 1830, the undeclared official national philoso-
phy, because it offered the powerful and growing middle class a practical 
compromise between republicanism and ideology on the one hand, and 
Catholicism and the monarchy on the other.1 For his opponents within and 
beyond the borders of France, Cousin seemed to compromise his philoso-
phy by his involvement with politics. Blithely opportunistic, the eclectic 
Cousin mined the works of his immediate predecessors in France, his con-
temporaries in Germany, and the common-sense philosophy of Scotland. 
He managed to please the middle-class intellectuals, while provoking the 
ire of the chief philosophical schools, even as he became a government offi-
cial in charge of education and a published apologist for the “bourgeois 
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monarchy.” In his pamphlet “Justice et charité” Cousin argued that justice 
consisted in preserving natural rights, but he did not believe in equality 
and taught that the state had but limited obligations to its citizens (Boas 
223). In attempting to cope with the realities of post-Revolutionary and, in 
fact, post-Restoration French society, Cousin offered his people an eclectic 
solution, a way of looking at their religious and philosophical history that 
would heal the deep wounds opened by the intense ideological conflicts of 
the time. For this he was denounced as anti-Catholic by the Abbé Bautain, 
who said, “The mixed position, which the philosophy of today is trying to 
assume, is not tenable. There is no golden mean for eternal truths” (qtd. 
in Boas 215). From the point of view of the traditionalists, eclecticism was 
vague and incoherent, unable to distinguish between true and false, good 
and evil. Cousin fared no better with the radical, anticlerical left. Flaubert’s 
Sénécal thought Cousin was worse than the Jesuits, for “eclecticism taught 
one to draw certitude from reason, developed egoism, and destroyed soli-
darity” (qtd. in Boas 220). In 1852 George Henry Lewes advised a friend to 
read Cousin, but not to trust him, “to take no single fact on his authority,” 
to get his book but to “read it with the utmost caution” (Letter 139:203–4). 
Back in France, Lerminier claimed that Cousin was not a philosopher at 
all, but merely an “erudito”; the positivist Auguste Comte called him a 
“fameux sophiste”; and Sainte-Beuve at last “could scarcely mention him 
without a shudder” (qtd. in Boas 220). The twentieth-century historian 
George Boas merely charges Cousin with “buil[ding] his philosophy on 
motives of utility and convenience” (251), an enterprise Norman Klein 
credits as being the first “that attempted to cope with the implications of 
modern society” (ii). For all the opposition to his eclecticism—and it was 
considerable—Cousin struck a resounding chord with his “philosophy of 
the nineteenth century.”
Against System
Cousin and the Spirit of the Age
In a striking passage from his early lectures on the history of modern 
philosophy, delivered in 1816 and 1817, Victor Cousin imagines himself 
a laborer in the ruins of history: “I come to bring my stone; I come to 
do my work; I come to extract from the midst of the ruins what has not 
perished, what cannot perish” (Lectures 32).2 This is the essential image 
of what Cousin took to be the process of eclecticism. All that was true in 
the history of philosophy retained its solidity, even with the destruction 
of the system of which it had been part, and could be recovered for the 
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foundation of a new philosophy. This new philosophy would have nei-
ther a beginning, because its component parts predated the new structure, 
nor an end, because the work of building eclectically was not utopian, but 
recursive. If the eighteenth century had been the age of destruction, he 
believed “the nineteenth century should be that of intelligent rehabili-
tations” (31). The “spirit of party” would be succeeded by the “spirit of 
conciliation”—as it had so many times before; but the historical recursive-
ness of eclecticism troubles Cousin, even as he faithfully carries the stones 
that will build a new century. A similar “state of disorder” had been seen 
“at the decline of the ancient beliefs, and before the triumphs of Christi-
anity, when men wandered through all contraries without power to rest 
anywhere [ . . . ]” (31). Centered in Alexandria, but affecting the entire 
Roman world, the first wave of eclecticism failed to produce a synthesis.3 
If an eclectic method was to gain any credence among his contemporaries, 
Cousin had to distinguish his “enlightened” eclecticism from “that blind 
syncretism which destroyed the school of Alexandria, which attempted to 
bring contrary systems together by force” (33). What would make Cousin’s 
eclecticism “enlightened” and “intelligent” rather than “blind,” volitional 
and critical rather than naïve and accidental? He would have to make an 
antisystematic system the core of his new philosophy—to inhabit a struc-
ture whose dissolution was part of its design.
 The few published accounts of eclecticism left by Cousin alternate 
between confidence in a better future shaped by his method and the cos-
mic pessimism that demands it—he has to believe that no further progress 
in philosophy is possible without eclecticism. All three major systems of 
thought arising in the eighteenth century—the materialist, idealist, and 
common-sense schools—had reached their pinnacles of insight and suc-
cess, and were in unmistakable decline, with disciples producing only 
mannered versions of the masters. Unwilling to calculate the probability 
of an entirely new system of thought appearing on the scene, Cousin posits 
that progress will occur only through combining elements of the old. To 
choose any other course of action would deprive philosophy of both its 
autonomy and its future: submitting to the “ancient authority” (i.e., the 
Church) would mean a return to the Middle Ages; pursuing the conflict 
between schools would result in their mutual destruction. To get at the 
raw material worth saving, he would have to “disengage what [was] true 
in each of these systems” (“Destiny” 45), and get on with the hard work 
of rebuilding. Eclecticism therefore looked like “somewhat of a desperate 
resource” (50)—a salvage operation—but Cousin offered it up as the com-
mon-sense solution to a philosophical stalemate. His ambition, however, 
surely exceeded his common sense as he aimed to “construct a philosophy 
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superior to all systems” (45) from the ruins of exploded doctrines. Like 
many of his generation, Cousin feared dogmatism more than inconsistency 
and believed there was more danger in loving the theory than in loving the 
truth—however multifarious its forms.
 Looking to his own development as to a golden mean, Cousin discov-
ered that it was easier to swallow a piece of every school than to take any of 
them whole. If his favorite teachers disagreed, then like a good son Cousin 
would find a way to reconcile them, rather than having to bid either fare-
well; when they objected to sharing the same room, Cousin would beg 
them “to lay aside their tyrannical pretensions” (50). It was tyrannical to 
advocate for any exclusive system since, as Cousin believed, every system 
that had ever achieved any currency in human thought must be able to lay 
claim to some portion of truth. (The naïve corollary to this proposition was 
that systems of thought were true on the points where they agreed and 
false where they disagreed.) Eclecticism would first have to deconstruct 
“all systems by the fire and steel of criticism” in order to reconstruct “a 
new system which [was] the complete representation of consciousness in 
history” (“Exposition of Eclecticism” 101–2). Cousin’s claim for the supe-
riority of eclecticism rested mainly on its being creative—even redemp-
tive—where “sensualism” had been only destructive; but significantly, his 
starting point—psychology—was the same, and his analytical method—
observation—was originated by the same materialist philosophers whom 
he professed to supersede.
 The true beginning of all knowledge had to be the perceiving self, but 
Cousin assumed that this imperfect instrument could be turned from self-
reflection to take in a larger panorama: “I am now on the summit of the 
mountain, from which a vast horizon is displayed before my eyes, but I 
come from the depth of an obscure valley, and can still perceive and point 
out to others the way which has led me to the point on which I stand, so 
as to aid and encourage them to rise to the same eminence with myself, 
instead of letting them believe and of persuading myself that I have fallen 
upon it from the clouds” (61). Ambitious in its scope, but humble in its 
conception, eclecticism, more than most philosophies, internalized the 
contradiction between seeing the whole and being part of the whole. Even 
as the perceiving subject tries to step outside of history in order to survey 
the panorama of human experience and thought through time, he has to 
remember that he also stands within it. The two views—given by the eye 
and the mind’s eye—coalesce so that Cousin can claim impartiality in the 
eclectic process of picking and choosing from history’s ruins. Unlike the 
partial views afforded by other systems, eclecticism succeeds “by a patient 
and profound observation, and an induction at once comprehensive and 
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scrupulous [ . . . ] in embracing all the elements of consciousness and reality” 
(100). Eclecticism builds itself up from details, or partial views, to general 
ideas and the mastering vision. This principle of induction informs all of 
Cousin’s subsequent efforts in philosophy: translations, scholarly editions, 
and teaching the history of philosophy—all have value insofar as they “ter-
minate in a new recomposition [ . . . ] and sooner or later engender a new 
universal history of philosophy” (Introduction 410). History taught Cousin 
that all systems had arisen in response to “certain problems” within “the 
spirit of man,” and he believed that an eclectic history of philosophy would 
“account for all the requisites of thought” (421). The search for a unified 
solution was a common-sense proposition: the age demanded it and the 
human mind required it. Unlike the tyrannical systems that it sought to 
replace, eclecticism offered not the unity of a theory, but rather “the har-
mony of all contrarieties” (416); it derived its power not from exclusion, 
but rather from extension.
 Cousin wanted to bypass periods of ideological conflict altogether, by 
being mindful of the truth on all sides of any question. Mistrusted by all 
factions for what seemed like extreme moral relativism, he was forced to 
expend considerable effort defining and limiting the role of eclecticism in 
philosophy and eclecticism as philosophy. Throughout his fragmentary 
writings on the subject, Cousin variously names it a principle, a method, 
a system, a philosophy, and an application of philosophy. In 1817 Cousin, 
assigned to present a course of lectures on the history of philosophy, com-
mences by declaring that the “criticism of systems almost demands a sys-
tem, so that the history of philosophy is constrained to first borrow from 
philosophy the light which it must one day return to it with usury” (Lec-
tures 36). Philosophy will teach him to recognize what is true and what is 
false in each of the systems that he surveys: whence comes this light? If 
eclecticism is the light that Cousin borrows from philosophy, then he con-
ceives of it as a system worthy of criticizing other systems of thought—it is 
to be his “guide.” His love of philosophy compels him to study its history, 
so that he might bring back more light from the past. Eclecticism will help 
Cousin “to deduce from the study of systems, their strifes, and even their 
ruins, a system which may be proof against criticism” (37). Not yet the end 
of philosophy, eclecticism promises to discover its new beginning. It is “the 
true historical method” (35), but not the object of study. Eclecticism is thus 
already a problem for Cousin: he wants to make it into a system that can 
bring order to the chaotic past. It is more than method and less than phi-
losophy. It borrows from philosophy so that it might enrich philosophy.
 After his triumphant return to teaching in 1828, he expresses his hope, 
in “Destiny of Modern Philosophy” (1829), that “Eclecticism may serve as 
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a guide to the French philosophy of the nineteenth century,” which will be 
an “Eclectic philosophy” (53). Not surprisingly, eclecticism will lead to an 
eclectic philosophy, appropriate to the spirit of the age, that he does not yet 
name.4 In its best sense eclecticism represents “philosophical toleration,” 
which “after the long reign of fanaticism, . . . calls forth the desire and the 
taste for a profound study of every system” (53, 54). Bringing every system 
under the probing gaze of the scholar, eclecticism recovers the lost trea-
sures of human thought, which, like herbs concealed in a rain forest, will 
meliorate future ills. In the “Exposition of Eclecticism” (1833), it is again 
named a system, but Cousin at last gives a fuller account of its powers: “It 
is not compelled to proscribe all systems, in order to justify itself; it is satis-
fied with disengaging the inevitable portion of error that is mixed with the 
portion of truth, which forms the life and strength of each of them; and 
by pursuing the same course with them all, enemies as they were by their 
contrary errors, it makes them friends and brothers, by the truths which 
they contain, and thus purified and reconciled, it composes with them a 
vast whole, adequate to the expression of complete and universal truth. 
Not this method, at once philosophical and historical, which, in possession 
of truth, is able to find it scattered here and there in all systems, is Eclecti-
cism” (101). As Cousin imagines it, eclecticism is a method that begins and 
ends in breadth. From the start, it takes in all other systems, sifting them 
for the valuable nuggets of truth, which it recognizes by their solidity and 
endurance—these are the stones that remain when the supporting frame-
work of an old system fails. Instead of casting out any philosophy, which 
once influenced human action, it makes room for all that was beautiful, 
good, and true in each. The system underlying eclecticism, “which serves 
it as a point of departure and a principle in the labyrinth of history” (101), 
depends on observation and induction; it wields “a rigid criticism” as the 
instrument by which it decomposes all other systems and reconstructs the 
fragments “in a new system which is the complete representation of con-
sciousness in history” (102)—the “complete and universal truth.” Despite 
the bombast of “complete” in both phrases, Cousin qualifies the outcome 
of eclecticism with words such as “expression” and “representation”; eclec-
ticism cannot be allowed to become the dogmatic replacement for exclu-
sive doctrines. By nature it is the enemy of all systems and schools; if it 
becomes a system or a school, it goes against its nature. Eclecticism can 
only “express” and “represent,” because it is an ever-changing picture of 
accumulated human experience.
 Even with such natural restraints on the power of eclecticism, Cousin’s 
critics saw only the provocative arrogance of a young philosopher who 
claimed to have penetrated the open secret of the universe that everyone 
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else had somehow overlooked. Protesting that he was receiving calumnies 
in exchange for a gift freely given, Cousin yet understood well the vul-
nerable points of a system of thought that claimed to be independent of 
system and, systematically, to unite all contraries. In the “Exposition” he 
takes time to defend his “principle” and “instrument” from attack, ask-
ing whether it was “the dream of a deceived mind, which unable to pro-
duce a system for itself demands one of history?” (102). With the intention 
of persuading his critics of eclecticism’s spontaneous ascendancy, Cousin 
rather airily responds to each of the most serious criticisms of his method: 
“All these objections will vanish of themselves before the slightest exami-
nation” (102). Eclecticism is not a syncretism that mingles together all sys-
tems; rather it is choice and discrimination, not mixture and confusion, 
because it leaves no system intact. Eclecticism does not approve everything, 
confounding true and false, good and evil; rather it distinguishes true and 
false and makes use of only the truth in each system. Eclecticism is not 
fatalism; to say that man with his “noble but limited intelligence” grasps 
but a portion of the truth is not fatal. Eclecticism is not the absence of all 
system; rather it is the application of a system from which it stands apart. 
In eclecticism, Cousin concludes, “the spirit of the nineteenth century has 
recognised itself” (105). Even Cousin’s most severe critics might have con-
curred with this final claim. The malady of the nineteenth century could 
be traced to its inability to represent itself consistently, to its incapacity to 
decide on one mode of governance or a single faith. For Cousin, however, 
the true Eclectic in no way resembled the naïve, accidentally eclectic per-
son. In fact, eclecticism was to be his cure for this common ailment, the 
means of coping with the sum of history.
Historian of Philosophy and Philosopher of History
When Victor Cousin laid claim to eclecticism, it was not virgin territory, 
but, much like the Western Hemisphere, it had always been there, affect-
ing the weather, shaping the ocean currents, even when it was unknown 
by the Europeans who felt its presence. Eclecticism was a kind of standing 
offer in the history of ideas, an approach that could be taken with more 
or less intention behind it. Two periods that modern historians have often 
designated “eclectic” probably influenced Cousin’s adoption of the term: 
the late- or post-Hellenistic and the early modern. However, Cousin was 
uneasy about the “blind syncretism” of ancient eclecticism, and he was 
silent on the eclecticism of Enlightenment authors such as Jakob Brucker 
and Denis Diderot, preferring to see all philosophy after Descartes and 
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Locke (and before Kant) as having an empiricist orientation. In spite of 
these doubts, Cousin proudly acknowledges, “Eclecticism is not of yester-
day” (“Exposition” 104). It had been practiced, whether openly or not, by 
philosophers from Plato to Leibniz, and it was present in the new histori-
cism of German philosophy. Distrustful of novelty and deeply pragmatic, 
Cousin gives his eclecticism an entirely commonplace origin: “It was born 
the moment that a sound head and a feeling heart undertook to reconcile 
two passionate adversaries, by showing them that the opinions for which 
they combated were not irreconcilable in themselves, and that, with a few 
mutual sacrifices, they might be brought together” (104). Being eclectic 
for Cousin was like breaking up a fight between friends—you want your 
friends to get along so you don’t have to choose between them. As a his-
torian of philosophy, Cousin looked for new friends and for ways to keep 
his old friends happy. As a philosopher of history, Cousin believed in alter-
nating periods of conflict and compromise, high and low creativity, and, 
optimistically, that differences could always be sorted out in the end.
 Characterized by its supposed loss of vigor and creativity, the period 
between the reigning Hellenistic philosophies of Stoicism, Epicureanism, 
and Skepticism and the emergence of Neoplatonism (50 b.c.–a.d. 200) 
has long borne the negative label “eclectic,” at least since Eduard Zeller’s 
authoritative 1883 study A History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy.5 While 
recent efforts to expose the limitations of Zeller’s analysis have contributed 
to a better understanding of ancient philosophy, his work still gives us the 
clearest picture of nineteenth-century attitudes to what was then under-
stood as philosophical eclecticism.6 In Zeller’s reckoning, eclecticism arose 
as a means to reunite the Hellenistic philosophies that had their common 
origin in Aristotelian thought. Largely in agreement with Cousin’s expla-
nation of the emergence of modern eclecticism, Zeller offered a psycho-
logical explanation for the eclectic impulse. The first founders of separate 
schools, and their immediate followers, cling more tenaciously to points of 
doctrine, seeing every variation, every point of disagreement, as grounds 
for further dispute. Schools in their first and second generations tend to 
be exclusive, but this state of perpetual conflict inevitably declines, lead-
ing to a reassessment of points held in common and finally an attempt at 
fusion. Zeller repeatedly characterizes eclecticism as natural and univer-
sal—a permanent feature of the human mind, and a recurrent historical 
process. While Zeller’s initial characterization differed little from Cousin’s, 
his subsequent analysis of eclecticism (and all those thinkers caught up in 
its processes) was, for the period, typically ambivalent. Natural though it 
might be, eclecticism could produce two vastly different outcomes, leading 
to revolution and progress or to exhausted thought and irreversible decay. 
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In another significant parallel to his own century, Zeller saw that philoso-
phy was transformed by cultural exchange. Romans generally assessed the 
value of philosophy in terms of its practical utility. They asked what phi-
losophy could contribute to moral education and selected from the various 
systems what they deemed serviceable, “careless of the deeper interconnec-
tions of particular definitions” (16). Every individual would choose out of 
the various systems “that which [was] true for his own use[, which] presup-
poses that each man carries in himself the standard for decision between 
true and false” (18). For Zeller this appeal to the immediately certain made 
eclectic philosophy distinctive and important; but it was also a symptom 
of “scientific decay” and “the exhaustion of thought” (19). To ignore the 
intermediate stages by which we come to know a thing is unphilosophi-
cal, because it causes us to regard as innate that which is actually learned. 
The combination of systems based on the individual’s selection would not 
provide a long-term solution or obviate the need for a new system: positive 
conviction would again be necessary. Understood as a stage in a recurrent 
historical process, eclecticism would either revive the philosophy of direct 
revelation from God (such as did occur with the rise of Neoplatonism) or 
lead to skepticism—the utter loss of faith in what is given.
 Though he is frequently unsympathetic to the aspirations of eclectic 
philosophy and positively contemptuous of its professed methods, Zeller 
does concede the value of eclecticism in education. Most learning requires, 
to some degree, the application of eclectic principles, whereby the student 
learns first to imitate, then to combine, and finally to synthesize, the raw 
material of any subject. For three centuries teaching in academies of art 
had adhered to such eclectic principles. Far from being seen as a trammel 
on creativity, eclecticism in its conceptual openness freed the student to 
canvass all of history; to avoid being overwhelmed by it, he would have to 
approach the past critically. In the definition of eclecticism most likely to 
have influenced Cousin, Diderot eulogizes the eclectic philosopher as one 
who has embraced the utmost freedom of thought:
The eclectic is a philosopher who, trampling underfoot prejudice, tra-
dition, antiquity, general agreement, authority—in a word, everything 
that controls the minds of the common herd—dares to think for him-
self, returns to the clearest general principles, examines them, discusses 
them, admits nothing that is not based on the testimony of his experience 
and his reason; and from all the philosophies he has analyzed without 
respect and bias he makes for himself a particular and domestic one which 
belongs to him. . . . There is no leader of a sect who has not been more or 
less eclectic. . . . . The Eclectics are among the philosophers who are the 
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kings on the face of the earth, the only ones who have remained in the 
state of nature, where everything belonged to everyone. (Encyclopédie, art. 
“Éclectisme,” vol. 5; trans. A. A. Long; qtd. in Donini 19)7
Paolo Casini has argued that in this article we find a self-portrait of 
Diderot at a crucial turning point in his career (35–36). Though he bor-
rows the substance of the article from other writers, Casini points out that 
Diderot effaces the nuanced accounts of earlier eclectics in order to make 
the general type of the eclectic philosopher into a freethinker (38). Against 
those who would oppose the project of the Encyclopédie, and its mapping 
of human knowledge, Diderot argues not only for the necessity of being 
skeptical with respect to authority, but also for a constructive eclecticism.8 
He will not only doubt and tear down, but he will also respect truth when 
he finds it and build up something new—“a particular and domestic [phi-
losophy] which belongs to him.” Diderot elevates experience to equality 
with reason, just as Cousin would do, and thereby avoids the emptiness 
of abstract ideas that too often lacked any meaningful connection to lived 
experience. When he claims that the leaders of every school must have been 
eclectic, he is valorizing the essential creativity of the eclectic process. The 
homely image of the philosopher as king in a world “where everything 
belonged to everyone” would have appealed to the post-Revolutionary 
generation, trying to salvage something from the general wreckage. The 
emphasis in the Encyclopédie was on the history of ideas, on accumulated 
knowledge and its practical uses, which linked it with at least one aspect 
of Enlightenment thought. As Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann has argued, 
“The plane of experience for practical reason is the area of history. In the 
historical concept, which is essential for eclecticism, facts and topoi of his-
tory could be selected and applied to practice” (548). Although Cousin fails 
to acknowledge the example of the Encyclopedists, the idea of the utility of 
history underlies his eclecticism.
 Despite its close connection with the practical uses of history, if eclecti-
cism had any right to be called a philosophy in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, it was still best understood as a philosophy of history. As a theory of 
history, Cousin’s eclecticism borrowed the model of alternating periods of 
high and low creativity from Enlightenment philosophers such as Voltaire, 
and infused his belief in progress. Periodically, the eclectic philosopher 
would have to step into a historical impasse, and discover the foundation 
of a compromise that would generate historical change. In the hands of 
Cousin, therefore, eclecticism was a tool for both interpreting and trans-
forming human development through time. Though the influence of 
Hegel was indisputably strong with Cousin, his eclectic philosophy of his-
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tory was formulated before he knew Hegel and was probably more directly 
influenced, as I have argued, by Diderot’s conception of the philosopher as 
independent thinker. This is not to say that Cousin did not adapt his eclec-
tic philosophy of history to later developments. His eclecticism demanded 
perpetual rethinking and accommodation. For example, it is likely that 
Michelet’s 1827 translation of Vico’s Scienza nuova (1744) had a profound 
influence on the 1828–29 lectures on the history of philosophy.9 Although 
Vico’s theory of history is usually described as cyclical, he did not imag-
ine that every return caused an identical series of effects. This model of 
“the course nations run,” built on the succession of ideas informing social 
practices, would have justified the study of history that was so central in 
Cousin’s work. Even as the appearance of eclecticism signaled the exhaus-
tion of ideas or weariness with conflict, a volitional eclecticism was the best 
method for choosing how the next cycle of history would develop. To see 
Cousin’s eclectic philosophy of history only in terms of German histori-
cism, which was clearly to become the most powerful influence in shap-
ing nineteenth-century historiography, is to overlook the lesser stream of 
eclecticism that continues to shape ideas about the historical inheritance 
throughout the century. Organic historicism made eclecticism a problem, 
not a solution.
 Regarding Cousin as a philosopher of history in the tradition of Vico 
and as a historian of philosophy in the tradition of Diderot helps to account 
for his shifting notion of progress. While he clearly saw the nineteenth cen-
tury as having a unique role to play in history, such as might shape future 
progress in all fields of knowledge, later in his career he turned to writing 
the stories of the great women of the seventeenth century, France’s Golden 
Age. It was an age of organic completeness, in which all the elements of 
science, politics, philosophy, and the arts cooperated to make France the 
greatest nation in the world. What made Cousin imagine that a society 
reconstructed eclectically from the ruins of history could approximate the 
achievements of the seventeenth century? How could eclecticism produce 
anything other than monsters? Cousin wanted progress in philosophy to 
match that of the sciences, but it would have to get beyond the cycle of 
destruction and reconstruction. Eclecticism, pushed to its logical extreme, 
made progress into an illusion. In some ways this accorded well with the 
critical spirit of the age; but if naïve eclecticism was a problem of history, 
then deeper investigations into history and the bringing forth of more 
material might exacerbate the problem. To overcome the practical limita-
tions of his program, Cousin appealed to the sensibilities of the age.
 In his lectures before the “noble youth of the nineteenth century,” 
Cousin promised he would deliver to them a system that would be accepted 
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by their hearts, as well as by their reason (Lectures 37). If Proclus was the 
work of Cousin’s heart, as his biographer Jules Simon claimed, then it was 
because he imagined himself a modern-day Proclus, making the stand for 
a rational idealism in opposition to the forces of skepticism and empiri-
cism. Being open, as Proclus had been, to new kinds of historical under-
standing, Cousin believed that he could contrive a philosophy that would 
better represent the age than any that had come before. As a “necessary 
man,” Cousin imagined that he was fulfilling his destiny when he found 
that which had been lost—eclecticism. In spite of opposition from all exclu-
sive doctrines, his singular efforts would allow the nineteenth century to 
realize its true character and take its rightful place in history: “This word, 
long since fallen into deep oblivion, scarcely uttered by a single voice, has 
echoed from one end of Europe to the other, and the spirit of the nine-
teenth century has recognised itself in Eclecticism” (“Exposition” 105). The 
word would echo across Europe and Europe would have to answer back, 
uniting in the common purpose of building the age to come. Every nation 
would answer by carrying its stones—to return to Cousin’s metaphor of 
rebuilding—bringing forward its best, most enduring ideas. Sounding a 
call for European unity in an age of nationalism, Cousin’s eclecticism was 
self-consciously cosmopolitan. Taking his cue from Madame de Staël’s De 
l’Allemagne (1813), Cousin traveled to Germany to meet the great ideal-
ist philosophers, whose work he was instrumental in disseminating in 
France. He dismissed the idea that to be true to itself, the French spirit 
must remain ignorant of “the philosophical schools which flourish in other 
parts of the great European family” (80). He believed that traditional rivals 
France and Germany would find common ground “in this still feeble min-
gling of idealism and realism” and that “a true eclecticism [was] silently 
forming in European philosophy” (Introduction 428). After the fashion of 
his friend Hegel, he read intellectual developments as signs of national 
development: “the state of speculative philosophy in an epoch is equally 
relative to the general state of society in that epoch” (429). The proper his-
torical role for eighteenth-century French philosophy had been as inspirer 
of revolutions—revolutions that had to be suffered and won for the good 
of all humanity. Cousin believed that eclecticism promised its own epoch-
making combination of imagination and action, which would lead to a still 
more perfect mode of government, capable of inspiring cultural rebirth.
 What Cousin might rightly have deemed the institutions of eclec-
ticism—schools and universities; societies for the promotion of art, 
literature, and science; museums, encyclopedias, exhibitions, and antholo-
gies—were thriving in nearly every part of Europe and were on their way 
to promoting a general form of culture such as the Western world had 
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never seen. Having a habit of speaking of “the nineteenth century and its 
mission,” Cousin would often be overcome with enthusiasm for a future 
that held out the promise of kaleidoscopic unity, such as that contained 
in the French constitution: “the throne and the country, monarchy and 
democracy, order and liberty, aristocracy and equality, all the elements of 
history, of thought, and of things” (439). Situated between the old and the 
new worlds, Europe’s governments would inevitably reflect a mixture of 
old and new institutions. Literature, too, reflected the age’s propensity to 
mix and mingle, bringing together “classic legitimacy and romantic inno-
vation” (440). In short, it was impossible for philosophy to “avoid being 
eclectic when all that [was] around it [was] so” (440). The institutions and 
ideas of the nineteenth century would mutually reinforce and reflect each 
other. As a philosophy of moderation, eclecticism could come to fruition 
only when the moment of crisis (the revolution) was past; spontaneity 
and reflection were then possible, and together would usher in an age of 
progress. To be eclectic—to swim with the current of the times—not only 
would fulfill philosophy’s historical role but would make all Cousin’s work 
ramifying and productive. He could not choose his place in history, but by 
choosing eclecticism Cousin thought to make time pay. It was a typically 
eclectic compromise between liberty and necessity.
 Thus Cousin sounded the reveille for a new century. His generation 
would have a vital part to play in history—“that of being just toward all 
systems and the dupe of none of them” (“Exposition” 50)—which required 
a distinctive style of thought. In coping with the burden of the past, Cousin 
sought to exercise “reflective choice” in order to reshape and improve on 
the century’s intellectual inheritance. Without any pretension to original-
ity, he selected from the history of philosophy what was most congenial 
to the spirit of the age, what seemed “true and productive,” rather than 
“sterile and false” (Lectures 25). Eclecticism was to be the “breath of life” 
making the “sterile results of erudition . . . prolific, and thus productive of 
an universal history” (Introduction 410). Eclecticism was to be the hand-
maiden of genius, standing at its side and gathering up the “prophetic 
chants that ring from age to age” (“Exposition” 151). The eclectic philoso-
pher was to play the role not of a mere critic, but of an intimate friend or 
lover; philosophy was “not to separate itself from the people, but to sym-
pathize and identify itself with them, to labor for them, while it place[d] 
its foundation in their hearts” (151). At the most fundamental level eclecti-
cism was for Cousin the process of binding together both individuals and 
ideas: when we see too many differences “between one individual and 
another, one country and another, one epoch of humanity and another, we 
feel a profound melancholy” (150). Eclecticism makes us feel better about 
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history, Cousin argued, because we see that it is not waste, solitude, and 
longing, but rather abundance, unity, and fulfillment. His frequent 
recourse to the sexualized imagery of reproduction was in keeping with 
his view that eclecticism, though not a primary creation, was the second-
ary level of creation that generated historical change. In this way, Cousin 
roused the passions of his generation for compromise and gradual reform, 
not revolution, for the juste milieu, not utopia.
Literary Assessments in France
In his 1853 preface to Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, 
Cousin seems to revise the nature of his contribution to philosophy. While 
admitting that eclecticism is the “doctrine” most often linked with his 
name, he professes that his “true doctrine” and “true flag” is spiritualism, 
a philosophy whose genealogy he traces from Socrates and Plato through 
the Gospels, Descartes, and Madame de Staël. Practical man that he was, 
he no doubt saw that enthusiasm for eclecticism was waning and that he 
needed to strengthen his position with posterity. Spiritualism, by the early 
1850s, seemed to have had more influence in shaping the literature and 
art of the Romantic generation, but in reality they were first entranced by 
the promise of eclecticism, from which Cousin’s vague spiritualism had 
evolved. In seeking a foundation for eclectic judgment, Cousin had most 
often resorted to common sense, sensibility, and emotion—to the heart. 
He concluded nearly every lecture with an inspiring evocation of divine 
power not only as an effort toward theodicy but also as an indication of 
his “acceptance of a preeminence of the divine as the source and founda-
tion of human excellence” (Bénichou 153). As Paul Bénichou has written, 
Romantic spiritualism optimistically “combin[ed] faith in God and faith 
in man” and looked to the aesthetic as the primary means of communica-
tion with the divine (153). While spiritualism seems to arise naturally from 
Romantic preoccupations, Romantic eclecticism would seem to be almost 
a contradiction in terms, given the Romantics’ exaltation of originality; but 
Cousin gave Romantic writers license to broaden their subject matter, to 
place new emphasis on psychology, to import foreign ideas, and to experi-
ment with a variety of genres. Moreover, it was particularly characteristic 
of French Romanticism to embrace novel expressions of genius while pre-
serving a proud and comforting past.
 In an incisive 1827 review of Cousin’s Oeuvres de Platon that appeared 
in Le Constitutionnel, the novelist and critic Stendhal wondered what made 
the nineteenth century so receptive to the works of Plato and why after 
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many years of neglect Plato’s message had taken hold. He expresses the 
surprise Cousin must have felt when this age “réputé si frivole” and “plein 
de lui-même et aussi affairé” received the philosopher’s gift with enthusi-
asm, and when he saw his work crossing the boundary between the intel-
lectual elite and the ordinary bourgeois—“Un livre qui [ . . . ] a charmé 
jusqu’aux femmes” (“Sur Victor Cousin” 205). A partial answer, Stendhal 
believes, is in the century’s curiosity and love of the exotic, but the com-
plete explanation is far more complex; Plato’s own philosophy was ahead 
of its time and found its spiritual match in the nineteenth century, with its 
“double character.” Far from regarding the century’s mixture of beliefs as 
symptomatic of decline, Stendhal perceives it as a cause for celebration:
Oserons-nous rendre un si bel homage à notre siècle, et sa modestie vou-
dra-t-elle l’accepter? Lui, qui croit ne pas avoir de philosophie, en a une; et 
entre la philosophie de Platon et la sienne, il y a une analogie intime et une 
sympathie profonde. (206)
[Do we dare to offer such a beautiful homage to our century, and will its 
modesty want to accept it? It believes that it does not have a philosophy, 
but it has one; and between the philosophy of Plato and that of this century, 
there is an intimate analogy and a deep sympathy.] (my translation)
The close analogy between the philosophy of Plato and that of the nine-
teenth century originates in their mutual effort to reconcile materialist and 
spiritualist philosophies, a project Stendhal interprets as an attempt to get 
beyond the historical cycle of alternating ascendancy:
La destinée de ces deux factions a été de lutter toujours, de se détrôner 
chacune à leur tour, et de dominer alternativement sur les esprits; et la 
raison en est simple: le monde et toute chose en lui ayant réellement deux 
principes, l’un matériel et visible, l’autre invisible et immatériel, la philoso-
phie qui nie ou méprise l’un de ces éléments ne peut longtemps satisfaire 
la conscience du genre humain; son insuffisance se fait sentir le jour même 
où elle est adoptée, et le lendemain commence une réaction au profit de 
la doctrine opposée. [ . . . ] L’histoire des opinions humaines n’est qu’une 
série de réactions semblables, qu’ont exercées alternativement l’une contre 
l’autre quelques grandes idées exclusives. (206)
[The destiny of these two factions was always to fight, to dethrone each 
other by turns, and to dominate alternately the spirit of the age; and the 
reason for it is simple: the world and all things in it have really two prin-
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ciples, one material and visible, the other invisible and immaterial, the 
philosophy which denies or mistakes one of these elements cannot long 
satisfy the conscience of humanity; its insufficiency is felt the very same day 
that it is adopted, and the following day begins a reaction that profits the 
opposite doctrine. [ . . . ] The history of human opinions is only a series of 
similar reactions, where exclusive ideas are exerted alternately one against 
the other.] (my translation)
Like Cousin, who believed both in historical cycles and in progress, Stend-
hal believed that the nineteenth century would be unique in its ability to 
overcome the reactionary impulse that sets in following the dominance of 
one ideological phase or another. He admits that the post-Revolutionary 
reaction against the materialism of the eighteenth century was indeed 
spiritualist in nature, and that Romantic spiritualism simply marked 
another swing of the pendulum of ideas; but with the advent of Cousin 
and his introduction of foreign thinkers (Greek, German, and Scottish) 
into French, Stendhal imagines that a new epoch of human thought is 
commencing, where the old distinctions—classical and romantic, materi-
alist and spiritualist, conservative and republican—will fall away, and that 
his age will not be “une triviale répétition de tous les siècles” (207). The 
“lumières” of the new mixed philosophy will teach that “il y a du vrai et 
du faux dans toute les opinions” (208) and that one must neither scorn any 
system nor adhere fanatically to any other.
 Accepting this truth makes progress possible: “[ . . . ] l’enfance de 
l’espèce humaine a été la proie des doctrines exclusives, et que si l’âge d’or 
est devant nous, et non point derrière, c’est que l’éclectisme est réservé à 
sa maturité” [“the childhood of humanity was prey to exclusive doctrines, 
and if the golden age is before us, and not behind us, it is because eclecti-
cism is reserved for its maturity”] (my translation) (208). Stendhal believed 
that humanity progresses only by escaping the current of reaction, some-
thing that had happened only rarely throughout history under the guid-
ance of eclectic visionaries; the cultural situation of the nineteenth century 
was analogous to that of earlier transitional periods, where eclecticism had 
overcome ideological warfare. Those eras saw progress because they were 
eclectic, but like Cousin, Stendhal is uncertain about the degree to which 
the age can choose to be eclectic. He fancies a “génie de la conciliation” 
soaring over Europe, a spirit that “est celui de l’éclectisme, et il est l’enfant 
légitime des lumières” (209). As the philosophy of the nineteenth century, 
eclecticism would complete the work of the Revolution that had freed citi-
zens from tyranny over their bodies, at last liberating the mind from the 
tyranny of exclusive ideas. The age required a philosophy whose doctrines 
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would complement the new institutions. A government that would take 
eclecticism for its guiding spirit and have “le bon sens d’obéir à ses inspi-
rations” would win over the intellectual elite of Europe and become the 
benefactor of all humanity (209). Whether Stendhal delighted, as Cousin 
would do, in the mixed government of Louis Philippe, or still anticipated 
political institutions that would genuinely reflect the diversity of the 
French people of the nineteenth century, he had articulated the desirable 
link between eclecticism and the national character or Zeitgeist, and in so 
doing made clear the powerful appeal that Cousin had for intellectuals of 
his generation.
 In reflecting on the achievements of the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, and the Romantic movement in particular, the literary critic Sainte-
Beuve singled out Victor Cousin as one of the three academicians who had 
“la plus grande influence sur la direction des esprits des études en France,” 
calling him one of “les régents de cet âge” (“Villemain” 161). Sainte-Beuve’s 
admiration was tempered, however, by shrewd realism, and an awareness 
of the shortcomings of nineteenth-century culture when measured against 
past achievements.10 Cousin, he contends, is not a true philosopher, and 
when we remove the varnish (le vernis) of the prestige conferred upon 
modern genius, Cousin appears in his real form—“le plus éloquent des 
sophistes dans le sens antique et favorable du mot”—but still a sophist (162). 
Contemporary praise distorts the worth of men such as Cousin, just as it 
overlooks their flaws. By restoring their true character and contribution, 
we see that “Ce sont là du reste les plus belles gloires réservées encore aux 
époques dites de décadence” (162). In those years marked for decline, crit-
ics must still judge their contemporaries as posterity will judge them: as 
inferior though influential men, forgettable in spite of the seeded ground 
they leave behind them.
 While the melancholy mood of second thoughts intrudes upon many 
assessments of Cousin’s legacy in later-nineteenth-century French criticism, 
nowhere is this tone more pronounced than in Sainte-Beuve’s 1847 review 
of a collection of Cousin’s lectures dating from 1815 to 1820. In these early 
lectures Cousin promises to dethrone the reigning materialist and sensual-
ist philosophy almost with the force of his personality alone, an energy that 
yet permeates even the written expression of his early romanticism and 
that provokes in Sainte-Beuve a struggle between his heart, once captured 
by Cousin, and his head, long free of the great orator’s spell. Perhaps as 
much as the loss of his own youthful naïveté, Sainte-Beuve regrets Cous-
in’s naming of the new philosophy l’éclectisme, a designation that instantly 
complicated its reception and damaged Cousin’s credibility, if not within 
his packed lecture halls, then certainly outside them, and most unfortu-
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nately beyond the borders of France. Reflecting on what eclecticism meant 
to Cousin’s enthusiastic auditors, he recalls its enduring association with 
the long ago and far away, and with an intellectual curiosity that would 
take its practitioners outside the narrow confines of their native milieu:
Qui dit éclectisme suppose la curiosité des opinions du dehors et le goût des 
voyages intellectuels. 1816 se trouvait un moment bien choisi pour inoculer 
ce goût à l’élite de la jeunesse. C’était l’heure où l’on allait commencer 
à sortir de chez soi, non plus pour se combattre, mais pour se connaître. 
(“Victor Cousin” 1023)
[Whoever says eclecticism assumes curiosity about the opinions of the out-
side world and a taste for intellectual voyages. 1816 was a moment well 
chosen to inculcate this taste in the elite youth. It was at the moment when 
they were going to leave home, no longer to fight, but to know themselves.] 
(my translation)
Sainte-Beuve rightly links the success of eclecticism among the youth of 
France to Cousin’s post-Revolutionary moment. Cousin gave students a 
model for self-cultivation and an example of intellectual curiosity that they 
could take beyond the borders of France. Indeed, Cousin’s role in bringing 
the works of foreign thinkers into French changed irreversibly the course 
of nineteenth-century culture, first with the German and Scottish influ-
ence on Romanticism (an effort begun, of course, by Madame de Staël, 
whose work Cousin acknowledges) and then with his Greek translations, 
which helped to promote a second revival of Classicism in philosophy 
and the arts. This effort to recover the most important philosophical mat-
ter from history was entirely consistent with Cousin’s eclectic principles. 
Sainte-Beuve criticized the historical approach for its limited productivity, 
but recognized its labor as central in the eclectic philosophy:
Comme toute étude d’ailleurs qui porte sur l’histoire, l’éclectisme a sa 
réalité, indépendante même de la philosophie particulière à laquelle il 
s’appuie. Quand on ne le considérait, après tout, que comme une méthode 
historique pour aborder l’examen des systèmes de philosophie dans le 
passé, il faudrait reconnaître qu’il a produit de positifs et féconds résultats. 
L’Antiquité dans ses grandes écoles, le Moyen Âge et la scolastique, la 
Renaissance et les hardis rénovateurs italiens, ont été successivement mis 
en lumière, interprétés selon leur véritable esprit; et dans ces voies diverses 
où s’avance chaque jour une studieuse élite, on retrouve partout à l’origine 
le passage lumineux, le signal et l’impulsion du maître. (1023)
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[As with any study that is supported by history, eclecticism has its reality, 
independent even of the particular philosophy on which it rests. When 
one only considers that, after all, as a historical method used to take up the 
examination of past systems of philosophy, it must be acknowledged that 
it produced some positive and fertile results. Antiquity in its great schools, 
the Middle Ages and the scholastics, the Renaissance and its bold Italian 
renovators, were successively brought to light and interpreted according to 
their true spirit; and by these diverse routes where each day a studious elite 
advances, one finds everywhere in the beginning the luminous passage, the 
signal and the impulse of the Master.] (my translation)
The “positive and fruitful results” of eclectic historical study were every-
where apparent in the schools, where the “studious elite” benefited from 
the example of Professor Cousin, but the dilemma posed by mere eclecti-
cism remained. Everyone could agree that in philosophy, as in most other 
fields, the relatively new attentiveness to and practice of history were lead-
ing to great discoveries, but of a dry and archival sort; in France, where 
people expected philosophy to offer more than a catalogue of past achieve-
ments, a collection of biographies of great men, or an anthology of the 
wisdom of the ages, Sainte-Beuve thought that the eclectic’s progress was 
an illusion, a synthetic “doctrine” for an artificial age.
 All too conscious of the tendencies of the national character, he worried 
that prejudice against the idea of eclecticism would drive underground all 
Cousin’s achievements, and the better portion (in Sainte-Beuve’s reckon-
ing) of his philosophy, le spiritualisme:
Pour les esprits superficiels et qui jugent sur l’étiquette, l’éclectisme n’a sou-
vent paru désigner qu’un procédé extérieur qui va par le monde, quetant 
et glanant les vérités à droite et à gauche, sans les avoir avant tout appro-
fondies en soi. (1023)
[For the superficial spirits and those who judge by the political label, eclec-
ticism often appeared to indicate only an external process which passes 
through the world, collecting and gleaning the truths on the right and on 
the left, without first having really understood them oneself.] (my transla-
tion)
The “thoughtless bias” against the Eclectic method, which seemed but 
“questing and gleaning” after bits of truth, ignored the depth of Cousin’s 
commitment to the study of psychology (then a science of low reputa-
tion) and the requirements of the human spirit.11 In addressing these early 
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lectures to the youth of France, “[ . . . ] à vous qui formerez la généra-
tion qui s’avance; à vous l’unique soutien, la dernière espérance de notre 
cher et malhereux pays” (qtd. 1021), Cousin links moral liberty to politi-
cal liberty and makes both contingent on their openness to the doctrine of 
eclecticism. Philosophers could no longer require ideological “servitude” 
from their followers or preach a materialism that made slaves of everyone. 
Cousin recommended eclecticism to those who could deliver France from 
the stern conflicts of the Revolutionary generation, even as they brought 
about a conceptual revolution of their own. Sainte-Beuve clearly regretted 
the lost opportunity that Cousin’s original conception of eclecticism repre-
sented for his generation.
 The literary historian Hippolyte Taine, writing in 1857 after the total 
victory of eclecticism and the juste milieu, and perhaps with a more realistic 
view of its capacities and shortcomings, explains not only the success of “la 
philosophie régnante” with intellectuals and its particular charm for mem-
bers of the French middle class, but also its failure to live up to France’s 
own philosophical tradition. Whereas Stendhal had welcomed eclecticism 
as the principle that would restore balance to history and end the cycle of 
revolutions in philosophy, Taine rejected it as a mechanical principle, a 
seductive machine that swallowed up some of the best minds of his gen-
eration. In his study of eclecticism’s rise to power, Taine emphasizes the 
significance of the post-Revolutionary mood in bringing down the phi-
losophy of the eighteenth century, and goes even further than Stendhal 
in citing those writers who were most responsible for the mind-altering 
declarations that produced the conditions necessary for eclecticism and 
an eclectic philosophy: Rousseau, who authorized sentiment, consecrated 
the ideal, and proclaimed the invisible; Madame de Staël, who preached 
exaltation and enthusiasm; Chateaubriand, who recovered the beauty of 
Christianity, changed God into a decorative artist, and overcame science 
with sympathy (296–97). These revolutionaries differed from those of pre-
vious generations in that they retained certain proclivities of their grand-
parents:
S’ils avaient perdu les habitudes d’analyse, ils avaient gardé la passion de la 
métaphysique; ils étaient à la fois sentimentaux et systématiques, et deman-
daient des théories à leur coeur. Cela produisit un style singulier, inconnu 
jusqu’alors en France, le style abstrait. Composé d’expressions vagues, il 
convient au “besoin d’idéal” et au rêve. Composé d’expressions élevées 
et grandioses, il contente le besoin d’élévation et de grandeur. Composé 
d’expressions philosophiques, il semble introduire partout la philosophie. 
On l’employa, parce qu’on était rêveur, sublime et philosophe. (297–98)
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[If they had lost the habit of analysis, they retained the passion for metaphys-
ics; they were at the same time sentimental and systematic, and demanded 
theories for the heart. That produced a singular style, unknown hitherto 
in France, the abstract style. Composed of vague expressions, it suits the 
“need for the ideal” and for the dream. Composed of elevated and grandi-
ose expressions, it contents the need for elevation and grandeur. Composed 
of philosophical expressions, it seems to introduce philosophy everywhere. 
It was employed, because one was a dreamer, sublime and philosophical.] 
(my translation)
Already joined within them were these opposing tendencies, and the 
desire to make a science of the knowledge of the heart, to produce a phi-
losophy of sentiment, and to build future liberty upon the foundation 
of diversity; but their science was unscientific, their philosophy unphi-
losophical, and their future a fantastic utopia. In Taine’s prose, we can 
sense his disgust with the dreams that carried away the previous gen-
eration—dreams that, after all, only resembled the reality they sought 
to embody—grandiose language instead of grand ideas, philosophical 
expressions instead of philosophy. The “abstract style” created by com-
bining the desire for system with rampant sentimentalism allowed its 
practitioners to imagine that they inhabited an ideal compromise, which, 
in fact, had eluded them.
 The two passions of their “renaissance” were dream and abstraction, 
which imposed on all their theories the necessity of being consoling and 
poetic, and on the dreamers the obligation of believing in theories without 
having any proof (298). The romantics were at once “sceptique, idéaliste, 
mystique, indien, païen, chrétien, humanitaire, manichéen, en stances, en 
versets, en alexandrins, en petits vers, en couplets croisés, en rimes con-
tinues” (299). This mixture of creeds infused a variety of literary genres 
and, indeed, entirely mixed works. Taine laments the popularity of plays 
and novels that make claims appropriate only in scientific treatises, and the 
representation of characters within them as instances of universal human-
ity and historical epochs, or of the need for social and political reform: 
“Nul poëte ne daigna être simplement poëte” (299). Taine argues that the 
dilemma of style in French culture before Cousin prepared the nation for 
his consoling philosophy, which allowed it to continue in its chosen track; 
in the “style abstrait et sublime,” Taine recognizes the roots of eclecticism 
and of its success:
Les motifs qui persuadaient les maîtres persuadaient les disciples; le même 
besoin régnait dans la chaire et dans l’assemblée; l’auditoire était converti 
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d’avance; on lui prouvait ce qu’il avait envie de croire; dans les sentiments 
du professeur, il applaudissait ses propres sentiments. (300–301)
[The reasons which persuaded the masters persuaded the disciples; the 
same need reigned in the pulpit and the assembly; the audience was con-
verted in advance; one proved to it what it wanted to believe; in the senti-
ments of the professor, it applauded its own sentiments.] (my translation).
France was ready for Cousin, and his primary genius lay in his abil-
ity to satisfy the wants of a population yearning to believe in something. 
Throughout his essay “Pourquoi l’éclectisme a-t-il réussi?,” Taine resorts 
to the language of seduction to explain the force of Cousin’s eclecticism as 
it swept over France and “subjugated” its people. Nascent romanticism, 
and especially the German influence,12 combined with Cousin’s “sonorous” 
monologues to transform the public into an empty vessel to be filled with 
the “mists” and dreams of the Eclectic philosophy: “[ . . . ] et le public, 
emporté sur un nuage, était ravi de planer avec lui au dessus de l’univers” 
(301). Cousin’s appeal was particularly seductive because, Taine concedes, 
he possessed real genius.
 As we have already seen, Cousin’s endeavors received their impetus 
from the historicism that became the dominant mode of viewing the past 
and coping with its legacy. In looking at the profit Cousin made from the 
“nouvel esprit” that transformed the study of history, Taine at once admires 
the way Cousin “réunit à sa philosophie l’histoire de la philosophie” and 
regrets that “le philosophe usurpa l’estime que méritait l’historien” (304). 
In describing the way this man born of working-class parents during the 
Revolution climbed into the ranks of the powerful, Taine sees Cousin 
“availing” himself of “la faveur et [ . . . ] les services de l’histoire et du 
libéralisme” and at the same time “maneuvering” into the good graces of 
the public with “la variation perpétuelle de sa doctrine et l’allure ondoyante 
de son esprit” (304). When eclecticism was thus “défendu par des hommes 
de talent, [ . . . ] il devait tout abattre et tout subjuguer” (301), and this was 
even more the case after 1830, when Cousin was engaged in continually 
modifying his philosophy to suit the various interests of the mixed govern-
ment he underwrote with his own work. He excised all of those elements 
of his philosophy that seemed too foreign or anti-Christian or republican in 
order to conciliate the offended parties of the nationalists, the Church, and 
the aristocracy. At this point Cousin begins to merit the accusations once 
hurled only at his eclecticism; such modifications and emendations were 
certainly opportunistic, and we can measure the disappointment some of 
his adherents must have felt when we compare the power of Cousin’s early 
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1815 address (keep in mind Cousin was no more than 23 years old at the 
time) to his later sophistic capitulations. Taine wrote of the same early lec-
ture that had provoked Sainte-Beuve’s nostalgic recollections:
Son succès fut d’autant plus grand qu’à ses forces naturelles il ajouta des 
forces artificielles; il profita des circonstances accidentelles commes des cir-
constances permanentes; avec ses armes propres il eut des armes étrangères, 
et, en premier lieu, l’amour de la patrie et de la liberté. Écoutez ce passage, 
sentez ce style, et dites si un Français de 1815 pouvait y résister. (301)
[Its success was all the greater since to its natural forces it added artificial 
forces; it benefited from accidental circumstances as if they were perma-
nent circumstances; to its own weapons it added foreign weapons, and, 
initially, the love of the fatherland and freedom. Listen to this passage, feel 
this style, and tell me whether a Frenchman of 1815 could resist it.] (my 
translation)
The address in which Cousin exhorts the youth of France to save their 
country by embracing his “beautiful doctrines”—his philosophy of the 
nineteenth century—struck both Sainte-Beuve and Taine with its power of 
enthusiasm. Philosophy and history joined together would enter the sphere 
of action, and be no more separated from the people who needed them; 
but Taine is deeply critical of what seem to him to be conflicting aims: 
the study of philosophy and the improvement of society, or the writing 
of literature and the reform of politics. For Taine, the proof of the failure 
of Cousin’s project to save France with philosophy came in the modifica-
tion of those doctrines in the face of intense criticism (what happened to 
the Cousin who went into exile during the 1820s to avoid persecution by 
the Restoration monarchy?). By surrendering certain of his beliefs in the 
1830s, Cousin irreparably damaged his philosophy (such as it was), even as 
he managed to seduce more followers into his camp:
Il eût été bien difficile de ne pas réussir avec tant d’adresse, avec tant de soin 
pour séduire, amuser, entraîner et ménager les esprits, avec tant de précau-
tions pour suivre ou devancer leur marche. (308)
[It would have been quite difficult not to succeed with such an address, 
with so much calculated to seduce, amuse, involve and handle the spirit, 
with so many precautions to follow or precede their functioning.] (my 
translation)
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With these “variations utiles,” Cousin had the power of a political party 
behind him, the credit of his historical researches, the silence of his foes, 
the sympathy of the spirit of the age, and his own great talent. How could 
he fail to please?
 The problem with eclecticism was apparent, then, even at its height. 
In 1857 Taine could see that the reigning philosophy tottered on its last 
legs. The public approval had turned cold, and if the public attended to 
the Eclectics at all, they did so to revel in “son beau style” (311). Was the 
doctrine ineffectual because of Cousin’s compromises of 1830? Was it stag-
nant because it failed to engage with any opposition? Eclecticism always 
backed away from conflict, preferring to see in everyone’s ideas something 
of the truth, something it could use. Had this openness to diversity finally 
destroyed eclecticism? Cousin had warned against eclecticism ever becom-
ing a school, because it could exist only as a method or principle of inquiry, 
but when it became at least the quasi-official philosophy of the ruling 
party, it abandoned its prime directive. Of course, Cousin would have dis-
agreed with this interpretation, seeing its adoption by the July Monarchy 
as a sign of the new regime’s openness to competing or foreign ideas; but 
its welcoming attitude did not foreshadow a renaissance in French phi-
losophy. Early in his essay on the success of eclecticism, Taine blames the 
philosophy of Cousin for knocking down “la philosophie philosophique” 
and for reducing “la science à une machine oratoire d’éducation et de 
gouvernement” (291). Unlike the Positive philosophy that would follow 
eclecticism, it proved nothing and knew nothing except at a distance or 
within the trammels of the heart. Most critics of eclecticism would not 
admit it was any kind of philosophy worth the name; further, they wor-
ried that it resembled, and acted as, a machine for processing ideas. What 
emerges from the machine of eclecticism—or factory with all its laborer- 
historians—is necessarily a synthetic product, a secondary creation. The 
question, then, of why eclecticism found favor among artists and writers 
remains to be answered.13
 With its dual emphases on history and universality, eclecticism freed 
artists and intellectuals from the dominance of a single, classical tradi-
tion. It demonstrated the relativity of rules and styles over time, even as 
it professed to retain access to those universal qualities that would make a 
work of art eternally appealing. Stendhal, whose infatuation with Cousin 
comes through very strongly in Racine et Shakespeare, argued that all great 
artists had been romantic in their time (a notion that would be taken up 
by the openly eclectic Walter Pater), and so the “genius of conciliation” 
that eclecticism brought to Europe freed artists to be what they had always 
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been, the cultural innovators, those important persons who were able to 
see through to new combinations.14 This hope of seeing things as they were 
derived from Cousin as well, from his importation of Platonic philosophy 
into French culture and his emphasis on the powers of the imagination: 
“The Platonic ideal could be attained by an imaginative leap beyond the 
concrete object, and Cousin claimed that the intuitive faculty underlay all 
knowledge of the world” (Boime 16). Cousin offered the Romantics a way 
to be philosophical that was compatible with being artistic. The Romantics 
were disposed to be impressed by the talent of eclecticism for combination, 
by its willingness to recognize and unite opposing styles. In 1828 Cousin 
thrilled the Romantics in the audience by legitimizing their project: “the 
eclectic spirit in literature is shown in the accord of ‘classical legitimacy 
with romantic innovation’” (Boime 16). Echoing Cousin, Lamartine wrote 
that “one must be classical in expression and romantic in thought” (qtd. 
in Boime 16). In his famous account of the novel, Balzac places himself 
within the “school, which must be named that of literary eclecticism” and 
keeps company there with Walter Scott, Madame de Staël, James Feni-
more Cooper, and George Sand. According to his definition, the literary 
eclectic “demands a representation of the world as it is,” thus combining 
the leading features of the literature of imagery and the literature of ideas 
(Balzac 127, 130). In his “painting” of modern society, Balzac cannot limit 
himself to the rigid prescriptions of the seventeenth century, because life 
has become so much more complex: “The introduction of the dramatic ele-
ment, imagery, picturesqueness, description, dialogue, seems to me indis-
pensable in modern literature” (131). Balzac summed up the affinity that 
the modern writer had for eclecticism: “perfection requires a total view of 
things.”
Cousin in Britain
The Scottish philosopher Sir William Hamilton perhaps felt obliged to 
contradict Cousin’s work after hearing of the French philosopher’s aston-
ishing popularity following his lectures of 1828–29, and though Hamilton’s 
chief purpose was not to undermine eclecticism, those portions of Cousin’s 
philosophical teachings that he chooses to challenge are contiguous to those 
his contemporary S. T. Coleridge objected to as characteristic of eclectics.15 
Hamilton’s 1829 review of Cours de philosophie: Introduction à l’Histoire 
de la Philosophie (1828) commences with expressions of admiration for 
Cousin’s success in “awakening” in his hearers “interest unexampled since 
the days of Abelard” in the “exposition of doctrines unintelligible to the 
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many” (194). Slyly, Hamilton indicates that the pretensions of his doctrine 
are proportionate to the attention it has received (but what kind of atten-
tion?—that of the crowd unaccustomed to the language of philosophy): 
“It professes to offer nothing less than to be the complement and concili-
ation of all philosophical opinion” (194). The popularity of Cousin’s doc-
trine betrays to Hamilton its weaknesses; he wins approval not from those 
colleagues capable of disputing the foundation on which he constructs his 
philosophy, but from receptive students on whom the effect of his bom-
bastic language is greater than the meaning behind it. However, Hamil-
ton ventures to meet Cousin on terms of equality, as one philosopher to 
another. Rather than cast aspersions on his character, Hamilton exam-
ines the philosophical tradition in which Cousin establishes himself and 
whether its underlying doctrines are at all sound.16
 In common with Cousin’s French critics, Hamilton recognizes that 
Cousin belongs to the phase of reaction against eighteenth-century sen-
sualism, a reaction that is dominated by German “Rationalism.” Cousin 
believes, with the rationalists Fichte and Schelling, that human reason 
is the source of truth and reality, and that “Experience affords only the 
occasions on which intelligence reveals to us the necessary and universal 
notions of which it is the complement; and these notions afford us at once 
the foundation of all reasoning, and the guarantee of our knowledge of 
existence” (196). Like Kant, Hamilton rejects the idea that human beings 
can have any knowledge of the Absolute; but men such as Cousin refused 
to be circumscribed by the narrow limits of “a philosophy of observation” 
and, according to Hamilton, revived “a bolder and more uncompromising 
Rationalism” than any that had come before. These new rationalists reject a 
philosophy of experience as “unworthy of the name of science”; since expe-
rience is transitory and contingent, it cannot be relied upon as “a proper 
basis of certainty”: “Philosophy must, therefore, either be abandoned, or 
we must be able to seize the one, the absolute, the unconditioned, imme-
diately and in itself; and this [the rationalists] profess to do by a kind of 
intellectual vision. In this act, reason, soaring not only above the world of 
sense, but beyond the sphere of personal consciousness, boldly places itself 
at the very centre of absolute being, with which it is, in fact, identified; and 
thence surveying existence in itself, and in its relations, unveils to us the 
nature of the Deity, and explains, from first to last, the derivation of all 
created things” (197). Hamilton concedes that Cousin is not devoted exclu-
sively to “Rationalism,” but in fact attempts to “combine the philosophy of 
experience, and the philosophy of pure reason, into one” (198). Hamilton 
does not explicitly link the privileged position offered by “Rationalism” 
with the eclectic’s need to occupy the “very centre of absolute being,” but 
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it is clear that Cousin’s philosophy cannot exist without such egocentrism. 
The ideal perspective of the eclectic exists outside of the transitory view-
points of other systems, because it must be the judge of them all. If the 
eclectic cannot reproduce the transcendent vision of the Absolute, then he 
or she will not be able to escape the confines of the Zeitgeist; however, it 
is the paradox of eclecticism as Cousin formulates it not only to be the 
philosophy, even the spirit, of the nineteenth century but also to overcome 
the specific conditions of the age in order to find truth wherever it existed 
throughout time. Hamilton, of course, denies that any person can achieve 
a perspective outside of time, such as must belong to the Deity alone.
 While the target of Hamilton’s attack is not eclecticism, he attempts to 
destroy the foundation on which Cousin has erected his philosophy: the 
sovereignty of human reason. Cousin teaches that reason has three inte-
grated elements: 1) unity, absolute cause, the infinite (what Hamilton calls 
the unconditioned); 2) plurality, relative cause, difference (the conditioned); 
and 3) intelligence, which is composed of unity and plurality as cause and 
effect, the realization of the one through the other (198). The logical out-
come of this doctrine is to recognize “Man [as] the microcosm of existence” 
and reason as divine, since it is “a revelation of God in man” (199). When 
we create, we mimic the divine nature, and activate the “free causality” 
that exists within each human mind; the principles that created the uni-
verse are still at work within us, the “law of expansion” that moves unity 
toward variety, and the “law of attraction” that returns variety to unity 
(199). Hamilton cannot accept the premise that human reason can have any 
grasp of the Absolute or the Infinite, in other words, of God, and at best, 
human reason comprehends only the “conditionally limited” (203). Such a 
proscription makes philosophical inquiry impotent and irrelevant, at least 
according to those Rationalists who believe that philosophy can exist only 
as the study of the unconditioned.17 By contrast, Cousin seeks to enlist psy-
chology in the service of philosophy, in order to prove that the Absolute is 
indeed knowable and conceivable by the human mind through reflection, 
“under relation, difference, and plurality” (202). It is this manner of know-
ing the one unity, the Absolute, or God, that gives Hamilton the ammuni-
tion for his attack: “it is asserted to be known as absolute unity, i.e.[,] as 
the negation of all plurality, while the very manner by which it is known, 
affirms plurality as the condition of knowledge itself” (217). On this basis 
Hamilton announces that eclecticism is a “signal failure” because Cousin’s 
“reliance on the powers of man” can “end only in disappointment” (220). 
Human beings can indeed reflect upon the nature of existence, thus sepa-
rating and distinguishing its elements, but they cannot put it back together 
again—they cannot create unity from variety. Hamilton perceives the sin 
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of the eclectic to be one of overreaching, of believing that what we labor to 
attain, we have in fact accomplished.
 The specific features of Hamilton’s objections are significant consider-
ing the shape eclecticism would take in Britain. As Hamilton builds his 
case against the conceivability of the Absolute, he lights on Cousin’s equa-
tion of human reason with the divine, specifically the way Cousin uses this 
premise to construct the ideal perspective of the eclectic. Cousin’s eclecti-
cism depends on difference, relation, and plurality, on being able to repro-
duce the action of the reflective mind, which separates and distinguishes; 
and, more substantially, it must mimic the activity of the creative mind, 
which joins together what has been torn asunder. Hamilton perceives the 
relation in Cousin’s philosophy between reflection in the individual, and 
the practice of history, and the necessity of a history of philosophy “with all 
its elements, with all their relations, and with all their laws, represented in 
striking characters by the hands of time and of history, in the visible prog-
ress of the human mind” (201). This endeavor provides Cousin with the 
lofty vantage point he needs to discern the relations among previous sys-
tems, to overcome the partiality of reflection, and of history, and to reunite 
the dispersed products of human intelligence. The arrogance of the eclectic 
in his appropriation of God’s singular view looked very much like atheism 
or, worse, a boundless confidence in humanity that would render “God as 
a necessary postulate for proper moral action”18 completely irrelevant.
 Sir William Hamilton suffered, after his death, the same ignoble fate 
as Cousin, which was to be thoroughly refuted and utterly forgotten, but 
he did make an early and significant contribution to the debate on eclec-
ticism in Britain. By far the most important opposition, however, came 
from the pen of philosopher and critic George Henry Lewes, who wanted 
to expose eclecticism as a mirage and its founder as a dangerous charla-
tan. In his 1844 review “The Modern Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy 
of France,” he endeavors to explain the current state of philosophy in a 
country known only for its “sensualism and atheism” and to guide readers 
through the errors of various systems to the truth of positivism. The occa-
sion of the review allows Lewes to launch the positive philosophy of his 
hero Auguste Comte in Great Britain, but this goal necessitates the defeat 
of positivism’s chief rival to the title “philosophy of the nineteenth cen-
tury.” Whereas Hamilton focused on the tendency of eclecticism to pro-
mote unbelief through its arrogant assumption of a god’s-eye view, Lewes 
exposes its tendency to be unscientific when it advances metaphorical 
explanations of phenomenological problems. Lewes commences his critical 
survey of French philosophy with a brief analysis of what all nineteenth-
century philosophical systems do share, namely that they are “dogmatical 
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and constructive” where the philosophy of the eighteenth century had 
been “sceptical and destructive,” spiritual rather than material, religious 
rather than opposed to religion. The method of nineteenth-century phi-
losophy is historical, where that of the last century “invert[ed] the results of 
historical experience, and boldly asserted that civilization was the gradual 
process of degeneration [ . . . ] placing the golden age in the past, instead of 
the future; and calling on mankind to return to that primitive state” (355). 
Emancipated from this “misconception of the nature of social organisa-
tion,” the philosophy of the nineteenth century proceeds on the assump-
tion that society is “inseparable from man” and that “in its perfection we 
must seek the perfection of mankind” (355). For Lewes this healthy his-
toricism is as characteristic of the eclectics as it is of Auguste Comte (and 
all the other new schools). Since all hold these values in common, Lewes 
builds the case for positivism by destroying eclecticism’s right to call itself a 
science—and without the prestige of the “positive” sciences attached to it, 
eclecticism and all other philosophies would disappear, no longer having 
any “practical bearing” on the development of society.
 Like Hamilton, whose essay on Cousin he cites here, Lewes identifies 
the first error of the eclectics as their presumption that human beings can 
have knowledge of anything but phenomenological laws. Seeking knowl-
edge of essences, the eclectics are led into the familiar trap of believing that 
their naming of a thing has made it comprehensible. Cousin and his chief 
follower Théodore Jouffroy claimed that the mind could be “an object to 
itself” that would be observed by the mind’s eye, the “oeil interne.” Lewes 
declares this notion “too palpably absurd” (366), and ridicules Cousin and 
Jouffroy as “caricatures of men” (364) who bring the doctrines of legitimate 
philosophers (such as Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart) into contempt. 
How can the internal eye observe what is passing in the mind, when the 
instant it does so, the mind can contemplate only the effort at observation 
taking place? Lewes compares such an effort to the eye trying to see itself 
seeing. (Would it matter to Lewes that we can observe ourselves seeing 
simply by looking in the mirror? This could be a metaphor for the reflex-
iveness of the mind’s eye.) He seems to quibble over the basis of psychology 
when he accepts that the mind can be known to itself in recollection, when 
the facts of consciousness are repeated often enough that we become aware 
of the pattern, but not so long as we are trying to catch ourselves in the act 
of thought (365). As will often be the case in Lewes’s critique of eclecti-
cism, he objects to Cousin’s use of metaphors where only facts ought to be 
relevant or admissible; but Lewes’s approach overlooks the extent to which 
human beings still depend on metaphorical explanations of things beyond 
the reach of ordinary understanding. In fact, Lewes’s support of Comte 
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depends in large part on his acceptance of Comte’s evolutionary scheme of 
the mind, which posits that understanding is first supernatural and ficti-
tious, then metaphysical and abstract, and, finally, positive and scientific. 
Cousin’s abstractions do not belong to a scientific age—they might even be 
a form of primitive knowledge—and seem to limp far behind the verifi-
able matter of those sciences that do claim to have a practical bearing on 
society.19
 Using metaphors to fill the void of absent facts is one of the aspects 
of Cousin’s style to which Lewes most objects, but this continual recourse 
to literary tropes points to a problem in Cousin of much greater propor-
tions, his showmanship. Lewes names Cousin “the most showy [of liv-
ing metaphysicians],” in whose writing one finds “splendour of diction; a 
richness, variety, and purity of exposition; an enthusiasm in manner, and 
an erudition extensive though inaccurate”—“The style of Cousin is very 
near perfection” (367–68). What worries Lewes is the way Cousin takes in 
his audience with what amounts to a brilliant performance in the role of 
philosopher, a profession for which Cousin claims few qualifications and 
little training, having taken over the Chair of Royer-Collard at the age of 
twenty-three. Lewes challenges Cousin’s seemingly unassailable claim to 
fame, those well-known products of his erudition: the editions and transla-
tions of the great works of philosophy. Even Hamilton was taken in, Lewes 
says, by Cousin’s reputation “as the translator of Plato and the editor of 
Proclus and Des Cartes; as the expositor of Kant and Hegel” (368), and 
so long as one looked only at his reputation, admiration was still possible; 
but as soon as one inspected the basis of this reputation, Lewes warns, one 
would discover that his reputation was as much a tissue of lies as his phi-
losophy: “When we look into [his reputation] and see how it was obtained, 
a feeling of something very like contempt can hardly be restrained; for it 
then turns out that Cousin did not translate Plato; did not write the ‘Leçons 
sur Kant;’ [sic] and that his doctrines are the unacknowledged pillage of 
Hegel and his friends, joined to a caricature of the method of Stewart” 
(368). Lewes relates how he discovered, during a visit to Paris, the actual 
translators of Plato, capable but poor young men, “glad of employment, 
and glad of [Cousin’s] patronage” (369), who were enlisted to do the hard 
work of rendering Plato’s ideas intelligible (370), while Cousin merely 
went over the completed translation, “correcting and polishing the style 
(as he alone can polish), and wrote the argumentary prefaces” (369). Anx-
ious to remove even the smallest credit from Cousin, Lewes adds that 
“these prefaces often display a curious misunderstanding of the nature 
of the dialogues they precede!”—that is to say, Cousin did not bother to 
read the work carefully before adding his fictions to it. The work on Kant 
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evolved in a similar fashion, Lewes claims, with a young man laboring at 
the exposition of Kant’s ideas and Cousin polishing the style, contributing 
“two chapters of perfectly written gossip, named criticism,” and placing 
his name on the title page (369). At this point Lewes can barely contain 
his rage against the man whose outward brilliance cast a man of Comte’s 
talents into the shadows: “It is difficult to preserve the respect due to a man 
of M. Cousin’s unquestionable ability and attainments, when we see them 
coupled to such acts of charlatanerie; and we are the more anxious to call 
attention to these facts, because they enable us to understand the contradic-
tions of his philosophy, and to trace in that a kindred mode of operation” 
(369).20 In Lewes’s opinion, Cousin has contributed nothing to philosophy, 
stealing all of his ideas from original thinkers, and varnishing them with 
his exquisite style. “Faithful” to no master, Cousin’s enthusiasm for each 
of his successive subjects carries his students along; but his exposition “has 
always more or less misrepresented, sometimes caricatured, the doctrines 
he professed to expound” (370). Perhaps intending to deliver the final blow 
of the wrecking ball, Lewes declares that the “striking predilection for lit-
erature” Cousin manifested when a student at the École Normale should 
have carried him into an altogether different career, where this talent 
would “have procured him a brilliant and more honourable success” (370). 
As Lewes argues, Cousin’s flaws as a philosopher—his plagiarism, liter-
ary and showy style, and unscientific approach—all feed into and upon 
his eclectic principle. In particular, the charge of being overly literary will 
become important as we contend with the problem of verifiability that 
Lewes perceives in eclecticism.
 Following his destruction of Cousin’s reputation, Lewes embarks on 
the demolition of Cousin’s only substantial contribution to philosophy and 
the mental development of the species, his eclecticism. In his Biographical 
History of Philosophy, Lewes wants to dismiss eclecticism as “nothing but 
a misconception of Hegel’s ‘History of Philosophy’” (773), but grudgingly 
proceeds, as he does in his 1844 review, to analyze its usefulness in writ-
ing the history of philosophy and in philosophical inquiry more generally. 
Lewes readily concedes that Cousin does not profess to be original but 
“rests his claim as a thinker on the development of a method which is to 
reconcile all thinkers and which is to resume in one body of doctrine all the 
truths that lie scattered through the incomplete systems of others” (“The 
Modern Metaphysics” 374). By way of clarifying his master’s dictates, Jouf-
froy explains that this method would operate by juxtaposition: with all 
the great monuments of philosophy arrayed alongside one another, made 
known by the labors of the historians and translators, it would be the task of 
the eclectic to organize them properly, with “the questions [ . . . ] arranged 
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in their legitimate order, with the truths discovered concerning each by 
the different philosophers, so that the whole should form a methodical sci-
ence, in which we could perceive at a glance both what we know and what 
remains to be discovered” (qtd. 374). With the troops thus assembled, the 
eclectic would have merely to point out the weaknesses in each individual 
system, and set them aside, leaving the strengths to grow together. Lewes 
seems to shake his head in wonder at the naïveté Jouffroy exhibits here, an 
ingenuousness that seems genuinely unaware of the need for a “criterion 
of truth.” The first problem with the eclectic operation Jouffroy describes 
stems from the definition of error, which Lewes calls “fallacious”: “Error 
is often an incomplete view of the truth, but not always” (375). By way 
of example, Lewes reminds his readers that Newton did indeed burden 
his laws of attraction with the medium of ether (an error), but he’d got 
the laws right; on the other hand, Descartes developed a theory of vortices 
that was altogether wrong, and contained no salvageable truth. Since only 
some systems contain portions of truth, while others have none at all, how 
will the eclectic “select those systems which do contain them” (376) and 
not preserve error from those which do not into the bargain? What if the 
farmer does not know the wheat from the chaff? “He can only separate 
it by virtue of his previous knowledge,” Lewes argues, and therefore, the 
eclectic must know the truth already, at least by its relation to those truths 
that he has already ascertained, “and then he is in possession of a philoso-
phy in which he includes the discoveries of others, as the chemist includes 
any discovery made in any other quarter of the globe” (376). According to 
Lewes, the eclectic is in a vicious circle, seeking a system of philosophy by 
arranging the truths of other systems, but to do this he must already know 
these truths and thus be already in possession of a system; and, further, 
as in all the sciences, the discoveries of others will help him on his way. 
No one has ever been completely original, Lewes acknowledges, so what 
makes eclecticism special? It makes others do all the work! Lewes jokes at 
Cousin’s expense. Actually, eclecticism is nothing more than “a subsidiary 
process” in any field of inquiry, and is essential to the student’s success. 
The idea that eclecticism could become primary, let alone the philosophy 
of the century, strikes Lewes as ridiculous.
 Lewes destroys any pretension eclecticism could have to be a sys-
tem, but he is unable to arrest its force as a tendency of the age, a way 
of operating in response to a potentially overwhelming historical inheri-
tance. He does not attempt to explain why Cousin, despite his unscien-
tific assertions and careless plagiarisms, exerted such a powerful attraction 
over his audience, or why eclecticism, with its ethereality and outrageous 
hubris, nonetheless satisfied the need for both psychological explanation 
Part I: Toward an Age of Eclecticism
8
and practical application. Whether Lewes means to denigrate the literary 
when it is found in association with the eclectic is unclear; more likely, 
he wishes to establish philosophy on scientific grounds by wresting it out 
of the hands of the idealists and humanists. When Lewes equates being 
literary with being eclectic, as in the case of Cousin, he implies that the 
opposition between the culture of science, represented in philosophical 
terms by positivism, and the culture of arts and letters, or the humani-
ties, represented in philosophical terms by eclecticism, runs deeper than 
mere methodological disagreements. W. M. Simon, writing on the “two 
cultures” in nineteenth-century France, sees Comte’s attack on the psy-
chological foundation of Cousin’s eclecticism, specifically its use of “intro-
spection”—or l’oeil interne—as exemplifying their differences. For Comte 
introspection was unscientific (48), and he denied that it could have any 
value for the study of mental phenomena. Lewes believed that unscientific 
philosophical inquiry had no value for a society that had passed into the 
third stage of mental development, the positivist. Positivism would also 
be instrumental in overcoming the “intellectual anarchy of Europe” (396), 
the condition of being uncritically or naïvely eclectic. The metaphorical 
abstractions of Cousin seemed to linger behind in the transitional age; 
indeed, most eclectics understood their activity as transitive, getting soci-
ety, or a particular art form, from one stage of development to the next, 
but they are much less specific than Lewes was about what the new society 
ought to look like, though he did not doubt that positivism would supply 
all the religion and art that a scientific culture might require.
 Not all Britons responded negatively to the eclectic philosophy imported 
from France. A decade after Cousin’s death, William Angus Knight, 
a professor of moral philosophy at the University of St. Andrews, Scot-
land, addressed his students on the reviled system of philosophy known as 
eclecticism, and the need to recover its spirit in modern practice. How far 
Cousin had fallen in the fifty years since delivering his sensational 1828–
29 lectures to some two thousand auditors at the Sorbonne is betrayed by 
Knight’s avoidance of Cousin’s name in an exposition that probably owed 
a great deal to his eminent precursor. Knight follows Cousin in recogniz-
ing eclecticism to be more than a philosophical system. Where Cousin had 
defined eclecticism as both “a principle in the labyrinth of history” and 
“an instrument [of] rigid criticism sustained on a solid and extensive eru-
dition,” Knight taught that “It is both a system and a tendency; a formal 
philosophical doctrine, and a spirit of philosophizing” (44). In the 1878 lec-
ture “On Eclecticism,” he clarifies its essential nature as a constant mode 
of thought, rather than focusing on its historical outlines: “What I wish 
to put before you is its general speculative drift, its leading features, and 
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permanent tendency. These may be seen, not only from the phases it has 
assumed as a coherently developed doctrine, but even more characteristi-
cally from its unconscious presence, within the lines and under the limits 
of the systems which have ignored it. Wherever the effort to reconcile the 
claims of rival doctrines has taken the place of a one-sided advocacy of 
special views, the result, to the extent of the reconciliation, has been eclec-
tic” (44). Knight directly echoes Cousin here, who had earlier claimed that 
eclecticism was not new, but has been around forever, as compromise and 
reconciliation. Conceding that the propositions of eclecticism seem “self-
evident,” and that there is always truth on both sides of every great contro-
versy, Knight imagines eclecticism as scales keeping the sects in balance. 
Periods of compromise inevitably follow from periods of controversy. 
The chasm between opposing views widens until each forgets the truth 
to which the other lays claim. While Knight’s conception of the histori-
cal rhythm of ideas is not uncommon in the nineteenth century, he firmly 
positions eclecticism as an essential element within this pattern: “A state 
of perpetual controversy amongst the sects [ . . . ] would do no particular 
good, if it did not lead to a better appreciation of their respective merits; 
and we find that an eclectic or reconciling movement generally follows, 
and is produced by, the controversies of the schools” (47–48). Positing that 
eclecticism always follows periods of conflict, Knight echoes the predic-
tion and hope of many of his contemporaries that criticism would lead 
ultimately to new sources of inspiration: Macaulay perceived that Dryden’s 
eclecticism allowed him to develop new talents as a critic that led to the 
founding of a critical school of poetry, while architectural historian Robert 
Kerr observed that eclecticism had at last produced a synthesis of styles, 
giving birth to the style of the nineteenth century.
 In answer to the charge of dilettantism leveled at eclectics, Knight 
emphasized, as Cousin had done, the rigorous critical process and vast 
erudition that underlay his philosophical method. Knight has to make his 
stand for eclecticism by taking on its dilettante reputation. People have 
misunderstood eclecticism, Knight proposes, because the term seems “to 
indicate the really elementary process of gathering together bits of systems, 
and arranging them in what must be at the best an artificial patchwork. 
No wonder that the result of a mere collection of memorabilia, however 
carefully made, should be a product without unity, coherence, or vitality. A 
system that resolved itself into a ‘golden treasury’ of elegant extracts would 
deserve the neglect of all competent logicians, and of every serious thinker” 
(45). The dangers of this low form of eclecticism—this mere anthologiz-
ing of choice tidbits of wisdom—were apparent in the arts as well as in 
politics and philosophy, during the nineteenth century. Cheap imitations 
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and popular collections threatened the “unity, coherence, [and] vitality” of 
the arts, by compromising artists’ original creations, tearing apart coherent 
styles, and vitiating the power of complete poems, novels, and essays. How 
was an eclectic to prove he or she was not being, according to common 
usage, eclectic?
 Eclecticism could never be content with “mild and hazy common-
places” but would conserve “every intellectual difference that is the out-
come of distinctive thought, and of a true interpretation of the universe; 
only, it makes room, alongside of each interpretation, for others that have 
usually been held to be inconsistent and incompatible with it” (50). The 
eclectic does not mix up systems, or create a “golden treasury” of the best 
bits of others’ ideas, but preserves the integrity of each idea on the road to 
finding the greatest sum of truth. Since history had shown “uniformity of 
belief” to be impossible, and that disagreement would persist as long as 
humanity did, the eclectic would be there to push the adversaries through 
the stalemate. “With every cycle will come a new phase of insight, a new 
attitude of feeling towards the universe,” and the absence of controversy 
“would imply the decadence of the intellect, the withering of the imagina-
tion, and the stoppage of the pulse of the human heart” (51). Eclecticism 
would have to be an ongoing process that would never cease while con-
troversy remained or ideas flourished; eclecticism and controversy would 
always be with us because of human diversity and because of the unity 
of human nature. Unity within diversity “constitute[s] the root or ground 
of eclecticism” (53). If eclecticism could not rest upon any Utopian pla-
teau of human knowledge and achievement, then it could never become a 
“school” in its own right. Knight warns that in “laying the foundation of 
a school, the eclectic becomes sectarian, and thus commits an act of intel-
lectual suicide” (59). More a “regulative principle in all systems, and the 
outcome of all” than the “distinctive badge” of any one, eclecticism must 
reach its perfection in its utility, impartiality, and variety. Knight believed 
that far from leading to “inaction” or “supineness” as critics feared, eclec-
tics would be ever alert to changes in society, restless in the quest for truth, 
and exacting in the study of history.
X
Eclecticism seemed “literary” to Lewes because it operated metaphorically 
and comparatively, secured its followers on the basis of its beautiful style, 
and had impetus from what he and other critics such as Taine and Stend-
hal considered a “literary reaction” against the materialist culture of the 
eighteenth century. As part of his effort to tear down the lofty claims of 
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eclecticism, Lewes had compared Jouffroy’s eclectic maneuver to that of 
the chemist, who of necessity consulted all those works that had bearing 
on his own experiments; but for the scientist this was not a matter of juxta-
posing treatises and waiting to be inspired by their truth. Although Lewes 
intended to demonstrate that eclecticism was in no way an original idea or 
anything more than the common-sense procedure followed by any sensible 
scientist, was it just possible that eclecticism could offer a model whereby 
the humanities could mimic the progress of the sciences? In his famous 
essay on Milton, T. B. Macaulay argues that scientists progress by building 
on the discoveries of their predecessors, while artists generally experience 
a diminution of energy and creativity in response to the marvelous works 
of their precursors. What if Cousin and Jouffroy did indeed offer an alter-
native model of creativity, in which the historical inheritance itself would 
become the source of inspiration? As Taine suggests, eclecticism simply 
developed from impulses already present in the culture of the nineteenth 
century, so its imitation of scientific culture is not surprising; however, it 
is not a philosophy intended for the use of scientists but an idea meant to 
help those engaged in the humanistic disciplines to organize knowledge 
and those practicing art to deal with the anxiety of influence.
10
s the eclectic idea crossed the Channel to grapple with mani-
fest eclecticism, resistance to the philosophy grew in direct 
proportion to the rapidity with which British culture was 
becoming fundamentally eclectic. Not crippled by polarized ideologies as 
France had been, British philosophers and critics did not feel the powerful 
attraction to Cousin’s teachings that had once moved Stendhal to name 
Cousin the greatest philosopher of the age for his ability to overcome the 
destructive cycle of reaction and revolution. The culture of nineteenth- 
century Britain seemed to be under assault from the very forces of diver-
sity and difference that Cousin harnessed to his catholic theory of eclec-
ticism. The Victorians would become eclectic as the study of history 
promoted relativism and stimulated the adoption of multiple historical 
styles. They would become eclectic as a capitalist economy made the prod-
ucts of past and present, colonial and Continental cultures available to the 
middle classes through cheap reproduction. They would become eclectic 
as modern latitudinarianism overcame religious intolerance and encour-
aged acceptance of competing systems of belief. And they would become 
eclectic as widespread education propagated superficial knowledge and 
spread the veneer of civilization and taste over classes once distinguished 
by unequal access to culture. Self-conscious eclecticism was certainly at 
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work in the organization of such characteristically Victorian institutions as 
the museum of art and natural history, the public lecture series, the collec-
tion of biographies, the literary anthology, the keepsake and treasury, and 
the international exhibition. Advancing with the tide of changes that were 
decentering and diffusing national identity, eclecticism, aimed as it was at 
the educated classes, looked as though it would overflow the last remain-
ing stronghold of British culture—its press. If the literati succumbed to the 
sweet nothings of Cousin, then nothing remained but to give over respon-
sibility for culture to the masses and to submit to the dictates of popular 
opinion.
 Although Cousin’s writings were translated into English and widely 
reviewed in Britain, few philosophers would have been willing to avow 
publicly any allegiance to the French thinker, or to consider themselves 
part of an Eclectic school. This reluctance to embrace Cousin’s eclecticism 
cannot be explained only by its weaknesses (which were discussed on both 
sides of the Channel); indeed, Cousin offered both a cogent analysis of and 
a solution for handling the new cultural situation common to both coun-
tries. Yet eclecticism was not embraced in England, as it was in France, 
and Cousin was despised even though he was proposing and advocating 
the same kind of “glorious revolution” that had already been successful 
in Britain. His juste milieu was automatically mistrusted at least partly 
because he was French—because it seemed to represent all those tendencies 
of French thought against which the English defined their own national 
identity. As late as 1840 John Stuart Mill, in a review of Tocqueville, 
feels compelled to address the general unwillingness of British readers to 
engage with French philosophy (to which Tocqueville makes “a brilliant 
exception”): “At a time when the prevailing tone of French speculation is 
one of exaggerated reaction against the doctrines of the eighteenth cen-
tury, French philosophy, with us, is still synonymous with Encyclopedism. 
The Englishmen may almost be numbered who are aware that France has 
produced any great names in prose literature since Voltaire and Rousseau” 
(214). Mill, who was early influenced by Cousin, laments the “insular” ten-
dencies of British thought, which, in spite of French being “almost univer-
sally cultivated on this side of the Channel,” prevent his countrymen from 
being drawn into “The general movement of the European mind” (214). 
At the time of Mill’s review, the “prevailing tone” of French thought and 
the “general movement of the European mind” had been established by 
Cousin, who was also firmly in control of higher education in France, and 
Mill’s unwillingness to speak his name is indicative of the uneasiness about 
Cousin in Britain. Mill’s reference to Voltaire is significant, in light of his 
place in the negative Gallic stereotype that was still in force well into the 
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Victorian period. As historian Gerald Newman has written, “The chief 
intellectual components of the Gallic stereotype, Britain’s distorted image 
of revolutionary France, were evidently the ideas of destruction, license, 
abstract political thought, atheism, and impious mockery” (389). In the 
nineteenth century the Gallic stereotype was applied to “analogous tenden-
cies of unbelief, moral laxity, ridicule, generalizing philosophy, and cosmo-
politanism” (397; author’s italics)—all of which might have been associated 
with Cousin and eclecticism. Developed during the revolutionary period, 
the Gallic stereotype was used from the start to “uproot international 
ideas,” and eclecticism embodied an ideal of internationalism that Britain 
could not easily accept. That British writers could not acknowledge the 
French contribution to understanding the cultural situation, however, does 
not mean they did not take up the same ideas or face the same problems. 
The Gallic stereotype was linked to elitist decadence and mass culture, a 
dualism that parallels Victorian responses to eclecticism, particularly in the 
emerging discourse about literary modernity.
The Eclectic Mind
The history of the idea of eclecticism has been repeatedly punctuated by 
the same accusation: in seeking to find the best in everything and everyone, 
the eclectic bankrupts meaning. In an early critique of modern eclecticism, 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge challenges the foundation of the “philosophy of 
the nineteenth century.” Writing his Biographia Literaria between 1815 
and 1817, Coleridge might have got wind of Victor Cousin’s lectures of the 
same period in which the Frenchman first advanced the modern theory 
of eclecticism.1 In the biographical miscellany, Coleridge is concerned to 
construct and justify his conservative opinions in the wake of an attack 
by Hazlitt on the poet’s early support of the French Revolution; thus he is 
careful to distance himself from any hazy or confused doctrines, of which 
eclecticism could easily become an example. Coleridge borrowed the essen-
tial material of his statement against eclecticism from Schelling:
But the worst and widest impediment [to metaphysics] still remains. It is 
the predominance of a popular philosophy, at once the counterfeit and the 
mortal enemy of all true and manly metaphysical research. It is that cor-
ruption, introduced by certain immethodical aphorising Eclectics, who, 
dismissing not only all system, but all logical connection, pick and choose 
whatever is most plausible and showy; who select, whatever words can 
have some semblance of sense attached to them without the least expen-
Chapter : Eclecticism and Literary Modernity
105
diture of thought, in short whatever may enable men to talk of what they 
do not understand, with a careful avoidance of every thing that might 
awaken them to a moment’s suspicion of their ignorance. This alas! is an 
irremediable disease, for it brings with it, not so much an indisposition to 
any particular system, but an utter loss of taste and faculty for all system 
and all philosophy. (167)
Like Schelling, Coleridge wants to explain why his contemporaries had 
lost their taste for philosophy. Eclecticism was partly to blame, because it 
substituted an “impotent sham philosophy” for analytical study and “apho-
ristic” wisdom for patient philosophical inquiry (Works 7.1:292). Coleridge 
adds depth to Schelling’s briefer description with terms that would become 
essential in later critiques of eclecticism. First, he indicates that eclecticism 
is “popular”; even if he was unaware of Cousin as a rising star in phi-
losophy, he could have predicted the wide appeal that the eclectic principle 
would have, how it would soothe minds tortured by the difficult choices 
offered by ideologies. As Scottish philosopher William Angus Knight 
would later concede, eclecticism’s chief proposition is an obvious one: there 
is generally truth on both sides of any question. Coleridge must have seen 
how the ordinary mind reaches for the indisputable truth, the easy resolu-
tion, and then shows it triumphantly before the bickering ideologues and 
academics, asking, “what are you fools arguing about? Your battles are 
pointless, your foes imaginary. Join us here in the practical world!”
 Coleridge next identifies eclecticism as the “counterfeit” and “enemy 
of all true and manly metaphysical research” (167). All of Cousin’s major 
critics in Britain—Sir William Hamilton and George Henry Lewes in 
particular—would expose what they believed to be his false assumptions 
and exhortatory style that served to mask the emptiness of his proposi-
tions. They would complain, in much the same terms used by French critic 
Hippolyte Taine, that he convinces his auditors with grand schemes and 
epic generalizations that but mimic, or counterfeit, genuine philosophi-
cal inquiry. For Coleridge, the eclectic method is “unmanly” because it 
bypasses rigorous analysis in favor of historical presentations and uses the 
work done by others in a haphazard manner to forward its own agenda. 
“Manly” research involves, it seems, stern self-discipline, perhaps even the 
sacrifice of one’s health and happiness, to discover a fragmentary truth—a 
truth that will have been earned, not stolen. The ambivalence in some 
criticism toward Cousin and his eclectic principle would stem from the 
recognition that he labored over his history of philosophy, over all those 
editions and translations, but that he expended little thought (to para-
phrase Coleridge) in putting his system together. In fact, the eclectic seems 
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to justify his historical study by claiming for it a power to change lives that 
history as such does not normally possess. Hamilton would go so far as to 
say that Cousin did not understand what he was talking about. Coleridge 
believes that this was true of all Eclectics, but that their system allows them 
to proceed without “awaken[ing] them to a moment’s suspicion of their 
ignorance” (167). This “irremediable disease,” as Coleridge describes it, of 
a mistaken belief in one’s own powers of discernment encourages a person 
to rely on himself alone for judging true and false, good and evil, moral 
and immoral.
 Third, Coleridge introduces the theme of “corruption,” which for him 
signifies the destruction of system and “all logical connection.” Corrup-
tion would also come to be synonymous with decadence, one of the chief 
complaints against eclecticism in the arts, and with a presentiment of cul-
tural decline. Critics of eclecticism do not always distinguish whether this 
fall would be the result of a venal or a cardinal sin—another valence of 
corruption for Coleridge—whether from pollution of the old systems by 
foreign influences, such as those from the rising classes of the anarchis-
tic Continent, or from open rebellion and blasphemy. Certainly, eclecti-
cism was intended to be a conciliatory philosophy, but once people began 
to “pick and choose,” and to decide for themselves which portions of a 
doctrine they found agreeable enough to retain, then the integrity of any 
particular system would be destroyed. Of course, this picking and choos-
ing would be most problematic when it came to one’s religion. For exam-
ple, could one still be a faithful member of the Church of England if he 
or she decided that the style of medieval Catholicism better expressed the 
essence of Christianity? Were all those Gothic stone churches expressive of 
a resurgent core belief, or did they simply reflect the trend toward super-
ficiality in worship? More specifically, if one rejected, say, the doctrine of 
transubstantiation but believed all the rest of the teachings of the Church 
of Rome, could one still be Catholic? If people began to ignore the organic 
development and coherence of a system, and to select only “whatever is 
most plausible [or] showy,” or proper to the spirit of the age, then what is 
to prevent them from inventing their versions of each doctrine and each 
system, just as it suits them? (One could argue that this is ultimately what 
has happened with religion in the twenty-first century, where we see the 
endless splintering of religious sects, the mixing of pop culture with reli-
gion, or selective obedience on the part of members of mainstream reli-
gions.) For conservatives, eclecticism signifies a catastrophic disregard of 
traditional authorities. For liberals, eclecticism represents emancipation of 
the individual mind. For radicals, eclecticism portends the reign of medi-
ocrity.
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 Coleridge’s encapsulation of the opposition to eclecticism draws upon 
both conservative and radical opinions. Seeing that such a principle tends 
toward disintegration, rather than the ideal unity in diversity imagined 
by Cousin, toward the appearance of truth rather than the true, and 
toward indecision rather than decisive action, a philosopher-artist such 
as Coleridge would necessarily place his trust in traditional authority for 
holding negative social impulses in check and in the individual imagina-
tion for generating creative ideas. However, it would be misleading to 
overlook the eclectic qualities of Coleridge’s own work. In an amusing 
echo of his denunciation of “immethodical” Eclectics, he refers to his own 
Biographia as “an immethodical miscellany” (qtd. in Leask xxviii)—part 
biography, part literary criticism, part metaphysics, part literary theory, 
part history of philosophy, part philology, part exhortation, and part apol-
ogy. The multiplicity of purpose matches the diversity of method and style 
employed in discovering and communicating his opinions. In the chapter 
on metaphysics, he exhibits great admiration for certain of the doctrines of 
Leibniz, the very same upon which Cousin constructed his idea of eclecti-
cism. Leibniz taught that true philosophy would consist in “explain[ing] 
and collect[ing] the fragments of truth scattered through systems appar-
ently the most incongruous” and that the “deeper [ . . . ] we penetrat[ed] 
into the ground of things, the more truth we discover in the doctrines 
of the greater number of the philosophical sects” (Biographia 148).2 Since 
truth is often “masked” and “mutilated,” the task of the philosopher must 
be to seek it everywhere, without regard to the strange places in which 
he might find it. In an eclectic tour de force that would have delighted 
Cousin, Coleridge (following Leibniz) catalogues the truths to be found in 
opposing sects:
The want of substantial reality in the object of the senses, according to the 
sceptics; the harmonies or numbers, the prototypes and ideas, to which 
the Pythagoreans and Platonists reduced all things; the ONE and ALL of 
Parmenides and Plotinus, without Spinozism; the necessary connection of 
things according to the Stoics, reconcileable with the spontaneity of the 
other schools; the vital-philosophy of the Cabalists and Hermetists, who 
assumed the universality of sensation; the substantial forms and entelechies 
of Aristotle and the schoolmen, together with the mechanical solution of 
all particular phenomena according to Democritus and the recent phi-
losophers—all these we shall find united in one perspective central point, 
which shows regularity and a coincidence of all the parts in the very object, 
which from every other point of view must appear confused and distorted. 
(148–49)
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Cousin had, of course, followed Leibniz closely in his original formulation 
of eclecticism, even borrowing this aphorism (which Coleridge quotes in 
the original French): “J’ai trouvé que le plupart des sectes ont raison dans 
une bonne partie de ce quelles avancent, mais non pas tant en ce quelles 
nient” (149).3 The really attractive part of eclecticism is its promise to be the 
key to all mythologies; nothing has to be excluded when one’s philosophy 
exemplifies the principles of inclusion and tolerance. Eclecticism assumes, 
as Coleridge does here, that it is possible to achieve “one perspective central 
point” from which all systems might be viewed as they really are. But how 
that ideal viewpoint is to be found is not clearly explained either by Leib-
niz or by Cousin. The dilemma of the individual’s self-reliance remains, 
which may explain why, only a few pages further on, Coleridge comes out 
against eclecticism.
The Multitude of Voices
Despite eclecticism’s obvious attractions, uneasiness about it persisted. 
Apparently fueled by two of the most dangerous tendencies of the age—
superficial learning and latitudinarian attitudes—eclecticism wore by 
turns the aspect of the philistine bourgeois, the pantheistic bohemian, and 
the cosmopolitan dilettante. Eclecticism focused attention on the problem 
of judgment, specifically how people who were only partially educated, 
by chance or by inclination, would determine which of the “prophets” of 
the age spoke the truth, or at least parlayed a recognizable version of the 
contemporary situation.
 In an 1829 essay for the Quarterly Review on the “State and Prospects 
of the Country,” Robert Southey worries about the “progress” in the liter-
ary marketplace that every year makes more books available for sale. The 
increase is an obstacle to literature and education because no individual 
could possibly read and judge them all. The first of the two factors making 
the age an unpropitious one for concentrated study can be characterized as 
historical; living at a late period in history, a scholar is naturally more bur-
dened by the sheer number of texts demanding his or her attention in any 
field of study—not to mention the “new” knowledge of those disciplines 
invented in modern times, which are jostling for prominence with tradi-
tional studies:
The Greeks had no other literature than their own, enriched with what 
little they had gleaned from Egypt; the Romans had no other than that of 
Greece; and, till within the last fifty years, the learning of a well-read per-
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son was confined to that of Greece and Rome, a few of the most celebrated 
Italian, French, and Spanish writers, and a limited selection from the 
works published in our own language. To these languages, German must 
now be added; and in each of them, a list of authors of celebrity might be 
drawn up, whose works it would require the lifetime of a laborious student 
to digest. In addition to this, the sciences of agriculture, natural history in 
all its branches, mechanics, chemistry, mineralogy, and geology, have either 
been created or exceedingly extended. To master all this is impossible. No 
perseverance can toil through such a mass, nor memory retain it. (118–19)
Sounding almost panicked at the prospect of being overwhelmed with the 
“mass” of knowledge, Southey has captured one of the characteristic ideas 
of his century, namely that human learning had reached such dimensions 
in modern times that new institutions and organizations will be needed to 
cope with it all, to order it, to reduce it to more human dimensions. Yet the 
impulse toward reductive models gives rise to the second great difficulty fac-
ing scholars, and all reasonably educated people, in the nineteenth century: 
can the “new systems, manuals, and abridgements [ . . . ] conveying knowl-
edge more easily, simply, or compendiously than before” (119) be relied 
upon to transmit the same ideas and information as the original authors 
would have done? The encyclopedias, dictionaries, anthologies, digests, 
periodical reviews, eclectic journals—in short, all those publications that 
promised to purvey the important knowledge of the day in swift and pain-
less fashion—bypassed the labor and sacrifice once thought to compose the 
essential quality of the scholarly life.4 Even if digested knowledge sufficed 
for the merely educated person, how could these shortcuts ever satisfy the 
genuine seeker after truth? But without some guide through the vast tracts 
of human knowledge, how could any one person hope to cover any por-
tion of it in his or her lifetime? Southey worries that the average reader 
will “give up profound and systematic application in despair, and betake 
[himself] to works of a subordinate character” until that person “becomes 
a mere living dictionary.” The tendency of the age is to substitute “mere 
knowledge, for the power of saying and doing that which is fit, which, 
more than anything besides, contributes to stamp this the age of moderate 
men, and to render the existing state of society so unfavourable to every 
sort of extraordinary excellence” (119). In Southey’s view the power to say 
and do “that which is fit” seems to derive from encounters with ideas at 
first hand, since the already digested knowledge emerges with the strong 
coloring of an interpreter’s opinions, making it difficult, if not impossible, 
for the twice-removed reader to capture the original spirit of the text. In 
the Biographia Literaria, Coleridge is even more severe in his judgment on 
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the worth of periodicals and digested knowledge. Satirically thanking the 
“anonymous critics” who had made his name famous, he jokes that readers 
will not “distinctly remember[ ] whether [his name] was introduced for an 
eulogy or for censure”: “And this becomes more likely, if (as I believe) the 
habit of perusing periodical works may be properly added to Averrhoes’s 
catalogue of ANTI-MNEMONICS, or weakeners of the memory” (32–33). 
Far from improving the understanding of the average reader, the “habit of 
perusing periodical works” leads to a kind of degeneration of knowledge, 
where all the conflicting opinions offered in various journals lead one fur-
ther into confusion.
 John Stuart Mill did not share their Conservative politics, but he agreed 
with some of the poets’ diagnoses of the leading characteristics of the age. 
One of the great dangers of what Mill called the “age of transition” was the 
advent of false prophets who would try to supplant the ancient institutions 
and fill the void of absent authority. In an inventory of its shortcomings, 
a transitional age must record its lack of consensus; the old authorities are 
divided among themselves or against each other, resulting in a “mixed state 
without received doctrine” (“Spirit of the Age” 28). While the “diffusion 
of superficial knowledge” is the “grand achievement” of the age, it is not 
the cause of transition; it is the tendency of people to discuss and question 
ideas, rather than embrace them, that gives the age its transitional charac-
ter (6–8). In his essay on “Civilization,” Mill specifies how the increase of 
reading and the growth of commercial publishing exacerbate this “intel-
lectual anarchy.” Demonstrating that the individual has less influence in 
a civilized society in which more decisions are made by “the movements 
of masses” (90), Mill argues that all classes ought to be prepared for the 
responsibilities of rule. Following Southey, Mill observes that civiliza-
tion promotes a “relaxation of individual energy,” with wealth as the sole 
inducement to concentrated activity (97–98), and a reliance on opinion, 
without any reliable guide to judge what is true and what is quackery or 
puffing (100–101). The fate of literature in a civilized society, then, is not 
surprising:
It is not solely on the private virtues, that this growing insignificance of the 
individual in the mass, is productive of mischief. It corrupts the very foun-
tain of the improvement of public opinion itself; it corrupts public teaching; 
it weakens the influence of the more cultivated few over the many. Litera-
ture has suffered more than any other human production by the common 
disease. When there were few books, and when few read at all save those 
who had been accustomed to read the best authors, books were written 
with the well-grounded expectation that they would be read carefully, and 
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if they deserved it, would be read often. A book of sterling merit, when it 
came out, was sure to be heard of, and might hope to be read, by the whole 
reading class; it might succeed by its real excellencies, although not got up 
to strike at once; and even if so got up, unless it had the support of genuine 
merit, it fell into oblivion. The rewards were then for him who wrote well, 
not much; for the laborious and learned, not the crude and ill-informed 
writer. But now the case is reversed. (102)
Driving the destruction of literary values is the desperation of an author 
to succeed, to be noticed at all among the million competitors willing to 
do anything to capture, ever so briefly, the public’s attention. With the 
sheer mass of publications stacked up against any writer, he can no longer 
rely even on history to rescue him from oblivion. Advertising now trumps 
merit, and the press of opinion tramples genuine ideas. Both Southey and 
Mill recognize that time is working against even the most diligent readers, 
and without a track through the wilderness of opinions no one can hope to 
collect, even in the most ample of “golden treasuries,” the best works of the 
age. Mill’s scheme for overcoming the “system of individual competition” 
(105) in literature depends on exploiting the tendency of the age toward 
combination. In order to arrest the decay of literature and the reign of 
ignorant opinion, Mill proposes “organized co-operation among the lead-
ing intellects of the age, whereby works of first-rate merit, of whatever 
class, and of whatever tendency in point of opinion, might come forth 
with the stamp on them, from the first, of the approval of those whose 
name would carry authority” (106).5 This patently eclectic project would 
depend first of all on the “regeneration of individual character among our 
lettered and opulent classes,” a cultural sea change requiring the complete 
reformation of the university system—a notion Mill might have derived 
from Cousin, with whom he corresponded and who was a noted author 
on educational reform. Since “great minds” were never formed by institu-
tions whose purpose was the reproduction of their own narrow values, the 
universities would have to become nonsectarian, both in admission poli-
cies and in teaching: “all thinkers, much above the common order, who 
have grown up in the Church of England, or in any other Church, have 
been produced in latitudinarian epochs, or while the impulse of intellec-
tual emancipation which gave existence to the Church had not quite spent 
itself” (108). With the rooting out of the “principle [ . . . ] of dogmatic reli-
gion, dogmatic morality, dogmatic philosophy” (109), it might at last be 
possible to produce graduates “qualified to seek truth ardently, vigorously, 
and disinterestedly” (107)—those individuals who would eventually be 
capable of judging ideas on their merits. Teachers, Mill writes, would not 
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be expected to conceal their opinions for the sake of becoming eclectic or 
undogmatic, but would hold those opinions more firmly for “know[ing] 
all creeds, and, in enforcing [their] own, stat[ing] the arguments for all 
conflicting opinions fairly” (110). He concludes: “In this spirit it is that all 
the great subjects are taught from the chairs of the German and French 
universities” (110). In this reference to Cousin’s eclecticism, Mill acknowl-
edges his debt to the eclectic paradigm and advocates an educational pro-
gram founded on eclectic principles. Seeing in eclecticism a principle of 
democracy—a democracy that was anyway advancing relentlessly over the 
nineteenth century—Mill recognizes that the only cure for the “common 
disease” of the age, its intellectual confusion or eclectic tendency, is in the 
application of a rigorous principle of eclecticism. The pretension to knowl-
edge would be supplanted by authentic knowledge, and the pretension of 
hack writing to literary values would be replaced by literature’s hard-won 
truths.6
 Of all the statements on the intellectual anarchy of the nineteenth cen-
tury, and its need for eclecticism, Thomas De Quincey offers perhaps the 
most prescient analysis of the future of human learning. In a brief 1824 
essay, De Quincey concedes that “this is the age of superficial knowledge” 
of which the greatest proof is the encyclopedia—but “prodigious exten-
sion implies a due proportion of weak intension; a sealike expansion of 
knowledge will cover large shallows as well as large depths” (“Superficial 
Knowledge” 449). Unlike Mill, however, De Quincey does not imagine a 
vanguard of intellectuals emerging to guide confused youth through the 
literary wilderness; instead, he perceives that the proliferation of knowl-
edge in all fields is leading to the division of intellectual labor. He even 
recommends that this specialization continue, as profundity is to be pre-
ferred over comprehensiveness (for the sake of knowledge itself); but as is 
typical of his writing, De Quincey severely qualifies this recommendation 
by offering an extremely appealing model of individual development as 
its opposite: “Let all the objects of the understanding in civil life or in sci-
ence be represented by the letters of the alphabet: in Grecian life each man 
would separately go through all the letters in a tolerable way; whereas at 
present each letter is served by a distinct body of men. Consequently, the 
Grecian individual is superior to the modern; but the Grecian whole is 
inferior: for the whole is made up of the individuals; and the Grecian indi-
vidual repeats himself. Whereas in modern life the whole derives its supe-
riority from the very circumstances which constitute the inferiority of the 
parts [ . . . ]” (452). The question, then, for the history of the idea of eclec-
ticism is whether, as a principle and a tendency, it will operate more like 
the modern machine, where each person contributes his bit of skill to the 
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overall operation, or whether, as a principle and a tendency, it will oper-
ate more like an educated Greek, who considers all the issues raised by all 
fields of knowledge, and determines for himself the truth in each. Clearly, 
time has become a factor in a way that it never could have been for that 
ancient Greek, whose whole world revolved around Greece and who saw 
only a noontime shadow of history beneath his feet. The multiplicity of 
modern life—and the fantastically long expanse of history trailing behind 
us—has catastrophically limited our ability to comprehend any subject at 
all. Now scholars are taught to be specialists, as De Quincey predicted we 
would be, and the impulse toward comprehensiveness is wisely laid aside. 
The eclectic, even in the nineteenth century, risks the integrity of his or her 
knowledge for the sake of that expansive vision.
The Burden of the Past
In his 1836 sketch of the architectural profession, A. W. N. Pugin satirized 
the tendency of his colleagues to sell their skills to whoever could afford 
them, and at whatever cost to their own aesthetic and moral principles. 
Architecture suffered from the influx of capital and from the spread of 
superficial knowledge about styles that gave the average man or woman 
license to demand a building or renovation in whatever style he or she 
fancied. The writer suffered similar indignities, resulting from the boom 
in reading and publishing, so that De Quincey’s vision of the fate of the 
scholar in the nineteenth century might also have predicted the fate of the 
artist. With the disappearance of traditional authorities, public opinion, 
transmitted through the organ of the press, became increasingly important, 
and literature was absorbed into this new function. Because writers who 
wanted readers had, on some level, to satisfy the demands of their public, 
they would often produce great quantities of historical poems, fictions, and 
biographies, or sensational novels and tales; though, of course, one of the 
extraordinary aspects of Victorian culture was the willingness of people 
to listen to men such as Mill, Carlyle, Ruskin, and Arnold berate them 
for their mistaken attitudes and careless actions. Certainly, the intellectual 
anarchy and pervasive unbelief these men found so troubling were mani-
fested in the literature of the day, and nowhere was the situation more dire 
than in poetry. Everyone agreed that poetry had evolved at the beginning 
of civilization; the humanist philosopher Giambattista Vico even proposed 
that poetry made civilization possible by naming the phenomena of nature 
and transforming them into law-giving deities.7 Poetry seemed to spring 
from the human impulse toward belief in a transcendent reality, and when 
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that belief was lost, so too was the poetic faculty. The proliferation of com-
peting belief systems and the geometrical increase in reading materials 
tended to erode the faith on which traditional institutions depended for 
their continued dominance; the crowd overwhelmed individual voices and 
limited the influence they might have; and so the poem and the poet faded 
into inconsequence.
 For at least a century preceding William Hazlitt’s trenchant explana-
tion of why poetry can only decline, poets and critics had offered various 
explanations for its demise.8 In fact, Walter Jackson Bate sees the growth 
of criticism in the mid-eighteenth century as an attempt “to reground the 
entire thinking about poetry in the light of one overwhelming fact: the 
obviously superior originality, and the at least apparently greater immedi-
acy and universality of subject and appeal, of the poetry of earlier periods” 
(48). Eighteenth-century critics were the first to explain the superiority of 
ancient poetry historically; that is, they saw that the ethos of the ancients, 
with its passionate directness, was more conducive to the growth of 
poetry than were the affectations of civilized societies. At the head of the 
Romantic movement, Wordsworth believed that poetry might be renewed 
by returning to its sources: nature, simplicity, and common life. As Bate 
points out, however, the Romantic poets were in the minority. Most critics 
“assume[ed] that the door [was] closed” (49). Belief in the marvelous and 
the heroic had vanished with Christianity, science, and the “well-ordered 
State”; language had become specialized, and less metaphorical, with the 
growth of analytical writing; the arts in general had become detached from 
ordinary life; and the subdivision of genres had contributed to the narrow-
ness of the artist’s practice (49–52). As the reading audience grew larger, so 
did its “mediocrity of taste” (53). Finally, eighteenth-century critics blamed 
their own stock-in-trade, criticism, for intensifying self-consciousness and 
timidity in poets; but the growth of criticism was “considered inevitable as 
a culture grows older, and part of the price paid for the spread of literacy” 
(54).
 A new emphasis in discussions of poetry’s decline appeared in the nine-
teenth century, with the comparison of progress in the sciences to progress 
in the arts. Hazlitt, in his brief essay for the Round Table (1817), “Why the 
Arts Are Not Progressive,” rejects the analogy between science and art 
as altogether false and dismisses the remedies for art’s tardiness—namely 
“study of the antique, the formation of academies, and the distribution of 
prizes”—as likely to do more harm than good: “When that original impulse 
no longer exists, when the inspiration of genius is fled, all the attempts 
to recal it are no better than the tricks of galvanism to restore the dead 
to life” (158). The galvanic solutions that Hazlitt mentions were precisely 
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those being employed in painting and architecture, and were actually cre-
ating (some thought) a great deal more confusion than had existed before. 
Now instead of a single model worthy of imitation—the classical—artists 
of the nineteenth century confronted at least two—the classical and the 
medieval. The institutionalization of the fine arts (painting and poetry for 
Hazlitt) and the professionalization of artists generally produce rules and 
criticism, but not, he believes, great art. According to Hazlitt, only that 
which is “mechanical, reducible to rule, or capable of demonstration, is 
progressive, and admits of gradual improvement: what is not mechanical 
or definite, but depends on genius, taste, and feeling, very soon becomes 
stationary, or retrograde, and loses more than it gains by transfusion” (158). 
Like many of the writers of the Romantic period, Hazlitt aligns poetry 
with nature, and thus excludes the possibility of progress except by draw-
ing upon that source. Science advances by building on previous discover-
ies, while the arts, depending on individual genius, “leaped at once from 
infancy to manhood” and “have in general declined ever after” (159). The 
great artists were not only in direct communication with nature; they also 
were unhampered by criticism from any but those who genuinely inclined 
toward art. Only those with “natural genius” attempted either poetry or 
criticism, while other great minds were employed with wars, religion, and 
politics—there were none of those connoisseurs and “pretenders to taste” 
whom the modern artist confronts as a rule, as soon as his work reaches the 
world. Hazlitt reminds the cheerleaders of progress that “The diffusion of 
taste is not the same thing as the improvement of taste” (161), and while 
institutions certainly promote the former, there is little evidence that they 
can affect the latter: “The number of candidates for fame, and of pretend-
ers to criticism, is thus increased beyond all proportion, while the quan-
tity of genius and feeling remains the same; with this difference, that the 
man of genius is lost in the crowd of competitors, who would never have 
become such but from encouragement and example; and that the opinion 
of those few persons whom nature intended for judges, is drowned with 
the noisy suffrages of shallow smatterers in taste. The principle of uni-
versal suffrage, however applicable to matters of government, which con-
cern the common feelings and common interests of society, is by no means 
applicable to matters of taste, which can only be decided upon by the most 
refined understandings” (161). Hazlitt assumes that only persons born 
with an understanding susceptible of “refinement” can develop as critics 
and artists, which seems to make art forever undemocratic in a society 
that will eventually become democratic in its government. Denying that 
the “public taste is capable of gradual improvement,” Hazlitt apparently 
denies the efficacy of democratic education, a surprising assertion from 
Part I: Toward an Age of Eclecticism
11
one whose own writing aimed to improve his readers with straightforward 
discourse on the chief topics of the day. Unlike the Romantics in France, 
who believed that anyone could be educated into understanding, though 
not into genius, Hazlitt wants to erect a barrier against incursions into fine 
art by the insensible and uncultivated, whose opinions on works of genius 
ought to be deflected, leaving them intact for the judgment of those whom 
nature has qualified for the task. If the proper judges are left to their work, 
then those works worthy of attention will reach public notice, while those 
with merely flashy presentation and little substance or art will end up in 
the dustbin of history.
 Thomas Love Peacock’s wicked little treatise on The Four Ages of 
Poetry (1820) proposes a historical trajectory similar to the one offered by 
Hazlitt—poetry peaks in the second period of civilization, the Golden 
Age, soon after the mechanical aspects of the art have caught up with the 
brilliant expressions and vivid ideas of the Iron Age—but is much less for-
giving of those latest entrants into the annals of literary history, the Lake 
Poets. Contemporary poets are living in what Peacock considers the sec-
ond Brass Age, the modern period having four ages of its own, all dim-
mer reflections of the ancient ages of poetry. Blaming the obsession with 
picturesque beauty for driving budding poets back into nature, Peacock 
argues that these modern poets “convert[ed] the land they lived in into 
a sort of fairy-land, which they peopled with mysticisms and chimaeras” 
and inspired with their nonsense a whole host of “desperate imitators, who 
have brought the age of brass prematurely to its dotage” (15). Peacock 
views the embracing of history by poets with as much skepticism as their 
ecstatic return to nature, and contrasts their collective delusion with other 
fields of knowledge:
While the historian and the philosopher are advancing in, and accelerating, 
the progress of knowledge, the poet is wallowing in the rubbish of departed 
ignorance, and raking up the ashes of dead savages to find gewgaws and 
rattles for grown babies of the age. Mr. Scott digs up the poachers and 
cattle-stealers of the ancient border. Lord Byron cruises for thieves and 
pirates on the shores of the Morea and among the Greek islands. Mr. 
Southey wades through ponderous volumes of travels and old chronicles, 
from which he carefully selects all that is false, useless, and absurd, as being 
essentially poetical; [ . . . ]. Mr. Wordsworth picks up village legends from 
old women and sextons, and Mr. Coleridge, to the valuable information 
acquired from similar sources, superadds the dreams of crazy theologians 
and the mysticisms of German metaphysics, and favours the world with 
visions in verse, in which the quadruple elements of sexton, old woman, 
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Jeremy Taylor, and Emmanuel Kant, are harmonized into a delicious poet-
ical compound. (16)
The critique here is unmistakably aimed at the eclecticism of the Roman-
tic poets, who, in drawing inspiration from numerous sources, fail to pro-
mote—in Peacock’s opinion—any coherent ideas of their own. Far from 
representing progress in poetry, which would be a recovery of the origi-
nality of the ancient poets, the Romantics have proven that any return to 
the Golden Age of poetry is absolutely impossible. The Romantic is undis-
criminatingly “eclectic” and therefore not a true eclectic at all. In effect, 
Peacock argues that the poets fail to follow the example of a scientifically 
oriented eclecticism: “The brighter the light diffused around [the modern 
poet] by the progress of reason, the thicker is the darkness of antiquated 
barbarism, in which he buries himself like a mole, to throw up the bar-
ren hillocks of his Cimmerian labours. The philosophic mental tranquil-
lity which looks round with an equal eye on all external things, collects a 
store of ideas, discriminates their relative value, assigns to all their proper 
place, and from the materials of useful knowledge thus collected, appre-
ciated, and arranged, forms new combinations that impress the stamp 
of their power and utility on the real business of life, is diametrically 
the reverse of that frame of mind which poetry inspires, or from which 
poetry can emanate” (17). Peacock makes it perfectly clear that the ill- 
considered, indiscriminate, and eclectic combinations of the Romantics 
will not “impress the stamp of their power and utility on the real business 
of life.” Though the two processes of collection Peacock describes might 
at first seem to advance toward equally rewarding ends, the poet’s self-
burial in “the darkness of antiquated barbarism” does not have the same 
potential for progress that the philosophical eclectic’s has—and here is the 
crux of the problem in interpreting Peacock’s attitude toward eclecticism. 
He recognizes that there are two kinds of eclecticism, but cannot imagine 
that they would have anything in common, or would constitute similar 
ways of operating in response to a historical crisis of decline. For him, the 
mental attitude of the eclectic philosopher must be diametrically opposed 
to that of the frantic and mystical poet of the modern Brass Age—but not 
to the mental attitude that brought about the second Golden Age, around 
the time of the “revival of learning.” At that time, the collection of the 
scattered materials of the medieval troubadours and rediscovered Greek 
and Roman literature “resulted in a heterogeneous compound of all ages 
and nations in one picture; an infinite licence, which gave to the poet the 
free range of the whole field of imagination and memory” (12). The rich-
ness of Renaissance eclecticism derived from an ability to combine diverse 
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influences effectively and correctly; the bizarreness of Romantic eclecti-
cism results from combinations that are jarring and offensive. Peacock’s 
ambivalence toward eclecticism is typical of nineteenth-century literary 
critics, whose horror at the misbegotten monsters of their own day gives 
way before the intricate eclectic beauties of the past. Hazlitt had called 
Milton the greatest imitator and greatest borrower to have lived, and, as 
Peacock intimated, his perfection resulted from his ability to combine the 
energy and power of the Golden Age with the “studied and elaborate mag-
nificence” (13) of the Silver.
 Thomas Babington Macaulay thought to set the capstone on the 
tomb of poetry when he wrote in 1825 that the most wonderful proof of 
Milton’s genius was the age in which the poet of Paradise Lost had lived. 
Like Macaulay himself, Milton lived in an age when poetry was becoming 
impossible—an enlightened age of scientific progress when analytical abil-
ity overtook poetic wisdom. Under these conditions, Milton’s education 
might have crippled him, as it gave him full knowledge of ancient models 
whose originality “def[ied] imitation” (“Milton” 3) and made him “regret 
[ . . . ] the ruder age of simple words and vivid impressions” (4). While 
Macaulay is concerned to demonstrate Milton’s Zeitgeist-defying genius, 
he also explains, without regret, the diminishing power of poetry in the 
nineteenth century: the steady advance of knowledge in one field—sci-
ence—compensates for the loss of strength in another—poetry, or the arts 
in general. The key for Macaulay is in recognizing the opposing means 
by which art and science achieve perfection. Poetry thrives in the infancy 
of the race and springs from the wonder and mystery people feel when 
confronted with the natural world; science works to dispel mystery and 
thus improves gradually over the centuries: “Even when a system has been 
formed, there is still something to add, to alter, or to reject. Every genera-
tion enjoys the use of a vast hoard bequeathed to it by antiquity, and trans-
mits that hoard, augmented by fresh acquisitions, to future ages” (4). In 
Macaulay’s view, imagination and knowledge are poised on great cosmic 
scales, and as the weight of accumulated knowledge grows heavier with 
each passing year, it steadily depletes the force and sharpness of imagina-
tion.
 Few artists and poets rejoice at the accumulation of a “vast hoard” of 
works of genius. What to the scientist represents the foundation on which 
he will raise a still more durable structure to the artist signifies the towering 
obstacle of accomplished revelation. All that remains to the poet burdened 
with his inheritance is the ornamentation and ceaseless refinement of the 
“palace of art.” As Macaulay recognizes, science gains by refinement of its 
theories, while poetry almost always loses: “In an enlightened age there will 
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be much intelligence, much science, much philosophy, abundance of just 
classification and subtle analysis, abundance of wit and eloquence, abun-
dance of verses, and even of good ones; but little poetry. Men will judge 
and compare; but they will not create” (6). In negative judgments of eclec-
ticism in painting and architecture, the accusation of excessive scholarship 
was always the centerpiece. To paraphrase Macaulay, artists who “judge 
and compare [ . . . ] will not create,” and the tendency of civilized art to 
be refined, scholarly, and unoriginal would seem to support the (usually) 
Romantic opponents of eclecticism. The search for originality either para-
lyzed artists or provoked an eclectic compromise. Some artists attempted 
to strip away their civilized sensibilities in order to recover something of 
the purity of ancient expression. Straining against a treacherous language 
that betrays thought as it emerges, the poet has a still harder task ahead of 
him:
He who, in an enlightened and literary society, aspires to be a great poet, 
must first become a little child. He must take to pieces the whole web of 
his mind. He must unlearn much of that knowledge which has perhaps 
constituted hitherto his chief title to superiority. His very talents will be a 
hindrance to him. His difficulties will be proportioned to his proficiency 
in the pursuits which are fashionable among his contemporaries; and that 
proficiency will in general be proportioned to the vigour and activity of his 
mind. And it is well, if, after all his sacrifices and exertions, his works do 
not resemble a lisping man or a modern ruin. We have seen in our own 
time great talents, intense labour, and long meditation, employed in this 
struggle against the spirit of the age, and employed, we will not say abso-
lutely in vain, but with dubious success and feeble applause. (7)
In the image of the modern poem as “a lisping man or a modern ruin,” 
Macaulay has captured the effect of the poet’s speaking a borrowed lan-
guage. In attempting to translate his modish ideas into a language of the 
heart, the poet’s tongue grows large and clumsy in his mouth, as if to 
hold back insincere words. But the modern poet is also a modern ruin, 
a structure built to mimic natural processes and accumulated beauty. His 
language reflects the knowledge of his age and can be antique only by 
fraudulent means.
 Macaulay perpetuated a legend of Milton that became a common-
place in the nineteenth century; his greatness “in an age so unfavour-
able to poetry” must “in some degree be attributed to his want of sight” 
(“Dryden” 20). Living blind and isolated from the mainstream of taste, 
Milton avoided its pollution. By contrast, Dryden swam in it, drank down 
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its influences, and fed its strength with his own limited genius. Macau-
lay’s review of Dryden’s poetical works complements the essay on Milton; 
though these two poets were proximate in time and space, their artistic 
lives could not have been more different. For Macaulay, Dryden was the 
“greatest of [ . . . ] the critical poets” (21), while Milton was the last of the 
great imaginative poets. All of Dryden’s disadvantages can be traced to the 
age in which he lived—“On no man did the age exercise so much influ-
ence” (21)—and all of his abilities are commensurate with an advanced 
stage of civilization.9 From the earlier essay, Macaulay retains this guiding 
principle, “that the creative faculty, and the critical faculty, cannot exist 
together in their highest perfection” (3–4), and builds from this premise 
a case against Dryden, which is also peculiarly a defense of the best of the 
second-rank poets.
 Making the familiar argument that “critical discernment is not suffi-
cient to make men poets” (5), Macaulay brings forward the issue that had 
been nagging at the literary pessimists for more than a century: “It is by 
giving faith to the creations of the imagination that a man becomes a poet 
[and] by treating those creations as deceptions, and by resolving them, as 
nearly as possible, into their elements, that he becomes a critic” (5). The 
earliest poets are best because they were all, in Bate’s term, just “postprimi-
tive.” As Peacock argues in The Four Ages of Poetry, it was this second, 
golden age of humankind that produced the greatest works of art, when 
the knowledge of the mechanical part of the art was mastered, when the 
imagination was still young, and when belief was still possible. More than 
a theory for Macaulay, this was the law of human nature: “Our judgment 
ripens, our imagination decays” (8). Such a historical pattern might imply 
that there was very little hope for the future of art, since art seemed to 
depend on a state of naïveté impossible to sustain with the advancement 
of knowledge. Art could thrive only in the briefest of human moments, 
and what came after was a kind of living fossil. The fundamental problem 
was unbelief, not specifically a lack of faith in religion, but an inability to 
suspend disbelief, to suppress the critical faculty: “We should act in the 
same manner [as the ancients] if the grief and horror produced in us by 
the works of the imagination amounted to real torture. But in us these 
emotions are comparatively languid. They rarely affect our appetite or 
our sleep. They leave us sufficiently at ease to trace them to their causes, 
and to estimate the powers which produce them. Our attention is speed-
ily diverted from the images which call forth our tears to the art by which 
those images have been selected and combined. We applaud the genius of 
the writer. We applaud our own sagacity and sensibility, and we are com-
forted” (9). Neither modern audiences nor modern poets actually believe 
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in the emotions—let alone the marvelous actions—represented in art. The 
pleasure for the spectator, Macaulay contends, now comes from his or her 
awareness of the machinery, technique, and composition involved in cre-
ation. Paradoxically, this improvement in technical knowledge comes at 
the expense of imaginative content: “The progress of language, which was 
at first favourable, becomes fatal to it, and, instead of compensating for 
the decay of the imagination, accelerates that decay, and renders it more 
obvious” (11). Increasingly abstract language is comparable to money, 
another circulating medium, a formal resemblance that might highlight 
the decreasing actual value of language (12); but we already know that for 
Macaulay, advances in science compensated for the loss of imagination and 
belief. Despite these apparent shortcomings, Dryden occupies an impor-
tant place in literary history, and Macaulay’s contempt for Dryden’s lesser 
abilities as a poet turns into a celebration of his capacity for criticism.
 Another compensation for the loss of poetry is evident in the gains of 
criticism, which improves as science improves; but as Macaulay tells the 
story, Dryden struggled to reach even this height above the decadence of 
mainstream taste. Dryden commenced his career at a time when English 
literature had just suffered the withering influence of the Protectorate, 
and was about to sink further under the weight of a “foreign yoke”: “It 
was to please Charles that rhyme was first introduced into our plays. Thus, 
a rising blow, which would at any time have been mortal, was dealt to the 
English Drama, then just recovering from its languishing condition. Two 
detestable manners, the indigenous and the imported, were now in a state 
of alternate conflict and amalgamation. The bombastic meanness of the 
new style was blended with the ingenious absurdity of the old; and the 
mixture produced something which the world had never before seen, and 
which, we hope, it will never see again” (19). Before 1678 (the year Macau-
lay marks as the turning point in Dryden’s long career), Dryden falls under 
the spell of the court and develops an eclectic style, which combines the 
“bombastic meanness” and “ingenious absurdity” of new and old, foreign 
and native. Macaulay criticizes three chief failures of Dryden’s early man-
ner: unrealistic, unbelievable characters; bombastic, ornate speeches; and 
excessive, undiscriminating flattery—all of which either cause or result 
from Dryden’s eclecticism. As an example of the inferior Dryden, Macau-
lay chooses Annus Mirabilis, a work, he says, that has “no claim to be called 
poetry” since “It is produced, not by creation, but by construction” (22). 
Brandishing his Homeric standard, Macaulay speedily dispatches Dryden’s 
poem, remarking on how his description of a sea battle with the Dutch is 
rendered “not by an act of the imagination, at once calling up the scene 
before the interior eye, but by painful meditation,—by turning the subject 
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round and round,—by tracing out facts into remote consequences” (22). 
Macaulay suggests here that Dryden simply has not got the imagination 
to bring the sea fight to life for his readers; instead, like a critic, he turns 
a once-living historical fact into lifeless abstraction. By way of example, 
Macaulay supplies this “favourable instance”:
Amidst whole heaps of spices lights a ball;
And now their odours armed against them fly.
Some preciously by shattered porcelain fall,
And some by aromatic splinters die. (qtd. 22)
Objecting to the way “preciously” and “aromatic” “divert our whole 
attention to themselves,” Macaulay complains that the image of the bat-
tle “dissolves” before the excessive color of the words used to describe it. 
Compounding the fault of overly ornate language is the tendency to bom-
bast, to violent language all out of proportion to the “abject tameness of the 
thought” (27). Dryden once wrote that audiences demanded these “rants,” 
but Macaulay disallows such a defense as “unworthy of a man of genius” 
(27). Of course, one could please without ranting, and this further instance 
of disjunction between language and thought leads to the troubling ques-
tion of whether audiences even perceived how inappropriate Dryden’s 
language was. His characters, Macaulay argues, never seemed real, not 
because he wrote speeches for Moors and Americans, but because they, too, 
are abstractions, without variation and complexity: “As is the love of his 
heroes, such are all their other emotions. All their qualities, their courage, 
their generosity, their pride, are on the same colossal scale” (26). Mimick-
ing ancient tragedy, Dryden fails to capture its emotion; he creates char-
acters who tower over his modern audiences by their words and deeds, 
but who have no more apparent emotion than trees have. He admired the 
wildness of Shakespeare, Dante, and Homer, and thought to reach their 
perfection by “daring sublimity”: “he attempted, by affected fits of poetical 
fury, to bring on a real paroxysm; and [ . . . ] he got nothing but his distor-
tions for his pains” (27–28).
 As Bate recounts in The Burden of the Past, Dryden late in life recog-
nized how futile were these attempts to match the long strides of his ances-
tors:
Strong were our Syres; and as they Fought they Writ,
Conqu’ring with force of Arms, and dint of Wit;
Theirs was the Gyant Race, before the Flood;
And thus, when Charles Return’d, our Empire stood.
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Our Age was cultivated thus at length;
But what we gain’d in skill we lost in strength.
Our Builders were, with want of Genius, curst;
The Second Temple was not like the First. 
(“To Mr. Congreve” 1694, qtd. in Bate 1)
Struck forcibly by the futility of trying to equal the genius of their ances-
tors, the best of Dryden’s generation turned their powers to criticism. 
Macaulay attributes this shift to Dryden’s superior taste, which “gradually 
awakened his creative faculties” (31). It was also his propensity for exces-
sive flattery and undiscriminating admiration that propelled him toward 
the founding of a critical school. While Macaulay does not draw attention 
to the role of Dryden’s catholicity in pushing him toward criticism, this 
trait is important in light of Dryden’s early eclecticism. Macaulay looks 
with revulsion upon the excessive flattery that he perceives in Dryden’s 
poetry, but is willing to overlook its presence even in the later period for 
the sake of his brilliant critical works. In this somewhat puzzled recogni-
tion of Dryden’s particular genius, Macaulay lights, I think, on the source 
of his power as a critic:
His literary creed was catholic, even to latitudinarianism; not from any 
want of acuteness, but from a disposition to be easily satisfied. He was 
quick to discern the smallest glimpse of merit; he was indulgent even to 
gross improprieties, when accompanied by any redeeming talent. When 
he said a severe thing, it was to serve a temporary purpose,—to support 
an argument, or to tease a rival. Never was so able a critic so free from 
fastidiousness. He loved the old poets, especially Shakespeare. He admired 
the ingenuity which Donne and Cowley had so wildly abused. He did 
justice, amidst the general silence, to the memory of Milton. He praised 
to the skies the school-boy lines of Addison. Always looking on the fair 
side of every object, he admired extravagance, on account of the invention 
which he supposed it to indicate; he excused affectation in favour of wit; 
he tolerated even tameness, for the sake of the correctness which was its 
concomitant. (32)
By Macaulay’s account Dryden was willing to search high and low for the 
best expressions that his and previous ages had to offer. More specifically, 
I think it was this early practice of trying to combine “diverse beauties” 
that led him to found a “critical school” in the spirit of that early Carracci 
academy that emphasized selection and combination. Macaulay himself 
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characterized critical poetry as the “poetry of courtesy, [ . . . ] to which the 
memory, the judgment, and the wit, contribute far more than the imagi-
nation” (12). This “different species” of poetry thrived, in eclectic fashion, 
on mining and combining all that was usable from earlier works; and if 
sometimes Dryden’s compositions failed to evoke the emotion of those 
antecedents, then he contributed to his age a style of expression, and the 
consciousness of the diversity of past ages of poetry. By employing some-
thing of the old manner and something of the new, Dryden demonstrated 
how the literature of the past could be used eclectically in the present.10
 Turning his attention to the literature of his own age, in 1830 Macaulay 
railed against the poetic stylings of Robert Montgomery, the very type of 
the “modern ruin.” Popular in his day, and forgotten (as Macaulay pre-
dicted he would be) in ours, Montgomery’s work is puffed up by “the 
unsupported assertions of those who assume a right to criticize” (374); 
the reading public fearing to look foolish buys up in large numbers the 
works of the latest “master-spirit of the age” (376). Seeking to enhance his 
reputation by stealing ideas and images from greater talents, Montgomery 
even failed “to turn his booty to good account” (377). Macaulay dissects 
Montgomery’s plagiarized verses in order to expose the careless igno-
rance behind the praise heaped upon him. Two examples of Macaulay’s 
catalogue will suffice to demonstrate the vulgar eclecticism at work here. 
Addressing the sea, Byron wrote, “Time writes no wrinkle on thine azure 
brow,” while the thief Montgomery rendered the image ridiculously thus: 
“And thou, vast Ocean, on whose awful face / Time’s iron feet can print no 
ruin-trace” (378). From Walter Scott, Montgomery lifted this lovely com-
parison, “The dew that on the violet lies, / Mocks the dark lustre of thine 
eyes,” and made it his own: “And the bright dew-bead on the bramble 
lies, / Like liquid rapture upon beauty’s eyes” (378). Montgomery’s reckless 
thievery underscores the importance of responsible, informed criticism; 
one must learn how to select from the ever-increasing mass of literary pro-
duction that which deserves praise and emulation. Macaulay pauses over 
Montgomery because “literature must be purified from this taint” (387) of 
plagiarism and eclecticism: “And this is fine poetry! This is what ranks its 
writer with the master-spirits of the age! This is what has been described, 
over and over again, in terms which would require some qualification if 
used respecting Paradise Lost! It is too much that this patchwork, made by 
stitching together old odds and ends [ . . . ] is to be picked off the dunghill 
on which it ought to rot, and to be held up to admiration as an inestimable 
specimen of art” (385). Macaulay opposes the “patchwork” brand of eclec-
ticism that would raise a modern ruin and revel in the circulation of fraud-
ulent treasures. But as real treasures accumulate, how is art to progress, if 
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not by the operations of eclecticism? Macaulay the critic offers no solution 
for the aspiring poet—probably because he did not see any. Typical of his 
age, Macaulay was willing to grant science the benefit of critical selection 
and comparison, but poetry and the other arts would have to proceed by 
dint of pure invention and imagination. Montgomery was indeed a terrible 
poet; I believe, however, that his fault lay not in imitating Scott and Byron, 
but rather in doing so incompetently.
Self-Consciousness as Disease
That Thomas Carlyle worried over the passing of poetry is apparent in his 
1829 essay “Signs of the Times.” In it he famously diagnoses the malady of 
the nineteenth century as an imbalance between “dynamic” and “mechanic” 
forces. An overemphasis on mechanistic explanations and endeavors has 
precipitated the decline of religion, poetry, and morality: “There is a sci-
ence which treats of, and practically addresses, the primary, unmodified 
forces and energies of man, the mysterious springs of Love, and Fear, and 
Wonder, of Enthusiasm, Poetry, Religion, all which have a truly vital and 
infinite character; as well as a science which practically addresses the finite, 
modified developments of these, when they take the shape of immediate 
‘motives,’ as hope of reward, or as fear of punishment” (72). Like Macau-
lay, Carlyle allows for a shifting balance of these forces over time; but he 
is not willing to admit that gains in mechanistic knowledge compensate 
for the loss of other kinds of wisdom. Nor is he deceived into thinking, by 
the proliferation of institutions and societies supporting the arts, that the 
arts are in fact healthy: “In defect of Raphaels, and Angelos, and Mozarts, 
we have Royal Academies of Painting, Sculpture, Music; whereby the lan-
guishing spirit of Art may be strengthened, as by the more generous diet 
of a Public Kitchen” (66). Rather, it is increasingly clear to Carlyle and 
many others that the formal organization of national culture generally sig-
nals a decline in cultural production. Just as Henry Fuseli contends that 
the academies are symptoms of art in distress, Carlyle refuses to see the 
proliferation of institutions as anything more positive than the mechani-
zation of art. After all, were science and art “indebted principally to the 
founders of Schools and Universities?” (73). In his view schools existed 
as machines for the preservation and transmission of knowledge; and no 
great work of art or poetry could be created by a machine: “Again, were 
Homer and Shakespeare members of any beneficed guild, or made Poets 
by means of it? Were Painting and Sculpture created by forethought, 
brought into the world by institutions for that end? No; Science and Art 
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have, from first to last, been the free gift of Nature; an unsolicited, unex-
pected gift; often even a fatal one. These things rose up, as it were, by 
spontaneous growth, in the free soil and sunshine of Nature. They were 
not planted or grafted, nor even greatly multiplied or improved by the 
culture or manuring of institutions. Generally speaking, they have derived 
only partial help from these; often enough have suffered damage [ . . . ]. 
They originated in the Dynamical nature of man, not in his Mechanical 
nature” (73). Carlyle believed, with most of his thoughtful contempo-
raries, that works of original genius could have been produced only in 
a simpler age still in touch with the invisible, spiritual aspects of nature. 
As the histories of art and science took on more precise outlines in the 
early nineteenth century, it was evident that human creativity depended 
on the mysterious operations of unnamable forces; but Carlyle was willing 
to name these powers dynamical and to link them to religion, worship, 
morality, and wonder. Without an attitude of humility toward nature 
and its infinite diversity, human beings reduced themselves to digestive, 
reproductive machines, unable to create. Most distressing from Carlyle’s 
point of view, religion—the proper foundation of humility—was itself 
taking on a mechanical character, as people began to place their faith in 
the machines of practical science: “Religion in most countries, more or less 
in every country, is no longer what it was, and should be,—a thousand-
voiced psalm from the heart of Man to his invisible Father, the fountain of 
all Goodness, Beauty, Truth, and revealed in every revelation of these; but 
for the most part, a wise prudential feeling grounded on mere calculation; 
a matter, as all others now are, of Expediency and Utility; whereby some 
smaller quantum of earthly enjoyment may be exchanged for a far larger 
quantum of celestial enjoyment. Thus Religion too is Profit, a working 
for wages; not Reverence, but vulgar Hope or Fear” (79). Carlyle found 
the “true Church of England” in the “preaching” of the daily newspapers, 
which inflict “moral censure” and impart “moral encouragement, conso-
lation, edification” (80). As religion shares with the press its aim and its 
audience, it takes on its nature, which is to make profit by telling people 
what they want to hear, or to move the populace to action in some cause, 
whether it be right or wrong; unity of purpose cannot endure, virtue is 
a matter of “Public Opinion,” and the moral compass spins in its case. 
Being then of a “fundamental character” Unbelief spreads to the offspring 
of religion—literature. No longer a “thousand-voiced psalm” or “vesper 
hymn to the Spirit of Beauty,” poetry is “a fierce clashing of cymbals, and 
shouting of multitudes” (80). Many of these discordant voices possess tal-
ent, but in such a noisy age who will hear them? The disturbing answer is 
that only the loudest—the best-advertised, so to speak—will penetrate the 
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tumult. Under these conditions, poetry will need not inspiration, but flash 
and style—which explains why bad poets sell: they need only the demeanor 
of the poet to convince a gullible public of their poetic nature; they require 
but the sturm und drang of the Romantic to raise a storm cloud of approba-
tion around their heads.
 Despite having similar views on the state of contemporary poetry, 
Carlyle and Macaulay bring divergent perceptions of progress in art and 
science to bear on their explanations of poetry’s decline. Macaulay judged 
advances in science to be the result of centuries of study, while rare artistic 
geniuses (most of whom lived long ago) conjured up occasional miracles. 
By contrast, Carlyle located the ground spring of inspiration for both art 
and science in the individual. His own age was sick because the arts and sci-
ences continued to produce without any reference to a higher motive force 
than the “force of circumstances.” The works of individual genius were 
reduced to little more than mechanistic theories or recipes of three parts 
environment stirred into one part heredity. The painter Henry Fuseli saw 
in eclecticism and its recipes the mechanization of art; Carlyle compared 
the creation of a modern poem to another mechanical process, bricklaying: 
“We enjoy, we see nothing by direct vision; but only by reflection, and in 
anatomical dismemberment. [ . . . ] We have our little theory on all human 
and divine things. Poetry, the working of genius itself, which in all times, 
with one or another meaning, has been called Inspiration, and held to be 
mysterious and inscrutable, is no longer without its scientific exposition. 
The building of the lofty rhyme is like any other masonry or bricklaying: 
we have theories of its rise, height, decline, and fall,—which latter, it would 
seem, is now near, among all people” (79). Carlyle and Fuseli observed that 
the collection and theorization of art in institutional settings tended to 
produce lackluster reflections of original works of genius—or worse, the 
dismembered horrors of a Robert Montgomery. And yet, toward the end 
of “Signs of the Times” Carlyle acknowledges that the “admiration of old 
nobleness, which now so often shows itself as a faint dilettantism, will one 
day become a generous emulation, and man may again be all that he has 
been, and more than he has been” (83–84). From the Carracci to Winckel-
mann, and from Dryden to Macaulay, the idea that careful study and emu-
lation could “save” art had been a powerful one; but with the proliferation 
of criticism, scholarship, reviews, and, above all, poetry, reaching the atten-
tion of a partially educated public, who would judge the soundness of the 
“third temple”?
 This ambivalence toward criticism actually forms the basis for Car-
lyle’s next major essay on the spirit of the age, “Characteristics,” in which 
he questions whether all of this “self-contemplation” can really be healthy. 
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Two major premises inform the essay, both of which have important bear-
ing on nineteenth-century attitudes to eclecticism: “The beginning of 
Inquiry is Disease” (40) and “the end of Understanding is not to prove, and 
find reasons, but to know and believe” (43). In formulating his theory that 
all speculation is a kind of sickness, Carlyle assumes that “the first condi-
tion of complete health is, that each organ perform its function uncon-
sciously, unheeded; let but any organ announce its separate existence, were 
it even boastfully, and for pleasure, not for pain, then already has one of 
those unfortunate ‘false centres of sensibility’ established itself, already is 
derangement there” (39). Since the unexamined body is the only healthy 
body, the only healthy society must be a precritical one. Carlyle dwells nos-
talgically on ancient “republics” and monarchies where every “organ”—or 
person—“perform[ed] its function unconsciously” and where
Society was what we can call whole, in both senses of the word. The 
individual man was in himself a whole, or complete union; and could 
combine with his fellows as the living member of a greater whole. For all 
men, through their life, were animated by one great Idea; thus all efforts 
pointed one way, every where there was wholeness. Opinion and Action 
had not yet become disunited; but the former could still produce the latter, 
or attempt to produce it, as the stamp does its impression while the wax is 
not hardened. Thought, and the Voice of thought, were also a unison; thus, 
instead of Speculation we had Poetry; Literature, in its rude utterance, 
was as yet a heroic Song, perhaps, too, a devotional Anthem. Religion was 
everywhere; Philosophy lay hid under it, peacefully included in it. Herein, 
as in the life-centre of all, lay the true health and oneness. Only at a later 
era must Religion split itself into Philosophies; and thereby the vital union 
of Thought being lost, disunion and mutual collision in all provinces of 
Speech and Action more and more prevail. For if the Poet, or Priest, or by 
whatever title the inspired thinker may be named, is the sign of vigour and 
wellbeing; so likewise is the Logician, or uninspired thinker, the sign of 
disease, probably of decrepitude and decay. (50)
Like many of his contemporaries, Carlyle imagined a prelapsarian state in 
which men and women existed in harmony with each other and with their 
environment. Differences in opinion arising from speculation fractured 
these thoughtlessly ideal societies; people no longer shared a single idea, 
worked toward a common purpose, or worshipped in one church. Diverse 
populations lack the unity of Carlyle’s “antique Republic”; antagonistic 
religions undermine the solidarity of the “feudal monarchy”; and muse-
ums, libraries, and universities exacerbate the mood of self-contemplation. 
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Philosophies divorced from religion in particular draw Carlyle’s attack, 
because they first encourage skepticism toward traditional value systems 
and then give birth to the most damaging of modern ailments, unbelief. 
In his sketch of the precritical society, Carlyle shows religion in harmony 
with philosophy, not yet “split into Philosophies,” and literature in ser-
vice to religion, a “heroic Song” or “devotional Anthem,” not yet disinte-
grated by speculation. The “inspired thinker” creates unconsciously, while 
the “uninspired thinker” manufactures consciously (51). Taking up once 
again his preferred diagnosis of modern life, Carlyle equates the “Divi-
sion, Dismemberment, and partial healing of the wrong” (40) in society 
with mechanization, and machinery with speculation. Instead of art, we 
have theories of art; instead of poetry, we have reviews of poetry—these 
secondary creations are but the machinery of logic, “sign[s] of decrepitude 
and decay.”
 Carlyle’s second major premise in the essay is, of course, almost insepa-
rable from the first: that the goal of understanding is not to know, but 
to believe. Modern poets cannot match the sublimity of their ancestors, 
because they no longer believe in their creations. Instead of awaiting some 
species of divine inspiration, they collect, assemble, and imitate the “trea-
sures” of the past; essentially they gather up old poems for raw material 
and manufacture new ones, no matter that they cannot feel or know what 
ancient poets knew and felt about the words and ideas they used so effec-
tively. Listening hard for the sounds of genius, modern poets forget, Car-
lyle says, that “genius is ever a secret to itself”: “The Shakespeare takes no 
airs for writing Hamlet and the Tempest, understands not that it is anything 
surprising: Milton, again, is more conscious of his faculty, which accord-
ingly is an inferior one. On the other hand, what cackling and strutting 
must we not often hear and see, when, in some shape of academical pro-
clusion, maiden speech, review article, this or the other well-fledged goose 
has produced its goose-egg, of quite measurable value, were it the pink of 
its whole kind; and wonders why all mortals do not wonder!” (42). Con-
sciousness produces art of inferior quality—for Carlyle, no other outcome 
is possible. But does it follow that academics, reviewers, and second-rate 
poets should cease producing work? If one cannot be Shakespeare, should 
one give up the art? Has literature reached the end of its history? Cer-
tainly not. In many of his writings, Carlyle demonstrates his commitment 
to a cyclical model of history that predicts the eventual spiritual renewal 
of society, a rebirth that will mean the dawning of a new era of poetry, in 
its broadest sense. Surrendering to the irony of his position as reviewer, 
he acknowledges that “the diseased self-conscious state of Literature [is] 
disclosed in this one fact, which lies so near us here, the prevalence of 
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Reviewing!” (57). But he asks more pointedly whether self-consciousness 
is more than a symptom, whether “it is also the attempt towards cure” 
(54). As with his hope that the “admiration of old nobleness” might lead 
to “generous emulation,” Carlyle here trusts that in doing this “sick thing” 
and “listen[ing] to itself,” Literature might return to a healthier state. 
Despite Carlyle’s opposition to eclecticism and specifically to its modern 
representative, Victor Cousin (66), his most optimistic pronouncement on 
the future of literature takes a very eclectic-historicist view of the present 
situation, anticipating that the best part of the past will always be with us:
The true Past departs not, nothing that was worthy in the Past departs; 
no Truth or Goodness realized by man ever dies, or can die; but is all still 
here, and, recognised or not, lives and works through endless changes. If all 
things, to speak in the German dialect, are discerned by us, and exist for us, 
in an element of Time, and therefore of Mortality and Mutability; yet Time 
itself reposes on Eternity: the truly Great and Transcendental has its basis 
and substance in Eternity; stands revealed to us as Eternity in a vesture of 
Time. Thus in all Poetry, Worship, Art, Society, as one form passes into 
another, nothing is lost: it is but the superficial, as it were the body only, that 
grows obsolete and dies; under the mortal body lies a soul that is immortal; 
that anew incarnates itself in fairer revelation; and the Present is the living 
sum-total of the whole Past. (65)
For Carlyle in his role as historian, the key to revitalizing the present was 
collecting the biographies of great men whose words and actions would 
inspire people the way religion once did; since “the Present is the living 
sum-total of the whole Past,” the present actually benefits from “increased 
resources”—from the “new wealth which the old coffers will no longer 
contain” (65). The forms of past art survive, even when the inspiration and 
belief is lost, and so the question for Carlyle becomes, as it did for most 
critics and historians of the arts, what will be the new foundation of our 
belief? Will we have an accidental, indiscriminate mixture of past forms 
and ideas driven by marketplace forces? Or will we achieve a considered, 
critical selection of past art that will assist us in developing the style by 
which the age will truly express itself?
 With a few exceptions, most reviewers and literary critics judged the 
poetry of the mid-nineteenth century severely and retained the pessimis-
tic tone of their eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century precursors. Far 
from benefiting from the “increased resources” of history and world cul-
ture, Victorian poets seemed to travel in the old ruts, to be imitative in a 
way that was antithetical to the growth of a new style of poetry. Charles 
Chapter : Eclecticism and Literary Modernity
11
Kingsley’s 1851 article in Fraser’s, irritably titled “The Prevailing Epi-
demic,” is typical of the response to contemporary poetry and its incoher-
ent eclecticism. Kingsley commences his review of “nine new books of 
poetry, whereof only two, if as many, are of such merit as to make it con-
ceivable to us why they should have been published” by iterating a great 
Carlylean truth: “If a man has a single new fact, or thought, or metre, to 
add to the accumulated treasure-heaps of mankind, let him bring it, and 
we will welcome him as a benefactor, however small his gift [ . . . ] but if 
all he can do is to say over again things which have already been said a 
great deal better, let him be silent” (492). Not only does Kingsley betray 
concern over the enormous crowd of publications vying for his attention 
at Fraser’s; he also worries over the lack of “sound and sterling critic[s]” 
who will stem the torrent of amateur and ill-considered literary offerings. 
Although he will not promise to read through all the works he will review, 
he yet maintains that “a book may be worth reviewing, though not worth 
publishing,—even as a great many actions are fit to be punished, which 
are by no means fit to be done” (493). Acting on this principle, he attempts 
“to take the most and the least faulty [works] before us, and by exposing, 
through them, some of the common poetic mistakes and superstitions of 
the day, try, if possible, to warn others from the road which leads to Limbo 
Patrum, the region of failures and abortions” (509). Kingsley lists as the 
most egregious fault of aspiring poets the total lack of art or manner in the 
poetry—a consequence, he feels, of the widespread belief that sincerity of 
feeling is sufficient to merit any assemblage of words whatever: “Now, is 
this a book to be read through? especially when the author informs you 
in the preface that it has no plot, and has actually been made as you make 
chairs and tables, bits at a time, jotted down in a note-book, ‘altogether 
unpremeditated either in design or otherwise’” (494). According to King-
sley, such scribblers are not called to poetry; they do not feel any stirring 
joyfulness in the play of language, nor do they have any grand ideas to 
bequeath to humanity.
 Compounding the thoughtlessness that allows amateur productions to 
reach the public is the noticeably sloppy language of which they are com-
posed. In his dissection of W. R. Cassels’s poem “Pygmalion,” Kingsley 
draws attention to the particular weaknesses of the modern poet. First, 
Cassels errs by his imprecise word choices, which Kingsley demonstrates 
by citing passages that hint at a careless and wasteful mimicry of romantic 
images. The offending poet stumbles with the phrase “verderous pleasure” 
(Kingsley queries, “What sort of pleasure is that?”), with “That heaven 
sets lambent on its imaged self” (Kingsley begs to know, “What in heaven, 
or its imaged self either, does that mean?”), and “Upon each limb / Grace 
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laid its sweet commandment lovingly” (Kingsley wonders, “Why lovingly? 
Did grace love the statue? If so, what is grace?”) (495). Second, Cassels falls 
prey to a habit that Kingsley regards as the most offensive of the modern 
poet, namely frequent reference to the wistful longings, unique powers 
of observation, and all-around incomparable genius of the Poet. In “Pyg-
malion” he envisions streams “Calling forth flowers from the slumbering 
earth, / Like ‘thoughts from the dream of a Poet,’” (495); in another poem 
Cassels tells the story of a poet disappointed in the world who comes back 
to his first love in the country (496). While Kingsley does not detest this 
latter poem as much as Cassels’s others, he wishes it had any other person 
as its hero. The hackneyed image of the poet that the Victorians inherited 
from the Romantics cannot be blamed entirely on the wave of feeling that 
washed out traditional poetic values earlier in the century. The Romantic 
poets seemed to offer a kind of generalized notion of the poetic nature, 
whereby any reasonably thoughtful individual might lay claim to height-
ened perception and feelings. One of the works Kingsley reviews accord-
ingly contains no fewer than four poems about poets—“The Poet’s Bride,” 
“Poesie,” “The Poet,” and “Sonnet—The Outer and Inner Life of a Poet” 
(498)—a density that prompts the critic to complain that poetry is suffer-
ing from an epidemic of “poets”: “Why will he run into the modern cant 
of young authors on this point too? Instead of writing poetry now-a-days, 
people write spoilt prose about poets, and think that will do as well. Poetry 
about Poets!–a folio commentary on a bank-note! If they know so per-
fectly what poets ought to be, why don’t they go and be it, and let the poor 
world, not over-stocked with ‘world-singers’ just now, see what it is like? 
Just as the unfortunate Germans are, or were, overrun with scribblers of 
‘Kunst-novellen,’ who could not draw a cow if they were asked, so we are 
with poet-scribblers who can’t write poetry” (498). In all of these examples, 
Kingsley sees a gap between theory and practice, saying and doing—there 
are novels about artists written by people who know nothing about art, 
poems about poets written by people who know nothing about poetry. The 
pervasiveness of poetry about poets (and the corresponding evacuation of 
genuine thought or feeling) is symptomatic of the drift in modern poetry 
toward a vague and eclectic spiritualism.
 In the nineteenth century, Kingsley complains, it suffices to look like 
a thing in order to be it—modern poets substitute the re-presentation (or 
the theory) for the act. Since the audience for poetry no longer understands 
the impulse behind it or the words that compose the great poems of the 
past, the modern poet’s superficiality might escape detection. As long as he 
collects enough of the catchphrases, loads his poem with the usual images, 
and assumes the appropriately wistful attitude, most casual observers will 
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reckon him a poet: “It is a sad style, this, which too many young men have 
got into now-a-days, in prose and verse: one part Carlylese, one part Ten-
nysonian, one part Bulwerean, one part third-hand Fichtean, and seven 
parts Anna-Matilda Slipslop, stolen apparently from her well-known bal-
lad in the Rejected Addresses; everybody’s peculiarities, and nobody’s beau-
ties; great, big, huge stock-words, every one of them a hoary sinner about 
town these ten years, substituted for a thought in every line, except where 
the young poets forget themselves a moment, and their dyed wigs get awry, 
and the native baldness peeps out” (497). In revealing the recipe mixture 
for most modern poems, Kingsley foregrounds one item in the list: preten-
tiousness. The use of “stock-words” in place of authentic thought can be 
blamed in part on the spread of superficial knowledge, which encourages 
individuals to lay claim to a more expansive territory of knowledge than 
is really wise, given their limited resources for holding onto it. Kingsley 
detects a misunderstanding of the most basic philosophical precepts in 
David Holt’s Lay of Hero-Worship when the poet writes “Out of the Real 
the Ideal springeth,” and he counters—no matter whether the poet meant 
to be cleverly paradoxical—“Nonsense! [ . . . ] The ideal is the real, and the 
only real, according to all philosophies which acknowledge an ideal, and 
not a mere nominal abstract” (497). Since the poet has “filched” these terms 
(and many others that Kingsley lists) from philosophy, “they must be used 
rightly, and not wrongly” (497). But Holt exhibits a far more dire brand 
of pretentiousness for Kingsley when he claims that he can construct a 
“basement upon which to build a bright / Edifice of Divine imaginings” 
(497). Here Kingsley recognizes the hated spiritualism of the age with its 
“Every-man-his-own-God-maker-cant” (498) and blasts Holt for invok-
ing the Divine as a means to glorify the poet and his imaginings, “just as 
you would intense or gorgeous, or ‘utterless,’ or any other word from the 
stock-cant vocabulary” (497). Kingsley caps his argument against the pseu-
doreligious feeling of so much contemporary poetry with a diatribe against 
the thoughtless eclecticism of the age: “Seriously, the prevalence of this 
sort of—what shall we call it?—Pseudo-Spiritualistico-Eclectico-Hypo-
platonico-Pantheistico-Pamborborotaractic Sentimentalism, infecting the 
greater part of our bad poetry, and too much of our good, is an ugly sign 
of the ‘unreality,’ as the modern phrase is—the lying, as our forefathers 
used to call it, in their coarse way—which is abroad in the world;—nasty 
foul out-croppings of Mr. Carlyle’s universal ‘Liars’-rock substratum,’ in 
the very sanctuary of God, as poetry once was and will be again, but never 
to those who persist in this fashion of writing” (498). Kingsley asks these 
poets to give up writing poetry, to come into contact with one “fact,” and 
to quit pretending to illumination that they do not possess (499). Such 
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pretending contributes to the spread of a dangerous state of unreality, par-
ticularly in the upper classes, who seem most disposed to write nonsense, 
and who are most likely to be estranged from any “simple, universal word, 
or thought, or feeling, of human nature” (499).
 The spread of superficial knowledge, false religious feeling, philo-
sophical confusion, rampant literary borrowing, and intellectual laziness 
are familiar symptoms of eclecticism. Kingsley adds one more feature to 
the idea of eclecticism at mid-century: its effeminacy. Coleridge and Lewes 
might have laid the foundation for Kingsley’s diagnosis, but this muscu-
lar Christian made unmanliness a central feature of the (literary) spirit of 
the age. In fact, Kingsley links almost all of the negative characteristics 
of modern poetry to its unmanliness. He first employs sexual language 
in his critique of Cassels’s poem “Pygmalion.” Glossing the final lines, 
in which Pygmalion finally enjoys the warm contact of his Galatea (“He 
clasped the maid unto his beating heart, / As father might the daughter 
of his love”), Kingsley complains, “Oh, most lame and impotent conclu-
sion!” (496). While playing up the humor of a climax driven by paternal 
love, Kingsley also speaks to the lack of poetic consummation. Instead of 
feeling the fire of sexual passion, Cassels supplies only “dim wonderment,” 
a conclusion Kingsley dismisses as “vapid, gaudy, wordy, misty bombast 
and slipslop, without definite images, sound manful thought, or even cor-
rect use of language” (496). Cassels is unable to satisfy the poetic prom-
ise raised by his borrowings from more “virile” sources such as Carlyle, 
Tennyson, and Bulwer Lytton, being, Kingsley mocks, “seven parts Anna-
Matilda Slipslop” (497). Not surprisingly, Kingsley holds out the “poetess” 
as the ultimate failure for the young men whom he primarily addresses in 
this essay. The “quasi-metaphysical verbiage” of so many modern poets 
bypasses the “severely philosophic method” of the always masculine scholar 
(501). The “Autotheistic” position (the false religious feeling and poet- 
worship Kingsley detests) betrays a deep-seated cowardice, barely separated 
as it is “from sheer, blank, honest, manful Atheism—honest and manful 
because it wears no rouge, and has courage to look steadily at the reflection 
of its own skeleton face” (498). Kingsley implies throughout “The Prevail-
ing Epidemic” that the “sanctuary of God” in which true poetry dwells 
can be retaken only by honest, “manful” language, which has been lost, he 
believes, in the imprecise, perplexed vocabulary of modern life.
 Just as Macaulay reviewed the work of a bad poet in order to remind 
critics of their obligation to serve the public, Kingsley rehearsed the faults 
of modern poetry in order to arrest the decline of the art. He hoped that 
poetry would come to reflect the age in a significant way or even to tran-
scend it by a mastery of traditional form—a mastery that could come only 
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with a return to the beliefs that shaped tradition. But how were these 
foundational beliefs to be recovered and restored? In the second part of 
this book, I consider five writers (including Kingsley) who struggled to 
create in an age of eclecticism. Most writers discovered the necessity of 
compromise. The conditions of literary modernity demanded it. Just as 
Ruskin tried to find principles for modern architecture that would be like 
Gothic, but different, writers had to understand both the structure and the 
spirit of past literature. Old forms might be infused with new meanings, or 
combined to create new styles, and new modes of expression might equal 
the force of the antique; but this could not happen ex nihilo. In the ordi-
nary sense, every writer born in the nineteenth century was eclectic. But if 
these writers wanted to use that vast inheritance, they had to learn how to 
be eclectic.
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iven Charles Kingsley’s dissatisfaction with the eclecticism of 
much post-Romantic poetry, it is remarkable that he regarded 
The Princess—a self-consciously eclectic work—as a great synthetic 
achievement: “[Tennyson] makes his ‘Medley’ a mirror of the nineteenth 
century, possessed of its own new art and science, its own new temptations 
and aspirations, and yet grounded on, and continually striving to repro-
duce, the forms and experiences of all past time” (250). Tennyson avoids 
what Kingsley identifies as the chief errors of his fellow poets—superfi-
cial knowledge, false religious feeling, philosophical confusion, rampant 
literary borrowing, and intellectual laziness—all familiar symptoms of a 
pervasive, naïve eclecticism. He works with the same materials and under 
similar exigencies to create unity from potentially chaotic variety, and to 
make a “Medley” of the discordant music of his age. Aubrey De Vere’s 
October 1849 review of The Princess for the Edinburgh Review likewise 
praises Tennyson’s capacity for capturing the spirit of the nineteenth cen-
tury, and for doing what no one else seemed capable of doing: render-
ing the age a fit subject for poetry. The genius of Tennyson’s synthesis, 
as Kingsley saw it, was in grounding the “temptations and aspirations” 
of the nineteenth century on “the forms and experiences of all past time.” 
De Vere’s analysis extends the idea of the age as “medley” when he credits 
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Tennyson with writing a poem that successfully combines widely different 
genres and moods. In asserting that the poem partakes of the eclectic char-
acter of the age, De Vere pays tribute to Tennyson’s ability to evoke of one 
of the defining features of modern life:
If a man were to scrutinise the external features of our time, for the purpose 
of characterising it compendiously, he would be tempted, we suspect, to 
give up the task before long, and to pronounce the age a Medley. It would 
be hard to specify the character of our Philosophy, including as it does 
fragments of all systems, sometimes at open war, and sometimes eclecti-
cally combined. Not less various is the texture of Society among us, in 
which time-honoured traditions are blended with innovations which a few 
months make antiquated. [ . . . ] As heterogeneous in its character is Art 
among us. Here we have an imitation of the antique, there a revival of the 
middle ages; [ . . . ]. By what term could we describe the architecture of the 
day? In our rising cities we find a Gothic church close to a Byzantine fane 
or an Italian basilica; and in their immediate neighbourhood a town hall 
like a Greek temple, a mansion like a Roman palace, and a clubhouse after 
the fashion of Louis XIV. The age in which we live may have a character 
of its own; but that character is not written in its face. (204)
As was so often the case during the nineteenth century, critics would 
invoke the heterogeneity—or outward eclecticism—of Victorian architec-
ture in an effort to describe the inner character of the age. Here De Vere 
equates architectural with philosophical eclecticism, and connects them 
both to a more expansive “texture of Society,” which readily combines the 
antique and the innovative. By designating his poem “A Medley,” Tenny-
son captures the particular quality of an age that cannot be characterized 
easily in any other way. It is tempting to see, as De Vere does, Tennyson’s 
classification of The Princess as part of an overall design—a poem that self- 
consciously “resembles the age,” speaks the age’s eclectic dialect, and per-
forms its attendant crises. But not all readers of The Princess were willing 
to see “depths where there [were] none” (Chretien 203). C. P. Chretien’s 
April 1849 review in the Christian Remembrancer raises an uncomfortable 
question about the poem, which has never been resolved: was the appella-
tion of “medley” an afterthought, a kind of justification for the long poem’s 
obvious, unresolved heterogeneity? Or is “medley” meant to draw atten-
tion to the “unity of purpose which methodises its variegated exterior” (De 
Vere 204)? In other words, does the poem merely reflect the eclecticism 
of the age, or is it coping with that eclecticism self-consciously through its 
eclectic form?
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 Two oft-quoted anecdotes from Tennyson’s life reveal his ambivalent 
feelings about the most-revised of his long poems. In late December 1847 
he wrote to his friend Edward FitzGerald, “My Book is out and I hate it 
and so no doubt will you” (Letters I:281). During the weeks leading up to 
the publication of The Princess: A Medley on Christmas day, Tennyson was 
visiting Carlyle, who wrote to Emerson about the poet and the poem: “a 
truly interesting Son of Earth, and Son of Heaven,—who has almost lost 
his way, among the will-o’wisps, I doubt; and may flounder ever deeper, 
over neck and nose at last among the quagmires that abound!” (qtd. in 
Letters I:281n). Carlyle worried, too, that “spinning rhymes” and calling 
them “high Art” would never furnish Tennyson with the great task he 
needed (281n). As Arnold would later say about writing poetry in general, 
the times were against him. Hallam Tennyson records in the Memoir that 
FitzGerald and Carlyle “gave up all hopes of him after ‘The Princess’” 
(I:253). Serious poetry, it was thought, should not muddy itself too much 
in the present age, or it would not outlast its generation; but was the poem 
serious—was it original—because it arrested for a moment the fast-flow-
ing stream of the present? His son also records a conversation Tennyson 
had with Frederick Locker-Lampson in 1869 in which “He talked of ‘The 
Princess’ with something of regret, of its fine blank verse, and the many 
good things in it: ‘but,’ said he, ‘though truly original, it is, after all, only 
a medley’” (Memoir II:70–71). If Locker-Lampson’s memory of the poet’s 
phrasing is accurate, Tennyson, like many of his reviewers, was forced to 
acknowledge an irresolvable something at the heart of this strange poem. 
It was original—it was “only” a medley. The originality of the poem lay 
precisely in using the medley form to represent what was unintelligible by 
any other means—and by no other means could he extricate himself from 
the “quagmire” of the present.
 Contrary to what was widely believed at the time and to what still 
passes as common knowledge on the subject, The Princess was not a criti-
cal failure.1 Granted, Tennyson was disappointed at the poem’s recep-
tion—at the consensus that The Princess did not live up to the expectations 
raised by the Poems of 1832 and 1842. But the majority of critics who 
weighed in between January 1848 and October 1849 liked the poem, even 
as they lamented the misapplication of Tennyson’s remarkable powers 
to what seemed more a collection of headlines than a work of art. Even 
those critics who praised the beauty and sentiment of The Princess could 
find little justification for its extreme heterogeneity, both thematic and 
formal. Rather than debating the controversial content of the poem, many 
reviewers found themselves embroiled in controversy about form and 
style. Even his staunchest supporters conceded that they would have to 
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wait still longer for the great moral poem they believed their hero would 
produce.
 In its bare outline, The Princess looked like it would supply this lack. 
The main poem relates the story of a young prince who was betrothed 
at birth to Princess Ida, who, having reached the age suitable for marry-
ing, is instead intent on founding a university for women over which she 
will preside. Despite the promise of an epic struggle between male and 
female that is finally resolved to everyone’s satisfaction, reviewers were 
uneasy about the juxtaposition of comic and tragic elements, and modern 
and traditional values. And some critics wondered why Tennyson pre-
sented his serious message about the education and status of women in 
the form of a burlesque. The Prologue even in its shorter 1847 incarnation 
did explain the poem’s formal structure, and many reviewers complained 
that The Princess lacked unity of purpose. The unusually broad range of 
sources informing the poem—debates on the Woman Question, discover-
ies in the sciences, classical mythology, the Arabian Nights, to name just a 
few—provoked attacks on the poem’s anachronisms and moral confusion. 
But as John Killham in his study of Tennyson’s sources concedes, the poet’s 
“eclecticism in choice of materials represented the state of current taste and 
thinking” (276). We do indeed see a world of differences at Vivian Park 
(the setting of the framing story), but we see that its diverse elements do 
not clash. We witness the breakdown of communication between tradi-
tion and modernity and between men and women, but we see commonalty 
and continuity reestablished between them. Tennyson’s eclecticism in this 
poem works on two levels: first, he canvasses “the state of current taste and 
thinking” (the manifest eclecticism of Victorian culture, apparent in its art, 
philosophy, religion, and politics) and brings that variety into the poem; 
and then he blends these diverse elements in order to achieve a progressive 
synthesis of past and present, male and female, heroic and mock-heroic. 
The poem thus provided critics with an occasion to rehearse the principal 
arguments for and against eclecticism. Two critical responses in particular, 
those of Chretien and De Vere, show that in the debate over the nature of 
Tennyson’s genius, and the success or failure of this poem in particular, 
eclecticism was becoming as serious an issue in poetry at mid-century as it 
was already in architecture and philosophy.
Eclecticism at Cambridge
In the late 1820s, when Tennyson was at Cambridge, a professor at the Sor-
bonne, Victor Cousin, delivered a series of blockbuster lectures on the his-
tory of philosophy. Underlying Cousin’s narrative was the conviction that 
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by analyzing the history of philosophy eclectically, one could identify the 
truths unifying the different schools. It was simply a matter of discovering 
what was constant in this history, and putting aside what did not seem 
to fit. The philosophical battles that had, he felt, falsely opposed German 
idealism, Scottish common sense, and French psychology would cease; and 
the ideological détente that followed would provide the foundation for a 
political juste milieu—a happy medium that blended republican principles 
with monarchical rule. Although Cousin himself was always careful to 
describe eclecticism as a method rather than a school, he became identified 
personally with an eclectic philosophy whose fortunes were inextricably 
linked to the July Monarchy. As a philosophical approach, eclecticism was 
equated in British minds entirely with what they regarded as the instabil-
ity of the French nation in the post-Revolutionary period. More seriously, 
the eclectic method of discovering truth struck some British philosophers, 
such as William Hamilton and George Henry Lewes, as an unhealthy 
compound of dilettantism and pedantry, without the element of genu-
ine conviction. In Britain the rise of eclecticism signaled a loss of faith in 
authority, combined with a sense of the wholeness of the past seen against 
the fragmentariness of the present. Could an eclectic method overcome the 
naïve eclecticism of a society that seemed to pick and choose at random 
from the past, unaware of how this style clashed with that or how this idea 
was irreconcilable with that one? In spite of the unpopularity of French 
thought in Britain, eclecticism became the most congenial intellectual tool 
of a pragmatic age. The eclectic looked for compromises and avoided con-
flicts, which explained the predominance of liberalism in politics and lati-
tudinarianism in religion, of mixed styles in architecture and painting, and 
of hybrid genres, such as the novel, in literature.
 During his years at Cambridge, Tennyson became involved with the 
“Apostles,” a society of gifted undergraduates who had embraced the 
spirit, if not the letter, of the eclectic philosophy that was thriving across 
the Channel.2 The early influence of F. D. Maurice had instilled within 
successive generations of members a consistent set of liberal values and a 
“spirit of the society” that Henry Sidgwick described as the “belief that we 
can learn, and a determination that we will learn from people of the most 
opposite opinions” (qtd. in Allen 4). Maurice’s own spiritual development 
represents an extreme version of the transformation most Apostles expe-
rienced. The son of a Unitarian clergyman whose tolerance of all beliefs 
worked against the effectiveness of his own teachings, and the brother 
of several evangelical sisters, Frederick Maurice spent his life searching 
for unity and avoiding controversy: “He came to think that every form 
of human belief might be seen to contain elements of truth that might be 
discovered by close analysis of the form and by an attempt to sympathize 
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with those who held to it” (Allen 70). The process of “painfully honest self- 
scrutiny” (70) undertaken by all Apostles was merely the first step toward 
social regeneration; the Apostles’ educational program, a crucial supple-
ment to the narrow curriculum of Cambridge, included the study of 
modern literature, from which one would gain an understanding of the 
operations of the divine principle at work in the world. Like Cousin of the 
Sorbonne, who found his political middle way in the July Monarchy, Mau-
rice eventually found his theological juste milieu in the Established Church, 
which was broad enough, he felt, to include all Christian believers. Cousin 
and Maurice taught their followers to canvass a range of opinions and 
finally to rest in compromise and unity, comfortably in the middle.
 Peter Allen’s intimate account of the Apostles’ early years offers com-
pelling portraits of the many young men who underwent such spiritual 
transformations as a result of their association with the “Conversazione 
Society.” A category of experience that might rightly be described as 
eclectic, the dialectical self-scrutiny undertaken by the Apostles carried 
individuals from the point of (generally) radical beliefs to confusion and 
uncertainty to inclusively liberal beliefs. Jane Carlyle, one of the less chari-
table critics of Maurice and the “mystics,” said that members such as John 
Sterling simply “wanted back-bone” (89). Thomas Carlyle preferred to 
call his friend’s susceptibility to new influences and impressions a “gift for 
imaginative sympathy” (89). Both Sterling and Maurice wrote novels about 
young men whose spiritual quests led them to adopt and to reject one sys-
tem of thought after another; but this was a process of spiritual awakening 
that would fit them for the vital project of social regeneration—they were 
to join Coleridge’s “clerisy.” The necessity of eclecticism in youth was cen-
tral to educational projects from the Royal Academy of Art to Newman’s 
Idea of a University. Only by canvassing a range of belief within a controlled 
environment could a youth emerge as an individual whose opinions might 
genuinely be described as his own. At the very least, then, the Apostles 
gave Tennyson a “loosely consistent set of values” with which his work 
would enter into conversation.3 The “spirit of the society” haunted the twi-
light space wherein the poet described a moment of waking to conscious-
ness again and again—a moment of waking that was essential to what I 
characterize as the Apostolic transformation. In The Princess Tennyson 
gave this spiritual transformation a generic form—the medley.
The Eclectic Poetics of The Princess
Even as Tennyson inclined toward eclecticism intellectually and tempera-
mentally, he did not find it easy to rest in the condition of being eclectic. In 
Chapter : Alfred Tennyson
15
Part V of The Princess, it is difficult not to hear an echo of his earlier poem 
on the dangers of solipsism, “The Palace of Art,” when Princess Ida rages, 
“Far off from men I built a fold for them [women]; / I stored it full of rich 
memorial; / I fenced it round with gallant institutes, / And biting laws to 
scare the beasts of prey, / And prosper’d, till a rout of saucy boys / Brake 
on us at our books, and marr’d our peace, . . .” (V:380–85). While the Prin-
cess’s university is no “lordly pleasure-house” (“Palace” 1), she does create a 
space in which women might “reign . . . apart” (14) and where the world’s 
treasures of knowledge and art have been sifted to create a self-reflecting, 
self-fulfilling narrative. If Cousin’s image of the eclectic philosopher was 
an internal eye, then in “The Palace of Art” Tennyson gives us the soul as 
an all-seeing, self-sustaining eclectic: “I take possession of man’s mind and 
deed. / I care not what the sects may bawl. / I sit as God holding no form 
of creed, / But contemplating all” (209–12). The Princess does not pretend 
to be above professing a creed, but, in establishing the university, she extri-
cates herself from the entanglements of history and family, to sit in judg-
ment on the world. Consequently, both the Princess and the feminized 
soul of the earlier poem succumb to a kind of “death in life”—a stagnation 
or loss of consciousness worse than death—before reengaging with the 
world. Tennyson keeps the dangers of eclecticism firmly in mind for the 
reader, even as the overall movement of the poem supports the Princess’s 
eclectic aim. Instead of an enclosed, self-devouring eclecticism, Tennyson 
models the dialectical eclecticism of the Cambridge Apostles; and, as a 
careful reading of the poem will demonstrate, the medley is anything but 
an indiscriminate collection of the age’s tropes and artifacts.
 As Tennyson sets the stage for the entertainment that is the core nar-
rative of The Princess, he draws upon the collegiate model of the debate in 
a story passed among several narrators, each of whom might inflect the 
story with his own interpretation or alter its course toward a particular 
outcome.4 In practice, we have in The Princess a single poet-narrator who 
has unified the seven parts of the story in a single style, leaving the char-
acters’ voices to provide the dialectics.5 The auditors and narrators of the 
framing story (and inevitably the readers who are pulled into that frame) 
are likely to sympathize with the troubles of the characters and to identify 
with the various positions taken by them. Sympathy, and even susceptibil-
ity, were vital elements in the character of a Cambridge Apostle, especially 
in his approach to handling controversy, and Tennyson constructs his dia-
lectics with the intention of making the reader see the mixed situations 
of the medley as natural and inevitable, and any ideological extreme as 
untenable. The primary, contending forces involved in the framing and 
core narratives of The Princess form three pairs: tradition and modernity, or 
the proper relationship between past and present; male and female, or the 
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relative strength of each in shaping our identity; and the heroic and mock-
heroic, or the power of generic conventions in shaping ideology. Tenny-
son makes these rigid dichotomies meaningful by showing how we engage 
eclectically with variety and that achieving synthesis must always involve 
compromise between like elements, not the exclusion of difference.
 In the Prologue Tennyson establishes a complex dialectic between naïve 
eclecticism and the eclecticism that can be achieved only through an effort 
at selection and combination. Since volitional eclecticism usually consti-
tutes an effort to cope with the burden of the historical inheritance, Ten-
nyson’s use of historical material in the framing story provides an index of 
his commitment to an eclectic outlook. The opening lines of the Prologue 
not only describe the setting, Vivian Park, but also invoke the tradition of 
the country house poem, which had been popular in English poetry dur-
ing the Renaissance. While less explicitly a poem of praise than, say, Ben 
Jonson’s “To Penshurst,” the Prologue does present an exemplary scene 
of the times, commends the generosity of the host, surveys the riches of 
the house and its collections, and describes the joy of the common people 
who take advantage of a summer holiday on the park grounds. Combin-
ing the generic features of the country house poem with the memory of a 
feast of the Mechanics’ Institute that he had witnessed at the Lushingtons’ 
house in 1842, Tennyson brings the past forward into the present. In order 
to make the marriage between the tradition of country hospitality and 
social and scientific progress as natural as possible, Tennyson has to choose 
the elements of that union very carefully, so that a scene “Strange . . . and 
smacking of the time” (1. 89) becomes reassuringly familiar.
 The Prologue continually reinforces the poet’s underlying eclecticism. 
Herbert F. Tucker has referred to the modern scene at Vivian-place as “a 
Crystal Palace without the walls” (354) and, though The Princess predates 
that quintessential Victorian edifice, this is an especially apt image of what 
Tennyson wants to accomplish. The reader is led from the lawn and the 
Mechanics’ Institute into the house, where an apparently random collec-
tion of artifacts contributes to a distinctively modern harmony:
 Walter show’d the house,
Greek, set with busts. From vases in the hall
Flowers of all heavens, lovelier than their names,
Grew side by side; and on the pavement lay
Carved stones of the Abbey-ruin in the park,
Huge Ammonites and the first bones of time;
And on the tables every clime and age
Jumbled together; celts and calumets,
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Claymore and snow-shoe, toys in lava, fans
Of sandal, amber, ancient rosaries,
Laborious orient ivory sphere in sphere,
The cursed Malayan crease and battle-clubs
From the isles of palm; and higher on the walls,
Betwixt the monstrous horns of elk and deer,
His own forefathers’ arms and armour hung. (Prol.:10–24)
Eclecticism in art and architecture was meant to preserve the values 
attached to the different styles; the eclecticism of the collection operates 
in like manner. The Greek Revival house “set with busts” reaches back 
to a place remote from modern Britain both temporally and geographi-
cally, and contains the figures of great men whose ideas and actions have 
presumably influenced the evolution of Vivian Park. Here and throughout 
the Prologue, Tennyson links the long history of the family (“forefathers’ 
arms and armour”) and national traditions to an even more expansive geo-
logical time. Paired with the shell of an extinct mollusk, the ammonite, the 
ruins of the abbey are among “the first bones of time.” In the collection, 
objects of “every clime and age” are “jumbled together,” but instead of 
clashing they seem to open up and reveal each other. For example, soft-
ening the violence of the instruments of war (Celts, claymore, Malayan 
crease, battle-clubs) are the more peaceful objects in Sir Walter’s collection 
(calumets, snowshoe, fans, rosaries, carved ivory). What would seem to be 
a collection without meaning, without a narrative—in other words, naïve 
eclecticism—becomes instead dialectical and expressive.
 The effort to combine eclectically the values of past and present con-
tinues throughout the Prologue, culminating in the story of a princess 
who defies the spirit of her age, before reconciling with it. On his tour of 
the house and its collections, the poet-narrator picks up “a hoard of tales 
that dealt with knights / Half-legend, half-historic counts and kings . . .” 
(Prol.:29–30) and a woman warrior, figures all from the family’s proud his-
tory. From the “half-legend, half-historic,” the party moves to the half-
modern scene of the summer holiday. Significantly, he “kept the book and 
had [his] finger in it— / Down thro’ the park” (53–54), so that even as he 
looks upon the wondrous present, the poet holds open the door to the past. 
Instead of portraying the scientific displays as potentially disrupting the 
world of tradition invoked by the country house poem, the poet’s figura-
tive language brings the alien into the existing order:
 Strange was the sight to me;
For all the sloping pasture murmur’d, sown
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With happy faces and with holiday.
There moved the multitude, a thousand heads;
The patient leaders of their Institute
Taught them with facts. One rear’d a font of stone
And drew, from butts of water on the slope,
The fountain of the moment, playing, now
A twisted snake, and now a rain of pearls,
Or steep-up spout whereon the gilded ball
Danced like a wisp; and somewhat lower down
A man with knobs and wires and vials fired
A cannon; Echo answer’d in her sleep
From hollow fields; and here were telescopes
For azure views; and there a group of girls
In circle waited, whom the electric shock
Dislink’d with shrieks and laughter; round the lake
A little clock-work steamer paddling plied
And shook the lilies; perch’d about the knolls
A dozen angry models jetted steam;
A petty railway ran; a fire-balloon
Rose gem-like up before the dusky groves
And dropt a fairy parachute and past;
And there thro’ twenty posts of telegraph
They flash’d a saucy message to and fro
Between the mimic stations; so that sport
Went hand in hand with science; [ . . . ] (Prol.:54–80)
The poet-narrator offers up the strange sights that modern science has 
produced, but with the intention of seeing them integrated into the famil-
iar cultural landscape, even of transforming science into a kind of fairy 
tale or myth (“rain of pearls,” “gilded ball,” “danced like a wisp,” “Echo 
answer’d,” and “a fire-balloon / Rose gem-like up before the dusky groves 
/ And dropt a fairy parachute”). Young girls still giggle in shifting cliques, 
even if they have been moved by electricity rather than gossip. Children 
still play on the water with toy boats, though they might be powered by 
steam. Young men and women still flirt and court, even if the messages are 
not whispered into warm ears, but passed into the telegraph. Incorporating 
aspects of modern life into the most pleasing configuration of traditional 
social relations, Tennyson models in the Prologue on the level of society 
what he illustrates in the main tale on the level of the individual, namely 
that we will all be better off if we blend the diverse elements of which we 
are composed, rather than forcing them into conflict. Just as attendees of 
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the Great Exhibition were meant to return to their homes feeling renewed 
optimism about the progress of their age, readers of The Princess were sup-
posed to feel that the plenitude of the present could not be captured in 
any single style and that the generic and stylistic inclusiveness of the poem 
pointed the way to new possibilities for the art of poetry.
 Throughout the Prologue the reader feels the shifting of temporal sands 
as the poet-narrator moves back and forth, as it seems, between past and 
present. After gazing long upon the modern scene, the group of friends, 
“satiated at length / Came to the ruins” (90–91). Quite deliberately, the 
poet-narrator frames a scene from within the ruins that blends past and 
present, creating the juste milieu that he has been seeking, neither past nor 
present but both together: “High-arch’d and ivy-claspt, / Of finest Gothic 
lighter than a fire, / Thro’ one wide chasm of time and frost they gave / 
The park, the crowd, the house; but all within / The sward was trim as any 
garden lawn” (91–95). Within the theatrical space of the ruins, the host and 
his college friends, his sister, their Aunt Elizabeth, and various other ladies 
gather for a feast. Tennyson contrasts the liveliness of the young people 
with the serenity of the tomb where they will have their meal, as if to draw 
attention to the entirely commonplace idea of the persistence of human 
generation. Even when individual efforts fail and empires fall, the next 
generation waits to take their place; but the transfer of the life force does 
not travel in one direction only. Described as “Half child, half woman” 
(Prol.:101), Lilia, the host’s sister—a key figure in the poem, drapes the 
broken statue of her ancestor Sir Ralph with an orange scarf, “That made 
the old warrior from his ivied nook / Glow like a sunbeam” (Prol.:104–5). 
In this poem, Tennyson often shows how the living restore life to the dead, 
and so does not commit the error Kingsley so detested, of “ignoring the 
Present to fall back on a cold and galvanised Medievalism” (250). Lilia’s 
playfulness when she warms the statue with her scarf; the poet-narrator’s 
finger in the ancient text; and the feast upon the tomb—all are gestures of 
restorative sympathy, a reaching out to the past, without surrendering to 
it. Following the pattern of the Prologue, the core narrative must strike a 
balance between admiration for what William Morris might have called 
the strong colors of the past and the necessity of living in the present:
Heroic seems our princess as required—
But something made to suit with time and place,
A Gothic ruin and a Grecian house,
A talk of college and of ladies’ rights,
A feudal knight in silken masquerade,
And, yonder, shrieks and strange experiments
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For which the good Sir Ralph had burnt them all—
This were a medley! (Prol.:223–30)
The present lends its own colors to old subjects and links ideas that gain 
in power from their juxtaposition. What makes eclecticism seem seductive 
to some and incoherent to others is its presumption that one can have, to 
paraphrase Voltaire, the best of all possible worlds. Rather than dismiss-
ing such idealism as naïve or ridiculous, Tennyson puts forward a vision 
of historical change as medley—evolution not revolution. Who would be 
happier to return to a time when they would be burnt for practicing sci-
ence? Change should be welcomed, as long as it is tended like a garden—
nurtured and loved, but clipped and pruned when required.
 When the central narrative begins, we see that neither the Prince nor 
the Princess has learned to live with a medley of past and present. One of 
Tennyson’s later revisions, the addition of the Prince’s “weird seizures,” 
underscores the attitude toward history displayed in the Prologue—one 
cannot begin to live until one lives in the present. Burdened by a heredi-
tary malady, the Prince suffers from waking dreams, seems to walk among 
ghosts, and cannot tell truth from shadow. While the Prince’s “fancies” 
keep him a prisoner in an insubstantial past, the Princess’s fancies have 
more troubling consequences, for they concern the future. In attempting 
to bring about a Renaissance for women, the Princess selects from a largely 
mythical past. Any theory-driven picking and choosing seems doomed to 
failure; even the Princess acknowledges that she works in shadow, know-
ing only parts of the whole.
 ‘. . . but we that are not all,
As parts, can see but parts, now this, now that,
And live, perforce, from thought to thought, and make
One act a phantom of succession. Thus
Our weakness somehow shapes the shadow, Time;
But in the shadow will we work, and mould
The woman to the fuller day.’ (III:309–14)
As Tennyson must have learned from his Apostle friends, one had to test 
one’s opinions, to discover their origins, and whether there was any truth 
in them. If one were surrounded only with flatterers and inferiors, it was 
unlikely that one would grow to maturity holding opinions that were 
mostly truthful; but instead, one would likely happen, by solitary read-
ing and thinking, into opinions that were partly right and partly wrong. 
Encouraged by her theory-obsessed mentor Lady Blanche, and her fond 
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friend Lady Psyche, Princess Ida was unlikely to weigh her convictions 
against any dissenting authorities—until she met the Prince.
 The song “Tears, Idle Tears” and Princess Ida’s response to it take 
up more explicitly the question of history’s relevance in the present age. 
When a young woman sings of “Tears [that] from the depth of some divine 
despair / Rise in the heart, and gather to the eyes, / In looking on the happy 
autumn-fields, / And thinking of the days that are no more” (IV:22–25), 
Princess Ida answers this heartfelt song disdainfully:
 “If indeed there haunt
About the moulder’d lodges of the past
So sweet a voice and vague, fatal to men,
Well needs it we should cram our ears with wool
And so pace by. But thine are fancies hatch’d
In silken-folded idleness; nor is it
Wiser to weep a true occasion lost,
But trim our sails, and let old bygones be,
While down the streams that float us each and all
To the issue, goes, like glittering bergs of ice,
Throne after throne, and molten on the waste
Becomes a cloud; for all things serve their time
Toward that great year of equal mights and rights.
Nor would I fight with iron laws, in the end
Found golden. Let the past be past, let be
Their cancell’d Babels; tho’ rough kex break
The starr’d mosaic, and the beard-blown goat
Hang on the shaft, and the wild fig-tree split
Their monstrous idols, care not while we hear
A trumpet in the distance pealing news
Of better, and Hope, a poised eagle, burns
Above the unrisen morrow.” (IV:44–65)
The attitude of the Princess to history represents an extreme that the poem 
is meant to overcome. As Carlyle wrote, the present is “the living sum-
total of the whole Past” and so the past is always with us—that scene now 
muted, this now shining brightly. In the two decades preceding Tenny-
son’s composition of The Princess, medieval and classical scenes obtruded 
regularly upon the public imagination, most notably the Eglinton Tourna-
ment of 1839. Tennyson would have heard of or witnessed such attempts 
to “bring the Middle Age forward” (as Kingsley put it), which rarely satis-
fied the nostalgia of the instigators and highlighted the futility of trying 
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to recover medieval (or classical) vitality. These efforts struck many as 
“fancies hatch’d / In silken-folded idleness,” but Tennyson’s view is more 
moderate. The Princess is a theorist, who believes that she can resist the 
feelings engendered by history and “the days that are no more.” But in 
becoming a fully developed human being, she cannot look exclusively 
toward the future, and she must do more than gather up those bits of the 
past that justify her powerful Hope (such as the list of great women in 
Psyche’s history lesson).
 In Part VII, when the Prince is recovering from his battle wounds, the 
Princess reads “to herself” the famous idyll “Come down, O maid, from 
yonder mountain height” (VII:177). She has been on the mountain, but she 
must now return to the valley, where love dwells. What good are her theo-
ries if not brought back to earth? What good the treasures of her college 
if not shared? As in the “Palace of Art,” where the soul retires to a “cot-
tage in the vale,” Princess Ida abandons the mastering, panoramic view, 
and chooses the occluded and intimate view below. When the Prince finds 
love, he loses his doubts, and “all the past / Melts mist-like into this bright 
hour” (VII:334–35). In this mutual completion, Tennyson suggests that the 
soul grows richer not from mastery or possession, and certainly not from 
isolation, but from the many-sided development afforded by love, the true 
seeing.
Medley as “Symbolic Form”
Eileen Tess Johnston has written of the way that “medley,” with its dual 
meaning of “mêlée” and “mixture,” “gives symbolic form to the whole of 
The Princess” (568). Not only is the poem itself a literary medley, but it also 
promotes a concept of the individual as mixture within the mêlée of social 
life: “The entire central tale [ . . . ] presents the substitution of mêlées with 
medleys, of confusions with mixtures, of combats, literal and figurative, 
inward and outward, with creative interchange” (563). The two meanings 
of medley mirror the Janus-face of nineteenth-century eclecticism—the 
volitional and the naïve. The original meaning of medley, dating back to 
the fourteenth century, related exclusively to combat, especially “hand-to-
hand fighting between two parties of combatants” (OED). We can dem-
onstrate Tennyson’s awareness of the archaic meaning of medley in his 
use of “mellay,” a Middle English variant of medley (563; OED): “Down 
/ From those two bulks at Arac’s side, and down / From Arac’s arm, as 
from a giant’s flail, / The large blows rain’d, as here and everywhere / He 
rode the mellay, lord of the ringing lists” (V:491).6 As medley’s derivative 
Chapter : Alfred Tennyson
15
meaning of “mixture” evolved, a “disparaging sense” soon attached to it. 
In this later sense, which became dominant as early as the seventeenth cen-
tury, a medley was a “heterogeneous combination or mixture (of things)” or 
“a mixed company (of persons differing in rank, occupation, etc.)” (OED). 
Taken more broadly, as part of the symbolic structure of the entire work, 
Tennyson prompts his readers to consider the degree to which the hetero-
geneous elements of the poem (past and present, male and female, heroic 
and mock-heroic) remain in conflict or finally harmonize, leaving open 
the question of whether the poem performs the positive, now rarely used, 
meaning of medley, namely “A cloth woven with [ . . . ] different colours 
or shades” (OED).
 As a prominent aspect of his philosophy of medley, Tennyson illus-
trates the Princess’s journey from self-contained, one-dimensional individ-
ual to integrated, eclectic self. In promoting this idea of self as medley, he 
employs the motif of the lost child as a link throughout the entire poem.7 
Significantly, the necessity of losing the child is one of the principal argu-
ments of the poem’s feminist voices, a “theory” that must be undermined in 
order to achieve reconciliation between male and female. In Part I, when 
the Prince first wonders about the “fancies” (I:94) that make the Princess 
refuse to marry him, he hears from her father that Lady Psyche and Lady 
Blanche “fed her theories . . . Maintaining that with equal husbandry / The 
woman were an equal to the man” (I:129–30). Since women “had but been, 
she thought, / As children; they must lose the child, assume / The woman” 
(I: 135–37). Her fervor on this point leads her to produce “odes / About 
this losing of the child” (I:139–40). When the Prince arrives at the college 
disguised as a woman, paying compliments to the Princess, his “language 
proves [him] still the child” (II:44)—when men flatter women thus, they 
are treating them as either children or fools.
 The seriousness of Princess Ida’s argument against such degrading 
treatment is not entirely discounted by the poet-narrator, but the interpo-
lated songs (sung by the women) do offer a counterpoint to the Princess’s 
theories. The first song, “As thro’ the land at eve we went,” tells of a hus-
band and wife who have quarreled without knowing why; the falling-out 
is a blessing in disguise when they “kiss again with tears” above the grave 
of the child “We lost in other years” (I:254, 256). The cause of separation 
is the thing forgotten, while the child and the shared memories of the 
past unite them. When Psyche recognizes her brother Florian in Part II, 
we see the same process unfold. At first Psyche maintains her separate-
ness from him, declaring that she has “no country, none; / If any, this; 
but none, Whate’er I was / Disrooted, what I am is grafted here” (II:200–
202). This denial of the past is a denial of the child and sister that she 
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was, a requirement, she believes, of becoming a fully developed woman; 
but Tennyson means for us to see that Psyche has lost more than she has 
gained—disrooted, grafted, she is no more a whole person. (Later in the 
narrative, when she loses her baby, we see the psychic damage she sustains 
before recovering the child inside and outside herself.) Florian recalls her 
as “brother-sister Psyche, both in one” (II:236), intimating that the future 
Psyche prophesied in her lecture had already come to be: “everywhere / 
Two heads in council, two beside the hearth, Two in the tangled business 
of the world . . .” (II:155–57). As in the song, when the lovers “kiss again 
with tears,” Psyche and Florian kiss and “betwixt them blossom’d up / 
From out a common vein of memory / Sweet household talk, and phrases 
of the hearth” (II:292–94). Their reunion prefigures the other unions of the 
poem, just as the mother in “Sweet and low, sweet and low,” the song that 
follows Part II, promises her baby that its father will come home soon.
 Much of the core narrative of The Princess concerns the means by which 
we develop an authentic self, whether it is by integrating our past and 
present selves, or by acknowledging the admixture of male and female in 
each of us. The prototype for Princess Ida comes from the past—a woman 
warrior larger than life—and the character that the seven male narrators 
create seems particularly inauthentic because she strives after greatness, 
wanting her deeds to live on into the future. Setting aside the question 
of whether Tennyson was sympathetic to feminist goals, it is still possible 
to consider the importance of the issue of authenticity in his underlying 
philosophy of medley—why can we not simply select the elements that we 
want to make up our personality? During one of his seizures, the Prince 
sees Ida as a “hollow show” and “Her college and her maidens empty 
masks” (III:169, 171); and in the same moment sees himself as “the shadow 
of a dream, / For all things were and were not” (III:172–73). When the 
college collapses following the battle between their two countries and the 
maidens rush to help the fallen soldiers, the narrator wants the reversion 
to seem inevitable. The Prince saw the maidens as empty masks, because 
they tried to conceal their true selves beneath the aspect of the scholar; but 
they could not simply choose to cut themselves off from their past selves 
or, Tennyson no doubt wants the reader to see, from their femininity. Ida’s 
new persona is a hollow show and the girl she once was is her “dead self” 
(III:205); but neither does the Prince yet possess a stable identity, trapped 
as he is among the ghosts. When the wounded Prince kisses Ida, she glows, 
like the statue of Sir Ralph, coming to life again: “Her falser self split from 
her like a robe / And left her woman” (VII:146). Lest this resolution seem 
an utter denial of Ida’s ambitions, and of a true dialectic within the poem, 
Tennyson has prepared the reader for a more nuanced handling of the 
hero and heroine’s union. Defending the Princess before the battle, the 
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Prince makes the case to his father that women “have as many differences” 
as men (V:173) and must be accorded “More breadth of culture” (V:180). 
His father opposes change because he fears confusion between the sexes, 
the muddle of a middle:
Man for the field and woman for the hearth;
Man for the sword, and for the needle she;
Man with the head, and woman with the heart;
Man to command, and woman to obey;
All else confusion. (V:437–41)
This is precisely the kind of extremist position that Tennyson’s eclecticism 
is meant to overcome. At this moment, the Prince sees his father the king, 
the soldiers’ camp, and the college all turned to hollow shows: “I seem’d 
to move in old memorial tilts, / And doing battle with forgotten ghosts, 
/ To dream myself the shadow of a dream” (V:467–70). The repetition 
of his seizures at moments when the Princess and his father have been 
rigid, unyielding, and one-dimensional underscores the need for the happy 
medium of like in difference that is the goal of the poem:
For woman is not undevelopt man,
But diverse. Could we make her as the man,
Sweet Love were slain; his dearest bond is this,
Not like to like, but like in difference.
Yet in the long years liker must they grow;
The man be more of woman, she of man;
He gain in sweetness and in moral height,
Nor lose the wrestling thews that throw the world;
She mental breadth, nor fail in childward care,
Nor lose the childlike in the larger mind;
Till at the last she set herself to man,
Like perfect music unto noble words;
And so these twain, upon the skirts of Time,
Sit side by side, full-summ’d in all their powers,
Dispensing harvest, sowing the to-be,
Self-reverent each and reverencing each,
Distinct in individualities,
But like each other even as those who love. (VII:259–76)
It would be too easy to dismiss this passage as a clear articulation of a doc-
trine of separate spheres such as Ruskin sets out in “Of Queen’s Gardens” 
(1865), seductive precisely because women seem powerful within their 
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special sphere of, say, “childward care.” That does not seem to be what 
Tennyson is after here. Instead he presents the culmination of the idea of 
the self as medley, a complex tune whose notes do not readily blend with 
another’s music, but that will over time and with practice seamlessly inter-
weave as each catches the other’s melody. The woman and the man do not 
surrender individuality or distinctiveness, but reverence themselves and 
each other; they grow more like, more in harmony, as they love.
 This sense of emergent harmony is what Tennyson wanted to hear 
in his own poem, and he struggled with a sense of failure—worried that 
The Princess was cacophony and unresolved conflict instead of interwo-
ven harmonies. While most readers could accept the objectives of blend-
ing past and present, and male and female, it was much more difficult for 
them to admire Tennyson’s generic mixture. The Princess and the Prince 
might have been heroic, but in making them “to suit with time and place,” 
he injected a degree of mockery that made it hard to swallow the high-
flown sentiments his characters expressed. For example, in Part IV, after 
the Princess has complained of men’s mock-love and the mock-Hymen 
who sang of it, the poet-narrator describes several scenes in unmistakably 
comic fashion. When the Princess falls into the river, and the Prince pulls 
her to safety, he is “Oaring one arm, and bearing in my left / The weight 
of all the hopes of half the world” (IV:164–65). Looking out for the Ama-
zon pursuit, the unmasked Florian hides “behind a Judith, [and] under-
neath / The head of Holofernes peep’d and saw . . .” (IV:207–8); while 
the Prince surrenders to the Goddess of Memory: “At last I hook’d my 
ankle in a vine / That claspt the feet of a Mnemosyne, / And falling on 
my face was caught and known” (IV:248–50). Taken before the Princess, 
the seriousness of her words makes the comedy that has just played out 
seem particularly sour. Women are the “laughing-stocks of Time, / Whose 
brains are in their hands and in their heels, / But fit to flaunt, to dress, 
to dance, to thrum, / To tramp, to scream, to burnish, and to scour, / For 
ever slaves at home and fools abroad” (IV:496–500). If the poet-narrator 
has been making light of the Princess’s gravity, and poking fun at the idols 
of the women’s college, then what are we to make of Ida’s demand that 
women be taken seriously as the capable equals of men? Struck by another 
of his seizures, the Prince sees “The Princess with her monstrous woman-
guard, / The jest and earnest working side by side” (IV:540–41), making 
the reader quite certain of the poet’s self-conscious mixing of the heroic 
and the mock-heroic. In the Prologue, it was clear that the heroic would 
be associated with traditional form, but the reverence for tradition was to 
be coupled with the mock-heroic of the modern sensibility. It was no lon-
ger possible to have the purity of heroism, unmixed with a conviction that 
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this nineteenth century was not a heroic age. To pretend otherwise would 
be fatal to Tennyson’s purpose, which was not to present a sham Middle 
Ages, but rather to show the strands of the past woven into the present. 
When Ida moans that she has “made [her]self a queen of farce” (VII:228), 
Tennyson does not want us to take her for a fool, or to believe that her 
dreams were foolish, but to see that she did take herself too seriously. This 
was a kind of intellectual and emotional rigidity that had to be avoided. 
The poet-narrator acknowledges, finally, the problem with tone, that he 
had “wrestle[d] with the burlesque,” sensing that the women “wish’d for 
something real” (Conc.:16, 18). Why, his critics ask, did he not make the 
Princess “true-heroic” and “true-sublime”? The framework of the poem 
made such purity impossible, and so he “moved as in a strange diagonal” 
between “the mockers and the realists” (VII:227, 224). Such a mixture was, 
however, typical of the mode of argument used by Cambridge Apostles. 
As Henry Sidgwick explained, “it was rather a point of the apostolic mind 
to understand how much suggestion and instruction may be derived from 
what is in form a jest—even in dealing with the gravest matters” (qtd. 
in Allen 6). For example, in the early 1830s when the political situation 
was at its most volatile, some of the Apostles helped to put out fires in the 
countryside near Cambridge and wrote a mock-heroic poem about rick-
burning to commemorate their deeds; but as Peter Allen notes, they “pause 
in their comic treatment of these events to reveal their sympathy for the 
distressed and rebellious agricultural workers” (122). For the Apostles, the 
comic mode was available both as a means to defuse the tensions inherent 
in the situation, and to satirize the ideological extremes that had brought 
the nation to such an impasse.
 An example of serious play not unlike the Apostles’ poem “Swing, at 
Cambridge,” The Princess tries the fit of various styles of “dress” and vari-
ous poetic modes. Both formally and thematically, Tennyson creates a per-
suasive picture of inclusiveness. Instead of seeing such eclecticism as naïve, 
he makes it a requirement for human progress. His self-conscious struc-
turing of the poem as medley, with its multiple significations of mixture, 
mêlée, and mélange, marks a significant attempt to formulate a poetics 
adequate to the nineteenth century, that is, a poetics of eclecticism.
The Critical Debate on Tennyson’s Eclecticism
In the first half of this chapter, I have considered the extent to which 
eclecticism was abroad as an idea in the 1820s and how essential it was 
as a mode of thought among the Cambridge Apostles. I also examined 
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the varieties of eclecticism in The Princess, particularly how Tennyson uses 
volitional eclecticism to avoid ideological extremes and achieve compro-
mise—a mélange or medley. He models a theory of poetry based on the 
philosophical underpinnings of the idea of medley, which shares with phil-
osophical eclecticism its sense of human knowledge and experience as a 
unified field. His effort represents, I believe, a conscious decision to make 
use of the medley form to create something quite original, a poetics that 
would represent the nineteenth century to itself. In the second half of this 
chapter, I want to analyze two reviews of the poem that bring into sharper 
focus what was at stake for Tennyson in making eclecticism a central issue 
in the poem as well as its creative inspiration.
 Criticism of The Princess was sharply divided between those who dis-
cerned a unifying design in the poem—Tennyson was being deliberately 
eclectic—and those who could find no unity in the poem and saw in it only 
a grotesque reflection of perplexed modernity. In approaching Tennyson’s 
poem as medley, C. P. Chretien and Aubrey De Vere reach opposite con-
clusions about the medley’s effectiveness as poetry.8 Chretien regards the 
poem’s eclecticism as limiting its significance to the present only, whereas 
De Vere discerns in the poet’s versatility a trait common to poetic genius 
throughout history. Sensitive to the peculiar character of the age, both 
reviewers acknowledge that Tennyson’s genius is perhaps uniquely suited 
to represent and express it. For Chretien, however, this compatibility is no 
cause for rejoicing or for elevating Tennyson to the poetic pantheon: “The 
present is so exclusively his sphere that he cannot transcend it,” and thus 
he can never become the “poet of our common humanity” (220). Unlike 
Kingsley, who praised Tennyson’s grounding of the aspirations of the 
present on the foundation of all past and present times, Chretien asserts 
that Tennyson does not grasp that which is “permanent in human nature” 
(220) and, furthermore, that he lacks the power to synthesize the material 
of history: “He knows that age succeeds to age, blowing before it a noise 
of tongues and deeds, of creeds and systems. But he is never bold enough 
to hope that he has discovered the key which can open the mystery of the 
world, and detect order in its confusion” (220). As figures for the confu-
sion he perceives in Tennyson’s mind—a disorder that the poet, on some 
level, allows to persist—Chretien depends on tropes of architecture and 
design. In an ironic reflection of the Prologue of The Princess with its mis-
cellaneous collection of persons and artifacts—“A Gothic ruin and a Gre-
cian house”—he begins by comparing the mind of the poet to a cathedral, 
which, seen from the outside, “should impress us with the multiplicity of 
its parts” and, seen from the inside, “should be eminently one”: “Here we 
should trace, in its full solemnity, that Form which all variety of detail 
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must vary without concealing. Here, the diversity of individual taste is to 
be lost in the majesty of the mastermind. In that capacious area, all are 
instinctively to look one way, to think one thought, and wonder” (201).9 
Chretien imagines that a poet should have, like Christianity, a single great 
idea that he or she transmits to posterity. Even if the message is dispersed 
throughout many different poems, there should be an underlying unity—a 
“master mind”—that connects them all.
 Because Tennyson’s principal gesture in The Princess looks to Chretien 
like “fantastic playfulness” (202–3) and not like moral mastery, this long 
work reproduces the “faults and beauties” of Tennyson’s shorter works, 
“an alteration in degree, but not in kind; an improvement, if any, which 
was not a development” (202). The improvement Chretien has in mind 
does not raise Tennyson above his old level among the poets, but only 
places him “in a larger and more ornate niche” (202). Tennyson’s orna-
mentation in The Princess, since it does not augment the unity of the work, 
and, like many Victorian buildings, suffers from excessive heterogeneity, 
is taken as proof that the great poem promised by the early “fragments” 
would never come. Unlike the cathedrals whose walls show the accretion 
of history—“the noise of tongues and deeds, of creeds and systems”—The 
Princess fails to master its inheritance. Tennyson’s work confirms Chre-
tien in his belief that the “Tennysonians” have been persisting for too long 
under the delusion that the beautiful moments his poetry gave them would 
not simply burn out, but would feed poetry’s eternal flame. Chretien asks 
his readers what this fantastic, disordered collection signifies beyond the 
individuality of its collector:
Here was an antique statue glittering in the whiteness of its marble, and 
there a picture, somewhat Rubenesque, in a gold frame; on the one hand, 
Haroun Alraschid sat, in “merriment of kingly pride,” under a canopy; 
on the other, a weather-beaten S. Simeon prayed, harangued, and solilo-
quized from the top of his pillar. Sometimes the poet’s scroll displayed 
combinations of grave words—good, and beauty, and duty, and love, and 
so forth—which puzzled the metaphysician, who endeavoured to make 
their meaning definite; a turn of the leaf brought the reader to some lucu-
brations of a half profane, half maudlin tone, and a very vinous and ques-
tionable morality. What does it all mean? we asked; or rather, what does 
the author mean? Is he content that his mind, as reflected in his volumes, 
should rival an auction room, or an embryo museum, both in the multifari-
ousness and confusion of its beauties? Are the pictures never to be hung up, 
the statues never to be placed in their niches? Shall the caliph, and the pillar 
saint, and the Will Waterproof, be crowded together in a capacious tent, 
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or picnic in common on the sward? Shall we never be shown how abstract 
philosophical speculation is made to bear on the beauties of nature, or cast 
a reflected light over dim pictures of imaginary ladies, some as sensuous, 
and all as sleepy, as any that Lely drew? (201)
Resembling nothing so much as a cabinet of curiosities (or “Palace of Art”), 
Tennyson’s poetry has more in common with those “embryo museums” of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than it does with the modern, 
rational, didactic museum. The cabinet of curiosity lacks any organizing 
principle beyond the peculiar mind of the individual collector, while the 
collections of modern museums both result from and proceed according to 
a master narrative. In one of the most impressive instances of the tension 
between eclecticism and a merely eclectic world, the Victorians expended 
a great deal of effort in converting curiosities into ordered collections, 
even as the tide of miscellaneous goods threatened to overwhelm them. As 
Chretien’s analysis suggests, Tennyson fails to be eclectic, and only reflects 
the eclectic confusion of modern life. Like many of his contemporaries, he 
seems to suffer from what Thomas Hardy would call, in his 1881 novel A 
Laodicean, “the malady of unlimited appreciativeness,” a condition affect-
ing those whose pleasure in the variety of the historical inheritance renders 
them incapable of ordering it, or selecting from it the necessary prelimi-
naries to achieving a functional synthesis. Though Chretien acknowledges 
the distinct modernity of Tennyson’s mental “auction room,” he will not 
admit that the conditions producing Tennyson will prevail in the future, 
thus permitting unborn generations to appreciate “the poet of today.” The 
“specimens of fossil beauty” (218) found throughout Tennyson’s works 
have not been reanimated, and serve only to “adorn” the present; there-
fore, the “mine of conceits” (221) that is The Princess will itself one day be 
a curiosity, since, as poetry, it cannot speak to the future. Chretien picks up 
here on several important themes related to the critique of eclecticism: it is 
inauthentic, because it seeks to bring together things and ideas not organi-
cally related; it is the result of taste, rather than feeling, since passion is 
needed to reanimate the dead; it is merely picking and choosing from old 
styles, rather than synthesizing an authentic new style.
 Alongside the critique of material eclecticism in the nineteenth cen-
tury, there frequently appears a flanking attack on intellectual eclecticism 
and its analogous confusions. Anticipating one of the symptoms of modern 
poetry Kingsley scrutinizes in “The Prevailing Epidemic,” and strength-
ening his claim that Tennyson’s intricate beauties do not conceal any depth 
of meaning, Chretien also exposes Tennyson’s dubious use of abstract, 
philosophical language. Far from casting illumination on the “multifari-
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ous” beauties of his poetry, Tennyson’s philosophical dalliances compound 
the “confusion.” The “combinations of grave words” only “puzzle[ ] the 
metaphysicians” without leading them to a single thought that would dis-
sipate the Tennysonian fog. Chretien’s irritation with Tennyson’s “philo-
sophical” digressions stems at least partly from the critic’s perception that 
the poet is attempting to exceed his ability. Tennyson’s reputation rests (as 
Chretien believes it should) on his facility with language, a talent that for 
Chretien is more a matter of mechanical skill than profound insight. If 
Tennyson possessed a great mind, then his “fluency” would signify “some-
thing far higher than a mere facility in using well-assorted words,” and 
would “proceed[ ] from no skill in mechanical contrivance, but from an 
intellectual harmony” (205). The mechanical perfection of poetic language 
that Chretien observes in Tennyson had, of course, long been a cause for 
worry among those critics who believed that the best days of the art were 
past, and never to be recovered. Dryden’s refinements of poetic language 
looked patently inferior to Macaulay, whose preference for Milton derived 
from the older poet’s apparent isolation from the poetic fashions of his day. 
Peacock reckoned that the fashionable poets (the imitators, the refiners of 
language, the men of the Silver Age) had gained in mechanical skill what 
they had lost in passion. Tennyson, it would seem, could only amplify their 
perfection, or fall off from it. All his skill with the “instrument” avails 
him nothing without passion, which “like lightning, fuses and blends 
things most unlike with each other” (209). Chretien denounces Tennyson’s 
introduction of antique and foreign expressions as one of the least suc-
cessful attempts to blend old and new within The Princess; these Greek 
constructions might exhibit his erudition and provide a novel source of 
interest, but they chiefly highlight the lack of integration that on every 
level mars the poem. Even Tennyson’s famous ability to render landscape 
realistically meets with Chretien’s disapproval. Immediately after prais-
ing Tennyson for “tread[ing] in the very steps of nature,” Chretien asserts 
that such “microscopic delineation is, to a great extent, artificial.” He then 
sharpens his portrait of Tennyson as effeminate minstrel, a poet concerned 
only with the instrument, and never with the air: “These drawings with 
a fine point are necessarily wanting in power. They betray at every turn 
the labour of composition. No one could suspect Mr Tennyson of being a 
rapid writer, and throwing off his best passages without a sense of effort. 
This is one reason why he fails in his attempts to express strong emotion. 
He betrays none of the characteristic quickness of passion. However great 
his subject, he knows but one method of treating it. He sits down calmly 
before hero, saint, or villain, and draws his portrait, stroke by stroke, as 
a lady would paint a flower” (207). Eclecticism has been associated with 
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the stylistic chaos of material culture, and with the strife of religious and 
philosophical dissent; now, after building a picture of Tennyson’s mind 
as an “auction room” and his philosophy as multifarious and confused, 
Chretien asks his readers to judge the poet’s fluency with language as yet 
another aspect of his modernity—and his eclecticism. Recalling Kingsley’s 
preoccupation with the effeminacy of modern poets, evident, he thought, 
in their lack of affective power, and in their mental confusion, Chretien’s 
denigration of Tennyson’s skill as effeminate is revealing: Tennyson’s 
effeminacy and his unfitness to create a poem that will be heard through 
the ages are symptoms of the same disease—“the prevailing epidemic” as 
Kingsley deems it—which produce the same negative result, a meaning-
less poem.
 If C. P. Chretien traces Tennyson’s weaknesses as a poet to his tendency 
to overpower a subject with the peculiarities of his own mind, Aubrey De 
Vere finds in the poetry of Tennyson the very model of genius at work. 
Rather than attributing the expression of modern sensibility found in Ten-
nyson’s works to transient features of the age, De Vere recognizes that Ten-
nyson reveals more to us of future humanity than of past. He credits “the 
Versatility of [Tennyson’s] imagination” (211) with holding together the 
“discordant materials” (209) of a poem whose design canvasses the entire 
scene of nineteenth-century life. A kind of “English Decameron” (205), 
the poem travels swiftly among scenes of science, classical and medieval 
history, education, art, politics, and the trials of modern love, by means of 
“imperceptible gradations and continual delicate variations of key” (King-
sley, “Tennyson” 250). De Vere concedes that only the genius of a Tenny-
son could successfully modulate such variety without becoming ridiculous: 
“Any but the most delicate execution in this respect would have produced 
a very coarse, not to say grotesque, effect. The humorous and the serious 
are, however, seldom here found antithetically opposed to each other; but 
blend rather, like the different shades of some fine material shifted in the 
light” (205). This positive evaluation of the poem’s heterogeneity stands 
in sharp contrast to Chretien’s, which emphasized Tennyson’s failure to 
“blend” the old and the new, the comic and the tragic; De Vere rather 
commends the poem’s ingenious combinations, which justify his high 
opinion of Tennyson. The versatility to which De Vere refers the success of 
The Princess places Tennyson, he argues, firmly within the great tradition 
of English poetry.
	 De Vere uses the opportunity of reviewing new editions of the works 
of Shelley and Keats alongside The Princess to position Tennyson in rela-
tion to “ideal” and “national” schools of poetry, and to predict that the 
greatest of living poets will eventually overtake the Romantics’ lofty repu-
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tation. In his definition of versatility, De Vere is careful to delineate its 
positive and negative tendencies; and in this respect, his explanation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the “versatile” imagination parallels descrip-
tions of the “eclectic” imagination: “Versatility is sometimes indeed in 
poetry as in life, only the exercise of that imitative power which betrays 
a want of individuality, original conception, and tenacity of purpose. In 
such cases it proceeds from quick and volatile sympathies vividly open to 
external impressions, and from that clear unwrinkled mind, which, being 
all surface, apprehends and reflects all forms of thought, but is incapable 
of receiving a principle or resting in a conclusion. Poetry thus produced is 
the result neither of genius nor of high ability; but of that cleverness which 
bears often more resemblance to the former than to the latter” (212). If 
the poet is pliant before every impression, and resists no one and nothing, 
then the words flowing from his or her pen must be as superficial as the 
thoughts from which they spring. De Vere’s “negative” versatility invites 
comparison to the philosophical eclecticism that comes under attack dur-
ing roughly the same period. G. H. Lewes and Hippolyte Taine worried 
that Victor Cousin’s genius for reflecting and imitating the precepts of 
various systems of thought would hasten the destruction of all philosophy, 
and all system. They contended that Cousin selected the best from others’ 
philosophies because he had no original system of his own—no original 
genius, but only the semblance of it. To borrow De Vere’s terms, Cousin 
“apprehends and reflects all forms of thought, but is incapable of receiving 
a principle or resting in a conclusion” (212); in fact, Cousin teaches that the 
eclectic can never rest in any conclusion, but must continually revise the 
truths he has discovered through contact with new ideas. The dialectic so 
central to Cousin’s eclecticism, and certainly influenced by his long asso-
ciation with Hegel, is crucial both to De Vere’s theory of poetic genius and 
to the structure of The Princess. Tennyson’s detractors argued that he mir-
rored the perplexity of modern life without offering his readers any higher 
ground—to apprehend the character of the age, to erect a new philosophy, 
or to found a new school of poetry. These are the worries, too, of Kingsley 
in “The Prevailing Epidemic”: the self-absorbed ramblings of too many 
modern poets betray the “want of individuality, original conception, and 
tenacity of purpose” that De Vere recognizes as the negative tendency of a 
versatile imagination. But versatility, De Vere argues, is also a “high poetic 
attribute” that Tennyson possesses in greater abundance than any other 
living poet: “It consists in mobility of temperament united to a large mind, 
and an imagination that diffuses or concentrates itself at will” (212). While 
Chretien might agree with De Vere as to Tennyson’s versatility, he bases 
his case against Tennyson’s place in literary history on his lack of mastery 
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over his “multifarious” subjects. Versatility without a mastering gesture 
leads only to restless confusion.
 De Vere interprets Tennyson’s output (up through The Princess) in 
exactly opposite terms: Tennyson’s “‘various talents’ are united with ‘the 
single mind,’ [giving him] ‘moral might and mastery o’er mankind’” (212), 
and a coherent poetic vision. The versatility capable of achieving genuine 
synthesis, of “resting” in a conclusion, “enables the poet to apply his own 
experience, analogically and by imaginative induction, to regions unknown 
and forms of life untried,—at once passing into the being of others and 
retaining his own” (212). (Not coincidentally, this is precisely what Ten-
nyson says in The Princess about men and women joined in love.) Being 
able to undergo the influence of diverse impressions, and still retain an 
inner core of self, seems essential both to an eclectic-critical method and 
to Tennyson’s approach to poetry, as De Vere understands it. As proof of 
Tennyson’s likely high position in the annals of his art, De Vere refers his 
readers to Tennyson’s ability to create characters who combine “attributes 
of universality and individuality,” appealing both to common humanity, 
which does not lose its essential contour over time, and to the peculiar 
character of the age. In other words, Tennyson eclectically combines those 
features of human nature that will endure, and explores the external fea-
tures of the age alongside them, helping to determine what the nineteenth 
century will bequeath to posterity. De Vere emphasizes that having only 
the ability to portray realistically individual character does not make a poet 
great; equally, any attempt to exist solely upon the ambrosia of the univer-
sal leads to a “want of moral depth and tenacity.” Poets who neglect the 
reality of their own time “remain for ever but imitators” (212); therefore, 
the poet who would speak to his fellows and to posterity must success-
fully navigate the unknown in the mundane vessel of his own time and 
place. Among recent poets Tennyson is unusual, De Vere believes, in his 
exploration of ordinary human “affections which depend not on instinct 
or imagination alone, but which, growing out of the heart, are modified 
by circumstance and association, and constitute the varied texture of social 
existence” (226). For De Vere, it is Tennyson’s “versatility of heart” that 
makes him almost uniquely able to sympathize with persons caught up in 
the particular circumstances of life in the nineteenth century.
 As Isobel Armstrong argues in Victorian Scrutinies, the “sympathy” so 
highly valued by De Vere is more than an expression; it forms part of a 
pragmatic critical vocabulary, which placed “emphasis [ . . . ] almost invari-
ably on the human or social reference of the work of art, on its effect on the 
reader, and hence on the needs of the reader” (6). According to Armstrong, 
for Victorian critics sympathy was “the faculty of sharing and understand-
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ing the situation of another person by being able to change places with him 
in imagination” (9). In Tennyson this “faculty of sharing” was no doubt 
instinctive, but was also reinforced in his character by his interactions with 
the Apostles. The greatest poets of necessity possess the largest sympathies, 
and these sympathies derive from “versatility of heart.” De Vere believes 
that all great poets, whenever and wherever they live, share this fundamen-
tal trait, a “vital power” common to “poetical periods” in history: “when 
men have ceased to be pressed down by the selfish wants of savage life, and 
not yet hardened and made selfish by the conventions of over civilization, 
the imagination has a versatility and sympathy, a vital power, which at 
other periods is quite unknown” (213). Like the historians Macaulay and 
Carlyle, De Vere links natural religion and natural poetry to periods when 
imaginative sympathy predominates; however, he asserts that, along with 
only a few other modern poets, Tennyson retains the capacity for sympa-
thy that makes great poetry possible.
 Confident that poetry will continue as long as the faculties producing it 
exist within at least one person, De Vere disagrees with those who believe 
that “modern England does not contain the materials of poetry”: “those 
materials unquestionably are obscured by the rubbish that now overlays 
them; and to extricate and exhibit them requires [ . . . ] unusual poetic dis-
cernment” (227). Tennyson, of course, is unusually capable of “extricat[ing] 
and exhibit[ing]” the poetic aspects of modern life. While the youthful Ten-
nyson’s versatility might have been of a more pliable character, in maturity 
his gift shows itself in a widening sympathy with the circumstances of his 
age and country. De Vere considers the early eclectic phase as a necessary 
one in the evolution of Tennyson’s poetic powers:
The versatility of a very young poet is indeed but a part of his docility. He 
will listen, with the susceptive faith of youth, successively to each of the 
great masters of song; and the echo which remains in his ear will in some 
degree modulate his tone. He will trace every path in which the Muse has 
trod, in the hope of reaching that point from which they diverge; and it 
is well that he should try all things, provided he hold fast to that which 
is best. The infancy of the life poetic, like that of all life, learns much by 
unconscious imitation; but it can only so learn when the poet possesses 
those high faculties which seek, through imitation, only to work out their 
own development. True genius will soon cast aside whatever is alien to its 
individual nature; while, on the other hand, incorporating into its proper 
substance all poetic elements that are truly congenial, it will blend them 
also with each other, and stamp upon them a unity of its own. The poet 
will be original when he wields collectively the powers that were once his 
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only alternately; and versatility will then have been exalted into a higher 
gift,—that of comprehensiveness. (213)
As a picture of artistic development, this passage hints at the central role 
of eclecticism in forming a personal style. Greater than the sum of one’s 
education, and yet bearing some structural similarities to it, eclecticism 
enables an artist to develop an individual style; the artist must acquire an 
intimate knowledge of the traditions of his or her art, imitate its greatest 
masters, and possess the genius to withstand their influence. The artist of 
genius discards “whatever is alien” and incorporates whatever is “conge-
nial,” “blend[ing]” these elements in a unified creation—an idea of genius 
that was central in the Renaissance, but which became controversial in the 
eighteenth century with the shift to a Romantic conception of originality. 
De Vere conveys a powerful sense both of the artist’s stature relative to 
history and the enlargement of the artist who “wields” its riches; he also 
suggests how comparatively rare must be the birth and maturation of a 
true artist, especially as history increases the number of potential stylistic 
models. Although most critics would have recognized that not all great 
works of art were immediately available for imitation, in the nineteenth 
century they were unlikely to cordon off any historical period as being 
irrelevant to contemporary artistic production; in fact, the greatest diffi-
culty artists such as Tennyson confronted was the superabundance of his-
tory, that nothing would be excluded from speculation and appropriation. 
For De Vere, the nineteenth century shows its poetic versatility in its cease-
less effort to find new sources of poetic inspiration; the materials of poetry 
seemingly exhausted, the age invents a world of its own: “All regions of 
the earth have been ransacked for the materials of poetry—Persia, Arabia, 
Hindostan, Iceland: it has been the ambition of the poet to reproduce the 
forms and manners, if not the mind, of the remotest lands; and where the 
imagination has been content to tread on English soil, it has commonly 
taken refuge in some remote period of our history, and recounted the 
Saxon legend, the chivalrous exploit, or the feuds of border warfare” (214). 
Far from judging such eclectic form and content as symptomatic of the 
confusion of the age or, worse, as signaling the death of poetry, De Vere 
hails this romantic eclecticism as proof of the health of the art. Further-
more, a poet’s choice of subject will depend not on the circumstances of the 
age, but primarily on his or her “moral nature, and the preponderance in 
it of a vivid sympathy with reality on the one hand, or on the other, of an 
ardent aspiration after the ideal” (214). De Vere’s delineation of the “ideal” 
and “national” schools of poetry (the former concerned with embodying 
the abstract and the latter focused on reality) leads him to the crowning 
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instance of Tennyson’s supremacy: while at first he resembled his imme-
diate precursors, Keats and Shelley, whose poetry seemed “distilled from 
poetry, rather than drawn from the living sources of life and truth” (227), 
Tennyson has progressed from ideal abstractions to “robust and character-
istic” national sentiments.
 In De Vere’s view, Tennyson’s greatness derives from his amplitude, 
his wider view and greater variety in representing the natural, moral, and 
intellectual spheres of human existence. Combining a thorough compre-
hension of timeless human nature with an acute recognition of the aspi-
rations of his own age, Tennyson thus achieves the desired synthesis of 
antique and modern sentiment, ideal and national humanity. In evaluating 
the general thrust of De Vere’s argument, it is evident that he did not need 
The Princess to convince him that Tennyson would ultimately have “taken 
his place among the true poets of his country” (227); but the particular 
features of this long poem did allow De Vere to demonstrate Tennyson’s 
progress from youthful to mature “versatility,” and, more specifically, the 
poet’s masterful investigation of modern attitudes against the background 
of an eclectic historicism.
X
When Walter Pater wrote in 1888, “In this late day certainly, no critical 
process can be conducted reasonably without eclecticism,” he had in mind 
as his “justifying example” the poetry of Tennyson: “How illustrative of 
monosyllabic effect, of sonorous Latin, of the phraseology of science, of 
metaphysic, of colloquialism even, are the writings of Tennyson; yet with 
what fine, fastidious scholarship throughout!” (Appreciations 17). Pater 
never doubted that Tennyson’s versatility was a sign of his greatness. In 
his view literature was not the transcription of “mere fact, but of fact in 
its infinite variety, as modified by human preference in all its infinitely 
varied forms” (10). In The Princess Tennyson grasped the complexity of 
this “soul-fact” through his eclecticism. Despite the sincerity of the con-
victions that underlie Chretien’s analysis of the poem, or perhaps because 
of them, he is unable to perceive that Tennyson’s medley is more than a 
collection of unrelated facts—the mental “auction room” he thought an 
apt representation of the poet’s mind—but rather reality modified by 
taste and feeling. The eclecticism that seemed to be picking and choosing, 
a “mine of conceits,” is the foundation of Tennyson’s originality; it is the 
source of his creativity. The very commonness of naïve eclecticism hints at 
the difficulty of the eclectic process, and the rarity of this form of genius. 
Although Tennyson did not intend to make the form of his poem an issue of 
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contention, it was inevitable that his medley would provoke anxious dis-
cussion about the intellectual and material eclecticism of the age, particu-
larly as it touched upon moral questions. Tennyson was keenly aware of 
the dangers of a solitary and solipsistic eclecticism, as we see in “The Pal-
ace of Art,” and The Princess strains with the effort to find its juste milieu. 
Even in the present age, with our noted fondness for problem texts, no 
one would want to argue that The Princess is the great work of Tennyson’s 
maturity; but because it is less than perfect, and betrays the poet’s struggles 
with form, it gives us a template with which to approach a far greater 
work such as In Memoriam, which is no less eclectic than its precursor. It, 
too, canvasses dialectically “the state of current taste and thinking,” before 
finally resting in synthesis. There, finally, Tennyson’s eclecticism brings 
him to a religious compromise that would come to represent the spiritual 
aspiration of an entire generation, and to a poetic form that would give his 
generation its voice.
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n an 1887 article for the popular monthly Macmillan’s Magazine, 
the critic and biographer Mowbray Morris christened Victoria’s 
reign the “Alexandrian Age,” but Morris’s appropriation of the idea 
of ancient Alexandria signaled a profound uneasiness about the present. 
Searching for the “precise note of [the] age, so as to fix and catalogue it for 
future use,” Morris settles upon “Alexandrian,” because Victorian culture, 
like its Hellenistic precursor, produced no “spontaneous and creative” lit-
erature, but only a vast quantity of writing that was “derived from that 
already existing” (28). In the first Alexandrian Age, Roman imperialism 
had spread the Greek language and Greek civilization everywhere, but 
“the free Greek life that had made that language what it was, and inspired 
that literature, was dead” (28). By the time Alexandria had become a cen-
ter of learning, literary success was accomplished through discovering 
and obeying critical canons, making literature the prey of “mannerism 
and affectation.” In the nineteenth century, an identical spirit of schol-
arly cosmopolitanism had infected literary production, giving birth to a 
highly stylized literature that could not, Morris argued, satisfy the “native 
manliness” of the English character: “the general tendency is to a minute, 
dissecting, curious mood, more given to pulling down than to building 
up” (31). To be Alexandrian, then, was to be ingenious, artificial, pedantic, 
effeminate, and decadent. The man largely responsible for shaping the 
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idea of Alexandria upon which Morris establishes his analogy is Charles 
Kingsley, whose writings in the 1850s generated a disturbing and, ulti-
mately, unflattering correspondence between past and present, between 
Roman Alexandria and Victorian Britain.1
 Set in Alexandria, Egypt, Kingsley’s 1853 novel Hypatia; or, New Foes 
with an Old Face is chiefly a sermon against two dangerous tendencies in 
nineteenth-century Christianity: the Oxford movement, powerfully rep-
resented by John Henry Newman; and what Kingsley calls “Anythingari-
anism,” manifest in the teachings of American transcendentalist Ralph 
Waldo Emerson. The struggle to find a middle way between dogma-
tism and unbelief had already been played out in the religious conflicts 
of fifth-century Alexandria, a setting that would provide Kingsley with 
a safe cover for the exposition of his distinctive theology. Kingsley’s via 
media would construct a religion that resonated with the spirit of the age, 
encompassing a democratic and “muscular Christianity,” which regards as 
sacred all ordinary human relations and common duties of life, and the 
truth found in the competing doctrines of Judaism, Roman Catholicism, 
and spiritual philosophy.2 The problem for the historian of ideas is to dis-
cern the extent to which Kingsley sees this eclecticism as a necessary pre-
cursor to the acceptance and renewal of Christianity, and the danger that 
excessive latitude poses to its institutional forms.
 The historical novel Hypatia is therefore a crucial document in the his-
tory of the idea of eclecticism, and in the representation of Alexandria as 
the stage on which the drama of modernity is first enacted. The story of 
a fifth-century Neoplatonist philosopher is set within a city crowded with 
religious and philosophical notions; Christians, Greeks, Goths, Jews, and 
Romans vie for primacy in a city that has become the crossroads of ancient 
(and, in the repetition “New Foes with an Old Face,” modern) thought. 
Like his teacher F. D. Maurice, Kingsley believed that the historical pro-
cess involved the reconciliation of opposing forces in society. On the stage 
of cosmopolitan Alexandria in the year 413 Kingsley places the demo-
cratic creed of Christianity and aristocratic Neoplatonism; corrupt Eastern 
Christianity and healthy Western Christianity; Latin government and the 
Gothic, barbarian North. He opposes Alexandria and Rome; Rome and 
the Christian Church; Christianity and Judaism. In a tremendous strug-
gle, from which no party can emerge unscathed, the Old World must give 
way to the New. But for Kingsley no form of belief ever disappears, but 
each instead is absorbed into new forms of belief, which better serve the 
Zeitgeist.
 From the beginning two of the main characters are associated with 
rigid, doctrinaire positions—Philammon, the young ascetic monk, and 
Chapter 5: Charles Kingsley
11
Hypatia, the Greek philosopher—and so neither is likely to achieve the 
via media that philosophy-torn Alexandria requires. Philammon remains a 
monk and Hypatia is brutally murdered by a Christian mob. The third of 
Kingsley’s main characters, Raphael Aben-Ezra, a philosophical Jew who 
converts to Christianity, is the true hero of the novel and the representative 
of Kingsley’s middle way.3
Hypatia and the Eclectic Philosophy
Gathered from various sources, the story of Hypatia, perhaps especially 
the prurient details attached to descriptions of her murder, inspired in 
Kingsley such an intense vision of the philosopher’s final moments that 
he decided to write the novel that would cost him more intellectual labor 
than any of his other works, and which he hoped would secure his future 
literary reputation.4 Still, the touching picture of Hypatia, cornered in a 
church and gazing at a portrait of Christ before being torn to shreds by 
the mob, could not overcome his basic lack of sympathy for the pagan phi-
losopher, a failure of imagination that could account for the obscurity into 
which the novel has fallen. Kingsley does not tell Hypatia’s story, or even 
Raphael’s, so much as that of the city, in which the world-spirit was at that 
moment working out its destiny. Hypatia is introduced in chapter II, as 
the representative of the “dying world” who believes in the “old creeds, 
while every one else is dropping away from them,” and though the gods 
no longer speak to their oracles, she will “show [herself] superior to the 
herd, by seeing the boundless depths of living glory in myths which have 
become dark and dead to them, [and] struggle to the last against the new 
and vulgar superstitions of a rotting age” (13). Kingsley introduces here the 
keynote of Hypatia’s philosophy, namely its aristocratic exclusiveness. Her 
students are fashionable “loungers,” gentlemen “fops” who flock to her 
lectures to admire Hypatia’s beauty and to memorize the latest theories, 
which change, seemingly, with every season. (As the burly Goths proclaim, 
these philosophers cannot even be called men.) Hypatia’s hatred of Chris-
tianity stems from its association with a “low-born” and “illiterate” deity, 
whose fanatical followers believe that the Son of God died for the beggar 
as much as for the noble, the beautiful, or the wise. In their pursuit of sal-
vation, Christians are taught to disregard “learning, authority, antiquity, 
birth, rank, [and] the system of empire which has been growing up, fed by 
the accumulated wisdom of ages” (18). Hypatia shrinks from contact with 
anything dirty and vulgar and surrounds herself with books and statuary. 
Though her virtue and sincerity are never in question, Kingsley clearly 
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sees Hypatia’s sin as one of pride, especially the pride attached to rank and 
beauty: “she sits enshrined far above the noise and struggle of man and 
his work-day world” (125). Even when she “stoops to conquer” the young 
monk Philammon, newly arrived from the desert and clad in animal skins, 
she decides to teach him because she sees in his face and form a remnant of 
Greek beauty and masculinity that bespeaks his noble soul. Believing that 
the beautiful youth must be of patrician birth (in fact Philammon was born 
a slave), Hypatia declares to her father, “I have longed so to find one such 
man, among the effeminate selfish triflers who pretend to listen to me” 
(125). But Hypatia’s admiration of Philammon’s masculine beauty goes no 
further; indeed, her attitude of horror toward marriage strongly resembles 
the life-denying asceticism of her opponents.
 Even Hypatia’s renowned philosophizing appears to Kingsley to 
be merely a worship of appearances: Hypatia reveres the beauty of the 
ancient religion, but ignores its truths. Nonetheless, Cyril, the Patriarch of 
Alexandria, believes that while her lecturing continues, “and the great and 
powerful flock to it, to learn excuses for their own tyrannies and atheisms, 
so long will the kingdom of God be trampled underfoot in Alexandria” 
(23). Kingsley certainly exposes his eponymous heroine to the charge of 
sophistry. Hypatia regards books as she does men: “the soul is all with 
which our souls must deal; and the soul of the book is whatsoever beauti-
ful, and true, and noble we can find in it” (99). Her eclectic method allows 
her to erase what is vulgar and ordinary in a poet such as Homer and to 
elaborate on the soul of the text, rejecting the notion that anyone could 
take Homer literally and leave his reputation intact: “Can they suppose 
that the divine soul of Homer could degrade itself to write of actual and 
physical feastings, and nuptials, and dances, actual nightly thefts of horses, 
actual fidelity of dogs and swineherds, actual intermarriages between dei-
ties and men, or that it is this seeming vulgarity which has won for him 
from the wisest of every age the title of the father of poetry? Degrading 
thought!” (99). Hypatia professes to open her heart to receive influences 
from all the great thinkers of the past, “from whencesoever they may have 
come,” but the standard of selection—whatever is beautiful, true, and 
noble—lies in her immediate consciousness. She chooses what is “true” 
for her own use, which presupposes that she must carry in herself, as 
Zeller writes of eclectic philosophers generally, “the standard for decision 
between true and false, and that truth is directly given to man in his self-
consciousness” (Zeller 17–18). Hypatia’s approach to Homer makes the 
eclectic method look very dangerous. In dispensing with the senses, the 
body, and the round of ordinary human experiences, Hypatia strips litera-
ture of just those elements Kingsley placed at the center of all his work—
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Kingsley sermonizes in order to teach people how to live as Christians. By 
contrast, Greek philosophy seemed “to distance its devotees from the com-
mon, ‘unenlightened’ human being” (Hawley 294). The starting point for 
Hypatia’s Neoplatonism cannot be the world, because the world cannot be 
read literally: “Where is truth but in the soul itself, Facts, objects, are but 
phantoms matter-woven—ghosts of this earthly night, at which the soul, 
sleeping here in the mire and clay of matter, shudders and names its own 
vague tremors sense and perception” (98). Even as Hypatia proclaims that 
all individuals are part of the universal being, she rejects the notion that 
she should have any communion with her earthly yoke-fellows until she 
enters into “The Nothing, which is The All” (105). Hypatia’s rapturous 
description of her “abysmal Deity” chills Philammon, who was raised on 
the notion of a personal God made man, a God made for the world.
 Although Kingsley certainly understood the historical role of Neopla-
tonism in reconciling Christianity and pagan philosophy, he identified in 
Hypatia’s teaching a spiritual and speculative confusion that was infect-
ing intellectual Christians in his own time. The “unseen and indefinable” 
energy that Hypatia worshipped in the manifold forms of the Greek pan-
theon typifies for Kingsley a very modern dilemma. Hoping to satisfy their 
reason of the existence of God, many of his contemporaries sought refuge 
in vague definitions of a higher being, such as Hypatia offered her students, 
but in taking this route to faith, people consistently confuse the human 
and the divine, the first descent to “Pantheistic Infidelity” (294). Hypatia 
wonders why “men should be content to grovel, and be men, when they 
might rise to the rank of gods” (15) with her philosophy. Newman and the 
Tractarians traced this spiritual self-reliance back to the Protestant Ref-
ormation; even the Evangelical movement was a “house built upon [the] 
sands of inward assurance and private judgment” (Willey 77). By rejecting 
papal authority, the Reformation had subjected the Church to the State; 
by relying upon individual judgment, Protestantism had opened the way 
to sectarianism and ultimately to unbelief (77). Kingsley approached the 
problem somewhat differently than Newman. To his wife Fanny he wrote 
against the teaching that “leads back again to the Self[; . . . ] when tempted 
to look inward, it is well to go immediately and work for others” (qtd. in 
Hawley 291). He feared the theological speculation and the scientific mate-
rialism that had produced an epidemic of doubt in the nineteenth century. 
Reviewing a stack of truly awful poetry in 1851, Kingsley derided the ten-
dency of the modern poet to exalt himself as a God: “Older and cleverer 
men than you, with false prophet Emerson at their head, bandy about in 
their new Every-man-his-own-God-maker cant, the most holy and awful 
words, and apply unblushingly to man the attributes of Almighty God, 
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little knowing how thin a paper-wall parts their Autotheism from sheer, 
blank, honest, manful Atheism,—honest and manful, because it wears no 
rouge, and has courage to look steadily at the reflection of its own skel-
eton-face” (“Epidemic” 498). Emerson was again the target of Kingsley’s 
polemic in the 1852 dialogue Phaethon: Loose Thoughts for Loose Think-
ers.5 Kingsley wanted to expose the pitfalls of the American philosopher’s 
“Anythingarianism,” which was characterized by a “carelessness about 
induction from the normal phenomena, coupled with this hankering after 
theories built upon exceptional ones” (Essays 357). This “craving for signs 
and wonders” evident in pseudosciences such as phrenology and mesmer-
ism always and everywhere accompanies, he felt, a decline of faith in God. 
In Phaethon the speaker’s encounter with the American Professor Win-
drush reminds him of the Neoplatonists of Alexandria, and “their exactly 
similar course—downward from a spiritualism of notions and emotions, 
which in every term confessed its own materialism, to the fearful discovery 
that consciousness does not reveal God, not even matter, but only its own 
existence; and then onward, in desperate search after something external 
wherein to trust [ . . . ]” (358). This persistent learning without ever com-
ing to the truth led many of Kingsley’s contemporaries to give up believ-
ing altogether. Emerson did not embrace honest and manful atheism, but 
assisted in the reformation of Unitarianism, so that it became a religion of 
reason and, for Kingsley, an intellectual rather than a moral Christianity. 
Ironically, perhaps, the Unitarians supported Kingsley’s position against 
the Tractarians, but their latitudinarianism went far beyond Kingsley’s 
desire for an inclusive, simplified doctrine. American Transcendentalism 
was also associated with Eclecticism, via the French philosopher Victor 
Cousin, whose writings were widely translated in the United States dur-
ing the 1830s and 1840s. Though Cousin never achieved a significant fol-
lowing in England, he was wildly popular in France and well received 
in the United States.6 Cousin believed that the nineteenth century had 
recognized itself in eclecticism because it was essentially a philosophy of 
compromise and reconciliation. Ignoring the circular logic of his claims 
for eclecticism, Cousin argued that it provided a system for the judgment 
of systems, giving the individual a method for discriminating the portion 
of error that was mixed with the portion of truth in any system.
 In the years immediately preceding the composition of Hypatia, King-
sley wrote frequently, in a variety of contexts, against the eclecticism that 
was pervading Victorian intellectual culture. Poetry had become eclec-
tic, and each poet a little deity presiding over his wretched creation: the 
“Pseudo-Spiritualistic-Eclectico-Hypoplatonico-Pantheistico [ . . . ] Sen-
timentalism that is infecting the greater part of our bad poetry, and too 
much of our good, is an ugly sign of the ‘unreality’ [ . . . ] that is abroad in 
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the world” (“Epidemic” 498). Echoing Carlyle, he urges poets to “get some 
definite and truthful meaning for your own words before you utter them,” 
or, better yet, to stop writing and do something (499). When he took up 
his post as professor of English literature at Queen’s College, London, in 
1848, Kingsley designed a historical survey that would stop young women 
“wander[ing] up and down in all sorts of eclecticisms and dilettantisms” 
(Essays 247). He would retire the “Elegant Extracts” and “Select Beauties” 
typically given to female students, and let them feast on whole works. He 
would limit their contact with foreign literature, until they were secure 
in the literary history of their own nation. Without this firm foundation, 
“selfwill and irregular eclecticism are the natural results” (260). A woman 
must recognize the excellence of her own culture lest she by a “sudden 
revulsion [become] an equally prejudiced cosmopolite and eclectic” (263). 
In his review of Anna Jameson’s study of Catholic art, Kingsley defines 
what it means to be an eclectic: “One who, in any branch of art or science, 
refuses to acknowledge Bacon’s great law, ‘that nature is only conquered by 
obeying her;’ [sic] who will not take a full and reverent view of the whole 
mass of facts with which he has to deal, and from them deducing the fun-
damental laws of his subject, obey them whithersoever they may lead; but 
who picks and chooses out of them just so many as may be pleasant to his 
private taste, and then constructs a partial system which differs from the 
essential ideas of nature, in proportion to the number of facts which he has 
determined to discard” (216–17). In this instance Kingsley associates the 
Manicheanism of Byzantine and some early Italian painting with a deep 
“spiritual eclecticism” that constructs a fictitious “angelic nature” from “all 
which is negative in humanity, [because] they were prone to despise all by 
which man is brought into contact with this earth—the beauties of sex, of 
strength, of activity, of grandeur of form” (217). This Manichean art, for 
Kingsley, was not only spiritually eclectic but also effeminate and prudish. 
Spiritual expression for them was everything, but Kingsley cautions that 
it could never represent the whole of human experience. What is consis-
tent in Kingsley’s writing during this period is the constant association of 
eclecticism, effeminacy, and decadence; but his intellectual tendency cer-
tainly leans toward eclecticism as he praises Anna Jameson for bringing 
forward those lessons Protestants can learn from the “Romish” church, 
before Catholicism finishes on the rubbish heap of history.
Philammon and the Inhumanity of Ascetic Christianity
Kingsley opposes the sectarianism and dogmatism of the early Church 
because they embody a destructive, dissective tendency that threatens to 
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destroy Christianity from within. An even greater threat to the health 
of religious and political life was asceticism, a rejection, Kingsley felt, of 
God’s gift of our human nature. In his view monastic life constitutes a 
refusal to serve God, a religious imperative that can be satisfied only by 
serving others; the contemplative life is inherently selfish.7 Though Kings-
ley reserves a sneaking admiration for the severe physical discipline under 
which the monks live, his notion of manhood must include sexual rela-
tions with women. However, his version of muscular Christianity and its 
frank celebration of “animal spirits” could be seen to promote male prof-
ligacy. Indeed, many condemned Hypatia as an obscene book on just these 
grounds.8
 The peculiar emphases of Kingsley’s picture of early Christianity are 
explicable when considered as a lifelong battle against Tractarian prin-
ciples, which he associated with John Henry Newman. Susann Dorman 
argues that Newman intended his religious-historical novel Callista (1855) 
as a correction of the negative view of the early Church found in Hypa-
tia. Previously, in “The Religion of the Day,” Newman had characterized 
the Christianity of the nineteenth century as one-sided, retaining only the 
“brighter side of the Gospel,—its tidings of comfort, its precepts of love” 
(qtd. in Dorman 178). This was, Newman felt, “the religion natural to a 
civilized age, and well has Satan dressed and completed it into an idol of 
the Truth” (qtd. in Dorman 178). By leaving out the darker side of revela-
tion, Christianity had developed a “wholly optimistic emphasis” that would 
have evolved anyway with the cultivation of reason and the refinement of 
taste and sentiment. Newman does not credit Christianity with directing 
the course of civilization, as Kingsley does, but regards the present empha-
sis in religion as “rational” picking and choosing, the recourse of “shallow 
men, in every age” (qtd. in Dorman 179). In Callista Newman sought to 
undermine Kingsley’s humanist emphasis by associating liberal Anglican-
ism with the excessive refinement of eclecticism.
 In Hypatia Kingsley explicitly condemns the gloomy asceticism of 
Newman and the Tractarian movement, which threatens “The very ideas 
of family and national life—those two divine roots of the Church, severed 
from which she is certain to wither away into that most godless and cruel 
of spectres, a religious world” (xiv). Kingsley clarifies his position yet again 
in an 1856 book review of Hours with the Mystics:
As long as “the salvation of a man’s own soul” is set forth in all pulpits as 
the first and last end and aim of mortal existence; as long as Christianity is 
dwelt on merely as influencing individuals apart—as “brands plucked, one 
here and another there, from the general burning”—so long will Mysticism, 
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in its highest form[,] be the refuge of the strongest spirits, and in its more 
base and diseased forms the refuge of the weak and sentimental spirits. 
They will say, each in his own way: “You confess that there can be a direct 
relation, communion, inspiration, from God to my soul, as I sit alone in my 
chamber. You do not think that there is such between God and what you 
call the world; between Him and nations as wholes—families, churches, 
schools of thought, as wholes; that He does not take a special interest, or 
exercise a special influence over the ways and works of men—over science, 
commerce, civilisation, colonisation, all which affect the earthly destinies 
of the race. All these you call secular; to admit His influence over them 
for their own sake (though of course He overrules them for the sake of 
His elect) savours of Pantheism. Is it so? Then we will give up the world. 
(Essays 328–39)9
For Kingsley, mysticism is too much akin to “selfish individualism” to do 
any good in the world it has abandoned. Newman, whom he calls “the one 
real mystic of any genius” writing and teaching in Britain (301), offers no 
message to compassionate the many, but preaches personal salvation at the 
expense of community and family life. The “true reason of mystical isola-
tion” is despair of the world, a denial that “God’s human world is sacred” 
(329). A corollary of Newman’s position was its denial of the possibility 
of evolution in what he considered to be revealed dogma. Like other lib-
eral Anglicans, Kingsley wanted to be self-conscious about the historical 
changes that were inevitable in every facet of every civilization. For the 
Tractarians this self-consciousness produced a rational, secular Christian-
ity ever more removed from its divine origin.
 The Oxford movement thus idealized the past and ignored the pre-
sent, offering no solution to the “crisis of civilization, which for the Lib-
eral Anglicans was first and foremost a national crisis” (Forbes, Liberal 
Anglican 102).10 Perceiving similarities between the religious and politi-
cal conflicts of nineteenth-century Britain and fifth-century Alexandria, 
Kingsley believed that he had identified both the nature of the crisis and 
its resolution. Kingsley puts his most naïve character, Philammon, a young 
ascetic monk, onto the treacherous stage of Alexandrian history without 
any knowledge of the world or of human nature outside his tiny desert 
monastic community. In the striking opening chapter, Philammon, comely 
as a Greek god and poised on the brink of manhood, stands gazing upon 
the forbidden pictures of an ancient Egyptian temple. As he contemplates 
the beauty of the women, he wonders if they are really all damned, both for 
being pagans and for appearing to take so much pleasure in their earthly 
existence. He has never seen a woman before and does not really know 
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what a woman is. Perhaps he is led by curiosity, or by his restless youth, 
to seek his fortune in the city under the patronage of Cyril. Kingsley gives 
Philammon two guides, who show him apparently irreconcilable views of 
the city. The first, Eudaemon, a friendly philosophical porter, takes him to 
the harbor, ringed with palaces and towers, a grand panorama built by the 
“benighted heathens”: “Did Christians make all this? Did Christians build 
that Pharos there on the left horn—wonder of the world? Did Christians 
raise that mile-long mole which runs towards the land with its two draw-
bridges, connecting the two ports? Did Christians build this esplanade, or 
this gate of the Sun above our heads?” (54). This is a valuable object lesson 
for the ignorant monk, but it is immediately balanced by an image of squa-
lor that rivals Victorian London. “In squalid misery, filth, profligacy, igno-
rance, ferocity, discontent, neglected in body, house, and soul, by the civil 
authorities, proving their existence only in aimless and sanguinary riots, 
there they starved and rotted, heap on heap, the masses of the old Greek 
population, close to the great food-exporting harbour of the world” (62). 
The local parish priest who serves as the second guide exposes him also to 
the hypocrisy of the Christian Church in Alexandria, which has become 
bloated on the riches of the falsely pious. Both guides teach Philammon to 
use his eyes and to judge for himself.
 Inspired by the Patriarch, he is overcome with a desire to convert Hypa-
tia, to lead her captive in fetters before the church fathers. Hypatia con-
verts Philammon instead, from a strapping young desert god into a pale, 
doubting student. His failure to confront her with his Christianity results 
at least in part from his disappointment in the character of the monks. 
They are uneducated and dirty, caring nothing for higher spiritual ques-
tions and wasting their time gossiping about the latest sectarian squabbles. 
When a gang of monks loots the Jewish quarter and drives its inhabitants 
from the city, Philammon is repelled by their random destructiveness: “a 
shudder of regret, he knew not why, passed through him, as he saw the 
mob tearing down pictures, and dashing statues to the ground. Heathen 
they were, doubtless; but still, the Nymphs and Venuses looked too lovely 
to be so brutally destroyed” (78). Philammon’s thread in the novel might 
unravel the reader’s faith: does Christianity represent progress, or is it the 
beginning of the end? What has this religion built to replace the gran-
deur and knowledge of ancient times? Perhaps taking his cue from Anna 
Jameson, Kingsley maintains throughout the narrative a steady apprecia-
tion for Greek, Roman, and Hebrew culture, always taking care to bring 
forward those elements that would best serve a healthy Christianity.
 Philammon’s teacher, the Abbot Pambo, preaches a doctrine of serving 
God through forming the most human bonds possible, a form of Christi-
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anity that demands the renunciation of neither love nor the world. When 
one of the desert monks guiltily confesses that he often longs to return to 
Rome, Pambo retorts that it is “Better to have something to love—even 
something to weep over—than to become in some lonely cavern thine own 
world,—perhaps, as more than one whom I have known, thine own God” 
(131). For Kingsley, mysticism in philosophy or in religion often leads one 
to the same bad place—to selfish individualism and self-deification. By 
serving humanity, Pambo argues, we keep God in view: “by fleeing into 
solitude a man cuts himself off from all which makes a Christian man; 
from law, obedience, fellow-help, self-sacrifice—from the communion of 
saints itself” (131). Philammon must learn that a thousand invisible ties, of 
variable thickness, connect him to every other living being. But in Alexan-
dria the odds are against him making that discovery. Eudaemon observes 
that “the monks would exterminate the human race in a single generation, 
by a voluntary suicide” (53), but his philosophy does not stop him beating 
his Christian, black African wife. Hypatia, who will not marry or conde-
scend to form familiar relationships, tangles Philammon in the web of her 
philosophy. The patriarch Cyril, in seeking to establish God’s kingdom on 
earth, has forgotten its primary laws. Only the parish priest tries to teach 
Philammon how to live as a Christian. He does not learn this lesson fully 
until he discovers that he has a sister, Pelagia, who has been living as the 
concubine of the Goth Amalric. This is the “divine reality of kindred,” the 
force that will deliver him from his very Victorian crisis of faith and iden-
tity. When Hypatia, who had set going the “earthquake-roll” in his soul 
that “jarred every belief, and hope, and memory” (110), has no word for 
the sinner Pelagia, Philammon realizes the emptiness of his idol’s philoso-
phy and smashes it to pieces. In his first Alexandrian dream, Philammon 
had a vision of Goths dancing, Hypatia with horns and cloven feet, riding 
three hippopotami around a theater, Cyril cursing and pelting him with 
flower-pots, and Pelagia as an angel with peacock’s wings (62–63). This 
last image, the key to Philammon’s story, is reminiscent of the first in a 
series of William Blake’s proverbs in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell:
The pride of the peacock is the glory of God.
The lust of the goat is the bounty of God.
The wrath of the lion is the wisdom of God.
The nakedness of woman is the work of God.
Like his spiritual precursor Blake, Kingsley sought to undermine the 
prudishness of Christian doctrine. To accomplish this, he tried to balance 
the beauty of Greek art and culture and the civic and military life of Rome 
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with the asceticism and mysticism of Christianity. But this “muscular 
Christianity” could be seen, as James Eli Adams has argued, as another, 
equally rigid form of self-discipline.11 The portrait of Raphael Aben-Ezra 
would seem to support this claim; when he is driven from his home, he 
determines to spend his life wandering, a second Diogenes, not in search 
of a home, but in search of a man. He has given up his wealth, his friends, 
and his philosophy. In the clothing of a beggar, he crosses and re-crosses 
the Mediterranean, searching as much for an ideal of masculinity as for 
something to believe.
Raphael’s Via Media
Early in his career, Kingsley came under the influence of the Cambridge 
Apostles, who “taught him that the truth could be approached from any 
number of avenues” (Hawley 289). His subsequent call for an Anglican 
via media outraged both dissenters and Tractarians. Though he too had 
once looked for the middle way, Newman, a convert to Roman Catholi-
cism, came to believe that “to weaken a part of the dogmatic structure is 
to weaken the whole” (Willey 81). But “Newman’s view of history was 
apocalyptic,” while Kingsley’s was progressive (81). For Kingsley, latitude 
made the historical process easier to bear, and, at least in his novel, history 
gave the victory to a Christianity founded on human nature. The hero of 
the via media, Raphael Aben-Ezra, is a Hellenized Jew whose mother was 
raped by barbarian invaders; he is a cosmopolitan and an eclectic, a man of 
taste and action, capable of ascetic discipline and filial love. Arriving at the 
brink of nihilistic skepticism, he blends the best features of the doctrines 
he has encountered in Alexandria within a conciliatory Christianity.
 The truth of Kingsley’s picture of the modern spiritual condition lies 
in his attention to the mixture of creeds that must exist within his concilia-
tory model of historical development. The late Hellenistic-Roman period 
in which Kingsley’s novel is set provides him with just such a rich and 
potent mixture of peoples and their gods.12 Rome had become the pur-
veyor of syncretistic religion and of Christianity, which could itself be 
“the most complete example of ancient religious syncretism—in this case 
Hebraism combined with Hellenism” (Grant xv).13 Kingsley wanted to 
show that Christianity prevailed at this moment in time, and would exist 
in some form for all time, because it was most adaptable to the needs of the 
human heart. An equally strong reason for its triumph over paganism was 
its capacity for assimilating other creeds and thus more easily reconciling 
converts to the loss of their native religions. Christianity was not only syn-
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cretistic but also cosmopolitan—a religion that could transcend its national 
origin.
 When Raphael is thirty-three years old—the Christological age—he 
leaves Alexandria to become “the new Diogenes.” Before Raphael decides 
to imitate the Greek Cynic and become a citizen of the world, he must 
first sever his ties with the Jewish community of Alexandria and give up 
the economic and political power he had wielded there, in his ironic and 
off-handed manner. Kingsley never leaves the reader in doubt, however, 
that Raphael holds immense powers in reserve. Philammon perceives this 
superiority in Raphael’s “ease and grace, that courtesy and self-restraint” 
which seem to come not from rank but from “real strength” (79). Raphael 
has taste, self-possession, refinement, and good breeding—he is every inch 
the Victorian gentleman; but insisting on Raphael’s self-control and inde-
pendence, Kingsley more precisely invokes the gentleman in his role as 
head of family and promoter of the common weal. Raphael has all the 
advantages of a superior masculine type; Kingsley must next demonstrate 
the necessity of this man’s conversion to Christianity. Hypatia recognizes 
in Raphael her only real student, “her superior in [ . . . ] moral earnestness 
and strength of will”; but she is “chilled by the disagreeable suspicion that 
he was only playing with her [ . . . ] while he reserved his real strength for 
some object more worthy of him” (96). Next to the “unfathomable Jew,” 
other philosophers were mere “spinners of charming cobwebs [and . . . ] 
builders of pretty houses,” in which no one wanted live. Raphael is too 
smart and too skeptical to rest in Hypatia’s Neoplatonism, which is no 
more habitable than the creeds of her rivals.
 Arriving spiritually at “The Bottom of the Abyss,” where his intellect 
has crippled his capacity for belief in anything in or of the earth, Raphael 
is moved by the simplicity of his dog Bran’s instinct to protect her puppies, 
even when her master urges her to abandon them: “‘You are right after 
all! Here are nine things come into the world; phantasms or not, there it 
is; I can’t deny it. They are something, and you are something, old dog; 
or at least like enough to something to do instead of it; and you are not 
I, and as good as I, and they too, for aught I know, and have as good a 
right to live as I [ . . . ]’” (151). The dog’s “mere common sense” encour-
ages Raphael’s belief in a tangible creation not of his own making, neither 
transcendent nor ineffable, but insistently alive. Soon after this “wonder-
ful conversion” (261), Raphael encounters another example of filial devo-
tion in the person of Victoria, a Roman Christian whose father has been 
wounded in battle and who is about to be sold as a slave. Still inclined 
toward fatalism, Raphael wants to leave them to their cruel destinies, but 
Bran “by no means agree[s] with his view of the case” and knocks one of 
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the captors to the ground. Raphael follows the dog’s lead, conceding, “You 
are at least a more practical teacher than ever Hypatia was” (155). Roused 
to action, Raphael frees Victoria by murdering the two men and reuniting 
her with her father, and thus emerges violently himself from the “slough” 
of philosophy. Though he has abandoned his nation, he begins to forge 
new ties, to acknowledge himself part of a network of relations and obliga-
tions. He can no more abandon his newfound family than Bran can desert 
her puppies. One thing only restrains him from converting to Christianity 
at this point: Victoria is destined for the convent. Raphael cannot accept 
any religion that promotes celibacy—that threatens to sever the ties of love 
that bind him to this woman.
 Raphael’s next teacher—after Bran—is Synesius, the “Squire-Bishop,” 
a Christian priest who was a husband and father. As Susan Chitty has 
observed, Synesius “bears a striking resemblance to Kingsley himself” 
(154): “A man of magniloquent and flowery style, now without a vein 
of self-conceit; yet withal of overflowing kindliness, racy humour, and 
unflinching courage, both physical and moral; with a very clear practical 
faculty, and a very muddy speculative one [ . . . ]” (Hypatia 251). Kingsley 
winks at his reader here, acknowledging that Synesius’s love of specula-
tive philosophy, much like his own, has an element of self-delusion in it, 
but that will not stop his preaching “that eclectic farrago of his, which he 
calls philosophic Christianity” (95). No doubt Kingsley was sympathetic 
to Synesius’s unorthodox belief system. Unwilling to anticipate the end of 
days or to leave off philosophizing in order to preserve theological dogma, 
Synesius was at best a reluctant instrument of the Church fathers (Davis 
437). And having been taught by Hypatia, Synesius is well placed to medi-
ate between Neoplatonic philosophy and Christian dogma (Davis 437). For 
Kingsley, therefore, Synesius belongs to the tradition of Christian eclecti-
cism represented by Clemens of Alexandria (d. 215 C.E.). Clemens’s ideal 
of the philosophical method was eklektikon (Donini 16), a process of pre-
serving what was good and rejecting what was false in competing philo-
sophical systems.
 During the Victorian period, writers on Alexandrian Christianity sin-
gled out Clemens as the “peculiarly Christian philosopher” and represen-
tative theologian of that city, and the “head of the most learned Christian 
body of his day” (Tulloch 615; “Alexandrian Christianity” 408). But these 
two reviewers represent widely divergent views of how nineteenth-century 
Christians ought to regard a Christian tradition of eclectic thought. The 
1855 reviewer of Kingsley’s Alexandria and Her Schools objects to the idea 
that a “world-philosophy,” which is embodied in Clemens’s eclecticism, 
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can account for all phenomena or incorporate all the diverse thought that 
has been: “To the Jews he had given the law; to the Greeks philosophy; and 
Clemen[s] seemed to have imagined some analogous preparatory dispen-
sation to the Magian and the Brahmin; and each had served as a school-
master to lead them to Him, and His last crowning dispensation, which 
completed and superseded all” (“Alexandrian” 413). While the reviewer 
does not deny that the Alexandrian Christians thus “aimed to include all 
mankind in the scheme of God,” he feels with some of his contemporaries 
that millions of souls were destined to die without salvation, just as millions 
of seeds in nature were never fertilized. Like Synesius, Clemens did not 
accept this principle of waste in nature; indeed, he believed that God had 
“lighted” every person at birth, and “every man lived continually under a 
dispensation from him,” carrying a portion of the world-philosophy from 
which all would benefit.
 Taken from Tennyson’s In Memoriam, the epigraph to Kingsley’s vol-
ume represents well the ambivalence of Christian eclecticism:
Our little systems have their day;
They have their day and cease to be;
They are but broken lights of thee,
And thou, O Lord, art more than they. (11. 17–20)
John Tulloch, in “Alexandria and Its Christian School,” is much more 
sympathetic than Kingsley’s 1855 reviewer to a tradition of thought that 
acknowledges how Christianity is caught up in the historical process—
that it is not necessarily the “crowning dispensation.” Clemens claims our 
respect, Tulloch argues, because “in circumstances so different from ours, 
and amidst a complication of moral and speculative difficulties, which 
at least rival ours, [he] maintained so steadfastly the great principles of 
the faith” (616). If one does not attend to the implications of the paral-
lel between Alexandrian and Victorian Christianity, then, Tulloch asserts, 
“The very meaning of the present life around him must be hid from him 
as he gazes with a stolid dogmatism on its varied expressions. Still more 
will the past and its lessons be shut to him—a blind gallery hung round 
with expressive portraits and great scenes, not one of which he can see, 
through the dimness of superstition or the mists of bigotry with which he 
invests them” (616). If “Alexandrian Christianity” comes to mean heresy 
in the nineteenth century, there will be little opportunity to benefit from 
it. Systems do have their day and they do change, but as “broken lights” of 
God, they must be reverently preserved and studied.
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 A wanderer before settling in Alexandria, Clemens had studied with 
teachers from at least six countries, which makes him an apt prototype 
also for Raphael, a cosmopolitan who finds his spiritual home in Chris-
tianity.14 Just as Raphael has learned to believe in what he sees, he learns 
to read sacred text as the historical record of the thoughts and actions of 
human beings who once were alive; for example, the Song of Songs, he 
discovers, is about physical love, not a mystification of the divine. He also 
has to become skeptical of skepticism, before he can rest in Christianity. 
Eclectic vacillation is, as Eduard Zeller argues, the unrest of skepticism, 
which for most thinkers precedes “positive conviction” (20). Such a model 
accords with Kingsley’s philosophy of history, which allows for periods of 
unrest, such as the fifth century and the nineteenth century, during which 
systems of thought are in flux. The spirit of the age is with Raphael—not 
with the eponymous heroine, who is slow to realize her world is dying. 
Her philosophy has entered a period of decline, in which it becomes eclec-
tic, but she struggles still for lost certainty and purity. A Greek who wor-
ships the old gods, Hypatia cannot believe in progress, only in perpetual 
decadence. Raphael’s faith in the future is reflected in his love for Victoria, 
whom he “saves” in marriage. And although Kingsley makes a point of 
telling us that Raphael and his child are killed in war, that knowledge does 
not detract from his assertion that we have to participate in the world, 
that we have to act for good. Not only does Kingsley allow the reader to 
know the fates of individuals, but as a historian he must also admit that 
the institutions of the Eastern Church did not produce a final reconcilia-
tion, a true world-philosophy, but “absorbed into the sphere of Christian-
ity all which was most valuable in the philosophies of Greece and Egypt, 
and in the social organization of Rome, as an heir-loom for nations yet 
unborn; and laid in foreign lands, by unconscious agents, the foundations 
of all European thought and Ethics” (Hypatia xi). No other philosophical 
system was capable of providing a point of union that might unite the dis-
parate peoples of Alexandria, who retained their separate national identi-
ties while inhabiting a cosmopolitan city. Cosmopolitanism provided not 
the solution to the crisis, but rather a broad-based religious unity founded 
on the model of family life. Although it was Kingsley’s intention to defend 
the Broad-Church, latitudinarian position in Hypatia, he principally suc-
ceeded in making “Alexandria” the byword for a decadent society. His 
claims for the via media were obscured for contemporary readers by an 
ugly picture of the early Church and his inability to distinguish the middle 
way from the haphazard eclecticism that pervaded Alexandrian and Vic-
torian thought.
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Eclecticism and Empire
In an 1870 article provocatively titled “Eclecticism and Brahmoism,” Rob-
ert Milman, the bishop of Calcutta, provides, after Kingsley, the most 
extended exploration of Alexandria as an analogue of Victorian Britain, 
including, however, a decisive rejection of the reconciliation between 
faiths that might be expected to flow from the incorporation of territories. 
Milman identifies Alexandria as the birthplace of the eclecticism that was 
threatening the integrity and, ultimately, the survival of Christianity; and, 
by linking the compromise philosophy with Britain’s empire in India, he 
indicates the source of the present danger. The cosmopolitanism engen-
dered by empire is, for Milman, the source of its weakness.
 Intending to disgust the upper-middle-class, High-Church readers of 
Good Words, Milman describes Roman Alexandria, with its “mingled [and] 
eclectic population,” as “cosmopolitan.” Like the man who gave the city 
its name, Alexandria provided a temporary point of contact and center of 
union among the empire’s varied dominions (793), but it failed to create 
an enduring confederation among peoples “vain, fickle, and shifting with 
every breath of popular opinion” and following “but one god, [ . . . ] gain” 
(793). But it is Alexandria’s intellectual capital—a wasteful extravagance of 
knowledge for its own sake—that draws the bishop’s censure. Surrounded 
by “its menagerie, its botanical gardens, its halls of science, its schools of 
art, its studious cells” (793), the city’s great museum stands, for the bishop 
of Calcutta, as the symbol of the Alexandrians’ way. The mixed Greek, 
Roman, and Egyptian architecture of the museum, its varied collections, 
and its international school exert a profound influence on the character 
of the philosophy produced there. In their effort to explain the mysteries 
of the universe, the Alexandrian scholars communed not only with the 
“accumulated treasures of the poetry, the history, [and] the philosophy of 
past ages” (793) but also with distant regions beyond the empire, such as 
Persia and India. Rather than choosing between the philosophies then “in 
vogue at Rome,” the Alexandrians used their Neoplatonism to “forc[e] 
those systems which seemed even antagonistic into a curious and unnatural 
union with it” (794). Unwilling to accept the authority of a single author 
or a single system, the Eclectics joined in “unnatural union” elements of 
any system that pleased them, “like a clever piece of mosaic” (794). Only 
cleverness of this reckless type could unite “Theism and Pantheism” and 
“look with affected or real impartiality on all the various philosophies 
and religions which came within the scope of their attention” (795). Con-
demned for their impartiality and clever reasoning by all true believers, 
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the Eclectics won few converts. With no guide but one’s own mind among 
the tangled web of past and present philosophies, eclecticism would never 
be a reliable path to the truth.
 Observing the similarities between the Roman and the British empires, 
Milman implied that this second great historical encounter between East 
and West was likely to be as dangerous, and uncertain of outcome, as the 
first; indeed, as imperialism assimilated other cultures, Christianity came 
increasingly under threat. Milman believed that the Indian scholars of 
the Brahmo Somaj—the “modern Eclectic school” in India—were pro-
moting an “unnatural union” of opposites like that produced in doomed 
Alexandria. He explained the unwillingness of the Brahmo scholars to 
accept Christianity as the consequence of “superficial knowledge” rather 
than admit that their dilemma might result from the contradictions and 
inconsistencies of the Christian religion itself confronted with Hinduism 
and other philosophies. That the Brahmoists might detect the incipient 
collapse of a system of belief based on the willful ignorance of competing 
systems does not occur to the bishop; blindness is “moral courage” and cre-
dulity is “manly resolution” (799). To acknowledge value in the learning of 
disparate cultures—as the Brahmoists willingly did—was to admit some 
truth and some error in each, and, in Milman’s view, to risk the precipice 
of unbelief.15
 Milman sought to provide his readers with a stronger foundation 
for their Christian faith by exposing the weaknesses inherent in eclectic 
thinking. The Alexandrian Eclectics were, in his view, little more than 
very diligent explorers of curiosities who accumulated vast quantities of 
knowledge, which they turned to little account (792)—that is, they did not 
find reasonable proof of a higher being. In stark contrast to Kingsley, who 
freely admitted the mixed heritage of Christian theology, Milman ignored 
the contributions of Christian eclectics such as Clemens and Synesius who 
adapted Alexandria to their religion and their religion to Alexandria. 
Indeed, the bishop’s negative judgment of the Eclectic school seems to rest 
on its “aristocratic elevation of knowledge,” “over-refinement,” “conceit 
in intellect,” “fastidiousness,” and “picking and choosing” (799, 796)—just 
those tendencies that he saw reappearing in the intellectual and artistic 
culture of Europe in 1870. Kingsley had also condemned the aristocratic 
exclusiveness of dogmatic religion in the Oxford movement and the sec-
tarian and speculative debates of nineteenth-century Christianity—these 
were his “new foes” with old Alexandrian faces. But Milman’s hysterical 
reaction to “all the various expressions of opinion and belief, or unbelief, 
with which Europe [was] fermenting” showed that the crisis would not 
easily be resolved (798). Weakly echoing Kingsley’s exhortation to preserve 
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intuitive belief as the bulwark against doubt, Milman could only recom-
mend the dignity of submission to the higher authority of the Church. 
Whereas Kingsley had been most concerned with promoting a Christian-
ity activist in spirit and simplified in doctrine, Milman was poised to repeat 
the errors of the Church fathers and the scholastics in order to secure 
Western Christianity against the waves of foreign influence that British 
imperialism had already put into motion.
 Implicit in Mowbray Morris’s characterization of Victoria’s reign as 
“an Alexandrian Age” was a question on which he refused to speculate: 
“When is the great division of Empire to be?” If Hellenistic Alexandria 
and Victorian Britain were indeed parallel in their cultural, political, and 
religious development, then British imperialism would of necessity reach 
an end as complicated—and as inevitable—as the literary culture it had 
produced.16 Curiously, Morris had nothing to say about the bombardment 
of Alexandria by British imperial forces that had taken place only a few 
years earlier, in 1882, apparently in retaliation for an Egyptian nationalist 
attack on the city’s foreign population. Like most of his contemporaries, 
Morris had little interest in nineteenth-century Alexandria, except for its 
location, after 1869, on the trade route to India. In a sketch of “Alexandria 
Old and New,” one visitor recorded a sentiment typical of European trav-
elers to Egypt in the nineteenth century—that the greatness of its ancient 
civilization had been thoroughly degraded by its Arab inhabitants: “we 
reached the excavations which are gradually laying bare the site of the 
great city, the rival of Rome, with her temples, and her palaces, and her 
vast necropolis, where, by a strange contradiction, the resting-places and 
remains of the dead are in a far more perfect and recognisable condition 
than the most magnificent dwellings and resorts of the living” (229). For 
this traveler, the Arabs who carried off “blocks of granite and red por-
phyry, the portions of fluted columns, the capitals of acanthus-crowned 
pillars, to build their miserable huts” were motivated by “greed,” whereas 
the English “desire” was only to “secure [the fragments] for some col-
lection, public or private” (229). The idea that the relics of Alexandria’s 
glorious past were more valuable than the living inhabitants of a muted 
nineteenth-century city fueled Europe’s proprietary interest in the forgot-
ten capital.
 In 1858 it was possible for a confident imperialist to assert, without a 
sideways glance at the Egyptian population of Alexandria, “The East, hav-
ing no politics of its own, has been and is still made the arena for the poli-
tics of the West” (“Egypt and Syria” 154). Alexandria, he argues, could not 
sustain its own commerce without British intervention. If Britain were to 
abandon Egypt, where the “West meets the East, and predominates” (151), 
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Alexandria “would soon shrivel up into a fourth of its present dimen-
sions” (163). Blaming the Muslims for a “savage intolerance” that prohibits 
commercial development and historical progress, the writer takes up the 
image of ancient Alexandria popularized by Kingsley in order to justify 
imperial expansion. In this tradition Alexandria lives only when the eyes 
of Europe are upon her, gaining thereby a galvanic vitality—“Nothing of 
internal, or at least innate life, yet appears in the East. It is all derived, and 
of course fitful, as well as unnatural and unhealthy” (173). Even through 
the writer’s bold assertions of the desirability of Britain’s imperial presence 
in Egypt, it is possible to perceive his anxiety about the birth of another 
Frankenstein’s monster from the contact between East and West. Having 
early declared himself a believer in the “science of nations,” as it came to be 
known in the nineteenth century, the writer fears what James Martineau 
calls “the violence done to nationalities” (299).17 Kingsley had written with 
apparent delight of the collapse of the Roman empire: “Everywhere the 
mangled limbs of the Old World were seething in the Medea’s caldron, to 
come forth whole, and young, and strong” (Hypatia xiii). The “exhausted” 
races of the Mediterranean gained more than they lost, in Kingsley’s view, 
by their union with the “Gothic races” of the North—national differ-
ences were valuable only as they contributed to vigorous hybrid offspring. 
However, as Kingsley’s critics complained, if the analogy between Roman 
Alexandria and Victorian Britain holds, then “he seems to anticipate for 
Europe a social dissolution like that of the lower empire” (Martineau 296), 
in which the purity of Christian Europe is lost.18
 Kingsley’s vision of cosmopolitan Alexandria had provoked a reassess-
ment of the dialogue between East and West. Whereas writers such as Mil-
man and Martineau wanted to administer a spiritual inoculation against 
the influence of foreigners, Kingsley had always tried to recognize the 
Zeitgeist, wherever it could be found, and to nurture that vitality, which 
he perceived as the working out of God’s will in the world. While Kingsley 
was never explicit in anticipating the disintegration of the British Empire, 
the decline of Alexandria cautioned Britons to expect a similar fate: “I have 
shown you New Foes under an Old Face—your own likenesses in toga 
and tunic, instead of coat and bonnet. One word before we part. The same 
devil who tempted these old Egyptians tempts you. The same God who 
would have saved these old Egyptians if they had willed, will save you, if 
you will. Their sins are yours, their errors yours, their doom yours, their 
deliverance yours. There is nothing new under the sun. The thing which 
has been, it is that which shall be” (Hypatia 389). Raphael’s deliverance had 
depended on compromise and combination, on a religion of action that 
would revive the “divine roots of the Church”—family and national life. 
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Now that they knew their sins and their doom, where could Kingsley’s 
countrymen seek their deliverance? In the “contact zones” of East and 
West. In writing that now seems prophetic, Kingsley considered the fate 
of Alexandria, and the world, after the Muslim conquest, and arrived at 
a very different judgment than did his contemporaries. The Crusaders, 
he felt, had been wrong to try to stamp out the “peculiar life and char-
acter” of Egypt, an endeavor in which they necessarily failed—a failure 
that allowed the learning of Islam and its commerce to flow into Chris-
tendom. He imagines that the Crusaders were changed by their encounter 
with the East: “They learnt wider, juster views of man and virtue, which 
I cannot help believing must have had great effect in weakening in their 
minds their old, exclusive, and bigoted notions, and in paving the way for 
the great outburst of free thought, and the great assertion of the dignity of 
humanity, which the fifteenth century beheld” (Alexandria and Her Schools 
167–68). And looking to the future, Kingsley imagines that Alexandria 
might again become a “point of fusion” where the “young and buoyant 
vigour of the new-born nations may at once teach, and learn from, the 
prudence, the experience, the traditional wisdom of the ancient Europe-
ans” (170). But for this to occur there would have to be another historical 
reconciliation, this time between “the Crescent and the Cross.”
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t might seem perverse to make Matthew Arnold, that high 
priest of the highest of culture, into a representative for a literary 
middle way; but that is precisely how Arnold saw himself. In an 
1869 letter to his mother, Mary Arnold, he claims that his “poems represent 
the main movement of mind of the last quarter of a century” and that they 
“will probably have their day as people become conscious to themselves of 
what that movement of mind is, and interested in the literary productions 
which reflect it” (Selected Letters [hereafter SL] 217). I have tried to suggest 
that the “main movement of mind” in the nineteenth century was toward 
eclectic synthesis—of competing philosophies, histories, and literary and 
artistic styles; and that it is impossible to separate these developments from 
the coming to power of the middle classes or from the process of cultural 
globalization. The eclecticism apparent in so many aspects of nineteenth-
century British culture is no less prominent in the work of the man who 
became its self-appointed critic and prophet. Indeed, Arnold goes on to 
explain to his mother that though he has “less poetical sentiment than 
Tennyson and less intellectual vigour and abundance than Browning,” he 
manages to combine the best characteristics of each, and to “[apply] that 
fusion to the main line of modern development” (SL 217). More profound 
even than the peculiar combination of sentiment and intellect that Arnold 
perceives as his poetic legacy is his “translation” of a variety of histories 
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and styles into a modern poetic idiom. Far from lacking “sympathy with 
the wants of the present generation” (as the Anglican cleric G. D. Boyle 
uncharitably suggested in an 1853 review [70]), Arnold directs his poetic 
and critical efforts toward overcoming the modern condition of being 
“between two worlds,” as he famously expressed it in “Stanzas from the 
Grande Chartreuse.” At one moment, this liminal figure is a foreigner, 
who, “Thinking of his own Gods, [ . . . ] / In pity and mournful awe might 
stand / Before some fallen Runic stone—.” Ideas that once seemed as per-
manent as the stone on which they were etched have been abandoned: time 
spares no one. In another moment Arnold’s liminal narrator steps outside 
the time stream, refusing to cast off his mourning and join in the clamor of 
progress triumphant: “Fenced early in this cloistral round / Of reverie, of 
shade, of prayer, / How should we grow in other ground? / How can we 
flower in foreign air?” Few poems convey so vividly the sense of unend-
ing loss that runs all through Victorian literature, with its fatal, historical 
awareness. The present was necessarily derivative, a secondary creation; 
but did it have to be always a contraction of what came before? Was it 
always a falling away from the best that nature intended?
 In one of his lesser-known poems, “The Second Best,” Arnold again 
characterizes the present as transitional, but holds out hope that he is mov-
ing toward the future’s enduring form. The eclectic principle he imbibes 
from Victor Cousin and other French thinkers creates a temporary order 
in the present moment, and opens a door into a world untroubled by 
doubt, diversity, or division. Although he might have seen himself as “sec-
ond best,” after Tennyson and Browning, Arnold tries to blend “the best 
that has been thought and known in the world” into the in-between self, 
thereby mastering the rudderless eclecticism of modern life. Increasingly, 
however, the study of “excellent models” leads Arnold away from poetry. 
He resigns himself to the production of criticism, and to its secondary level 
of creation. Throughout the 1860s, in his second career as a literary critic, 
Arnold uses eclecticism as a tool for reforming middle-class taste. By the 
end of the decade, in Culture and Anarchy, Arnold’s criticism pivots on the 
contrast between two forms of eclecticism—the naïve, middle-class eclecti-
cism of “doing as one likes” and the volitional eclecticism of finding the 
“best that has been thought and known.” On this pivot point turns the 
future of literature.
Becoming Eclectic
As a young man Arnold emulated French manners, read widely in French 
literature, and later counted the critic Sainte-Beuve (a disciple of Victor 
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Cousin) as one of the four men from whom he was “conscious of having 
learnt” (SL 233). Arnold commenced his career as a critic long after the 
star of Cousin had faded from view, but Cousin’s writings on eclecticism 
almost certainly influenced the evolution of Arnold’s critical principles, 
both directly and indirectly through his reading of other French writers. 
The earliest extant reading lists (1845–47) reveal the centrality of Cousin’s 
philosophical works in Arnold’s intellectual development.1 In September 
1845 Arnold recorded his reading of Cousin’s Introduction à l’histoire de 
la philosophie—the published version of the famous 1828 Sorbonne lec-
tures that set out the theory of eclecticism. Later in the same year, he read 
Cousin’s Cours de l’histoire de la philosophie du xviiie siècle, which con-
tinued the 1828 lectures and illustrated the practice of eclecticism in the 
history of philosophy. During the next two years, Arnold seems to have 
relied on Cousin’s guidance in determining the direction of his further 
reading in philosophy. The eleventh lecture of the Introduction probably 
led Arnold to Vico, Herder (the Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
appears on reading list IV), and Creuzer (the Symbolik und Mythologie der 
alten Völker, besonders der Griechen of 1810–12 appears on the same 1846 
list). Lecture VI of the Cours contains a long discussion of the Bhaga-
vad Gita (that would directly influence Arnold’s 1848 poem “The World 
and the Quietist” with its concept of holy work) and praises Humboldt’s 
analysis of the sacred text (which appears on the third reading list as 
“Humboldt. uber die B. G.” and recurs on lists IV and V as well). Allott 
theorizes that Cousin’s mention of Glanvill in the twelfth lecture of the 
Cours probably encouraged Arnold to read The Vanity of Dogmatizing (a 
1661 text that Arnold bought in 1844, “but did not read until he found 
[it] mentioned in Cousin” [260]).2 The same lecture by Cousin inspired 
Arnold to include Cudworth’s The True Intellectual System of the Universe 
(1678) on the same reading list of December 1845. In reading the earlier 
dialogues of Plato during these years, Allott suspects that Arnold used 
Cousin’s translation, “for the sake of the ‘Arguments philosophiques’ 
prefixed to the dialogues” (261), a claim supported by the transcriptions 
we find in Arnold’s Note-books of Plato in the French of Cousin (150, 
166). Finally, Cousin’s discussion of Plotinus (Lecture VIII of the Cours) 
might have led Arnold to read the Enneads (List IV). On the fifth read-
ing list, Arnold includes one of Cousin’s critics, Abbé V. Gioberti; if he in 
fact read Gioberti, Arnold would have found a scathing attack on Cous-
in’s “panthéisme.” While Cousin’s name does not appear again on any 
of Arnold’s reading lists (not, I think, in consequence of his reading of 
Gioberti), many of those whom Cousin influenced do—Michelet, Sainte-
Beuve, Stendhal, Guizot, Renan, and Jules Simon, among others. Also 
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recorded are the scores of philosophical and religious works to which 
Cousin had introduced him.3
 Allott therefore logically characterizes Cousin as Arnold’s “mentor” 
during the 1840s (266), suggesting that Cousin’s eclecticism was useful in 
providing the young poet with “a lively guide to a comparatively mysteri-
ous field of knowledge” and with “a source of ideas which [could] be trans-
ferred to a literary or more popular context” (259–60). Like most modern 
critics, Allott dismisses Cousin as a “feeble” and unoriginal thinker, per-
haps capable of stimulating a superior mind such as Arnold’s, but unlikely 
to leave any significant imprint on the age. In any event, it is impossible to 
disregard the eclecticism that is a leading feature of Arnold’s scholarship 
during the period in which he read Cousin, and that afterwards appears 
so prominently in his poetry and criticism.4 When Arnold met Cousin in 
1859, however, he seems to have been more interested in the old philos-
opher’s role as education minister than in his forgotten fame as the pro-
mulgator of modern eclecticism, an omission that must qualify any claim 
of “influence.”5 Yet an admixture of this predisposition to a French style 
of thought and the pessimism Arnold felt about the progress of poetry led 
him to become, after Cousin, the most influential eclectic thinker of the 
nineteenth century. The fundamental truth that drives the eclectic cease-
lessly through the wilderness of ideas, namely that no one system can lay 
claim to all parts of the truth, also drove Arnold 1) to resist the literary 
tendencies of his age and to theorize a new direction for poetry; 2) to com-
pare critically the literatures of the world, past and present, and provide 
the tools with which the literature of the future might be written; and 3) 
to diagnose the intellectual confusion of the middle classes and to pursue 
eclecticism as its remedy.
 Arnold concedes the necessity of eclecticism when he writes in the 1853 
preface to Poems that, in the “confusion of the present times,” the young 
writer needs “a hand to guide him through the confusion” (48). In a strik-
ing statement of surrender to the spirit of the age, Arnold lays the founda-
tion for the theory of eclecticism that will be most fully articulated in “The 
Function of Criticism at the Present Time”: “If we must be dilettanti: if 
it is impossible for us, under the circumstances amidst which we live, to 
think clearly, to feel nobly, and to delineate firmly: if we cannot attain to 
the mastery of the great artists;—let us, at least, have so much respect for 
our art as to prefer it to ourselves. Let us not bewilder our successors; let 
us transmit to them the practice of poetry, with its boundaries and whole-
some regulative laws, under which excellent works may again, perhaps, 
at some future time, be produced, not yet fallen into oblivion through our 
neglect, not yet condemned and cancelled by the influence of their eternal 
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enemy, caprice” (Complete Prose Works I:15). The guiding “hand,” which 
Arnold has found and which he earnestly recommends to his fellow poets, 
is the small number of “excellent models” that exhibit the “boundaries and 
wholesome regulative laws” of the art. Even if the young poet cannot be 
original and produce what is excellent without the guiding hand, he can at 
least imitate the classics, and thus preserve the art of poetry so as to make 
possible the production of future great works. The preface exhibits a char-
acteristically eclectic approach to artistic production by recognizing that 
artists of the nineteenth century “must be dilettanti”—they are, as Winck-
elmann would have said, Nachahmer. Living in an unpoetic age, they must 
“respect the art more” than themselves and, in a historical project strongly 
reminiscent of Cousin’s eclecticism, endeavor to “transmit the practice of 
poetry” to future generations.
 The charge of dilettantism that Arnold levels against the artists of his 
generation derives from Goethe’s delineation of the two types of dilet-
tantes who write poetry: the one “neglects the indispensable mechanical 
part, and thinks he has done enough if he shows spirituality and feeling; 
and [the other] seeks to arrive at poetry merely by mechanism, in which he 
can acquire an artisan’s readiness, and is without soul and matter” (I:15). 
In this judgment Arnold echoes both Kingsley’s diagnosis of “The Prevail-
ing Epidemic” in modern poetry, namely that poets have forgotten their 
art and produce poems merely out of vanity, and Carlyle’s argument in 
“Signs of the Times” that the acute self-consciousness and “machine spirit” 
of the age have brought about the destruction of art. As Goethe argues in 
his brief 1799 essay, both kinds of dilettantism are harmful to art, so much 
so that it is better to “adhere to accepted models and imitate the good that 
exists rather than strive for originality” (216). In surrendering the goal of 
originality, Arnold repudiates the Romantics and sides with the unpopular 
eclectics and academicians whose faith in traditional institutions as arbi-
ters of taste seemed counterintuitive in an age of democracy. For Goethe, 
however, obedience to standards and rules was necessary for dilettantes 
only, who, as “plagiarists,” “undermine and destroy all natural beauty in 
language and thought by mimicking and aping it in order to cover up 
their own vacuity” (216). Arnold, by contrast, does not regard imitation as 
shameful plagiarism or eclecticism as dull mimicry, preferring to work for 
the future rather than yielding to a moment of despair. Even in this earliest 
piece of critical writing, aimed ostensibly at the reform of poetry, Arnold 
attacks the intellectual confusion and aesthetic laissez-faire of the middle 
classes—the real sources of poetry’s decline. When he urges that we col-
lect and preserve the rules of poetry, to protect them from “neglect” and 
“caprice,” Arnold sounds a lot like Macaulay (a writer for whom he had 
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little respect) in “Dryden” when Macaulay argues “that the creative faculty, 
and the critical faculty, cannot exist together in their highest perfection,” 
or in the review of poetaster Robert Montgomery when Macaulay sets out 
to give readers a lesson in what makes good poetry. Arnold shares with 
Macaulay and Carlyle a powerful sense of historical determinism inform-
ing his judgment that poetry cannot be great in an unpoetic age; unlike 
many of his contemporaries, however, Arnold believes that history itself 
will provide the subject matter that allows poetry to go forward.
 As do so many of Arnold’s essays, the 1853 preface responds directly 
to various critics of his work, including his friend and fellow poet Arthur 
Hugh Clough. A review of new poetry—Arnold’s own and that of a 
Glasgow mechanic named Alexander Smith—had given Clough the 
opportunity to consider more broadly the proper subject of poetry in the 
nineteenth century. To explain Alexander Smith’s greater achievement, 
Clough employed a powerful architectural metaphor: “The novelist does 
try to build us a real house to be lived in; and this common builder, with 
no notion of the orders, is more to our purpose than the student of ancient 
art who proposes to lodge us under an Ionic portico. We are, unhappily, 
not gods, nor even marble statues. While the poets, like the architects, 
are—a good thing enough in its way—studying ancient art, comparing, 
thinking, theorizing, the common novelist tells a plain tale, often trivial 
enough, about this, that, and the other, and obtains one reading at any rate; 
is thrown away indeed tomorrow, but is devoured to-day” (145). Clough 
suggests that the more ancient arts of poetry and architecture are too pre-
occupied with cataloguing their own histories to “tell a plain tale,” mean-
ingful to an ordinary reader. According to Clough, Alexander Smith’s 
volume of poetry shares with contemporary novels this ability to “build 
us a real house to be lived in.” Though they are as disposable as modern 
architecture, modern novels provide immediate shelter, immediate relief, 
immediate lessons. It is no longer practical to lodge beneath an Ionic por-
tico, and while it might form a fascinating entry in the history of architec-
ture or an attractive setting for a cold hard statue, the ancient styles and 
ancient stories will not warm the heart of a living being. When he says that 
the common builder has “no notion of the orders,” or history, of his art, 
he intends to question whether Arnold’s “More refined, [ . . . ] and more 
highly educated sensibilities, [are] too delicate [ . . . ] for common service” 
(153). Like the eclectic architects, poets too concerned with the glories of 
past styles miss the opportunity to communicate and connect with modern 
subjects, and to create for their art a style appropriate to the age.6
 In the preface Arnold answers charges of aesthetic refinement by point-
ing out the difference in poetic terms between simplicity and excessive 
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ornamentation. If poets follow the example of Shakespeare, Keats, or even 
Tennyson, then they run the risk of attending too much to “ingenuity of 
expression” and too little to the selection of an action. Following Goethe, 
Arnold asserts that what distinguishes a genuine artist from an amateur is 
the sense of Architectonicè, “that power of execution, which creates, forms, 
and constitutes: not the profoundness of single thoughts, not the richness 
of imagery, not the abundance of illustration” (I:9). The problem is that 
these superficial features are “more easily seized than the spirit of the 
whole,” and young poets frequently write poems “for the sake of single 
lines and passages; not for the sake of producing any total impression” 
(I:9, I:7). Arnold recognizes the danger of the age’s haphazard eclecticism 
in these immature and untalented poets. The problem is not, as Clough 
would have it, an incorrect choice of subject, but the crude appropriation 
of the superficial points of style.
 Although the distinction between design and ornamentation was 
architecturally and poetically significant, Clough had good reason to link 
his friend’s poetic efforts with those of contemporary architects. Nine-
teenth-century architecture was beset by a crisis of invention. The only 
good architecture of the period, William Morris would conclude in 1888, 
had been laboriously eclectic. Architects depended on past styles to give 
meaning to buildings raised for modern purposes, but the meanings thus 
conveyed were often wildly inappropriate. For critics such as Pugin and 
Ruskin, the incongruity between historical styles and their contemporary 
applications drew attention to the nineteenth century’s loss of faith in 
the principles that underlay the great architecture of the past. Similarly, 
Clough viewed Arnold’s eclectic subject matter as a melancholy ramble 
through the ruins of history, as the enervated effort of a scholar: “There 
is something certainly of an over-educated weakness of purpose in West-
ern Europe [ . . . ]. There is a disposition to press too far the finer and 
subtler intellectual and moral susceptibilities [ . . . ]” (163). This tendency 
to criticize high Victorian culture for its “weakness of purpose” must be 
connected to the perception that it was eclectically “over-educated” and 
therefore incapable of satisfying the expressive needs of modern sensibili-
ties. To respond to this modern dilemma, as Arnold does, with a poetics 
based on scholarship and imitation—in other words, with a more rigorous 
form of eclecticism—appeared to his critics to be a kind of artistic suicide. 
As long as art expressed little more than the greatness of the past, then it 
would be relegated, ever more quickly, to the margins of contemporary 
life.
 At an emotional crossroads in the review of “Recent English Poetry,” 
Clough asks himself whether he can reconcile these “totally different, 
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repugnant, and hostile theories of life” (162)—or whether he needs to 
make a choice. He feels the dilemma of being equally “at home” in Smith’s 
“real house” and beneath Arnold’s Ionic portico. Clough recognizes the 
technical superiority of “A.’s” poems, but sees his mission in the review 
as “going forth to battle in the armor of a righteous purpose, [ . . . ] with 
Alexander Smith” (161). As an artist-imitator, Arnold represents “ascetic 
and timid self-culture,” the opposite of Alexander Smith’s “unquestion-
ing, unhesitating confidence” (163). In a revealing moment, Clough admits 
that he has “been inclined to yield to a preference for the picture of simple, 
strong, and certain, rather than of subtle, shifting, and dubious feelings” 
(165)—exactly what so many of Arnold’s poems will not do. The moral 
restlessness of the poet gives no rest to the reader. A poetics of subtlety and 
doubt rarely produces the certainty that confident action requires. In his 
sympathetic reading of both poets, Clough understands the impulses that 
produced each, but he wants to choose the poems that help him to live in 
the present. Implicitly, Clough fears Arnold’s moral eclecticism. As if in 
danger of following Arnold into the abyss, Clough backs away from the 
better poet to grasp the hand of the stronger man.
The Eclectic Compromise in Arnold’s Poetry
The first volume of poetry, The Strayed Reveller, and Other Poems (1849), 
represents, as many critics have noted, Arnold’s effort “to reconcile two 
modes of poetry”: “Romantic introspection and a classical ideal of detached 
lucidity” (Machann 19–20). Canvassing Arnold’s sources, however, it is 
apparent that he was trying to attach meanings to his work much more 
varied than those belonging to Classic and Romantic. There is no doubt 
that the early poetry grew out of his eclectic reading. In addition to those 
sources gleaned from his reading of Cousin, Arnold found inspiration for 
“Mycerinus” in Herodotus, for “The New Sirens” in George Sand’s Lélia 
(1833), for “Written in Butler’s Sermons” in Joseph Butler’s Fifteen Ser-
mons (1726), for “In Utrumque Paratus” in the Enneads of Plotinus and 
in Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria, for “The Forsaken Merman” in the 
Danish folk ballad “Agnes and the Merman,” for “The Strayed Reveller” 
in Book X of the Odyssey, for “The Sick King in Bokhara” in Alexander 
Burnes’s Travels in Bokhara (1834), and for several others in Spinoza, Emer-
son, Cruikshank, Goethe, and Sophocles.7 Such a diverse array of textual 
sources is not unusual in Victorian poetic practice; what is distinctive about 
Arnold’s eclecticism is his effort toward synthesis, to detect in the mul-
titudinous voices of history the consistent articulation of eternal verities. 
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Arnold desires an eclectic unity of expression within the “Time Stream” 
that necessitates stepping outside of it.
 Many of the 1849 poems imagine circumstances under which an indi-
vidual might transcend the limits of time. For example, “Mycerinus,” 
“Fragment of an ‘Antigone,’” and “The Sick King in Bokhara” represent 
actions that free the actor from transient concerns—“A goal which, gain’d, 
may give repose” (“Resignation: To Fausta”), while “Shakespeare,” “The 
Strayed Reveller,” “To My Friends,” and “The World and the Quietist” 
depict ways of seeing that get beyond the “narrow margin” put up by the 
“Mountains of Necessity” (“To a Republican Friend, Continued”). An 
oracle reveals to King Mycerinus that “when six years are measured,” he 
dies, but the young king turns night into day and lives instead for twelve, 
no more the “Slave [ . . . ] of a tyrannous necessity” (11. 18, 42). When she 
“dares / To self-selected good / Prefer obedience to the primal law, / Which 
consecrates the ties of blood” (11. 28–31), Antigone chooses the timeless 
bond of family over the briefer links we forge with strangers. When the 
young king tells his old vizier that he will bury a commoner in his own 
royal tomb, he does so in the full knowledge that fame and glory are fleet-
ing, but that tending another man’s honor after death is within reach.
Even the great honour which I have,
When I am dead, will soon grow still.
So have I neither joy, nor fame.
But what I can do, that I will. (11. 217–20)
Against the vizier’s seeming wisdom—no man can take on the world’s sor-
rows—the king comes closer to Allah in his care for the least of these. 
While proper acting can bring repose, and peace, that “secret of life” (“Res-
ignation”), peculiar seeing makes the poet:
In the day’s life, whose iron round
Hems us all in, he is not bound.
He leaves his kind, o’erleaps their pen,
And flees the common life of men.
 He escapes thence, but we abide.
 Not deep the Poet sees, but wide. (italics in original; “Resignation” 11. 
209–14)
Shakespeare’s breadth of vision depends on his freedom from the Zeit-
geist: he is “Self-schooled, self-scanned, self-honoured, self-secure” (1. 10) 
and “Didst walk on earth unguessed at” (1. 11). Though ordinary mortals 
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“ask and ask,” Shakespeare smiles and is “still / Out-topping knowledge” 
(11. 2–3). “All pains,” “All weakness,” and “all griefs” find their voice 
in Shakespeare. Possessing this comprehensive soul and relieved of the 
necessity of painful doubting, Shakespeare achieves immortality. In “The 
Strayed Reveller” Arnold presents a conflict between two poetic visions, 
that of the bards who are capable of seeing life in its totality, but must suf-
fer with humanity; and that of the youth who watches life from Circe’s 
palace, outside the time stream, intoxicated by “the wild, thronging train, 
/ The bright procession / Of eddying forms, / [that] Sweep through [his] 
soul!” (11. 294–97). The narrator of “To My Friends” battles his “master,” 
Time, with poetic remembrance:
 Time’s current strong
Leaves us true to nothing long.
Yet, if little stays with man,
Ah! retain we all we can
If the clear impression dies,
Ah! the dim remembrance prize
 Ere the parting hour go by,
 Quick, thy tablets, Memory! (11. 57–64)
The poet of “mournful rhymes” in “The World and the Quietist” sees that 
“the world hath set its heart to live” (1. 11); but in its turning of “life’s 
mighty wheel” (1. 13), the world forgets time and death. In a surprising 
turn, Arnold makes remembrance of death the key to immortality. The 
laborer at the wheel hears “adverse voices” (1. 19), and comprehends his 
omnipotence, and knows that he is more than matter. Like the adverse 
voice of the servant to Darius the king, reminding him every evening of 
the power of Greece to defeat him, the poet speaks liberation.8
 Many of Arnold’s readers did not want to hear the message of libera-
tion that he tried to bring them, and too often the moral tendency of his 
poems was unclear. Indeed, Clough’s 1853 review is typical of the recep-
tion of the early poetry: the poet has squandered his talent in building up 
an effete intellectualism. Arnold himself occasionally expressed dissatis-
faction with being the poet of ideas. In May 1853 he confessed to Clough, 
“I feel immensely—more and more clearly—what I want—what I have 
(I believe) lost and choked by my treatment of myself and the studies to 
which I have addicted myself” (SL 86). Kenneth Allott interprets “stud-
ies” here as the philosophical and related studies of the six early reading 
lists, pursuits inspired by his “mentor” Cousin (264). While these studies 
might or might not have harmed Arnold as a poet, Allott stresses that “the 
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motive for them is easily grasped” (264). The intellectual confusion of the 
age required Arnold to master disparate fields of knowledge—science, 
religion, philosophy, and literature—to attempt to synthesize them, and 
thus to find their direction and meaning, if he were to contribute any-
thing. When Charles Kingsley asked, “To what purpose all the self-culture 
through which the author must have passed ere this volume [The Strayed 
Reveller] could be written” (Review 42), Arnold would have liked the 
answer to be more apparent: he wanted to make sense of tradition and the 
Zeitgeist.
 Kingsley’s objection to Arnold’s early poetry formed part of the cho-
rus of reviewers who maintained that poetry should speak to the needs 
of the age—or remain silent: “What does the age want with fragments of 
an Antigone? or with certain ‘New Sirens?’—little certainly with these 
last seeing that the purport of them is undiscoverable (as is, alas! a great 
deal more of the volume)” (43). Kingsley blames the incomprehensibility 
of modern poetry on the poets’ inward turn. They are fiddling, he says, 
while Rome is burning, and should instead be “taking [ . . . ] active part 
in God’s work” (45). In one of his more Carlylean moments, he warns 
Arnold that “If he chooses to trifle with the public by versifying dreamy, 
transcendental excuses for laziness, for the want of an earnest purpose 
and a fixed creed, let him know that the day is at hand when he that will 
not work neither shall he eat” (45). Implicit in Kingsley’s argument is the 
notion that poetry has “work” to do on behalf of the age. A peculiar kind 
of laborer, the poet observes from the margins of active life (and here one 
must think of Ford Madox Brown’s quintessential portrait of the mid-
nineteenth century, Work), yet he participates in that life by representing it. 
If his poems “transcend” this essential reality, then they are not doing their 
proper work of making meaning. Opposing Arnold’s presumed “laziness” 
to the implied demand for real work, Kingsley hints that the poet refuses 
to touch real life for fear of contagion or out of intellectual snobbery. Fur-
thermore, when Kingsley equates “earnest purpose” and “fixed creed,” he 
clearly believes that one cannot have the former without the latter. He per-
ceives that Arnold is searching for meaning over the broadest possible field 
of knowledge, because his creed is not yet fixed; but to put into print the 
evidence of an eclectic process will only confuse his readers. Kingsley sees 
Arnold’s eclecticism as working against the age, rather than in harmony 
with it. In his very earnest novel Alton Locke (1850), Kingsley has Sandy 
Mackaye lecture the young tailor-poet, who is trying to write verses about 
a roving missionary who encounters naked island girls in the South Pacific: 
“What do ye ken anent the Pacific? Which is maist to your business?—the 
bare-backed hizzies that play the harlot o’ the other side o’ the world, or 
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these—these thousands o’ bare-backed hizzies that play the harlot o’ your 
ain side—made out o’ your ain flesh and blude? You a poet! True poetry, 
like true charity, my laddie, begins at hame” (88). Sandy’s object lesson con-
tinues with a visit to a group of impoverished seamstresses, who embody 
the notion of “classic tragedy [ . . . ], man conquered by circumstance” (89). 
After encountering these pathetic and noble souls, Alton is converted to 
the view that “Fact is grander” than fiction and chooses to write of that 
“dark, noisy, thunderous element, that London life” (94). More troubling 
for Kingsley than Arnold’s use of historical material in The Strayed Rev-
eller and Other Poems is the poet’s apparent neglect of the most pressing 
social issues of the time. After all, Kingsley would go on to write historical 
novels, and he approved of Tennyson’s handling of contemporary issues 
within the historical framework of The Princess (1847); it would therefore 
be unreasonable to make him the spokesman for poetic presentism. But 
like many other writers, he felt that the orientation of modern literature 
toward the long ago and far away was often a symptom of its intellectual 
confusion and false principles. A poet who wanted to step outside the time 
stream might be trying to get a clearer picture of his historical moment; or, 
he might simply be trying to escape it.
 Kingsley’s sense that the author of The Strayed Reveller wrote against 
the age, rather than with it or for it, is surely confirmed by many of 
Arnold’s statements about contemporary poetry. In a revealing letter to 
Clough written in November 1848, Arnold expresses his irritation with 
the favorable reception of his friend’s poem The Bothie of Toper-na-Fousich, 
which seems too ready to cater to popular taste: “I have been at Oxford the 
last two days and hearing Sellar and the rest of that clique who know 
neither life nor themselves rave about your poem gave me a strong almost 
bitter feeling with respect to them, the age, the poem, even you. Yes I said 
to myself something tells me I can, if need be, at last dispose with them 
all, even with him: better that, than be sucked for an hour even into the 
Time Stream in which they and he plunge and bellow. I became calm in 
spirit, but uncompromising, almost stern. More English than European, 
I said finally, more American than English: and took up Obermann, and 
refuged myself with him in his forest against your Zeit Geist” (SL 49). 
In a swiftly developed line of association from the Bothie, to the Oxford 
clique, to an English, and finally American, Zeitgeist, Arnold articulates 
two ideas that will be repeated often in his later criticism. First, the senti-
ments of popular taste are transient, so that poetry catering exclusively to 
the fashion of the moment is poetry that will be forgotten; and, second, 
Anglo-American culture suffers from the crippling narrowness of exces-
sive attention to the present and to the individual. Like Arnold, Clough is 
Part II: Eclectic Victorians
0
a classical scholar; but unlike Arnold, Clough allows himself to “be sucked 
[ . . . ] into the Time Stream” when he produces a poem of momentary, 
and not of eternal, interest. As we have seen, in the preface Arnold places 
himself in the curious position of defending an eclectic solution (hewing 
to superior models in writing poetry) in an eclectic age, but this position 
is carefully vetted in his letters to Clough of the late 1840s. Since modern 
writers such as “Keats Tennyson et id genus omne” only confuse writers of 
the “foot soldier” variety, he believes that those who cannot read the best 
examples (the Greeks) “sh[ou]ld read nothing but Milton & parts of Word-
sworth” (SL 50). These writers have less in their works of a transient char-
acter, and more of “those elementary feelings which subsist permanently 
in the race, and which are independent of time” (I:4). He believes that 
he and Clough are living in “damned times” when “everything is against 
one—the height to which knowledge is come, the spread of luxury, our 
physical enervation, the absence of great natures, the unavoidable contact 
with millions of small ones, newspapers, cities, light profligate friends, 
moral desperadoes like Carlyle, our own selves, and the sickening con-
sciousness of our difficulties” (SL 59). While he never argues that modern 
middle-class life is devoid of poetic interest, Arnold does imply here that 
the rise of democratic institutions has hindered the development of great 
natures and that the din of the popular press has diminished the power 
of great voices. How will the best emerge from the crowd? How will the 
work of genius be heard in the cacophony?
 Throughout his poetry of the late 1840s and early 1850s, Arnold imag-
ines characters who stand outside the mainstream, and yet still overlook 
society, finding there the quiet space in which an adverse voice might be 
heard. In Empedocles on Etna, Arnold makes the calmness of spirit that he 
invoked against Clough and the Zeitgeist into an enduring critical posi-
tion—disinterestedness. Like Arnold’s hero, Obermann, Empedocles turns 
against the Zeitgeist, but in choosing exile he does not occlude the needs of 
society; on the contrary, he recognizes that the spirit of the age is for heed-
less progress, but he cannot ignore the suffering that progress brings with 
it. As most readers of Arnold are aware, the dramatic poem Empedocles on 
Etna holds an uneasy position in his poetic oeuvre. Expelled from his col-
lection of Poems in 1853, it represented a crisis, famously characterized as 
the “dialogue of the mind with itself,” which, while true, even in its proper 
historical moment, could in no way “infuse delight” and thereby justify its 
literary existence. Setting aside Arnold’s mea culpa and the overwrought 
poetics that followed upon it, we have in Empedocles a particularly lucid 
expression of the difficulty of preserving the core self apart from the spirit 
Chapter : Matthew Arnold
0
of the age, neither following the crowd nor standing in futile opposition to 
it.
 The frequent exhortation to “know thyself” found here and every-
where in Arnold’s poetry gains a deeper relevance when considered as an 
aspect of his eclecticism. When critics of the eclectic method point to the 
core problem of determining the principles of selection, they are really ask-
ing what makes any particular individual capable of rigorous eclecticism. 
As Arnold’s critical outlook becomes more overtly eclectic, he justifies his 
own capacity for selection in three ways: he gains a panoramic or com-
prehensive vision of human knowledge and affairs by imagining a view-
point outside or above the time stream, he avoids partisan entanglements 
by canvassing the widest possible range of opinions, and he knows his own 
mind, as much as anyone can. But how does one get to know one’s mind 
without some standards external to oneself? Empedocles’ awareness of this 
dilemma is signaled early in the poem when he describes the human soul 
as a wind-tossed mirror, glancing fragments of some larger truth in its 
surface:
 Hither and thither spins
 The wind-borne, mirroring soul,
 A thousand glimpses wins,
 And never sees a whole;
Looks once, and drives elsewhere, and leaves its last 
  employ. (I,2:82–85)
Possessing never more than partial knowledge of the conditions of exis-
tence, most people rely on each other or on tradition, rather than seeking 
for the truth within—but “Man gets no other light, / Search he a thousand 
years” (I,2:144–45). Most people never find their best internal resources, 
Empedocles warns, because they too often mistake will for intelligence. 
He advises his medical friend Pausanias that this is the root cause of man’s 
mental unease: “’Tis that he makes this will / The measure of his rights, / 
And believes Nature outraged if his will’s gainsaid” (I,2:154–56). This ten-
dency to make will the measurement for all good in life must be resisted, 
if we are to become capable of intelligent self-reflection. Once this error is 
uprooted, we come closer to accepting the limits of our existence—“Limits 
we did not set / Condition all we do; / Born into life we are, and life must 
be our mould” (I,2:184–86). Nature is the soil, and our ancestors the roots 
and stem from which we grow. As Empedocles says, we must keep time to 
tunes we did not make.
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 In the Stoic tradition that Arnold draws upon here, conformity to 
nature and the moderation of desire are the first steps to happiness and 
to knowing one’s own mind; but accepting limits does not make a human 
being an amoeba. We can have both immoderate “bliss” and vast knowl-
edge. To back off from either goal makes us less than we could be. In 
particular, Empedocles despises the limits we place on our knowledge of 
nature—calling it a sin to investigate the workings of the universe, giving 
up in despair because certain answers seem out of reach, and concluding 
that they must be the province of the gods alone: “Fools! That in man’s 
brief term / He cannot all things view, / Affords no ground to affirm that 
there are gods who do; / Nor does being weary prove that he has where to 
rest” (I,2:347–51). This admonition against rest when there is work to do 
might seem to contradict the drift of Empedocles’ Stoicism, but it consti-
tutes an important defense of eclecticism. Opponents might contend that 
an eclectic viewpoint is an artificial construct only, depending on an impos-
sibly vast erudition; but Arnold repeatedly offers models of the “internal 
eye” (as Cousin termed it) that make eclecticism seem not only possible, but 
a moral responsibility. Eclecticism is the only method available to human 
beings for dealing with the burden of the past and the vastness of the uni-
verse. Knowledge is gained piecemeal and we must spend our lives piecing 
it together, not “looking once” and turning away.
 Throughout the philosophical chant, Empedocles seems continually to 
iterate negative truths about human existence—we will never see things 
in their wholeness, we will never achieve the fulfillment of all our desires, 
and we will never find answers to all the questions we ask; in short, we 
have to remember that we are not gods, but instead something second best, 
human beings who can imagine a godlike perspective. Kenneth Allott 
notes the resemblance between these lines—
 But still, as we proceed
 The mass swells more and more
 Of volumes yet to read,
 Of secrets to explore.
Our hair grows grey, our eyes are dimmed, our heat is
 tamed; . . . (I,2:332–36)
—and lines found in Arnold’s early poem, “The Second Best.” While Act 
II of Empedocles lays out the philosophical principles that shape the har-
monious and productive life, including those of eclecticism, the few lines 
quoted above hint at the pitfalls awaiting the ardent eclectic—the more 
books one reads, the further the horizon of contentment recedes from 
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view. “The Second Best” thus echoes many of the themes found in early-
nineteenth-century writing about the “sea of knowledge” and the loss 
of intellectual authority that followed the rapid expansion of literacy in 
the period. The speaker is a scholar who, like Arnold, feels obligated to 
pursue an array of studies, even though he recognizes that he is strain-
ing and “overfeeding . . . his wit with reading” (11. 14–15). In the word 
“yet” that introduces these lines, however, the poet qualifies the experi-
ence: “yet, . . . No small profit that man earns” (11. 13, 16). He shapes his 
reading, rather than allowing himself to be consumed by it:
 No small profit that man earns,
Who through all he meets can steer him,
Can reject what cannot clear him,
Cling to what can truly cheer him;
 Who each day more surely learns
That an impulse, from the distance
Of his deepest, best existence,
To the words, ‘Hope, Light, Persistence,’
 Strongly sets and truly burns. (11. 16–24)
Having no alternative but to confront the swelling “mass” of books, the 
scholar sets himself toward the best. Though he might not gain “his deep-
est, best existence,” reading eclectically gives him at least the “second best” 
life. Contact with the best minds gives him the principles that “steer him.” 
He reaps the profits of greater clarity, sharpening his capacity for judging 
and ordering knowledge. He learns to “cling to what can truly cheer him” 
and to discard what only diminishes life.
 The muted hopefulness of “The Second Best” is found everywhere in 
Arnold’s writings, but it is a difficult mood to sustain, particularly when 
he or his characters feel that they are in conflict with the spirit of the age. 
From the heroism of a scholarly Prometheus, one easily descends into the 
excessive introspection and despair of Empedocles. In the dramatic form 
of Empedocles on Etna, Arnold creates not only a dialogue between Pau-
sanias and Empedocles, with a counterpoint in Callicles’ songs, but also a 
dialogue within the mind of the philosopher-hero. While in the first act 
Empedocles counseled self-reliance, in the second act we see that inner 
strength “impaired” by “some secret and unfollowed vein of woe.” Unable 
to live with others or with himself any longer, Empedocles chooses self-
destruction, and termination of the “dialogue of the mind with itself.” Most 
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readers recognize that, for Empedocles, suicide is salvation. But what has 
happened to that second best life of contemplation and scholarly pursuits? 
For Arnold, Empedocles’ suicide was an expression of a diseased self- 
consciousness that could no longer be disinterested. More a disease of lone-
liness than of eclecticism, or scholarly “overfeeding,” Empedocles’ despair 
stems from his sense that the world has turned against him by misunder-
standing him: “Their thoughts, their ways, their wishes, are not thine” 
(II,1. 19). Even as men exult him and look to him for magical cures for all 
their ills, they “rid him of the presence of himself” (II,1. 223), driving him 
into solitude. Like the narrator of “Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse,” 
who characterizes the modern condition so succinctly as being “between 
two worlds,” Empedocles also feels himself “miserably bandied to and fro 
/ like a sea-wave, betwixt the world and thee [nature]” (II,11. 230–31). The 
leap into Etna’s crater is finally an expression of faith, because Empedocles 
fears the continuance of the mind after death, particularly reincarnation, 
where “each succeeding age in which we are born / Will have more peril 
for us than the last” (II,11. 377–78). Successive rebirths would only drive 
Empedocles, a refugee from present times, deeper, and more impossibly, 
into the past. Implicit in his last thoughts before death is the notion that 
the future will continue to be a falling-off from glorious beginnings. The 
echo here of feelings Arnold expressed in numerous other poems and in 
letters to Clough is unmistakable; and though he removed the poem in 
1853 because of its untimely modernity rather than its ancient setting, 
Empedocles on Etna embodies a nostalgia that might be said to have origi-
nated with history itself.
 In the art and literature of the nineteenth century, such nostalgia was 
pervasive, and a few writers felt that the feelings it engendered and the 
eclecticism it encouraged ought to be resisted. Elizabeth Barrett Browning 
acknowledges the force of Arnold’s arguments in the poems and Preface of 
the 1850s by devoting much of the pivotal central section of Aurora Leigh 
(1856) to answering them.
 Ay, but every age
Appears to souls who live in’t (ask Carlyle)
Most unheroic. Ours, for instance, ours:
The thinkers scout it, and the poets abound
Who scorn to touch it with a finger-tip:
A pewter age—mixed metal, silver-washed;
An age of scum, spooned off the richer past,
An age of patches for old gaberdines,
An age of mere transition, meaning nought
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Except that what succeeds must shame it quite
If God please. That’s wrong thinking, to my mind,
And wrong thoughts make poor poems. (Book V:154–65)
Like many of Arnold’s early reviewers, Browning is annoyed by Arnold’s 
apparent reluctance to “touch [the age] with a finger-tip”—for her it is a 
question of whether the poet should remain on the margins or dive into 
the mainstream of life. In order to overcome the confusion of the present 
times, Arnold believes that he must stand apart—only then can he separate 
what has meaning and endures from what is meaningless and transient. 
Browning, however, spends much of the novel-in-verse arguing that artists 
are not always, romantically, social outsiders, but are sometimes those who 
define the character of an age and shape the nation’s future. In the guise of 
her eponymous heroine, Browning also speculates on one of the most com-
monly vetted problems of the period, the perception (real or imagined) of 
the decline of art. She lends modern resonance to images of decline famil-
iar since ancient times that have been continually invoked to describe the 
Victorians’ sense of their own historical position (“A pewter age—mixed 
metal, silver-washed”); she also utilizes more homely and ironically eclec-
tic images to emphasize the poet’s plight: “An age of scum, spooned off 
the richer past, / An age of patches for old gaberdines.” It seemed to many, 
including Arnold, that the age was an unpropitious one for the production 
of great works of art. Eclecticism, which seemed to skim off the riches 
of the past, or to be passing off old clothes as new, would naturally come 
under fire as a symptom of enervation and decadence. Echoing Carlyle 
in On Heroes and Hero-Worship, Browning denies that the present age is 
without its heroes. In her view, “All actual heroes are essential men, / And 
all men possible heroes: every age, / Heroic in proportions, [ . . . ]” (V:151–
53). Letting go of the notion that the nineteenth century is without heroes 
allows the poet to represent the “great actions” (as Arnold would say) and 
the “essential men” of her own time (precisely what Browning attempts in 
Aurora Leigh). In what reads like a direct response to Arnold’s 1853 Pref-
ace, she contends that regarding the age as one “of mere transition, mean-
ing nought / Except that what succeeds might shame it quite” is “wrong 
thinking” that will not necessarily produce great poetry in the future. In 
claiming that a poet’s “sole work is to represent the age” (V:208), Brown-
ing nevertheless looks unflinchingly ahead. The poet’s concern about the 
future should be limited to this question: will the generations to come feel 
the beating heart of the nineteenth century if she does not produce a “living 
art, / Which thus presents and thus records true life” (V:221–22)? Brown-
ing shares with Arnold what E. D. H. Johnson calls a “double awareness” 
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typical of Victorian writing: they agree that poetry needs to speak to the 
needs of the present, even as it “transcend[s] topicality” (ix). While Arnold 
believes that representing the present in its specificity will make a poem 
unreadable in the future, Browning relies on readers of the future to feel 
sympathy, as the Victorians certainly did, with their past, a sympathy that 
will be possible only if they record “true life.”
 As he would later write in a letter to his mother, Arnold believed that 
his poetry would evoke such sympathy, representing as it did “the main 
movement of mind in the nineteenth century.” Eclecticism did not pro-
duce an artificial culture with which it was impossible to have sympathy; 
on the contrary, it could represent a breadth of experience unmatched by 
an exclusive focus on the present moment. Arnold’s poetry ranged over an 
exceptionally diverse historical and geographical landscape, without seek-
ing to exclude Britain or the nineteenth century, which turned up every-
where in his lyrical poems. What he resisted most emphatically, however, 
was the model of evolution that was always opposed to the model of syn-
thesis. Antagonistic to the outlook of eclecticism, the theory of “incarnate 
history” (about which George Eliot wrote in her review “The Natural 
History of German Life”) had a fatalistic appeal uncongenial to Arnold’s 
primary mode of thought. If a people’s historical development was written 
in their genes, so to speak, then they were freed from the responsibility of 
commanding it. A true eclectic such as Arnold could never surrender his 
influence over development, and resisted its often pseudoscientific ratio-
nalization.
 Not surprisingly, Arnold’s ideas about history played a central role 
in the formation of his critical eclecticism. His belief in the possibility of 
freedom from the Zeitgeist runs directly counter to the positivists’ faith 
in the evolution of humankind through necessary stages (indeed, Auguste 
Comte may be one Frenchman from whom Arnold did not wish to learn). 
Arnold does not believe, however, with Clough, Kingsley, Barrett Brown-
ing, or The Spectator, that “‘the poet who would really fix the public atten-
tion must leave the exhausted past, and draw his subjects from matters of 
present import, and therefore both of interest and novelty’” (I:3).9 Under-
scoring his opinion that relevant poetry need not have a “modern” subject, 
Arnold based many of the new 1853 poems on history, myth, and legend: 
“Sohrab and Rustum” derives from the Persian Shah Nameh of Firdousi 
(via Sainte-Beuve’s “Le Livre des Rois, par Firdousi” [1850] and Sir John 
Malcolm’s History of Persia [1815]); the source for “The Church of Brou” is 
Edgar Quinet’s essay “Des Arts de la Renaissance et de l’Église de Brou” 
(1839); “The Neckan” derives, as does its earlier companion piece, “The 
Forsaken Merman,” from Scandinavian folklore; “Philomela,” the story 
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of a woman who was raped and mutilated by her sister’s husband, the 
King of Thrace, has its origin in Greek mythology; and “Balder Dead” 
drew upon a contemporary translation of the Prose Edda of Snorri Snurlson 
and, like “Sohrab and Rustum,” was an imitation of classical epic having 
a mythological source. Even an apparently modern poem, “The Scholar-
Gypsy,” derives from Glanvill’s seventeenth-century philosophical treatise 
and stays close to it in spirit. As in the Glanvill version, Arnold writes of 
a man who searches for a solution to living among society’s outcasts, and 
recasts the dominant theme of so many of his earlier poems:
O born in days when wits were fresh and clear,
   And life ran gaily as the sparkling Thames;
         Before this strange disease of modern life,
   With its sick hurry, its divided aims,
         Its heads o’ertaxed, its palsied hearts, was rife— (201–5)
For Arnold, of course, “modern life” refers to the nineteenth century, and 
its “strange disease,” an intellectual confusion for which the cure is exile. 
But already in The Vanity of Dogmatizing, Glanvill had recognized that 
“The Disease of our Intellectuals is too great, not to be its own Diagno-
stick: [ . . . ]. The weakness of humane understanding, all will confess: 
yet the confidence of most in their own reasonings, practically disowns it: 
And ’tis easier to perswade them it [is] from other lapses then [sic] their 
own; so that while all complain of our Ignorance and Error, every one 
exempts himself” (62–63).10 By Arnold’s time this disease affected a much 
greater portion of society—virtually anyone who could read. Ruth apRob-
erts has argued that “Glanville’s [sic] whole book was important in shap-
ing Arnold’s thought, and the Scholar-Gipsy himself becomes a symbol 
for the [ . . . ] anti-dogmatic philosophy of the seeker” (145). As Arnold 
surely learned from Cousin, in every incarnation of eclectic philosophy the 
eclectic begins as a seeker, with a method; and Arnold manages to practice 
a form of eclecticism that never verges into system, by keeping himself 
detached from the time stream, like the scholar-gypsy.
 Confused by Arnold’s declaration in favor of the Greek and Roman 
models, many contemporary reviewers of the 1853 volume ignored its sty-
listic range and varied subject matter, and the degree to which Arnold 
vividly bodied forth the complex, hybrid nineteenth century. However, 
the difficulty with becoming the eclectic scholar-gypsy was that Arnold 
could not really overcome, in this way, “the dialogue of the mind with 
itself.” Although Arnold was concerned with the suffering that “finds 
no vent in action,” his famous characterization of modern suffering finds 
Part II: Eclectic Victorians
10
its counterpart in Cousin’s “internal eye,” the position from which he 
would judge what was true and what was false in the history of philo-
sophical, educational, and political systems. While G. H. Lewes and others 
judged Cousin’s imagined detachment and objectivity as absurd, Cousin 
needed this objectivity to practice the history of philosophy as an eclectic, 
and to find truth wherever it existed. But in relying solely on the pow-
ers of his mind to juxtapose systems and discern the truth within each, 
Cousin ran the risk of being merely provincial. The erudition needed to 
put into practice either Cousin’s eclecticism or Arnold’s objective poetics 
was practically impossible for any one person. Cousin’s nonpsychological 
formulation for historical study sounds rather more plausible and prob-
ably influenced Arnold in the 1840s: “eclecticism must be the basis of the 
new history of philosophy because an infallible law requires that every 
philosophy, which in its turn becomes predominant, after having finished 
its theoretical developement [sic], must look back towards former ages, 
must interrogate them in its own spirit, and terminate in an history of 
philosophy conformable to itself” (Introduction to the History of Philosophy 
428). The best historicist writing of the nineteenth century always built a 
bridge from past subject to present need. Arnold’s efforts at translation 
in the 1849, 1852, and 1853 volumes (including Empedocles on Etna—the 
poem that Arnold later considered too modern, in the worst sense) were 
always directed toward interrogating the past in the spirit of the present, 
if not from the present of Kingsley, Clough, or Browning, then from his 
own unified self. Eventually, however, even this would not be enough for 
the poet who was increasingly becoming a critic, a role that afforded a 
much more secure position from which to observe the world and raise his 
“adverse voice.” In a letter to his sister Jane dated 6 September 1858, he 
confesses that to “submit voluntarily to the exhaustion of the best poeti-
cal productions” would entail giving up too much. It is unnatural, he 
writes, in the present unpoetical age, to attempt poetry at all; he cannot 
do it “without an overwhelming and in some degree morbid effort” (SL 
111). Arnold finds the solution to living in the present age—and writing 
for it—somewhere between being a fanatic and being “chalf blown by the 
wind” (SL 59); he will be neither dogmatic nor excessively latitudinarian, 
but will instead be eclectic in relation to the Zeitgeist. The middle class 
will find itself capable of living only when it recognizes that it has the 
freedom to shape its destiny, and is willing to listen to the “adverse voice” 
of Arnold.
X
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The critical exclusiveness of Arnold’s poetry—its scholarly quality, its 
expression of faith in the past, its detachment from the time stream—was 
meant to preserve his contemporaries from making bad choices by being 
aware of the choices they had to make. In that context eclecticism gave 
Arnold a way of coping with history and the problem of producing origi-
nal art that would, at least obliquely, reflect the age. As a volitional eclectic, 
Arnold favored synthesis over development, seeking to live in synchronic 
rather than diachronic time—outside the time stream. In translating cul-
tural material, Arnold created the potential for change. In promoting the 
ideal of Goethe, he eschewed nationalism and organic historicism: “Let us 
conceive of the whole group of civilised nations as being, for intellectual 
and spiritual purposes, one great confederation, bound to a joint action and 
working towards a common result; a confederation whose members have 
a due knowledge both of the past, out of which they all proceed, and of one 
another” (IX:38). When writing poetry in the styles of the past became too 
strenuous, Arnold decided to write for the future. In abandoning the writ-
ing of poetry for the writing of highly polemical criticism, he confirmed 
his membership in what we might term “the prophetic school” of liter-
ary criticism, where his controversial style would have a more profound 
and lasting effect. With the publication in 1865 of the Essays in Criticism, 
Arnold puts the eclectic principles worked out in his poetry into practice 
in his prose.
 In his preface to the collection, Arnold begins by declaring his alle-
giance with his audience, “The English middle class, of which I am myself 
a feeble unit” (III:288), so that he might argue more effectively against 
their present way of doing things. He is especially worried that the Eng-
lish middle class seem content with the philosophy of Benthamism and do 
not perceive the slightest reason to question its ascendancy. Arnold implies 
that his work will do just the opposite; namely, he will cause his readers to 
question every received opinion and to rest in none of them: “To try and 
approach truth on one side after another, not to strive or cry, nor to persist 
in pressing forward, on any one side, with violence and self-will—it is only 
thus, it seems to me, that mortals may hope to gain any vision of the mys-
terious Goddess, whom we shall never see except in outline, but only thus 
even in outline. He who will do nothing but fight impetuously towards 
her on his own, one, favourite, particular line, is inevitably destined to run 
his head into the folds of the black robe in which she is wrapped” (III:286). 
Arnold brings eclecticism to do battle with middle-class complacency. As 
an eclectic, he has learned to approach the truth from many sides, and in 
his ideal of detachment, not to argue violently for any particular side. In his 
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style of argument Arnold will often seem to be ducking and weaving like 
a boxer—he wants to pummel the reader, but he throws his punches only 
to the place where his reader most resists. In ventriloquizing the philoso-
phy of Empedocles, Arnold asserts that we must accept the fragmentary 
vision of eternal things, as if our souls were mirrors blown by the wind. To 
fight for one favorite view of the truth inevitably misses a hundred others 
equally persuasive at different moments. For Arnold the “epoch of trans-
formation” is not finished, and never will be finished, because we mortals 
never grasp more than a limited or momentary glimpse of what is true. 
Arnold thus sets out the need for eclecticism as a critical method, and will 
put this method into practice in his own work. In three of these essays, 
“The Function of Criticism at the Present Time,” “The Literary Influence 
of Academies,” and “Heinrich Heine,” Arnold argues that criticism must 
have a key role in the present if literature is to have any future at all.
Arnold as Comparatist
If Arnold had only used the term “eclecticism,” his brilliant essay on 
“The Function of Criticism at the Present Time” might have come down 
to us as the manifesto of eclectic criticism. In it he uses for the first time 
the phrase that would forever be associated with Arnold—“the best that 
is known and thought in the world” (III:283)—a clear expression of his 
eclecticism. The starting point of Arnold’s argument (a reminder of cer-
tain points from his controversial Homer lectures) probably did not endear 
him to his English readers: “almost the last thing for which one would 
come to English literature is just that very thing which now Europe most 
desires,—criticism” (III:258). The “power and value” of English litera-
ture thus “impaired,” Arnold makes a case for the development of critical 
principles in the most untheoretical of nations. Unlike the Germans and 
the French, whose critical efforts have all been directed toward seeing the 
“object as in itself it really is,” the English let their fondness for custom 
and a proud literary tradition obscure their judgment. Certainly, Arnold 
concedes, the critical faculty “is of lower rank than the creative”; but if we 
look unflinchingly at history it will be plain to see that “the production 
of great works of literature or art [ . . . ] is not at all epochs and under all 
conditions possible” (III:260). Arnold stays close to the tradition of eclec-
tic thought when he argues that criticism constitutes a transitive effort, 
namely getting from one creative period to the next. However, he goes 
a step further toward acknowledging the permanent need for eclecticism 
when he suggests, “The grand work of literary genius is a work of synthesis 
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and exposition, not of analysis and discovery; its gift lies in the faculty of 
being happily inspired by a certain intellectual and spiritual atmosphere, 
by a certain order of ideas, when it finds itself in them; of dealing divinely 
with these ideas, presenting them in the most effective and attractive com-
binations,—making beautiful works with them, in short” (III:261). The 
artist, apparently, is always doing something “eclectic” with the materials 
of the age; he or she does not discover new ideas—Arnold believes that is 
the work of the philosopher—but only achieves new combinations. Since 
the English fail to see the object as in itself it really is, their artists do not 
have the materials necessary to produce effective combinations of ideas—
in other words, great art. Criticism, however, has more control over the 
materials it synthesizes; it makes them usable by seeing “in all branches of 
knowledge, theology, philosophy, history, art, science” the object as in itself 
it really is. This tends at last, Arnold believes, “to make an intellectual 
situation of which the creative power can avail itself. It tends to establish 
an order of ideas, if not absolutely true, yet true by comparison with that 
which it displaces; to make the best ideas prevail” (III:261).
 Arnold’s faith in the power of criticism to be creative, to create epochs 
in which the creative spirit is in ascendance, derives from his historical 
outlook. Some critics argue that Arnold accepts a cyclical model of history 
derived from Giambattista Vico’s The New Science (1744), while others 
claim that Carlyle and the German Romantic philosophers were stron-
ger influences on the formation of Arnold’s historicism.11 As an eclectic 
who wanted to approach the truth from as many sides as possible, Arnold 
allowed himself to be influenced by a variety of sources; but as in so many 
arenas of his intellectual life, the profound and lasting influence came 
from France. Arnold and the French historian Ernest Renan (1823–92) 
were near contemporaries, but Renan’s influence on Arnold is easily 
traced to 112 entries in the Note-Books, references to Renan in twelve 
different essays or books, and the essay on Renan in Essays in Criticism, 
Third Series (Bachem 229).12 Like Arnold, Renan loses his faith as a young 
man and searches for “une philosophie vitale et compréhensive” that will 
let him “harmonize within himself the divergent skills and insights of 
scholar, critic, philosopher, and poet” and will let him “‘grasp the whole 
from every point of view’” (qtd. in Chadbourne 40). Richard Chadbourne 
concedes that to Victor Cousin, “Renan probably owes most of his termi-
nology and ideas concerning synthesis” (41). From Cousin he borrows the 
notion of the three ages of humanity (which Cousin had distilled from 
various Enlightenment and Romantic sources): in the first stage of his-
tory, the “syncretic,” we exist in an instinctive and poetic union with the 
world outside ourselves; in the second age, the “analytical,” we separate 
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ourselves from nature; and in the third age, the “synthetic,” we achieve 
“true wisdom” when we integrate reason with religion (Chadbourne 42). 
If we were following Vico’s schema, then this third stage would actu-
ally represent the beginning of a decadence and collapse, wherein society 
returns to its origins to be reborn. For Renan the third age is not decadent, 
but eclectic; that is, it incorporates what was best in each of the other ages. 
Renan, influenced by Cousin, sees eclecticism as a historical inevitabil-
ity, although it defies the model of organic development that he found 
so appealing in other respects. Cousin had written in the Introduction à 
l’histoire de la philosophie of the need to accept changes that had come since 
the Revolution: “the irresistible march of time will by degrees unite the 
minds and hearts of all in the intelligence and in the love of the constitu-
tion, which contains at once the throne and the country, monarchy and 
democracy, order and liberty, aristocracy and equality, all the elements of 
history, of thought, and of things” (439). With everything around it being 
so “mixed, complex, and mingled, is it possible that philosophy can avoid 
being eclectic” (440)? In his Studies of Religious History, Renan calls eclec-
ticism the “obligatory method of our age,” suited to the present intellec-
tual temperament of France and its desire for compromise. Although he 
is wary of traveling the road from eclecticism to relativism and nihilism, 
he believes that “it is impossible for an enlightened man to shut himself up 
in one [school] exclusively” (35). The points of contact between Arnold’s 
thought and Renan’s are clear, as is the significance of the early influence 
of Cousin. Both men were disposed to be eclectic and both believed that 
their eclectic criticism would shape the age to come.
 Flavia Alaya has written that Arnold and Renan “both had been led, 
by way of their explorations of the roots of modern institutions, to the axi-
omatic truth that societies are not so much altered by the ideas of single 
men as by the impress of such ideas upon mass opinion” (555). Both would 
have to become “popularizers” if they were to prepare for the “direction of 
social transformation [ . . . ] in advance” (555). In “The Function of Criti-
cism at the Present Time,” we see Arnold breathing the fire of ideas into 
the “epoch of expansion [that] seems to be opening” (Complete Prose Works 
III:269). This fire is fueled by criticism. In no other way can the epoch 
of concentration be exploded. The worship of tradition, the blind obser-
vance of customary forms, and the resistance to new ideas hold society 
in this concentrated phase. In opposing these alternating epochs Arnold 
accepts, as Renan did, an eclectic philosophy of history. By way of exam-
ple, Arnold refers frequently to the Renaissance as “a great hybrid move-
ment,” which was a fusion of the Hebraic and the Hellenic, of the Middle 
Ages and antiquity (Culler 143). Synthesis usually occurs after a period in 
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which there has been intense competition between ideas, and finds a way 
to bring the opposing sides into harmony. The expansion that Arnold has 
in mind for the nineteenth century is similar to that of the Renaissance, in 
that criticism will carry forward the best ideas and create the foundations 
on which the new age will be built. Criticism depends on the “free play of 
the mind,” obeying an instinct to know the best that has been thought and 
known in the world. Its only rule, Arnold proclaims, is its disinterested-
ness. Any prejudice, any “absorption” into politics would, like the casting 
of a vast net, restrict the free play of ideas. Arnold admits that England has 
its critics, but they are too involved in practice, are “too polemical and con-
troversial,” to lead the masses toward perfection. Although Arnold might 
have difficulty avoiding controversy himself, he has no trouble following 
the last of his dictates: since “much of the best that has been thought and 
known in the world cannot be of English growth,” the English critic “must 
dwell much on foreign thought” (III:282–83)—and this is just what most 
English critics will not do. Criticism, he concludes, must regard Europe 
as being “one great confederation, bound to a joint action and working to 
a common result” (III:284). If the intellectual boundaries of England are 
expanded, creative activity will again become possible. However, expansion 
is not the only way to serve the future of literature; Arnold also imagines 
that centralization, in the form of an academy, can produce the criticism 
that the age so desperately needs.
 Throughout this history of the idea of eclecticism, I have exhibited the 
resistance to academies and academicians as one symptom of the general 
resistance to eclecticism. Taking up this important question of the value 
of institutions in regulating taste and establishing standards for the arts, 
Arnold remains true to his eclectic principles. While “The Function of 
Criticism at the Present Time” argues for the vital role of the critic in 
preparing the way for future literature, “The Literary Influence of Acad-
emies” asserts the need for an institution that will guide their activities. In 
this essay Arnold again looks to the example of France: he praises the work 
of the French Academy and decries the lack of any comparable institution 
in England. Taking his cue from Renan, Arnold contends that without a 
literary academy in England, “inferior” literature will eventually gain the 
upper hand. In chapter 3 we saw how anxiously writers such as Coleridge, 
Southey, and Mill watched the rise of the popular press and worried that 
the number of voices competing to be heard would overwhelm those of 
real value. For them this development represented the advent of a variety 
of eclecticism, random and indiscriminate in nature. Thomas Love Pea-
cock realized that there were two types of eclecticism, the first the acci-
dent of a late and democratic period in history, and the second the result 
Part II: Eclectic Victorians
1
of a disciplined process of selection and synthesis. For Arnold academies 
belong in this second category; at the same time, they are useful in over-
coming the naïve eclecticism of the first category. This is because the acad-
emy has the capacity for “creating a form of intellectual culture which shall 
impose itself on all around” (Renan qtd. in Arnold III:235). However, it is 
this very imposition to which Englishmen most object. Arnold devotes 
much of the essay to denouncing the English complacency that hinders 
the establishment of an academy, which would regulate English taste and 
prevent Englishmen from always “going their own way.” It might at first 
seem paradoxical that Arnold opposes “going one’s own way” to “openness 
of mind,” a quality of which the English are in too short a supply. Going 
one’s own way or “doing as one likes” usually means following after the 
crowd or traveling in the ruts of custom and convenience. The English do 
not go their own way as individuals, approaching the truth from all sides at 
once; rather, they go their own way collectively, as a nation, not bothering 
to ask whether what their grandparents or neighbors believed to be true 
continues to be so. The French, by contrast, have the “Openness of mind 
and flexibility of intelligence [that] were the signal characteristics of the 
Athenian people in ancient times” (III:237). The good qualities of the Eng-
lish people—energy and honesty—seem to resist the fixed standards and 
centralized authorities of academies: “By this [the English nation] certainly 
escapes certain real inconveniences and dangers, and it can, at the same 
time, as we have seen, reach undeniably splendid heights in poetry and sci-
ence. On the other hand, some of these requisites of intellectual work are 
specially the affair of quickness of mind and flexibility of intelligence. The 
form, the method of evolution, the precision, the proportions, the relation 
of the parts to the whole, in an intellectual work, depend mainly upon 
them” (III:238). Arnold is getting at the same prickly problem of the age 
that he confronted in “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time”: the 
English might be superior in every way that matters in creative endeavors 
such as poetry and science, but they are inferior when it comes to prose, 
and critical prose is what is most needed at the moment. To write good 
prose one must have a flexible intelligence that sees how the parts relate to 
the whole, and sees the object as in itself it really is. Fortunately, Arnold 
believes, “quickness of mind and flexibility of intelligence” can be learned, 
unlike the “free activity of genius” (III:238). The academy “consecrates 
and maintains” these qualities, engendering genius in the long term, and 
thus advancing the cause of the “human spirit.”
 Without intelligence, English literature is susceptible to “hap-hazard, 
crudeness, provincialism, eccentricity, violence, blundering” and will there-
fore have less influence over the public and be a less effective agent for 
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change (III:241). For Arnold, the chief fault here is English provincialism. 
Lacking the “center and rallying point” that an academy would provide, 
English letters suffers from provincial fragmentation, so that its divided 
efforts lead to “ignorance and charlatanism” rather than to progress 
(III:242). Arnold means that English intellectuals, without the checks of 
their contemporaries upon them, are subject to “vagaries” and “intellectual 
eccentricity of all kinds” (III:243). We might take George Eliot’s Casaubon 
as the very type of the English intellectual who, isolated from his peers, 
does not realize that his “Key to all Mythologies” duplicates the decades-
old work of German philologists. His life’s work is meaningless, except 
as a private exercise, because he has taken no account of developments in 
the field, particularly abroad; and he has had no body of peers to referee 
his scholarship. Casaubon’s case is an extreme one, as Eliot intended, but 
his faults are exactly those that Arnold ascribes to English criticism: his 
work is too provincial and too eccentric, relying too much on individual 
genius and ignoring the larger context within which one must always 
work.13 What will cure the English of their provinciality?—only its oppo-
site, “urbanity,” which can be achieved via the “intellectual metropolis” of 
an academy: “for it brings us on to the platform where alone the best and 
highest intellectual work can be said fairly to begin. Work done after men 
have reached this platform is classical; and that is the only work which, in 
the long run, can stand. All the scoriae in the work of men of great genius 
who have not lived on this platform are due to their not having lived on it. 
Genius raises them to it by moments, and the portions of their work that 
are immortal are done at these moments; but more of it would have been 
immortal if they had not reached this platform at moments only, if they 
had had the culture which makes men live there” (III:245). To “get rid of 
provinciality” the English need a broader vision of culture. Arnold imag-
ines that they will attain this wider view by ascending a kind of historical 
plateau, a “certain stage of culture” (III:245). When they are upon the plat-
form, they are “classical,” “immortal,” and urbane. When they fall back 
into history, into the time stream, they are again prejudiced, transitory, and 
provincial. Arnold makes a very similar argument in “On the Modern Ele-
ment in Literature,” his inaugural lecture as Professor of Poetry at Oxford, 
when he claims that ancient Greek literature is, in fact, modern because 
it “adequately comprehended, [and] adequately represented” its own age 
(I:21). Having before them the spectacle of a “copious and complex pre-
sent” and behind them the spectacle of a “copious and complex past,” the 
English must eclectically “compare the works of other ages with those of 
our own age and country” and preserve those literatures that “solved for 
their ages the problem which occupies ours” (I:21). Having again reached 
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a “highly developed, culminating epoch,” Arnold believes that it is again 
necessary to ascend the platform and to try to comprehend the whole.
 Arnold’s opponents often found his reverence for foreign writers and 
institutions excessive and even disloyal. In calling on “foreign witnesses” 
to judge English culture, Arnold follows the lead of Heinrich Heine, who 
exemplifies the urbane spirit, the “tone of the city,” that will ultimately 
deliver the English from their provinciality, and their Philistinism. To this 
end, the cosmopolitan Heine was, in his own words, “a brave soldier in 
the Liberation War of humanity” (III:107). He is a “Liberator” because he 
is uniquely capable of feeling the force of modern ideas: “Modern times 
find themselves with an immense system of institutions, established facts, 
accredited dogmas, customs, rules, which have come to them from times 
not modern. In this system their life has to be carried forward; yet they 
have a sense that this system is not of their own creation, that it by no means 
corresponds exactly with the wants of their actual life, that, for them, it is 
customary, not rational. The awakening of this sense is the awakening of 
the modern spirit” (III:109). If Goethe began the work of dissolving “the 
old European system of dominant ideas and facts,” then Heine continues it. 
Unlike his German Romantic contemporaries, “[Heine] is not conquered 
by the Middle Age”; instead, he wages his war against the Philistines from 
the “intellectual metropolis” of modernity, Paris. Heine believes that “the 
French, as a people, have shown more accessibility to ideas than any other 
people,” and he despises their opposite, “the genuine British narrowness” 
(III:112). While the French perceive a lack of correspondence between 
old institutions and present needs, the English want nothing more than 
to patch up the old systems, and to hang on to the old ideas as long as pos-
sible. Instead of referring to “general principles,” the English proceed “by 
the rule of thumb” and have become “of all people the most inaccessible 
to ideas and the most impatient of them” (III:113). In escaping from the 
narrowness of his own country, Heine did not, however, become merely a 
Francophile; rather, in locating himself between two cultures, the German 
and the French, “he found something new” (III:120). No doubt Arnold 
admired Heine for his embracing of modern ideas, but he emphasizes that 
Heine was not “an acrid dissolvent” of the old. Heine belongs to “the main 
current of the literature of modern epochs” because he applied “modern 
ideas to life” (III:122), not because he abandoned the past. His great con-
tribution was in using French ideas to air out German attics. His country 
already had a wealth of ideas but needed a rational intelligence to order 
them and make them serve the present. Heine accepted the in-between-
ness of modern life and exploited it to produce original art. Like Heine, 
Arnold wants his people to have a wider view of the present, in all its 
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complex relations, and the Essays in Criticism as a whole attempt to build 
the “intellectual metropolis” out of the best ideas that have been thought 
and known in all the world. He also wants to give the English a new lan-
guage to speak. In modern times there is no longer the division between 
the language of scholarship and the language of the people; there is only 
the vernacular. Like Heine, Arnold wants to make the vernacular cosmo-
politan. Arnold’s “intellectual metropolis” requires a language as diverse 
as history itself.
 While the Essays on Criticism provided his English readers with exam-
ples of the greatness of European literature and culture, his next critical 
work, On the Study of Celtic Literature, brought home the implications of 
his critical method. Following the lead of Renan, who had published a 
study of the poetry of the Celtic races about ten years earlier, Arnold rec-
ommends the study of Celtic literature as a way to correct some of the 
faults of the English character. Probably nothing would have been more 
galling to his readers than this particular piece of advice: the English ought 
to look to the Irish and the Welsh for culture. (Critics today not directly 
interested in Celtic language and literature have tended to shy away from 
Arnold’s 1867 work as altogether embarrassing, because underlying his 
discussion of the literature are disconcerting assumptions about race, lan-
guage, and national identity.) In 1865 he explained to his mother how 
Celtic studies would fit into his overall critical enterprise (Machann 66): 
“I hate all over-preponderance of single elements, and all my efforts are 
directed to enlarge and complete us by bringing in as much as possible 
of Greek, Latin, Celtic cultures; more and more I see hopes of fruit by 
steadily working in this direction” (SL 168). The “fruit” would seem to be 
those fresh combinations of the materials of the age that produce great art. 
Imitating Renan, Arnold begins his study of Celtic literature with a visit 
to Celtic territory, to Wales. He even attends a festival of Welsh literature 
and language, which he judges a dull affair; but he is nonetheless inspired 
to witness the enthusiasm of common people there for poetry and history, 
something entirely lacking in the dull Anglo-Saxon.
 At first glance Arnold’s efforts seem entirely noble. He only wants 
his contemporaries to acknowledge and to make use of the richness of 
a native tradition that has been ignored for centuries. Emphasizing that 
English culture contains a mixture of Celtic, Norman, and Teutonic ele-
ments, Arnold wants to refute the popular notion that “it is vain to seek 
after Norman or Celtic elements in any modern Englishman” (Complete 
Prose Works III:336) because these populations were entirely absorbed. 
Why does Arnold want to revive these old tribal and national differences? 
One recent biographer has noted that he seems to be describing aspects of 
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himself. Certainly, he is not unpatriotic in the assertion of mixture over 
purity, because he believes (with Renan) that mixed nationalities are stron-
ger and, in much of his work, he seems to advocate a kind of literary hus-
bandry. If he cultivates the strengths of each racial element, then he will 
“complete” the English character, bringing it to its highest perfection. In 
order for this eclectic project to go forward, he also has to defeat those 
philologists who want to dismiss the imaginative literature of the Celts as 
“evidence of the existence of a common stock of ideas, variously devel-
oped according to the formative pressure of external circumstances. The 
materials of these tales are not peculiar to the Welsh” (III:325). Arnold, by 
contrast, wants to argue for a unique tradition linked to racial and national 
identity. This is a key moment in the history of the idea of multicultural-
ism: do we say that people should read something because it is universally 
and timelessly important, or do we say that people should read something 
“foreign” because it will reveal something of the uniqueness of another 
race or group of people? Arnold comes down at first on the side of differ-
ence and variety. He contends that the discovery of commonalty is “one of 
the most interesting discoveries of modern science; but modern science is 
equally interested in knowing how the genius of each people has differ-
entiated, so to speak, this common property of theirs; in tracking out, in 
each case, that special ‘variety of development,’ which [ . . . ] ‘the formative 
pressure of external circumstances’ has occasioned; and not the formative 
pressure from without only, but also the formative pressure from within. It 
is this which he who deals with the Welsh remains in a philosophic spirit 
wants to know” (III:325). Arnold does not seem to want true multicul-
turalism, the coexistence of many cultures within one, because he is too 
insistent on the need for the Welsh to give up their language, that which 
most constitutes their separateness: “The fusion of all the inhabitants of 
these islands into one homogeneous, English-speaking whole, the break-
ing down of barriers between us, the swallowing up of separate provin-
cial nationalities, is a consummation to which the natural course of things 
irresistibly tends; it is a necessity of what is called modern civilisation, and 
modern civilisation is a real, legitimate force; the change must come, and 
its accomplishment is a mere affair of time” (III:296–97). For Arnold, his-
tory tends to bring about homogeneity, but also strength and completeness, 
if managed properly. Instead of multiculturalism, this is eclecticism mov-
ing toward synthesis, federation, and the spirit of a nation in Renan’s terms 
(and a nation always demands sacrifice, forgetting): “In the first place, 
Europe tends constantly to become more and more one community, and 
we tend to become Europeans instead of merely Englishmen, Frenchmen, 
Germans, Italians; so whatever aptitude or felicity one people imparts into 
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spiritual work, gets imitated by the others, and thus tends to become the 
common property of all. Therefore anything so beautiful and attractive as 
the natural magic I am speaking of, is sure, now-a-days, if it appears in 
the productions of the Celts, or of the English, or of the French, to appear 
in the productions of the Italians; but there will be a stamp of perfectness 
and inimitableness about it in the literatures where it is native, which it 
will not have in the literatures where it is not native” (Arnold III:376). 
Blending races will always mean some loss, because the perfectness of a 
blended race’s original constitution and mode of expression will be gone. 
Perhaps unconsciously, Arnold’s readers feared hybridity, feared his eclec-
tic method, because it would lead ultimately to the loss of singularity, of 
English national identity. Though keenly aware of the values of difference 
and variety, Arnold found that comparison, union, fusion, and mixture 
would be of more benefit to the future of literature. His own work, so 
indebted to diverse European sources, might have lost something of the 
power of the original, but it brought new color and new strength to Eng-
lish literature.
X
From Heine, Arnold derived one of his most fruitful oppositions, that 
of the two Renaissances of the sixteenth century: the Hellenic and the 
Hebrew. Within the German Romantic poet, these two forces coexisted, 
but Arnold sensed they were out of balance, the Greek side being, perhaps, 
too dominant. In “Pagan and Medieval Religious Sentiment,” another of 
the Essays of 1865, Arnold acknowledges that Heine could keep himself 
alive by “colossal irony” and “sinister mockery,” but the moral dimension 
required by the millions is absent (III:229). Arnold’s most famous work 
of social criticism, Culture and Anarchy, is often read as an argument for 
privileging the classical, high culture to which many of his middle-class 
contemporaries lacked access or for making poetry into a new religion. 
While there is certainly a pervasive sense of anxiety about “low” cultures 
in Arnold’s 1869 work, he is in fact charting the course for a middle way 
appropriate to a democratic, middle-class-dominated society. Above all, it 
is a call for balance and moderation, for the perfection of a “many-sided 
development” (V:239). Arnold’s strategy for guaranteeing the future of lit-
erature rested mainly on preservation of and regular contact with the great 
minds of the past. This mandate was directed not only, nor even princi-
pally, toward future academicians, but toward the general educated reader 
on whose shoulders would fall the burden of selection. Part of dealing with 
the condition of being “between two worlds” is finding what they have 
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in common and creating a meaningful synthesis. In both the poetry and 
the criticism, Arnold developed a trans-historical styles discourse, aimed 
at the discovery of a new style appropriate to the age. By listening to the 
adverse voices of history, Arnold found a way to live in adversity and with 
diversity. By approaching the truth from all sides at once, Arnold found, at 
least, his own intellectual deliverance.
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t is appropriate to conclude the history of the age of eclecti-
cism with a writer for whom eclecticism became the necessary 
foundation of all his literary and critical efforts: “In this late day 
certainly, no critical process can be conducted reasonably without eclecti-
cism” (Appreciations 16). Walter Pater seems to relish living late in history. 
He makes no effort to dissociate eclecticism from a perception of decline 
or belatedness. His “critical process” is one of “winnowing” and “search-
ing,” and of becoming “conscious of the words he would select in a system-
atic reading of a dictionary, and still more of the words he would reject” 
(15). The elements of language “change along with the changing thoughts 
of living people”; the resources of literature increase rather than dimin-
ish; the accumulation of knowledge—of precursors—over time enriches 
rather than impoverishes. Logically, then, Pater feels none of that pessi-
mism about the future of poetry that many Romantic and post-Romantic 
writers did. In his criticism Pater is always seeking beauty of mixed par-
entage, what I would term, thinking of Tennyson, the beauty of the med-
ley. In all his work, but most deliberately in his novel Marius the Epicurean 
(1885), Pater carries on the work that Tennyson began in The Princess, that 
is, the conscious effort to formulate a poetics of eclecticism, and to write 
the eclectic self.
C h a P t e r  7
Walter Pater and Thomas Hardy
“Triumph in Mutability”
I
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 A familiar marker of eclecticism is its preference for mixtures, combi-
nations, and medleys over all exclusive doctrines and devotions. In an 1868 
review of the poetry of William Morris, Pater begins to develop an aesthetic 
that depends on the fulfillment of this eclectic principle. His admiration 
for Morris’s poetry stems from its perfect representation not of any par-
ticular moment in history, but of “an artificial or ‘earthly paradise’ [ . . . ] a 
finer ideal, extracted from what in relation to any actual world is already 
an ideal” (“Poems by William Morris” 144). In Pater’s view Morris thus 
exceeds the limitations of the nineteenth-century historical revivals: “This 
poetry is neither a mere reproduction of Greek or mediaeval life or poetry, 
nor a disguised reflex of modern sentiment” (144). Morris’s handling of 
historical material never becomes antiquarianism, which would constitute 
“a waste of the poet’s power” (146), nor does it become allegory or roman à 
clef. Rather Morris throws into relief the Greek or medieval life in a way 
that illuminates our relation to it or even our desire for it; he gives mean-
ing to the past by making the reader feel the vitality of the past within the 
present: “The composite experience of all the ages is part of each one of us; 
to deduct from that experience, to obliterate any part of it, to come face to 
face with the people of a past age, as if the middle age, the Renaissance, the 
eighteenth century had not been, is as impossible as to become a little child, 
or enter again into the womb and be born. But though it is not possible to 
repress a single phase of that humanity, which, because we live and move 
and have our being in the life of humanity, makes us what we are; it is 
possible to isolate such a phase, to throw it into relief, to be divided against 
ourselves in zeal for it, as we may hark back to some choice space of our 
own individual life. We cannot conceive the age; we can conceive the ele-
ment it has contributed to our culture; [ . . . ]” (146–47). In this important 
passage from Pater’s early criticism, a key element of his volitional eclecti-
cism is already present: neither can we develop beyond any age or phase of 
our history nor can we cease moving through time to settle into only one: 
“the choice life of the human spirit is always under mixed lights, and in 
mixed situations” (147). At these moments, the spirit is expectant, ready to 
leap forward to “the promise.” Pater highlights those mixed elements of 
Morris’s poetry, where he senses that division of self, where distinct influ-
ences or “sentiments” create a mixed situation. The Arthurian legends of 
The Defence of Guenevere (1858) yield their “sweetness” only in a “Chris-
tian atmosphere” (144); the simpler passions of The Life and Death of Jason 
(1867) come as a Renaissance in Morris’s poetry, “explain[ing] through him 
a transition which, under many forms, is one law of the life of the human 
spirit” (146); and again, “It is precisely this effect, this grace of Hellenism 
relieved against the sorrow of the middle age, which forms the chief 
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motive of The Earthly Paradise [1868], with an exquisite dexterity the two 
threads of sentiment are here interwoven and contrasted” (147). Morris 
and his characters live in medley, through the contradictions of accumu-
lated history, revealing the nature of self in a late age. The conclusion to 
Pater’s review of Morris (later revised as the conclusion to The Renaissance) 
celebrates the ability of the best poets to enlarge and enrich our experience, 
something Morris accomplishes by throwing into relief those elements of 
history that have contributed to our culture and are seen to be still at work 
within it.
 Thomas Hardy’s 1881 novel, A Laodicean, which has been the (some-
times hidden) keystone of this account of the age of eclecticism, might seem 
like an uneasy playfellow for Pater’s great works, Studies in the History of 
the Renaissance and Marius the Epicurean. Critics have rarely considered 
these contemporaries together, and when they do, as Uttara Natarajan has 
noted, it is only in passing (849).1 Natarajan herself goes much further in 
making the case for Pater’s importance in shaping Hardy’s idea of moder-
nity (in The Return of the Native)—something that interests me as well, 
but in the context of their engagement with volitional eclecticism. Eclec-
ticism was for Hardy, as for Pater, an inescapable condition of (literary) 
modernity. In A Laodicean Hardy takes two characters who have a practi-
cal, rather than intellectual, relationship with (and within) their own very 
mixed conditions, and demonstrates by the conclusion of the romance that 
their survival and their progress as human beings depend on their choos-
ing to be eclectic. It is a heroic struggle, tinged with humor, an updating of 
romance (and Gothic) to suit the time and place.
 Romance in Marius the Epicurean and A Laodicean is the generic equiv-
alent of the historical mixed situation that Pater found in Morris’s poetry. 
Diane Elam theorizes romance in much the same way that Pater theorizes 
Renaissance. It is a mode that always exists, and the mode of romance has 
always been postmodern, “a counter-discourse on history and the real” (3). 
Romance never really sees history as past (unlike realism, she says, which 
narrates history only in order to put it aside): “the postmodern romance 
re-members the past, re-situates its temporality, in order to make the 
past impossible to forget” (15). Like eclecticism, romance plays fast and 
loose with history, preferring the anachronistic to the diachronic; but this 
anachronism is always a point of integration and blending, a mélange—
or medley—of past and present. In romance, it does not matter that his-
tory is unraveled and re-sewn on a new pattern, because romance wants 
to remake the world in its own image through subversion and play.2 As 
Fredric Jameson puts it in “Magical Narratives: Romance as Genre,” it is 
“that struggle between two worlds which characterizes the romance as a 
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genre” (145). If Matthew Arnold’s lines “Wandering between two worlds, 
one dead / The other powerless to be born” may be made to stand, as they 
often have, for the Victorian Zeitgeist, then it is not surprising that so 
many writers, Hardy and Pater among them, should return to romance by 
the end of the century to represent that struggle. For Jameson, “Romance 
as a form thus expresses a transitional moment, yet one of a very special 
type: its contemporaries must feel their society torn between past and 
future in such a way that the alternatives are grasped as hostile but some-
how unrelated worlds” (158). Hardy dramatizes a Battle of the Styles in 
A Laodicean—Gothic versus Greek, tradition versus modernity—in such 
a way that it becomes a debate on what it would mean to choose eclecti-
cism instead of any one style. Elam’s theorizing of romance as postmod-
ern, anachronistic, and playful helps me to read the fictions of Hardy and 
Pater as repudiations of organic historicism. They choose revolution over 
evolution—they choose to return. History is still an object of desire, but it 
is no longer a distant one, because eclecticism brings the past closer to the 
present, and validates the activity of romance in picking up the pieces.
Eclecticism as Renaissance
Pater’s flexible use of the term “Renaissance” in the review of Morris to 
describe a phase in the life of a poet hints at both further refinement and 
further expansion of the idea. In The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry 
(originally published as Studies in the History of the Renaissance [1873]), 
Pater attends to a series of “mixed situations” that create the opportunity 
for what he defines broadly as rebirth or Renaissance. In each of the nine 
studies, he attempts to distinguish the particular enabling mixture of char-
acteristics and circumstances in the lives and works of artists who lived 
between the late Middle Ages and the eighteenth century. Pater’s principle 
of selection, if it might be called that, depends on locating those moments 
of Renaissance that emerge when the artist casts the peculiar or “mixed” 
light of his personality over his creation. As Pater tells his readers in the 
preface, he aims “to distinguish, to analyse, and separate from its adjuncts, 
the virtue by which a picture, a landscape, a fair personality in life or in a 
book, produces this special impression of beauty or pleasure, to indicate 
what the source of that impression is, and under what conditions it is expe-
rienced” (xx–xxi). Emphasizing, with a quote from Sainte-Beuve, that this 
can be accomplished only by contact with works at first hand, the passage 
recalls the process by which the early-nineteenth-century eclectic philoso-
pher Victor Cousin hoped to recover and synthesize the truth from all the 
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various systems of thought that had existed throughout time—but with 
a crucial difference that makes Pater a new kind of eclectic. Instead of 
attempting a totalizing eclecticism that would encompass the best thoughts 
and aspirations of humanity (such as Cousin or Arnold might have done), 
Pater abandons that line of inquiry for a personal eclecticism, asking, what 
is this work of art to me? Instead of relying on Cousin’s “internal eye” to 
map an external truth, the aesthetic critic analyzes his own impressions for 
what they mean, first of all, in relation to himself. Eclecticism remains for 
Pater what it was for Cousin and Arnold, a method of study and discovery, 
but it quickly transmutes into something else, a method of creation. Nev-
ertheless, Pater’s eclecticism has more in common with the praxis of nine-
teenth-century culture than with any effort to establish a criterion of truth 
by which one might judge the productions of the past. In the character of 
the dilettante, he makes a claim on our attention, as perhaps having found 
the way forward in the arts. While Cousin and Arnold hoped that prog-
ress, both social and aesthetic, could be achieved through volitional eclecti-
cism, Pater assumes it. He compares his own eclectic operation to that of 
the chemist who, discovering an element, makes a note of its properties for 
himself and others, and so presumes to build on humanistic knowledge 
and aesthetic experience the way that scientists have always done. As the 
critic learns to recognize the types and varieties of influence that works of 
art have on him, he becomes more susceptible to beauty in all its diversity. 
In this way he overcomes at once the dilemma of style and the anxiety of 
being eclectic: “What is important, then, is not that the critic should pos-
sess a correct abstract definition of beauty for the intellect, but a certain 
kind of temperament, the power of being deeply moved by the presence 
of beautiful objects. He will remember always that beauty exists in many 
forms. To him all periods, types, schools of taste, are in themselves equal. 
In all ages there have been some excellent workmen, and some excellent 
work done. The question he asks is always:—In whom did the stir, the 
genius, the sentiment of the period find itself? where was the receptacle 
of its refinement, its elevation, its taste?” (xxi). The temperament of the 
critic is paramount, because Pater does not believe there are any objective 
criteria by which the works of history can be arranged, compared, and 
judged. Neither will tradition be a guide, since all judgments established 
by habit or custom are to be avoided. At once cut adrift from history and 
totally immersed in it, the aesthetic critic responds to beauty as to a physi-
cal rather than an intellectual force—seeing and feeling rather than think-
ing and judging. Eclecticism—selecting the best that has been thought and 
known—now becomes a matter of personal conviction. The extreme rela-
tivity of this position is not disconcerting, a cause for anxiety or pessimism 
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about the future, because each age, as each critic and artist, will view the 
past in its own mixed light.
 Much of the preface to The Renaissance reads like an answer to Arnold’s 
“The Function of Criticism at the Present Time.” Beginning the essay by 
setting out the goal of aesthetic criticism, Pater slyly concedes, “‘To see the 
object as in itself it really is,’ has been justly said to be the aim of all true 
criticism whatever”; but he then proceeds to refigure Arnold’s objectiv-
ist (outside-the-time-stream) criticism as an entirely subjective project: “in 
aesthetic criticism the first step towards seeing one’s object as it really is, 
is to know one’s own impression as it really is, to discriminate it, to realise 
it distinctly” (xix).3 As Geoffrey Tillotson suggests, the disinterested criti-
cism that Arnold advocated “was, and is, impossible in practice” (92–93). 
The problem with seeing the object as in itself it really is could be traced 
back to history; Arnold wanted to pretend he could step outside the time-
stream, to proceed as though “unaware that the date of a mind mattered” 
(Tillotson 94). No one, as far as Pater was concerned, could step outside 
of time; as he wrote of Morris, every individual is a composite of all the 
ages that came before. The object could not be independent of history any 
more than the spectator or reader could be. In absorbing Arnold’s criti-
cism, Pater simply took what he could use and transformed it according 
to his different understanding of history. Another significant difference 
between Arnold and Pater is in their principle of selection (of the “best”). 
While Arnold searches for those works that are “modern” in the sense of 
being adequate to comprehend and represent the age in which they were 
produced (Arnold dips into history only to extract objects from it), Pater 
uncovers the “virtue” or “active principle” in a work, “the action of [its] 
unique, incommunicable faculty” (xxii). In emphasizing the individual 
virtue of a work of art, Pater does not neglect its place in history: “The 
various forms of intellectual activity which together make up the culture 
of an age, move for the most part from different starting-points, and by 
unconnected roads. As products of the same generation they partake of 
a common character, and unconsciously illustrate each other; but of the 
producers themselves, each group is solitary, gaining what advantage or 
disadvantage there may be in intellectual isolation” (xxiii–xxiv). In The 
Renaissance Pater wants to account for culture, not a culture that has come 
and gone, but culture that continues to shape the present. By contrast, 
Arnold wants to reform and improve the culture of the present on a model 
extracted from the past. At the end of the preface, Pater is again thinking 
of Arnold when he says that certain eras do provide more favorable con-
ditions for the mutual impacting of art, poetry, philosophy, and religion. 
The Renaissance was just such a “many-sided, centralised, complete” age, 
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in which each producer participated “in the best thoughts which that age 
produced” (xxiv). Pater believes this, but it is not the structuring principle 
of the work; the movement of the Renaissance is not centripetal, but cen-
trifugal—outward through space and time. In his studies the importance 
of Renaissance derives not only from the discovery of “old and forgotten 
sources” of imaginative pleasure but also from the “divination of fresh 
sources thereof—new experiences, new subjects of poetry, new forms of 
art” (2), which give new resources to the present and the future.
 The preface to The Renaissance provides only the first instance of Pat-
er’s coming to terms with the personal, even private, nature of criticism. 
Deeply influenced as Arnold was by French literature and criticism, Pater, 
too, looked to the eclectic examples of Renan and Sainte-Beuve in particu-
lar, to reach some of his most enduring conclusions about the means and 
ends of criticism. In her exhaustive, two-volume study Walter Pater’s Read-
ing, Billie Inman cites “Renan’s eclectic mode of thought” as one of the 
three major influences on Pater by 1866 (xi).4 Renan’s thesis in “The Reli-
gions of Antiquity” underlies “Pater’s idea that the modern mind is eclec-
tic” (98). It is the same source from which Arnold would have imbibed 
Renan’s eclectic principles. Unlike Arnold, Pater does not regard eclecti-
cism as a cure for the naïve eclecticism of the period, because he is not 
interested in the age as a particularly eclectic one. Like renaissance, eclecti-
cism as a concept is not fixed historically or geographically. Eclecticism is 
instead most persuasive, and most fruitful for Pater, as an explanation of 
the peculiar operations of his own mind. Inman, who has most carefully 
traced Pater’s unscholarly borrowings, translations, transformations, and 
misquotations, puts it this way: “Pater developed a remarkable originality 
through self-confident judgment, selective imitation, bold modification, 
and a gift for expressive phrasing. With a great mass of material to work 
upon, he was able to select, shape, and define ideas—indeed to form an 
authorial identity for himself” (ix). His eclectic reading, conducted appar-
ently without system, permitted him to explore the relation of each text to 
his own mind, to read “responsively.”
 Pater’s style of criticism derives from his style of reading, which can 
be characterized by its unusual receptivity. Not surprisingly, then, one 
of the traits of the Renaissance that attracts Pater is its openness to new 
ideas. As a “student” of the period, Pater has an advantage, he feels, over 
the student of the Reformation or French Revolution, because “he is not 
beset at every turn by the inflexibilities and antagonisms of some well- 
recognised controversy, with rigidly defined opposites, exhausting the 
intelligence and limiting one’s sympathies” (20). Like the French Roman-
tics who saw eclecticism as a way beyond ideological polarization, Pater 
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sees the Renaissance as a model for overcoming the false dilemma posed by 
the historical inheritance: “Here there are no fixed parties, no exclusions: 
all breathes of that unity of culture in which ‘whatsoever things are comely’ 
are reconciled, for the elevation and adorning of our spirits” (20–21). Pater 
probably owes something of this catholic attitude to Sainte-Beuve, whose 
work (like Renan’s) stands behind so much of The Renaissance. In his famous 
essay “What Is a Classic?” Sainte-Beuve argues against the old, narrow 
definition of the term.5 In France the Academy determined which authors 
were classics or models, “established rules for composition and style, strict 
rules to which one must conform” (86). A largely reactionary effort meant 
to beat back the advance of romanticism, the restriction of the meaning of 
the term “classic” did little to nurture “classic” literature. Sainte-Beuve, in 
attempting to redefine as classic “an author who has enriched the human 
spirit,” emphasizes that a classic can be born in any time and place: “The 
important thing today, it seems to me, is to maintain the conception and 
creed, while at the same time broadening it” (92). Sainte-Beuve, who had 
a difficult relationship with the French philosopher of eclecticism, Victor 
Cousin, is nonetheless echoing his teacher by acknowledging the need for 
selection without dogmatism. Rather than contracting the size of the liter-
ary canon, Sainte-Beuve would give it more generous proportions: “More-
over, there is really no question of sacrificing or disparaging anything. The 
Temple of Taste, I think, needs to be rebuilt; but in rebuilding it we have 
only to enlarge it, that it may become the Pantheon of mankind’s best, of 
all those who have made a notable and lasting contribution to the store of 
the spirit’s treasures and delights” (93).6 Sainte-Beuve also probably influ-
enced Pater’s personal approach to criticism. After listing those authors 
whom he would invite to his remodeled Temple of Taste, Sainte-Beuve 
gestures toward an infinite process of selection and revision: “The imagi-
nation of each reader will enable him to complete the sketch and even to 
choose the group he prefers. For choose one must, because the primary 
condition of good taste, after all has been understood, is to cease from end-
less voyaging and finally settle somewhere and take a stand” (96).7 With 
the comfortable, solid example of French eclecticism before him, Pater can 
proceed with confidence to judge and classify the literature of the past, to 
give it an order that, while entirely his own, will nonetheless guide others 
toward a revised understanding of their own and past cultures.
 As part of a general effort to see all ages and tastes as equal (in the 
sense of what they have to offer to the student of culture), Pater continu-
ally bears witness in The Renaissance to those moments in which historical 
oppositions are overcome or held in balance within the works of excep-
tional artists, precisely the mixed situations he prefers in Morris’s poetry. 
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A few examples will demonstrate the eclectic pattern of Pater’s judgments. 
In general, Pater conceives of the Renaissance as the period when “the 
rude strength of the middle age turns to sweetness; and the taste for sweet-
ness generated there becomes the seed of the classical revival in it” (2). 
Pater considers the poetry of Provence, with its “earthly passion, with its 
intimacy, its freedom, its variety” to represent a starting point for a medi-
eval Renaissance (3). The poetic expression of liberty he finds there marks 
the beginning of a new phase of human experience, “the free play of the 
human intelligence around all subjects presented to it” (3). The literature 
of the medieval Renaissance, described in “Two Early French Stories,” is 
the product of mixed parentage: the “outbreak of reason and the imagina-
tion” within the intense atmosphere of the Christian ideal. Much of the 
essay concerns the form taken by the era’s “antinomianism,” especially the 
“search after the pleasures of the senses and the imagination” (18–19). The 
one-sidedness of Christianity gives rise to these desires, a conclusion that 
strongly echoes Arnold’s in the “Hebrew and Hellene” chapter of Culture 
and Anarchy. Not surprisingly, like Arnold, Pater wants to suggest that a 
balance, or mixture, is more likely to produce great art.
 Pater also pursues this theme in “Sandro Botticelli” where he identifies 
the peculiar appeal of the painter’s work as having its source in a “middle 
world.” Preoccupied neither with Heaven nor with Hell as were so many 
of his contemporaries, Botticelli wanted to paint “men and women, in 
their mixed and uncertain condition” (43). Pater even theorizes that Bot-
ticelli subscribed to a heresy of the time, that human beings were actually 
fallen angels, who had taken no side in the war for Heaven. This uncer-
tain, in-between condition evokes the painter’s sympathy, causing him to 
paint his figures with a shadow of this knowledge upon them, of a great 
chance not taken. The mixture Pater perceives in Botticelli’s subjects was 
evident in his practice as well. In language reminiscent of Reynolds’s Dis-
courses, and the post-Renaissance academic tradition more generally, Pater 
describes Botticelli’s genius as eclectic: “the genius of which Botticelli is 
the type usurps the data before it as the exponent of ideas, moods, visions 
of its own; in this interest it plays fast and loose with those data, rejecting 
some and isolating others, and always combining them anew” (42). While 
Donald Hill cites William Blake’s (largely negative) annotations of Reyn-
olds as an influence on Pater’s preface to The Renaissance (and by extension 
on his aesthetic criticism), the Botticelli essay points to a different way of 
interpreting Blake’s aphorism “Ages are all equal, but genius is always 
above its age” (xxi; qtd. in Hill 299). What the geniuses of the Renais-
sance shared, in Pater’s reckoning, was the capacity to usurp and combine 
data they are given, to make it their own. Blake is typically figured as 
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a proponent of uninstructed, native genius (in the same vein as Edward 
Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition) when he derides Reynolds’s 
educational methods (master the tradition first, and then create something 
new); but Pater clearly makes Blake his own when he makes Botticelli’s 
genius—his membership in the broader Renaissance—dependent on his 
eclecticism.
 For the sculptors Pater takes up in “Luca della Robbia,” membership 
in the Renaissance is again the result of a transitional historical situation 
and an eclectic method. In Pater’s account, the fifteenth-century Tuscan 
sculptors lie somewhere between the universalizing practice of the Greeks 
(meant to express the perfect type of the individual, free of accidents) and 
the incompleteness of Michelangelo (meant to express individuality and 
intensity). They “unite to an intense and individual expression by a system 
of conventionalism as skilful and subtle as that of the Greeks” “elements 
of tranquillity, of repose” (54). Reynolds would have approved. They mas-
tered convention, and brought to it their particular individuality. In “The 
Poetry of Michelangelo,” Pater elaborates on his judgment that the genius 
of Michelangelo had been “spiritualised by the reverie of the middle age, 
penetrated by its spirit of inwardness and introspection” (52), blending a 
“lovely strangeness” with classical form, “sweetness” with strength (58). 
The fifteenth century into which both Leonardo and Michelangelo were 
born presents the historian with a “two-fold” movement, “partly the 
Renaissance, partly also the coming of what is called the ‘modern spirit,’ 
with its realism, its appeal to experience” (86). The Renaissance is modern 
because it is backward-looking—and both nature and antiquity are com-
passed in its view. In Leonardo’s painting Pater sees the same “peculiar 
atmosphere and mixed lights” (86) that define his revolutionary moder-
nity; there is, for example, in Leonardo’s Saint John the Baptist a “strange 
likeness to the Bacchus which hangs near it, and which set Théophile 
Gautier thinking of Heine’s notion of decayed gods, who, to maintain 
themselves, after the fall of paganism, took employment in the new reli-
gion” (93). The invocation here is not fanciful. Pater regards the blending 
as a “symbolical invention” that will be used “as the starting point of a 
train of sentiment, subtle and vague as a piece of music” (93). One gets 
the sense in reading The Renaissance that this is the music Pater has been 
hearing all along. When he comes to the description of “La Gioconda,” the 
reader knows it is the climax of his quest. The historical blending recurs, 
but on a huge scale, with Pater seeing all the “thoughts and experience of 
the world” in her face (98). In this justifiably famous passage, he seems to 
follow the woman, who has been dead many times, through the grave-
yards and “deep seas” of history. She is a singular being, but she is also the 
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pictorial embodiment of the eclectic, “modern idea,” the representative of 
collective human experience.
 The essays on the arts of the Renaissance, along with the preface and 
conclusion, were certainly the most important for determining the shape 
of literary modernism in Britain, but they do not reveal as clearly the terms 
of the Victorian debate on eclecticism, as does Pater’s one essay on a fellow 
scholar. In “Pico della Mirandola,” Pater exposes one of the peculiar pas-
sions of the Renaissance, the desire to reconcile the Christian religion with 
that of ancient Greece. Pater responds to Pico’s effort with both fascina-
tion and uneasiness, much as a contemporary might have done. In the first 
instance, Pater recognizes the impulse as a “generous” one: “To reconcile 
forms of sentiment which at first sight seem incompatible, to adjust the 
various products of the human mind to one another in one many-sided 
type of intellectual culture, to give humanity, for heart and imagination to 
feed upon, as much as it could possibly receive, belonged to the generous 
instinct of that age” (23).8 Pico himself, while embodying the “picturesque 
union of contrasts” (37) present in so much Renaissance art, yet failed to 
discover the perfect order that would explain all differences and resolve 
them. As J. B. Bullen has argued, the process of Renaissance at work here 
allows us to access the “composite experience” of all past ages (Myth 282)—
what Pater saw and felt in La Gioconda. The uneasiness Pico’s contempo-
raries felt, and which Pater’s probably felt, derives from their anxiety that 
having access to rival traditions would ultimately displace Christianity. 
And though Pater admires Pico’s effort, he finally concedes that the “rec-
onciliation” between Christianity and paganism can be only an “imagina-
tive” one, achievable exclusively through art.
 Pater responds to the efforts of Pico as to a precursor who attempted 
the same experiment under similar conditions. As a working model of aes-
thetic criticism, the imaginative reconciliation of opposing forces becomes 
the keynote in all of Pater’s writings; but even he was not immune to the 
powerful sense of failure provoked by the eclecticism of his age, a fail-
ure always marked by intellectual confusion (arguably of the kind repre-
sented by Pico). His attitude toward Pico’s effort to resolve the differences 
between Christianity and paganism is complicated by Pater’s acceptance of 
a developmental historical model, derived from Hegel and Lessing, among 
others. Countering the instinct that drives Pico and others like him, Pater 
writes that a “modern scholar” would remember that “all religions may 
be regarded as natural products,” organically related to the age in which 
they were born (25). By contrast, the scholars of the fifteenth century 
“lacked the very rudiments of the historic sense, which, by an imagina-
tive act, throws itself back into a world unlike one’s own, and estimates 
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every intellectual creation in its connection with the age from which it pro-
ceeded” (26). In essence, Pater brings historicism to bear on the question 
of eclecticism; the strength of nineteenth-century historicism gave birth to 
eclecticism and its attendant crises, but it also appeared to be the surest 
means of arresting the eclectic tendency. Passages on the subject in Plato 
and Platonism, generally considered to be his mature pronouncement on 
these competing critical methods, are especially revealing in this respect.9 
Commencing his account of Platonic philosophy with a brief sketch of the 
intellectual situation of the period, Pater shows us a world not so different 
from the late nineteenth century: “the world Plato had entered into was 
already almost weary of philosophical debate, bewildered by the opposi-
tions of sects, the claims of rival schools. Language and the processes of 
thought were already become sophisticated, the very air he breathed sickly 
with off-cast speculative atoms” (Plato and Platonism 6). Demonstrating 
that every age experiences the burden of history, Plato has to become, 
at least in the Timaeus, “an eclectic critic of older [theories]” offering “a 
sort of storehouse of all physical theories” (6–7). These older thinkers are 
“everywhere” in Plato’s philosophy, “not as the stray carved corner of some 
older edifice, to be found here or there amid the new, but rather like min-
ute relics of earlier organic life in the very stones he builds with” (7). This 
image, perhaps more than any other in Pater’s writings, portrays the nat-
ural eclecticism of intellectual work. He does not represent Plato’s intel-
lectual architecture as naïvely eclectic, with tacked-on ornamentation, but 
neither is it volitionally eclectic; rather he invokes a third term, a kind of 
organic eclecticism, best represented by the image of fossils in stone. The 
image also suggests the necessity of excavation, and the operation in the 
present, of the historic method. There is nothing new in Plato, “or rather, 
as in many other very original products of human genius, the seemingly 
new is old also, a palimpsest, a tapestry of which the actual threads have 
served before” (8). When Pater on the very next page rejects eclectic criti-
cism in favor of that historic method that will allow him to excavate Plato’s 
philosophy, he does so, I believe, not in consequence of the obsolescence 
of eclecticism, but because it is not the proper tool with which to criticize 
“speculative opinion” (8). Pater calls eclecticism “the method which has 
prevailed in periods of large reading but with little inceptive force of their 
own” (9). Its defect, he claims, is its “tendency to misrepresent the true 
character of the doctrine it professes to explain, that it may harmonise thus 
the better with the other elements of a pre-conceived system” (9). Rather 
than view Pater’s judgment on eclecticism as his final word on the subject, 
I want to look carefully at his characterization of Plato’s philosophizing. 
Plato had to become eclectic to cope with the mass of existing theories, 
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but his own strong personality shaped these “relics of earlier organic life” 
into a new dwelling of his own creation.10 Unlike many earlier critics of 
eclecticism (especially G. H. Lewes), Pater does not view eclecticism as the 
study method of an apprentice. In fact, he views eclecticism as having too 
powerful a creative tendency; it misrepresents others’ ideas (as Pater so 
often does) in order to harmonize them with an inner vision. Neverthe-
less, Pater is keenly aware that, in his own century, the “historic method” 
has discredited the “generous, eclectic or synthetic method” in criticism, 
because eclecticism colors one’s object of study too vividly (9). The prod-
ucts of history are really only intelligible, Pater concedes, at their own date 
and in their own environment. This claim, while seeming to go against his 
own scholarly and critical method, can only have been intended as a start-
ing point to the study of history, but never the goal of the (imaginative) 
historians he admired, such as Winckelmann or Michelet, who transcribed 
not mere fact, but “fact in its infinite variety, as modified by human pref-
erence in all its infinitely varied forms” (Appreciations 10–11). Indeed, it is 
not even the result of his study of Platonic thought, since Pater is always 
returning to the notion that Plato is modern because he was a relativist, 
unwilling to rest in any conclusion. Like eclecticism, Platonism cultivates 
the “habit . . . of tentative thinking and suspended judgment” (Plato and 
Platonism 195). It is not surprising, then, that the American classics scholar 
Paul Shorey, after reading Pater, made Plato “the true spiritual father of 
the long and illustrious line of sceptics and eclectics,” in which he also 
numbers Victor Cousin and Matthew Arnold (261).
 Bullen and many others have observed that Pater’s “studies” are largely 
about the discovery of selfhood, precisely what made his contemporaries so 
uneasy about the work.11 Indeed, Pater’s final essay has often been read as 
the key to his project and Winckelmann as the precursor who, like Pater, 
remade the world according to his own peculiar vision of a moment in his-
tory. Winckelmann acknowledged that great art would be both imitative 
and original, and he lived his life in much the same way; in his lifestyle he 
emulated, as he thought, a Greek existence and, through this discipline, 
became in his own time thoroughly original. In Winckelmann’s life and 
writings, Pater discovers the same pattern of Renaissance—a “mixed situ-
ation,” and rebirth through combination: “The basis of all artistic genius 
lies in the power of conceiving humanity in a new and striking way, of 
putting a happy world of its own creation in place of the meaner world of 
our common days, generating around itself an atmosphere with a novel 
power of refraction, selecting, transforming, recombining the images it 
transmits, according to the choice of the imaginative intellect” (Renais-
sance 170). In his reconstruction of Winckelmann’s life, Pater focuses his 
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attention on just these effects of artistic genius. When he moves to Rome, 
eats only bread and drinks only wine, and creates friendships with “bril-
liant youths,” Winckelmann puts “a happy world of [his] own creation in 
place of the meaner world of our common days.” Coming into contact with 
the antique, first in Dresden and then in Rome, the antiquarian “escape[s] 
from abstract theory to intuition, to the exercise of sight and touch” (147); 
he generates around himself “an atmosphere with a novel power of refrac-
tion, selecting, transforming, recombining the images it transmits, accord-
ing to the choice of the imaginative intellect.” As Hegel famously testified, 
Winckelmann opened a new organ for the human spirit through this criti-
cal effort. But it was not distant, disembodied criticism that could accom-
plish the revival of the Greek spirit in art; rather it was Winckelmann’s 
bodily immersion in the past that allowed for the transformation of the 
present. Only the revival of the (albeit imagined) Greek style of life could 
make their art viable again.
 That powerful sense of historical development evident in all of his 
writing made Winckelmann the first modern historian of art; and per-
haps, too, his comprehension of a historical situation bounded by loss and 
mitigated by irreversible decline gave subsequent writers and artists a per-
spective from which to criticize their own culture. Even as he recognized 
that “Greek art was determined by its particular environment: the climatic, 
social, and political conditions [ . . . ] made it unique” (Reflections xix), he 
saw past this determining moment to a “period of beginning [ . . . ] an age 
when man came slowly to realize it was not some superhistorical force or 
authority but he himself who determined the course of his destiny” (xxi). 
This acceptance of historical development in conjunction with its opposite, 
the loosing of the trammels of history at the moment of self-awareness, 
gave birth to the enlightened eclecticism of the nineteenth century (and of 
Pater in particular), an eclecticism whose modus operandi was the resusci-
tation of styles of life (in order to revive whatever particular element of that 
lifestyle seemed desirable, whether art, architecture, social organization, 
or literature). Winckelmann himself escapes the taint of naïve eclecticism 
because his system of imitation appeared to be internally coherent. James 
Eli Adams makes a compelling argument for the influence of Winckel-
mann’s anachronisms on the development of Pater’s critical persona. Char-
acterizing Winckelmann himself as “a relic of classical antiquity,” Pater 
“associates the critic’s life with previous discoveries of the physical relics 
of Greek art, events that confirm and extend the authority of ‘the Hel-
lenic tradition’” (Adams 158). Adams further argues that “Pater recasts 
that identity [the instinctive, anachronistic pagan] as a tradition in which 
his own reception of Winckelmann participates. [ . . . ] Pater’s essay takes 
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its place in a series of critical encounters that constitute the authority of the 
Greek ideal as a tradition renewed and extended with each discovery of a 
‘relic’ of Greek culture” (158). Viewed as an entry in a series of recurrent 
Renaissances, Pater’s recovery of Winckelmann perpetuates, I think, the 
kind of eclecticism that Winckelmann himself attributed to the Carracci. 
As Nachahmer (artist-imitators), they had no choice but to come to terms 
with the historical inheritance. In order to become inimitable themselves 
they had to imitate ancient art. Winckelmann imitated Greek culture, and 
in imitating Winckelmann, Pater too becomes completely original and 
inimitable.
Eclecticism as Romance
Until the end of the nineteenth century the romance of architecture was 
literature’s privileged interlocutor for conversations about the proper mix-
ture of past and present, and romance and realism in modern life. And 
as J. B. Bullen has observed in connection with Hardy in A Laodicean, 
“the choice of architectural styles [ . . . ] is but a symptom of a multiplicity 
of other choices” (The Expressive Eye 122). When the architect-hero of A 
Laodicean makes his first appearance, he is sketching a medieval church. 
At the time Hardy published this novel, in 1881, George Somerset’s pas-
time would have been a respectable one, even a middle-class cliché—but 
with a difference. The Gothic Revival in architecture is in decline, and 
Somerset has only just become enthusiastic. During his formative years, 
while Gothic was in ascendance, he favored the classical styles; about to 
embark on his professional life, he believes that it would be profitable to 
have more than a passing acquaintance with medieval architecture. While 
in the vicinity of De Stancy Castle, he comes upon a Baptist church where 
he witnesses a young woman, Paula Power, refuse to go through with 
her baptism into the community. The minister, Mr. Woodwell, delivers a 
scorching sermon on her lack of commitment to her father’s faith, intro-
ducing into the novel the theme of the “Laodicean.” He draws attention 
to these words in the Book of Revelation: “I know thy works, that thou are 
neither cold nor hot: I would thou wert cold or hot. So then because thou art 
lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spue thee out of my mouth. . . . Thou 
sayest, I am rich, and increased with goods, and have need of nothing; and know-
est not that thou art wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked” 
(14). Originally directed at the Christians of a wealthy trading community 
in a Roman province of Asia Minor, the designation “Laodicean” came to 
mean any person who was half-hearted in religion or politics, and in this 
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novel, in the choice of a style. Hardy has already informed us that Som-
erset, too, is a Laodicean: he vacillates on the question of style; although 
he is highly educated and even talented, he remains unformed by his still-
limited experiences and uncommitted to any particular aesthetic doctrine 
or more conventional faith. Hardy describes him as having “more of the 
beauty—if beauty it ought to be called—of the future human type than 
of the past” (4). An aspect of this future life will be—is—indecision result-
ing from excessive introspection: George Somerset “had suffered from the 
modern malady of unlimited appreciativeness as much as any living man 
of his own age” (7). To be modern, perhaps, means seeing—and enjoy-
ing—too much, because one has too much access to everything: sights and 
ideas, past and future.
 Paula and George share the same dilemma, the same contradictory 
impulses and perceptions, which Hardy concentrates in the Gothic castle 
that brings them together. The young and beautiful heiress to a railway 
fortune inherits her father’s profound modernity and the castle, represent-
ing history and all that her father could not give her—traceable genealogy, 
a portrait gallery exhibiting family physiognomy, a place in the nation’s 
history, and so on. The castle provokes a crisis; even as George demon-
strates to Paula that he is capable of undertaking a sensitive expansion and 
restoration of the dilapidated buildings, Paula—“A mixed young lady” 
(30)—anachronistically wants to construct a Greek court in its center. She 
confesses to George that she is not a medievalist, but an eclectic who longs 
for the romance of history (78). She wants to manufacture Greek pottery 
in a town that she will build herself, a utopian community of artisans. She 
exercises in a special gymnasium. Her castle room is cluttered with books 
and periodicals from America and the Continent: “These things [George 
observes], ensconced amid so much of the old and hoary, were as if a stray 
hour of the nineteenth century had wandered like a butterfly into the thir-
teenth, and lost itself there” (31). George associates Paula with “the march 
of mind—the steamship, and the railway, and the thoughts that shake 
mankind” (79), but the young architect witnesses the shifting of her alle-
giance toward the Gothic. When she is condemned in the newspaper as a 
barbarian outsider who threatens to destroy the castle, instead of holding it 
in trust for the public, Paula abandons her eclectic plan. Further, the spell 
of everything associated with the De Stancy family affects her deeply, so 
much so that Mr. Woodwell fears she is losing her faith under the influ-
ence of medieval Catholicism: “Sometimes I think those Stancy towers and 
lands will be a curse to her. The spirit of old papistical times still lingers in 
the nooks of those silent walls, like a bad odour in a still atmosphere, dull-
ing the iconoclastic emotions of the Puritan” (54). Although George had 
Chapter : Walter Pater and Thomas Hardy

“inclined to each denomination as it presented itself” and “had travelled 
through a great many beliefs and doctrines without feeling himself much 
better than when he set out” (48), he too is repelled by Paula’s threatened 
return to the national religion. By giving up her Dissenting inheritance 
and restoring her castle to a “pure” Gothic, Paula moves one step closer 
toward a dangerous mistake: marriage with Captain De Stancy. This melo-
dramatic turn in the plot is precipitated by the novel’s villain, De Stancy’s 
son William Dare, a cosmopolite photographer who specializes in creat-
ing illusions. He perceives Paula’s weakness, her artistic predilection for 
“a well-known line of ancestors” (96), her desire to be “romantic and his-
torical” (95). As George falls in love with Paula, his own artistic principles 
loosen to the extent that he adopts an eclectic point of view against Paula’s 
dangerously exclusive Gothic outlook. When Paula first poses the question 
“Do you think it a thing more to be proud of that one’s father should have 
made a great tunnel and railway like that, than that one’s remote ances-
tor should have built a great castle like this?” (79), George still favors the 
castle. After examining the great railway tunnel and observing its integra-
tion within the landscape, Somerset and Hardy seem to offer a contrary 
response, or at least an eclectic one. Hardy’s architect hero begins to recog-
nize that medieval architecture is dead, while modern constructions such 
as the elder De Stancy’s suburban villa and the ugly Baptist chapel are vital 
and vibrant.
 As the melodramatic plot unfolds against the backdrop of a realistic 
novel, and Paula first accepts Captain De Stancy’s offer of marriage—he 
wins her heart when he poses before a De Stancy portrait wearing armor 
and asking “Is the resemblance strong?”—and then rejects him when 
Dare’s plot to gain her fortune and discredit Somerset is uncovered. Paula 
then literally goes on a quest to win the love of Somerset, following him 
on a journey through Europe. This final reversal of the conventions of 
romance had been anticipated earlier in the story when Paula rescued 
Somerset from a castle tower where he had been entrapped. In the end, 
when Paula has found the object of her desire, she accepts Mr. Woodwell’s 
designation for her: “What I really am, as far as I know, is one of that 
body to whom lukewarmth is not an accident but a provisional necessity, 
till they see a little more clearly” (376). As if to maintain her inconsistency 
to the end, Hardy has Paula wish that her castle had not burnt down and 
that her lover were a De Stancy (379), even as George is planning to “build 
a new house from the ground, eclectic in style” (378). The castle will truly 
be, what it should already have been, a ruin whose original faith and sig-
nificance were irretrievably lost long before the nineteenth century. Har-
dy’s fiction articulates well the despair of contemporaries such as William 
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Morris over the possibility of a Gothic Revival, and also the dilemma of his 
heroine as she tries to separate herself from the Gothic influence, to find 
out what she will become herself.
 The question of exactly how to do this was a vital one, both for those 
working in the architectural profession, and for those simply caught up 
in its romance. Hardy answers decisively in favor of eclecticism, by mak-
ing architecture the figure for all the other choices one has to make in 
the nineteenth century, when all the old authorities have gone the way of 
Stancy Castle, and by foregrounding the desire for romance. Twice during 
Captain De Stancy’s courtship of Paula Power, the narration comments on 
the desire that is driving the heroine’s story. The first time it is the narra-
tor who defines her romanticism as natural, even healthy: “Human nature 
is at bottom romantic rather than ascetic, and the local habitation which 
accident had provided for Paula was perhaps acting as a solvent of the 
hard, morbidly introspective views thrust upon her in early life” (188). 
Even though the castle leads Paula astray, in one sense, it does allow her to 
forge a connection with the past that has been missing from her previous 
experience. That might be a good thing, the narrator tells us, for making 
her views less dogmatic and narrow. When she asserts at the novel’s end 
that it is right to be lukewarm until she sees a little more clearly, she might 
be making a broader claim for the age, and for human beings in general. 
Is it not better to be a Laodicean than to be resolutely, even passionately 
wrong? (One thinks here of William Butler Yeats’s memorable lines from 
“The Second Coming,” which refer to the events of the Russian Revolu-
tion, “The best lack all conviction, while the worst / Are full of passionate 
intensity” [7–8].) The second time the narration comments on romantic 
human nature, it is focalized through Somerset: “But romanticism, which 
will exist in every human breast as long as human nature itself exists, had 
asserted itself in her. Veneration for things old, not because of any merit in 
them, but because of their long continuance, had developed in her; and her 
modern spirit was taking to itself wings and flying away” (242). For Som-
erset the old thing lacking merit is first of all the De Stancy line, which 
has enchanted the woman he loves; but the claim here has far-reaching 
implications for the dilemma of style Hardy represents. If Paula’s “modern 
spirit” takes wings and flies away, if she tries to put the castle back the way 
it was, ignoring all of the intervening centuries, then she is being untrue to 
herself and to the present age. The eclectic does not time-travel. She does 
not put herself into the past; rather, she brings the past forward. In Elam’s 
terms, this is what romance has always done. It “re-members” the past in 
order to make it “unforgettable.” The Gothic Revivalists who tried not 
to be eclectic had to fail, because they were neglecting the modern spirit. 
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As Hardy and Morris recognized in their SPAB (Society for the Protec-
tion of Ancient Buildings) activities, restoration that stripped away the 
accumulated layers of history was a crime against the history the restorers 
pretended to honor. Only in the blending of the layered past with the mul-
tifarious present is history actually preserved. When Paula finally rejects 
De Stancy, she says that she does not “care one atom for artistic complete-
ness and a splendid whole” (309). Paula does not stop longing for romance, 
but she will have it through eclecticism.
 As a romance, Marius the Epicurean probably has more in common 
with the aestheticism and dreamlike narratives of George MacDonald’s 
Phantastes (1858) or his later Lillith (1895) than it does with Hardy’s A 
Laodicean, and yet it is the closer kin of Hardy’s mixed work because it 
foregrounds the problem of eclecticism in the formation of the self. In it 
Pater largely repeats Winckelmann’s effort to recombine images according 
to the author’s (and character’s) peculiar sense of fact, but it also repre-
sents Pater’s supreme effort to “reconcile” competing styles of life—just as 
Hardy has Paula Power do. Pater would have been attracted to the second 
century a.d., where he sets the action, for much the same reason he was 
intrigued by the Renaissance. As a period in history that allowed for the 
simultaneous existence of various literatures, philosophies, religions, and 
ritual practices, it would have been rich with the alloys created by their 
amalgamation. Marius enters this complex world from one bound by the 
traditions of home and the ancient religion of Numa. Very early in the 
narrative, Marius lets go of his exclusive devotion, so “that that early, much 
cherished religion of the villa might come to count with him as but one 
form of poetic beauty, or of the ideal, in things; as but one voice, in a world 
where there were many voices it would be moral weakness not to listen to” 
(I:43–44). The initial rival to the religion of home is simply a new phase 
of life, rich with new opportunities. He begins to think that he has spent 
too much time in contemplation of the past (one of the tendencies of his 
traditional form of worship), observing that when the modern world turns 
toward or absorbs something of the past, “for the purpose of a fastidious 
self-correction, in matters of art, literature, and even, as we have seen, of 
religion, at least it improved, by a shade or two of more scrupulous finish, 
on the old pattern” (I:48). These observations are in accord with Pater’s 
usual attitude regarding the quarrel of the ancients and moderns; moder-
nity offers incremental improvement on the past, because of the accretion 
of all past times. Pater even manages to avoid any prolonged note of nos-
talgia in the early chapters, by this turn of Marius’s toward the present and 
the future. Marius begins to see that neither individuals nor societies are 
impoverished by time, but rather are made richer by its perpetual motion.
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 As he turns decisively toward the future, Marius encounters the char-
acter who will voice some of Pater’s most enduring views on language 
and literature (that will be reiterated and extended in Appreciations). 
Together with Flavian, a young poet, Marius reads the “Golden Book” of 
the day, Apuleius’s The Golden Ass. From describing the external appear-
ance of the precious book, the narrator turns to what is inside, prefigur-
ing as he does something of Pater’s description of Tennyson’s language in 
“Style”: “And the inside was something not less dainty and fine, full of 
the archaisms and curious felicities in which that generation delighted, 
quaint terms and images, picked fresh from the early dramatists, the 
lifelike phrases of some lost poet preserved by an old grammarian, racy 
morsels of the vernacular and studied prettinesses:—all alike, mere play-
things for the genuine power and natural eloquence of the erudite artist, 
unsuppressed by his erudition, which, however, made some people angry, 
chiefly less well ‘got-up’ people, and especially those who were untidy 
from indolence” (I:56). Pater’s admiration for the mixed languages of 
contemporary authors such as Newman, Carlyle, and Tennyson is trans-
lated, here, into Marius’s appreciation of certain ancient writers, who 
were equally affected by a mixed situation. Most of Pater’s readers would 
not instinctively have grouped the “classics” with such authors of their 
own day whose literary languages were personal and complex, thinking 
perhaps that ancient writers were pure, fresh, and unburdened by precur-
sors. The narrator, whose temporal location is coterminous with Pater’s, 
as the references to Swift and Gautier in this chapter indicate, declares 
emphatically, “No! it was certainly not that old-fashioned ease of the 
early literature, which could never come again” (I:56). By acknowledging 
the problem of self-consciousness here, Pater rejects an entire tradition of 
literary criticism (operative for more than three centuries) that bemoaned 
the loss of originality, freshness, naïveté, purity, an unconditioned self—
whatever ideal condition was held against the self-consciousness of the 
belated artist. Pater is more interested in showing his readers an ancient 
literature that shares certain key elements, even a sensibility, with the 
literature of his own, eclectic age. His generation delights in “archaisms,” 
such as those to be found in Morris’s poetry; they take pleasure in the 
“racy morsels of the vernacular” that might be uncovered in Brown-
ing; and they recognize the “natural eloquence of the erudite artist” in 
someone such as Arnold, who indeed made them angry enough to cry 
for more of Alexander Smith! Apuleius, too, wrote in the vernacular, and 
like the literary languages developed by Morris, Browning, Arnold, and 
Pater himself, it was written “with all the care of a learned language” 
(I:57).
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 The chapter on “Euphuism” that follows the boys’ reading of Apu-
leius sets out some of the elements of eclecticism that Pater repeats three 
years later in “Style.” The narrator tells us that Flavian himself possessed 
“a fine instinctive sentiment of the exact value and power of words,” and 
he designs for himself a “literary programme” that distinctly resembles 
Pater’s own, at least as he represented it in “Style”: “He would make of 
it a serious study, weighing the precise power of every phrase and word, 
as though it were precious metal, disentangling the later associations and 
going back to the original and native sense of each,—restoring to full sig-
nificance all its wealth of latent figurative expression, reviving or replac-
ing its outworn or tarnished images. Latin literature and the Latin tongue 
were dying of routine and languor; and what was necessary, first of all, 
was to re-establish the natural and direct relationship between thought 
and expression, between the sensation and the term, and restore to words 
their primitive power” (I:96). The young man is both ambitious, seek-
ing to become a leader among men by increasing the power of his words, 
and patriotic, wishing to rehabilitate “the mother-tongue, then fallen so 
tarnished and languid” (I:94). Flavian envisions an improved, vernacu-
lar literary language, a combination of the “increasingly artificial” and 
“barbarously pedantic” classical Latin with the “colloquial idiom” and 
its “thousand chance-tost gems of racy or picturesque expression” (I:95). 
This combination is what Pater discovered in “Joachim Du Bellay” and 
the Pleiad school of poets in sixteenth-century France: “Du Bellay’s object 
[was] to adjust the existing French culture to the rediscovered classical 
culture” (The Renaissance 128). This project was based, like Flavian’s, on 
the writer’s faith in the vernacular. Great literature comes from a lan-
guage that is free, and alive. Du Bellay wanted to learn from the classics, 
but to bring the strength of antique words and images into French, rather 
than to borrow Greek and Latin, to put another’s words into his mouth. 
The passage in Marius also echoes the familiar pronouncements of Vico, 
Wordsworth, or Carlyle on the necessity of returning to origins (“primi-
tive power”) in order to reinvigorate a dying language. Pater recommends 
a similar operation in “Style,” in which the writer uses eclecticism to 
find his own original vocabulary: “A writer, full of a matter he is before 
all things anxious to express, may think of those laws, the limitations of 
vocabulary, structure, and the like, as a restriction, but if a real artist will 
find in them an opportunity. His punctilious observance of the proprieties 
of his medium will diffuse through all he writes a general air of sensibility, 
of refined usage” (12–13). Though Pater admits that some writers might 
fall into “mannerisms” and “fopperies,” a great writer, “braced by those 
restraints,” will discover “his own true manner” (14). A “real artist” finds 
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opportunity in restriction, and a treasure house in the burden of the past. 
Pater’s argument here should sound familiar, not only because it runs all 
through his work, but because it is identical to the claims made by eclec-
tics from Winckelmann and Reynolds to Cousin and Arnold. For Pater, 
then, Euphuism is not mere affectation; rather it is care of language, care 
of the instrument with which the artist creates. He answers the question 
of why a writer cannot say a thing simply, like the old writers of Greece, 
with a spirited defense of Euphuism: “Certainly, the most wonderful, the 
unique, point, about the Greek genius, in literature as in everything else, 
was the entire absence of imitation in its productions. How had the burden 
of precedent, laid upon every artist, increased since then! It was all around 
one:—that smoothly built world of old classical taste, an accomplished 
fact, with overwhelming authority on every detail of the conduct of one’s 
work. With no fardel on its own back, yet so imperious towards those who 
came labouring after it, Hellas, in its early freshness, looked as distant from 
[Flavian] even then as it does from ourselves. There might seem to be no 
place left for novelty or originality,—place only for a patient, an infinite, 
faultlessness” (Marius I:99–100). Neither Flavian nor Pater retreats from 
“the burden of precedent,” feeling instead what Harold Bloom named, in 
Pater’s honor, “the intoxication of belatedness.” Pater reiterates here what 
he wrote in The Renaissance, that there are neither poetical nor unpoetical 
ages. Poetic beauty was not “a thing ever one and the same,” but “chang-
ing with the soul of time itself” (I:100). As the soul accumulates experi-
ence, it becomes more complex, yielding greater riches to the artist. Pater 
has Flavian wonder whether future ages would look back on his time and 
think it ideal in comparison to their own, underscoring the essential con-
tinuity of the conditions of creation throughout history.
 The central problem of the romance is not literary but religious, 
although Pater clearly sees parallels between them. After Flavian’s death 
from the plague (brought, not insignificantly, by the imperial armies of 
Marcus Aurelius, the philosopher-emperor), Marius tries out various 
approaches to life, but is unable to rest in poetry, mysticism, or Greek 
philosophy. In finding a resolution to Marius’s philosophical dilemma in 
“complete education” or Cyrenaicism, Pater defers the religious question. 
The practical goal of his philosophy and his life (apart from the idealistic 
one of experiencing as many sensations as possible) would be to understand 
“the various forms of ancient art and thought, the various forms of actual 
human feeling” (I:152) with impartiality; to accomplish this end he would 
become, of necessity, a critic because, “in a world, confessedly so opulent in 
what was old, the work, even of genius, must necessarily consist very much 
in criticism” (I:153). As an interpreter “of the beautiful house of art and 
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thought which was the inheritance of the age” (I:153), Marius would have 
to live much in reminiscence, turning inward, achieving intimacy with his 
impressions.
 In Marius’s subsequent adventures, the narrator reveals some of the 
dangers involved in the hero’s endeavor. As he encounters competing sys-
tems of thought, most significantly that embodied by the Stoic emperor, 
Marcus Aurelius, he risks the loss of his own system. We follow in chapters 
such as “Second Thoughts” and “A Conversation Not Imaginary” Mari-
us’s dialectic, the process by which he tests and ultimately secures his own 
beliefs. The gravest challenges to Heraclitus, Epicurus, and Aristuppus 
of Cyrene come from the emperor and from Christianity, the emperor 
representing “the strange medley of superstition, that centuries’ growth, 
layer upon layer, of the curiosities of religion” that was the Roman empire 
in the second century, and Christianity embodying a somewhat different 
selection of the old religions. The key point, I think, is that both chal-
lenges to Marius’s already eclectic philosophy come from varieties of reli-
gious syncretism. In Rome, “A blending of all the religions of the ancient 
world had been accomplished” (I:184). Far from disdaining the “medley 
of superstitions” held by his people, the Stoic emperor (perhaps enlivening 
his own bleak outlook) entered into all their rituals. But Marius cannot 
accept either Marcus Aurelius’s religiosity or his Stoicism once he has seen 
the spectacle of animal sacrifice. The emperor and the general mass of his 
followers reject no practices, no rituals, no beliefs at all, and therefore, in 
their naïve form of eclecticism, seem to confound true religion entirely. 
Even in Cyrenaicism, there had to be distinctions, such as that between 
good and evil. In sharp contrast to the semiofficial naïve eclecticism of 
the empire, Christianity offers an attractive blending of the art, philoso-
phy, and literature of various faiths, which Marius sees for the first time 
in the “church” in Cecilia’s house. Like Kingsley in his early Christian 
novel, Hypatia, Pater wants to show how Christianity grew up eclectically 
around a set of core beliefs. Within this paradigm, Christianity’s wisdom is 
found in its eclecticism: “‘Wisdom’ was dealing, as with the dust of creeds 
and philosophies, so also with the dust of outworn religious usage, like the 
very spirit of life itself, organizing soul and body out of the lime and clay 
of the earth. In a generous eclecticism, within the bounds of her liberty, 
and as by some providential power within her, she gathers and serviceably 
adopts, as in others matters, so in ritual, one thing here, another there, 
from various sources—Gnostic, Jewish, Pagan—to adorn and beautify the 
greatest act of worship the world has seen” (II:126–27). When Marius is 
moved to sincere admiration of Christianity’s “generous eclecticism,” he 
enters the final phase of his romance, where he is able, finally, to reconcile 
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the moral and the aesthetic; but the conclusion of Marius the Epicurean is 
not definitive. It is a triumph of the sort that is characteristic of modern 
literature, what Ruskin called “triumph in mutability.” Rather than plac-
ing Christianity teleologically at the end point of the romance, as the ful-
fillment of the narrative, Pater carefully makes the hero’s conversion and 
martyrdom ambiguous, a sacrifice more for a feeling (hope) than a purpose 
(friendship). Eclecticism is described here as operating in accord with “the 
very spirit of life itself” when it organizes “soul and body out [ . . . ] of the 
earth.” When the “dust” of the “outworn” returns to the “lime and clay,” 
eclecticism molds it into a new form, in harmony with the self and the age. 
Eclecticism is generous, because it is inclusive; but it is also moral, because 
it works “within the bounds of [ . . . ] liberty.” And, finally, it is aesthetic, 
because it takes for the adornment of Christian worship all that was beau-
tiful in the Gnostic, the Jewish, and the Pagan. Nothing that was beautiful 
is ever really lost, so long as the eclectic “gathers” and “adopts.”
 Pater, more than any other nineteenth-century writer, explores the nat-
ural eclecticism of the human mind—the fossils in the stones, or the dust 
in the clay—and in particular, the eclecticism of the modern self, thereby 
dispelling the anxiety that had perplexed his immediate precursors, who 
feared there would never be a style to represent the age. As he contends in 
the “Postscript” to Appreciations, the nineteenth century has its style, and it 
is “an eclectic one”: “Appealing, as he may, to precedent in this matter, the 
scholar will remember that if ‘the style is the man’ it is also the age: that 
the nineteenth century too will be found to have had its style, justified by 
necessity [ . . . ] an intellectually rich age such as ours being necessarily an 
eclectic one, we may well cultivate some of the excellences of literary types 
so different as those: that in literature as in other matters it is well to unite 
as many diverse elements as may be: that the individual writer or artist, 
certainly, is to be estimated by the number of graces he combines, and his 
power of interpenetrating them in a given work” (261). In order to func-
tion at all, he seems to tell us, we must live with this complexity, and in 
order to create, we must learn to be conscientiously eclectic. Neither our 
language, nor our art, nor our religion can ever be simple; we can recover 
primitive language at times as a “corrective,” but our real style—our best 
style—will always be mixed. In his early essay on “Coleridge” (1865, rev. 
1880) he wrote of the “sickly thought” that struggled against the spirit of 
the age, and “saddened [Coleridge’s] mind, and limited the operation of his 
unique poetic gift” (Appreciations 69). Modern thought, Pater recognized, 
cultivates the relative in place of the absolute, but Coleridge went on seek-
ing absolutes. Pater speculates that Coleridge would have gained much by 
pursuing “the relative spirit”; but instead there is his failure, and “endless 
Chapter : Walter Pater and Thomas Hardy

regret, the chords of which ring all through our modern literature” (104). 
As a critic Pater is sensitive enough to recognize the interconnectedness of 
the sickness (relativism) and the cure (eclecticism). Though Pater refines 
and extends his philosophical and literary eclecticism in the essays that 
make up Appreciations, he has already written his true apologia in Marius, 
with its mingling of triumph and regret. It is usually read as an explana-
tion of a philosophical position that was misunderstood in the conclusion 
to The Renaissance; but it is equally important, in literary-historical terms, 
to read the work as an apology for eclecticism, and as the coda for an eclec-
tic age.
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hen I began to write this study of nineteenth-century eclecti-
cism, I was still looking at the problem from the perspec-
tive of its critics. I had in my mind an image of the “Citizen 
of the Nineteenth Century Strolling in the Ruins of History.” I would 
reveal this intrepid tourist for the tomb raider he was, plundering ruins 
(and regularly looting exotic cultures) for the raw materials of his deriva-
tive, exhausted creations. But almost from the beginning, I found myself 
in sympathy with this individual whose historical belatedness provoked 
such intense, intellectual anguish. The eclecticism of the nineteenth cen-
tury was, in large part, an answer to the dilemma of style—in what style 
should we build, paint, write?—but it was also a deliberate, philosophical 
turn of mind—balm on the deep wound of unbelief. In art, it was an effort 
to combine the best of “history’s diverse beauties”; in philosophy, eclec-
ticism meant that one could be skeptical and still believe in something, 
namely one’s own ability to sort through various systems of thought and 
come out with a fair amount of cold, hard truth. At some point I real-
ized that my research was becoming a performance of my own intellectual 
predicament. Driven by an awareness of the superabundance of history, 
eclecticism, comparative literature, and, most recently, multicultural liter-
ary studies have all shared the common aim of rebuilding the humani-
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ties according to an integrative social and political model. But I saw that 
comparative literature, like eclecticism, tried to comprehend too large a 
field of knowledge within the scope of an impossible erudition. The proj-
ect has been haunted by two related questions: first, is eclecticism a viable 
approach to the study of the humanities? And, second, to what extent does 
eclecticism already describe the current state of literary studies, both its 
“crisis” and the efforts to resolve that dilemma of purpose?
 In trying to ascertain whether our own “crisis” is a continuation of 
the crisis of the nineteenth century, it is important to map the historical 
relationship between eclecticism and three aspects of the current dilemma: 
translation, comparison, and cosmopolitanism. Each of these terms carries 
a heavy burden of significance for the present purpose and future survival 
within the university of the humanities in general, and literary study in 
particular. To test the relevance of the concept of “eclecticism” within the 
field of literary studies, I was drawn into dialogue with three critics whose 
writings on translation, comparison, and cosmopolitanism have been influ-
ential in shaping my understanding of the new terrain in which most of 
us will (and many already do) work: Wolfgang Iser, Charles Bernheimer, 
and Bruce Robbins. In “The Emergence of a Cross-Cultural Discourse: 
Thomas Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus,” his essay for the collection The Trans-
latability of Cultures, Iser suggests that the rift opened up by the quarrel 
between the ancients and the moderns in the eighteenth century would 
provoke Carlyle’s effort to renegotiate the relationship between past and 
present, foreign and domestic cultures. The theory of translatability that 
emerges from Sartor Resartus in effect “manages” the crisis and, in doing 
so, might have some bearing on the crisis provoked in our own time by 
the burgeoning of world literatures. For comparatists, the vexing ques-
tion of translation will thus become more insistent as we try to telescope 
ever more “distant” objects of study within our fields of expertise. In his 
introduction to the collection Comparative Literature in the Age of Multi-
culturalism (for which the 1993 ACLA report, “Comparative Literature 
at the Turn of the Century,” provides the occasion), Charles Bernheimer 
reflects on the anxiety that “comparison,” generally speaking, has always 
produced, and he speculates on the future direction of a “discipline” that 
once defined itself both as exclusive (in its membership) and all-inclusive 
(in its scope). Upsetting the more traditional notion of cosmopolitanism 
considered by some of the contributors to Bernheimer’s volume, Bruce 
Robbins throws into doubt the efficacy of any model of cosmopolitanism 
that relies on detachment, universality, and transcendence to achieve its 
aims. Instead, he proposes that our “Actually Existing Cosmopolitanisms” 
are made up of messy particularities, of the multiple linkages created by 
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technology, religion, profession, diaspora, “race,” language, and, yes, even 
old-fashioned nationality.
 The cultural situation that provoked Thomas Carlyle to write in 1833 
“Am I a botched mass of tailors’ and cobblers’ shreds, then; or a tightly-
articulated, homogeneous little Figure, automatic, nay alive?” (Sartor 
Resartus 45) (and to affirm that a man and his clothes are two separate 
creations) might best be explained as the confrontation between a new cul-
tural situation and the old understanding of identity. As Iser points out in 
the essay on Sartor Resartus, this relationship among cultures (of contact 
and mutual influence) did not pose a problem as long as the “intercon-
nection of traditions—whether in terms of receiving an inheritance or of 
recasting a heritage—was taken for granted” (245). During the eighteenth 
century, however, the notion of culture underwent important shifts: not 
only was the distance between the ancients and the moderns recognized 
and accepted, but the gulf between national cultures also widened: “by dis-
covering difference as the dividing line between cultures, history as a cross-
cultural discourse emerged” (246). Partly as a consequence of imperialist 
endeavors and partly in response to a globalizing economy, nineteenth-
century thinkers such as Carlyle either constructed “theories” for coping 
with newly discovered difference or they constructed ever more rigid 
versions of national identity. Iser suggests that Carlyle’s paradigm for cul-
tural translation works on two levels. It revitalizes the “amputated past by 
turning it into a mirror in which the present is refracted” (247)—precisely 
what Carlyle achieves in Past and Present. Only by “mutual mirroring” do 
we get “mutual interpenetration,” since the differences between the two 
cultures can never be effaced. Therefore, Iser writes, “[cultural pathology] 
can be counteracted not just by taking over features and attitudes from dif-
ferent cultures, but first and foremost by instilling a self-reflexivity into the 
stricken culture, thus providing a scope for self-monitoring” (248). At best, 
Iser argues, this is a kind of therapy for cultures in crisis. The old ways of 
coping with the incursion of competing traditions, pragmatic assimilation 
or appropriation, no longer alleviate the crisis. Translatability allows for 
the “mutual impacting” of cultures upon one another.
 Iser and the other contributors to the collection were developing a 
concept of translation and translatability that resonated with the Victo-
rian idea of eclecticism, although they never used the word or invoked the 
history of eclecticism in philosophy that stands behind Carlyle. Extending 
the efforts of the eclectic philosophers in France, Carlyle in Sartor Resar-
tus was attempting to reconcile German idealism and British empiricism 
or, more proximately, Scottish common sense. The work (of eclecticism) 
is necessarily self-reflexive for Carlyle. In the persona of the Editor, he 
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continually reflects upon the labor of selection and construction required 
to set out Herr Teufelsdröckh’s Philosophy of Clothes for an English-
speaking audience. In allowing for “mutual impacting,” the narrative of 
experience (Teufelsdröckh’s life-story) is frequently “punctured” by expo-
sitions of transcendental philosophy (both assembled from the bags of 
notes and fragments that the Editor received from Germany). The con-
stant interchange between narrative and argument allows for “mutual 
interpenetration” of the two cultures. The narrative of experience makes 
the philosophical speculation accessible, while the exposition of transcen-
dentalism becomes a means of “exceeding the familiar” (Iser 249). The jux-
taposition brings out “something” in the British readers of which they had 
never been aware. What this is, exactly, Iser does not say. Perhaps he does 
not need to because his essay on Sartor clearly exhibits the “something” that 
Carlyle manifests for him. Iser takes up the metaphor of a “Philosophy 
of Clothes”—the ostensible subject of Sartor Resartus, remember—in his 
effort to explain Carlyle’s theory of cultural translation and to propose one 
of his own.
 The autobiographical materials discovered by the nameless Editor of 
Sartor Resartus tell the story of a man whose life has no shape until he 
hits upon the philosophy of clothes. At the moment when Teufelsdröckh 
resolves his life-endangering crisis with the sartorial philosophy, he lays the 
foundation of a theory of translatability. Iser explains: “[The] self-inspect-
ing autobiographer turns more and more into a tailor, who constantly 
designs new clothes, or refashions garments inherited from the past. The 
autobiographer becomes a philosopher of clothes because he is unable to 
capture himself. Such a space-between can be ‘bridged’ only by ‘clothing,’ 
that is, by giving it a shape” (249–50). Failing in the project to know others 
as they really are, and failing to know ourselves as we really are, we turn 
to the study of clothing, that is, the shape they and we are given by what 
Carlyle calls the “Garments of Thought.” In metaphorically linking the 
forms of language and thought to fashion, Carlyle emphasizes that differ-
ences in style are translatable. Sartor Resartus poses as a translation from the 
German of Teufelsdröckh’s philosophy of clothes; in reality, it is Carlyle’s 
translation of German Romantic philosophy into a British style of thought. 
Similarly, in Past and Present Carlyle identifies language as the carrier of 
cultural identity and attempts to prove that cast-off Garments of Thought, 
such as those belonging to twelfth-century monasticism, may be recovered 
and repaired, clothing the impoverished languages of the present.
 Carlyle’s theory of cross-cultural discourse imagines a possible, evolved 
nineteenth-century language that would be informed both by primitive or 
ancient sources and by infusions from other cultures. From this confluence 
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of languages he proposes that we make and remake the world as “crises” 
dictate. To try to purify language (or thought) or resist the mongrelization 
of culture is to falsify communication and to become trapped in the lie of 
whole-cloth identity. Carlyle has contributed, in Iser’s view, the outline of 
cross-cultural praxis. How will the garments of foreign styles of thought 
gradually replace or interweave with our own? What will be the role of 
world literatures within an evolving canon? The Philosophy of Clothes—
Iser’s cross-cultural discourse—“anatomizes the process of translatability 
itself which, more often than not, is glossed over when imitation or depic-
tion is the overriding concern of representation” (255). For Iser and Car-
lyle, translation can take place only metaphorically, as something that gives 
a shape to the unknown, the “space-between.” By making Carlyle’s Philos-
ophy of Clothes into a theory of cultural translation, Iser has provided one 
eclectic model for coping with the “crisis” of multiculturalism. However, 
the resistance by some critics today to models of translation predicts a new 
retreat, even in this “age of multiculturalism,” behind national and disci-
plinary boundaries. Rather than surrendering to our fear of disintegration 
and mongrelization, we ought to view eclectic translation as a way to re-
tailor ourselves as cosmopolitan citizens of the world. This does not mean 
that we will become “botched masses of cobblers’ and tailors’ shreds,” but 
that we will be changed by the mutual mirroring that takes place when we 
attempt translation. Carlyle’s contribution to the theory of cultural transla-
tion bears reconsideration in light of recent debates on multiculturalism, 
and the eclecticism of that vision just might guide us through the wilder-
ness of our superabundant diversity.
 And yet comparatists have long been uneasy about the instrumental-
ity of translation. In the ACLA Reports of 1965 and 1975, and to a lesser 
degree in the 1993 Report, there is a persistent theme of textual translation 
as debasement. According to the authors, translation debases the values 
on which the discipline is founded—the distinctly elite values of the old 
notion of cosmopolitanism, Eurocentrism, and scholarly asceticism. Trans-
lation betrays the author. Translation can never give a reader insight into a 
foreign text or the tradition from which it emerges. Claiming knowledge 
of an author, text, or national literature via translation is the trick of the 
dilettante; the true comparatist must always do better, must underwrite 
faith in origins, in the original, in originality by claiming ownership at 
the source. Translation is therefore shameful. It is merely a service pro-
vided for those who will never have access to the cultural real. What is 
the relationship between textual translation, so reviled by “authentic” com-
paratists, and the cultural translation represented by Carlyle and theorized 
by Iser? As Charles Bernheimer has written, comparative literature is the 
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most “anxiogenic” of disciplines. In order to uphold the “values” of the 
post–World War II European founders of the discipline, we think we have 
to—think we are doing—more than our colleagues in modern languages, 
and yet we often have a hard time explaining the nature of our special 
contribution. The multifacetedness of comparative literature is often taken 
as the proof of its dilettantism, since the object of study is no longer clear. 
At the risk of sounding as omnivorous as some of our predecessors in the 
field, I want to suggest that the crisis of comparative literature has become 
everyone’s crisis, that issues of comparison and translation are now as 
endemic in English studies, French studies, and German studies as they 
are in the discipline that was supposed to take care of all that.
 Beginning graduate school in the early nineties, when the dominance 
of theory gave way, as Bernheimer emphasizes, to the “study of the ‘extrin-
sic’ relations of literature, its placements within psychological, historical 
or sociological contexts” (5), I became anxious about context. What was 
the good of avoiding translations, when my cross-cultural studies were 
making it impossible to know any one culture really well? Reading in the 
nineties meant taking into account race, gender, class, sexual orientation, 
history, politics, location, and language. For me, “narrowing” my field of 
study to British literature and culture within a European context was a cal-
culated effort to become a better reader, in the new sense. However, with 
the diversification of the canon in all the modern languages, one cannot 
simply escape from the problem of translation, or comparison; any method 
of literary study depends on translation. With the advent of multicultural-
ism, it is impossible to be comfortable within even a single literary tradi-
tion. In English, we must take into account English-speaking literatures 
around the world, and, most importantly for our students, the multiethnic 
literary traditions of North America. Now, more than ever before, literary 
scholars might be accused of dilettantism (of being naïvely eclectic), as we 
try to encompass more and more material within our range of expertise. 
What can we learn from comparative literature, the discipline known for 
persisting within a perpetual state of anxiety? As Bernheimer suggests, 
comparative literature is valuable because it teaches us to be self-critical as 
we live with instability. And so we must be cautious, as Rey Chow warns 
in her contribution to Bernheimer’s volume, about substituting for Euro-
pean masterpieces another canon of non-European works. She argues that 
the entire multiculturalist model is “flawed by its tendency to essentialize 
other cultures, attributing to them far more unity, regularity, and stabil-
ity than they actually have” (Bernheimer “Introduction,” 8). The cross- 
cultural discourse Iser sees emerging from the nineteenth century provides 
a partial answer to this dilemma; new varieties of cosmopolitanism force 
Afterword
5
us to acknowledge the partialness of our understanding, even as cosmo-
politanism enables the development of ever more complex cross-cultural 
discourses.
 Contributors to the 1998 collection Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feel-
ing beyond the Nation describe “actually existing cosmopolitanism” (not the 
old notion of a universal humanity as “a style of practical consciousness”) 
(Robbins 2; Cheah 21). Rather than an expansive feeling of connectedness, 
we experience a feeling of narrowness, of the limits of our understanding. 
A growing awareness of particularities, and of permanent differences, does 
not necessarily lead, in his view, to wagon-circling and border patrols. Rob-
bins sees actually existing cosmopolitanism as a series of variably intense 
connections “both within and beyond the nation” (12). The “cosmopoli-
tics” Robbins wants to formulate depends on that very Victorian notion of 
“sympathy,” on “defin[ing] collectivities of belonging and responsibility in 
the absence of that long history of face-to-face interaction that [ . . . ] was 
necessary to community” (9). It is vital, then, that the cosmopolitan get 
beyond “mere aesthetic spectatorship” and “privileged and irresponsible 
detachment” (4). Coping with the loss of authenticity, originality, and com-
munity, “critical cosmopolitanism” could change (and is already changing) 
comparative literature and multicultural literary studies by keeping its 
own historical and geographical origins firmly in view. According to this 
model, we still need humanistic criticism, but of a kind that strives toward 
“mutual translatability” without ever expecting to find “humanity.”
 Translation occurs metaphorically and continuously as we attempt to 
understand the other in new terms of relation, around the space occupied 
by our differences. Eclecticism, a very old style of cross-cultural discourse, 
constitutes the conceptual opposite of something like deconstruction 
because it implies belief within a framework of skepticism. Under the 
rubric of eclecticism, comparison leads not to indifference, but to affirma-
tion. If we think about cultural translation eclectically, keeping in mind 
that no system could lay claim to the whole truth, and if we pursue rigor-
ously dialectic reading, we might find “something” in ourselves that we’d 
never been aware of before. I am reminded of Walter Pater’s claim that 
eclecticism is the vernacular of sophisticated societies. Whether we want 
it or no, our language evolves to accommodate incursions from “outside,” 
styles of thought that alter our own. If we have no choice about being 
eclectic, then we must speak and write conscientiously as Eclectics: this 
is the lesson of the nineteenth century. Emerging from a literary reaction 
against the materialism of the eighteenth century, eclecticism gave human-
ists a concept of “progress” that had been lacking—but on a very different 
historical model. Operating metaphorically and comparatively, eclecticism 
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allows for synthesis, for incremental changes, not for rapid development 
and not in one direction only. Eclecticism promotes a cosmopolitan atti-
tude of mind. From seeing Europe as a single confederation whose cul-
tures were mutually interpenetrated, it was not long (historically speaking) 
until Europeans recognized, after the million contacts of colonization, 
forms of connection and mutual mirroring with cultures that seemed ever 
more diverse. How many colonials must have felt this way, when the com-
fortable boundaries of their world were forever changed by contact? We 
used to imagine that contact went only one way, changed only those who 
did not invite the change; but now, as we learn to speak a cosmopolitan 
vernacular, we understand that the only possible form of cross-cultural 
discourse is this mutual mirroring or comparison or eclecticism that finally 
makes exchange possible.
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Introduction
 1. I borrow the distinction between “The Two Modernities” from Matei Calines-
cu’s classic study, Five Faces of Modernity, pp. 41–46.
Chapter 1
 1. In his 1934 essay “What Is Baroque?,” Erwin Panofsky makes a strong case for 
the Carracci being at the center of a late-sixteenth-century movement toward synthesis, 
though by this time the negative term “eclectic” is simply omitted. Annibale Carracci, 
he writes, “began with a deliberate effort to synthesize the plastic values of classical 
antiquity and classical High Renaissance art with such purely pictorial tendencies as 
had survived the manneristic intermezzo, namely the Venetian colorism and the Cor-
reggesque ‘sfumato’” (38). Furthermore, Panofsky affirms the role of the Bolognese 
school as artistic reformers who wished to restore the “good old traditions” (36).
 2. In the 1959 foreword to his 1924 book Idea: A Concept in Art Theory, Erwin 
Panofsky qualifies the original priority he gave to Bellori’s 1672 “classicistic interpreta-
tion” of art and traces the concepts of the Idea del pittore, dello schultore, e dell’ architetto 
back to Giovanni Battista Agucchi, whose manuscript papers clearly show that ideas 
about the Carracci’s resolution of the conflict between “unnatural” Mannerism and 
“raw” Naturalism were already in circulation between 1607 and 1615 (vii). Despite this 
revision of Panofsky’s original genealogy, his contribution to the history of Idea is still 
valuable. It is particularly interesting how he distinguishes the Mannerists’ Neopla-
n o t e s
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tonic understanding of Idea from that of the Carracci (and Agucchi/Bellori). Neither 
the Mannerists nor the Naturalists were on the right path. If Idea has a metaphysical 
origin, then the artist can ignore sensory reality. Bellori argued that Idea originates 
from sensory perception, and comes into being through the selection of natural beauties, 
especially from art: “The infallible measure of this juste milieu was obviously the art 
of antiquity, which was honored not as a ‘naturalistic’ art but—precisely because of its 
limitation to a ‘purified’ or ‘ennobled’ reality—as a truly ‘natural’ art” (Panofsky, Idea, 
105). Thus classical art theory is born from an eclectic process, of which the Carracci 
may be considered the originators.
 3. According to Mahon, “eclectic” designates neither a period in the history of art 
nor a recognizable visual style, and cannot be recovered as a value-free critical term, 
since it “is unable to divest itself of its inherent qualitative connotation (which entails 
the confusing injection of aesthetic judgment into the argument): because of its obvi-
ous etymological origin and subsequent history it does not lend itself, as Gothic and 
Baroque have done, to gradual metamorphosis into qualitative neutrality” (228).
 4. Commentators on the Carracci experienced some semantic difficulty after Ma-
hon banned the use of “eclectic.” Donald Posner, in his two-volume monograph, con-
cedes Mahon’s point: since “Annibale’s analytical and selective stylistic experiments 
were mainly confined to the period before 1600, [ . . . ] the attempt of later critics to 
see the whole of Annibale’s Roman art as broadly and programmatically ‘eclectic’ was 
an unjustified exaggeration” (116). Posner concedes this point only to disagree with 
Mahon at the back door: “to suggest that Annibale’s art was in any way naïvely formed 
in a simple response to new influences would be equally unjustified. Annibale’s ana-
lytical deliberation in creating his style—his selection of Raphael as his main source, 
his investigation of Correggio within the context of his new style, his introduction of 
elements from Michelangelo and the Antique, the preservation of pictorial qualities 
from his Bolognese style—made him the first critically retrospective artist in the his-
tory of art and an example for artists and theorists for the next three centuries” (118). In 
1977 Charles Dempsey acknowledges that Denis Mahon played a vital role in making 
a critical re-evaluation of the Carracci possible, that he had effected “a revolution in 
taste” (1). But he goes on to write of Annibale’s confrontation with the “central intel-
lectual issue which faced all artists of his time—the bringing together of Theory and 
Practice, both in the painting of his own pictures and in the training of young artists” 
(3). Like Posner, Dempsey credits the Carracci with “uniting Tuscan disegno and Lom-
bard colore through mastering the theoretical basis of both in natural observation and 
analysis”; he adds, “in doing so [they] rose above the mere eclecticism of combining the 
natural perfections already expressed in the various manners of others” (43). In 1988 
another Carracci historian, Carl Goldstein, feels obliged to come to terms with Mahon’s 
and Dempsey’s diametrically opposed readings of the Carracci, and produces a book 
chiefly concerned with reexamining the relationship between theory and practice, with 
a special emphasis on contemporary understandings of the theory and history of paint-
ing. He describes the Carracci (without using the word eclectic) “as thoughtful artists 
who consciously chose from among the artistic options available to them, developing 
a particular aesthetic stance and pictorial styles as a result of their assessment of past 
and recent art,” but whose achievements were misrepresented by well-meaning literati 
(Visual Fact 6). Margaretha Rossholm Lagerlöf, in her study of classical landscape paint-
ing, agrees with Mahon “that the wording employed by the theorists has simplified or 
concealed important aspects of these paintings”; but she goes on to admit, “It cannot be 
Notes to Chapter 1
5
denied, however, that the Carracci school won the high regard of the classicists, of the 
advocates of selection according to the principles of beauty together with subjects and a 
style derived from the repertoire of antiquity, and a mode of expression resembling that 
of Raphael” (42). This prompts Lagerlöf to ask, “What was it in the Carracci paintings 
that could satisfy this type of taste and yet be regarded as innovative, a conquest of new 
artistic territory?,” to which I would answer: a successful eclectic synthesis of their study 
of past art and of nature.
 5. Despite Dempsey’s appreciation for Mahon’s contribution to the study of Ba-
roque painting, he strongly disagrees with Mahon’s attempt to throw out the theoreti-
cal interpretation with “the bathwater of eclecticism” (54). In defending the Carracci 
against critics who underrated the Carracci by subscribing to a critical notion of eclecti-
cism, Mahon ignored the very reliable historical sources such as Agucchi who testified 
to the Carracci’s effort to reform painting through imitation of various masters (56).
 6. The original Italian text is given by Denis Mahon in his discussion of its correct 
attribution:
Sonetto in lode di Nicolò Bolognese.
Chi farsi vn bon pittor cerca, e desia
 Il disegno di Roma habbia alla mano,
 La mossa, coll’ombrar Veneziano,
 E il degno colorir di Lombardia.
Di Michel’Angiol la terribil via,
 Il vero natural di Tiziano,
Del Coreggio lo stil puro, e sourano,
 E di vn Rafel la giusta simetria.
Del Tibaldi il decoro, e il fondamento,
 Del dotto Primaticcio l’inuentare,
 E vn pò di gratia del Parmigianino.
Ma senza tanti studi, e tanto stento,
 Si ponga solo l’opre ad imitare,
 Che quì lascioci il nostro Nicolino. (208)
 7. Mahon believes that Malvasia is responsible for these verses, whether they were 
actually written by a mourner at Abate’s funeral or invented later for his Felsina Pittrice 
(1678).
 8. Fuseli’s early argument against eclecticism resonates well into the nineteenth 
century. In “The Nature of Gothic” John Ruskin will value “imperfection” in art over 
mechanistic perfection and launch the entire reformation of nineteenth-century arts 
and crafts.
 9. It would be intriguing to interpret Blanc’s assessment of the Carracci in light of a 
recent study of Blanc’s own eclecticism by Misook Song. She claims that “Blanc’s eclecti-
cism, although it appears strongly hybrid in nature, can be reduced to his purist belief in 
the all-embracing universal notion of ‘eternal geometry’ whose pedigree ultimately goes 
back to Plato” (105). The line Song traces from Blanc back to Plato would certainly have 
to include the Neoplatonists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who propagated 
many of the theories the Carracci found so congenial.
 10. In his comprehensive study Teaching Art, Carl Goldstein affirms that “The visual 
evidence [ . . . ] shows that the Carracci did indeed mine the works of the masters of the 
Renaissance, regarding such works as sources of images at least equal to nature, which 
Notes to Chapter 1
0
is to say that their practice was demonstrably ‘eclectic,’ and eclecticism is a doctrine 
residing in the innermost sanctum of the academic tradition” (36). However, Goldstein 
believes that Carracci eclecticism was based on the Renaissance notion of “imitation” 
and that their practice involved a higher degree of improvisation than such an institu-
tionalized system might allow. Assuredly, Goldstein says, they were not systematically 
eclectic in their teaching. But he admits “That later academies may have been influ-
enced by reports of Carracci ‘eclecticism’” (36).
 11. Academic prestige might have fallen off in the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, but the academies remained for artists the primary route to public success. Thus, 
I do not wish to overemphasize the importance of Romanticism, since Carl Goldstein, 
in his comprehensive study Teaching Art, has shown that the two revolutions of the late 
eighteenth century, the political and the cultural, did not substantially affect teaching 
methods in the academies (58–61). More substantial reforms, described by Albert Boime 
in “The Teaching Reforms of 1863 and the Origins of Modernism in France,” would 
come later, but even these, Goldstein argues, were primarily “external” (having to do 
with admissions and the awarding of prizes and with overcoming the prejudice against 
craft) (61); that is, the academic teaching methods based on eclecticism remained.
 12. While the academic tradition might have originated in Italy and reached its pin-
nacle of prestige and organization in France, Goldstein points out that nowhere “did 
doctrine take so strong a hold or play so central a role as it did in the Royal Academy 
officially established in London in 1768” (Teaching Art 54). Founded to establish an 
academy of design and to hold annual exhibitions, it incorporated the best of the Italian 
and French academies. He also notes that Reynolds’s series of Discourses would largely 
be supported by his successors, which “testif[ies] to a consensus in the Royal Academy, 
as though the members had entered into a pact as to the means and ends of visual art” 
(58).
 13. Albert Boime’s Thomas Couture and the Eclectic Vision is by far the most compre-
hensive account of eclecticism in painting. He provides not only a history of its sources 
in the philosophy of Cousin and his contemporaries, but also a detailed study of the art 
and teaching of Thomas Couture—the genesis of his eclectic style, his search for “the 
juste milieu expression,” and “the iconography of the juste milieu.” Couture and other 
eclectic artists wanted to mediate between the “extremes of romanticism and classicism 
in the fine arts” (29). Boime points out that even those artists whom we consider most 
“Romantic” were deeply affected by Cousin’s teachings. Eugène Delacroix believed 
that eclecticism had its source in national identity: “One might say that eclecticism is, 
par excellence, the French banner for the arts of drawing and music. In their art, the 
Germans and the Italians have marked qualities some of which are often antipathetic 
to others: the French seem to have striven since time immemorial to reconcile these 
extremes by attenuating whatever seemed to be disharmonious therein” (qtd. in Boime 
29). As Boime points out, it is not contradictory to associate romanticism with eclecti-
cism. Both represented the aspirations of the middle classes; both wished to expand 
political and cultural frontiers; and both “emphasized the individual’s consciousness as 
the ultimate test of experience” (30). Boime’s work on eclecticism effectively reminds us 
of how dominant it was as a way of thinking in all artistic and cultural movements of 
the nineteenth century.
  Patricia Mainardi is another critic whose work attends to the intersections be-
tween high art and popular culture. In her 1987 book Art and Politics of the Second 
Empire: The Universal Expositions of 1855 and 1867, Mainardi explores the impact of 
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eclectic theory on academic painting and international exhibitions. The 1855 Exposition 
Universelle des Beaux-Arts allowed ordinary French people to see art from around the 
world for the first time, to compare the art of different countries, and to “form their 
own opinions” (66). Actually, Mainardi argues, the critic became more important than 
ever in helping the visitor to understand the dizzying range of works of art. In accor-
dance with the “government dictum of eclecticism,” artists representing twenty-eight 
countries were honored at the exhibit. Eclecticism thus attempted “to find a structure, 
a theory, which could encompass in coherent fashion the varied art” on display (69). 
The second mandate of eclecticism, that of “combining the qualities of different schools 
into a harmonious ensemble,” was admirably fulfilled by the French artists themselves 
for whom eclecticism became a national aesthetic. Even an art critic such as Théophile 
Gautier was satisfied with this formulation, proposing that English art represented the 
idea of individuality, Belgian art the idea of facility, German art the idea of intellect, and 
French art the idea of eclecticism (70).
 14. For Reynolds the prestige of poetry derived from its independence of the ac-
cidents of nature. In “Ut Poesis Pictura: Reynolds on Imitation and Imagination,” 
Harvey D. Goldstein asserts that Reynolds consistently opposes the two arts, because 
poetry “applies itself directly to the imagination ‘without the intervention of any kind 
of imitation.’ The ‘poetry of painting’ locates, for him, the imaginative effect of the art 
divorced from the subject which is that art’s language” (227). Nevertheless, Goldstein 
concedes, the painter must follow the ways belonging to art—the “study of authentic 
models of excellence”—to learn how an object strikes the imagination (227).
 15. Despite Ruskin’s powerful critique of the academic method Reynolds advocated, 
there is strong evidence to suggest that Reynolds ultimately won the war. Prominent ac-
ademicians of the later nineteenth century, such as John Everett Millais, Lord Leighton, 
G. F. Watts, and Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema, not only were trained using traditional 
academic methods but also led the revival of typical academic subjects (history and my-
thology) and lent them a new post-Romantic prestige. Ample proof of the eclecticism 
of later-nineteenth-century art can be found in Andrew Bolton Marvick’s 1994 disserta-
tion, “The Art of John William Waterhouse: Eclecticism in Late Nineteenth-Century 
British Painting.” In his conclusion, Marvick affirms the notion on which this study is 
based, namely that Waterhouse’s “eclectic program [ . . . ] suggests the possible existence 
of parallel examples of eclecticism in the art of Waterhouse’s era and social milieu” 
(abstract). Marvick arrives at this conclusion after a careful examination of “[t]hree 
predominant historical situations [ . . . ]: first, that an environment suitable for the 
emergence of a consistent eclectic—as it were, a consistently inconsistent—figurative 
art within the Royal Academy existed at the time of Waterhouse’s studentship; second, 
that Waterhouse responded, with an extraordinary degree of variety, to that stimulus to 
create any number of eclectic inventions while maintaining his links with the Academy; 
third, that his work was, in more or less degree, recognized by his contemporaries as 
primarily an eclectic art, an art of style” (270). Marvick’s study of Waterhouse thus lends 
support to my claim that academic eclecticism dominated nineteenth-century art.
 16. In what follows, I affirm the importance of Scott’s literary example to the tour-
istic pursuit of history and argue that Scott contributed to the growth of an eclectic-
historical outlook in architecture. Scott’s place in the genealogy of eclecticism is more 
complex and far-reaching. Most notably, Scott’s reception in France by Stendhal, Bal-
zac, and Hippolyte Taine is significant in light of the fact that they were all influenced 
by the arch-eclectic philosopher Victor Cousin (the subject of chapter 2). Balzac in 
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particular seems to have recognized Scott’s eclecticism as his genius: “certain rounded 
and completed beings, certain bifron intellects, embracing all, want lyric and action, 
drama and ode, believing that perfection requires a sense of the total. This school, which 
must be named that of literary eclecticism, demands a representation of the world as it 
is: images and ideas; the idea in the image, or the image in the idea, movement, and 
reverie. Walter Scott satisfied completely these eclectic natures” (Balzac 127). In this 
passage, Balzac seems to describe the exemplary form of the novel, a genre which was 
born, through Cervantes, a hybrid creature. Not surprisingly, he includes himself in the 
eclectic school, determining that only such an all-embracing vision would be adequate 
to represent such a complex age.
 17. Ruskin was wrong about Scott’s Presbyterianism, at least according to recent 
biographer John Sutherland. Scott attended Episcopalian services with his mother, and 
then with his wife, though he read the Scottish prayer book at home. As Sutherland 
puts it, “Scott seems not to have put much importance on the mere forms of religious 
devotion” (72). But Ruskin’s broader sense about Scott’s religion is correct—it is not a 
serious matter with him, and is probably therefore an accurate measure of the writer’s 
modernity, and his eclecticism.
 18. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that Scott was a volitional eclectic. Ian 
Duncan puts it this way: “Scott composed Ivanhoe out of the quarry of his extensive 
reading in English literature from the Middle-English romances and old ballads to 
Shakespeare and the King James Bible” (“Editor’s Notes” 525). The image of a com-
positional quarry is an apt one for Scott, and could illustrate his writing process from 
The Lady of the Lake (1810) through to the end of his career. In the “Dedicatory Epistle” 
that accompanied the first edition of Ivanhoe (1819), Scott makes it clear that he is 
mixing history and romance, and “intermingling fiction with truth” (17), and, though 
the completion of Abbotsford is a few years off, he makes a prophetic (and typically 
self-deprecatory) comparison with trends in architecture: “it is extremely probable that 
I may have introduced, during the reign of Richard the First, circumstances appropri-
ate to a period either considerably earlier, or a good deal later than that era. It is my 
comfort, that errors of this kind will escape the general class of readers, and that I may 
share in the ill-deserved applause of those architects who, in their modern Gothic, do 
not hesitate to introduce, without rule or method, ornaments proper to different styles 
and to different periods of the art” (21). The letter is signed by the fictitious Laurence 
Templeton and is addressed to his friend, the equally fictitious Dr. Dryasdust, suggest-
ing that Scott regarded as silly the preoccupation with antiquarian details of modern 
Gothic. Scott was an obviously self-conscious practitioner of literary eclecticism, and 
given the allusion here to contemporary architecture, it is safe to assume that he was 
equally aware of the mixture of styles employed at Abbotsford.
 19. In his study Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development, architec-
tural historian Manfredo Tafuri points to awareness of urban eclecticism early in the 
nineteenth century when he cites this passage from F. Milizia’s Principi di architettura 
civile (3rd ed., 1813): “The plan of the city should be distributed in such a way that 
the magnificence of the whole is subdivided in an infinity of individual beauties, all so 
different one from the other that the same object is never encountered twice, and mov-
ing from one end to the other one finds in each quarter something new, unique, and 
surprising. Order must reign, but in a kind of confusion . . . and from a multitude of 
regular parts the whole must give a certain idea of irregularity and chaos, which is so 
fitting to great cities” (qtd. 21).
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 20. I have written elsewhere of picturesqueness as the dominant aesthetic of eclecti-
cism, specifically in the design of Bedford Park (see Bolus-Reichert, “Everyday Eclecti-
cism,” 162–96). Established in London in 1875, the early garden suburb of Bedford 
Park represented the best effort of architects and designers to live up to the ideals of the 
Aesthetic Movement. In most contemporary accounts, visitors remark on the pictur-
esqueness, variety, and novelty of the Queen Anne architecture, in stark contrast to the 
drab monotony they would find in the ordinary middle-class housing estate. William 
Morris visited the suburb in 1879 and soon after began writing of the historical dilemma 
provoked by the Queen Anne style, which captured the qualities of the picturesque only 
by eclectic imitation. Morris’s revision of the idea of the picturesque and the writing of 
his utopia News from Nowhere emerge in dialogue with the aesthetic and communitar-
ian principles of Bedford Park. The picturesque eclecticism of Bedford Park remains 
as a persuasive image of the road not taken in twentieth-century domestic architecture, 
a failure of vision more easily explained by Morris’s socialist critique of the picturesque 
aesthetic.
Chapter 2
 1. George Boas’s 1925 history, French Philosophies of the Romantic Period (1964) 
is still the best account in English. Valuable contemporary histories include Charles 
Adam’s La Philosophie en France (première moitié du XIXe siècle) (1894) and Félix 
Ravaisson’s La Philosophie en France au XIXe siècle (1868). Paul Bénichou’s Le Temps 
des prophètes: Doctrines de l’âge romantique (1977) is probably the most influential recent 
study of the period. During the 1990s there was a spate of studies on Cousin’s legacy in 
France. Notable among them are Éric Fauquet’s edited collection Victor Cousin: Homo 
Theologico-Politicus: Philologie, philosophie, histoire littéraire (1996), Jean-Pierre Cotten’s 
Autour de Victor Cousin: Une politique de la philosophie (1992), and Patrice Vermeren’s 
Victor Cousin: Le jeu de la philosophie et de l’état (1995). Donald R. Kelley gives the best 
recent account in English of the varieties of philosophical eclecticism before Cousin in 
“Eclecticism and the History of Ideas,” pointing out that although eclecticism was nei-
ther a school nor a real tradition, it was given new life (and a history) in early modern 
times (580). The appearance of several books and articles in the Journal of the History 
of Ideas in recent years seems to indicate that the history of eclecticism is being written 
once more, lending credence to Martin Mulsow’s claim that “in a ‘multi-option society’ 
eclecticism is a virtue which is necessary for life” because, like our Enlightenment 
precursors, “we are faced [ . . . ] with a breadth of choice before which the making of a 
considered judgment becomes a farce, for it can lead only to paralysis” (476). Eclectic 
thinking has once again become a necessity. In his review of German scholar Michael 
Albrecht’s monumental history of eclecticism, Eklektik. Eine Begriffsgeschichte mit Hin-
weisen auf die Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte (1994), Ulrich Schneider agrees, 
“eclecticism has lost its traditional bad reputation and seems increasingly attractive to 
late twentieth-century thought in search of non-dogmatic and nonsystematic forms of 
philosophizing” (173).
 2. Cousin had originally published his early lectures in five volumes as the Cours 
de l’histoire de la philosophie moderne in 1841. He selected what he considered the key 
elements of his philosophy and republished the extracts in one volume as Du Vrai, du 
Beau et du Bien in 1853. They were translated into English the same year as Lectures 
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on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. All citations refer to the 1872 American edi-
tion.
 3. Cousin does not speculate whether that synthesis had been achieved in Christi-
anity, although some later writers do. For example, Charles Kingsley’s novel Hypatia 
(1852–53), set in fifth-century Alexandria, deals with exactly the period of transition 
that Cousin describes, but he sees Christianity as fulfilling and indeed exceeding the 
promise of Hellenistic eclecticism.
 4. Though Cousin does not here give his philosophy the name “spiritualism,” by 
1853, when he is writing the preface to Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, 
he says “Our true doctrine, our true flag is spiritualism” (9). After decades of attacks on 
eclecticism, he seems to find safe harbor in spiritualism and gives it a respectable lin-
eage, including Socrates, Plato, the Gospel, Descartes, Royer-Collard, Chateaubriand, 
and Madame de Staël. He still calls eclecticism “dear to us, for it is in our eyes the light 
of the history of philosophy,” but now it is an “application of the philosophy which we 
teach, but it is not its principle” (9).
 5. In the best recent account of the “eclectic” interregnum, John Dillon and An-
thony Long try to shed the negative judgment that these unaffiliated philosophers were 
mere “indiscriminate assemblers of other thinkers’ doctrines” (vii).
 6. Both Donini and Dillon and Long want to overthrow the long-standing influ-
ence of Zeller’s account of eclecticism in Greek philosophy, arguing that his account was 
reductive and frequently uninformed about the actual contributions of philosophers to 
whom he attached the negative epithet. Donini canvasses the variety of meanings that 
can be attached to eclecticism in this period, arguing finally for great caution in applying 
the term at all, which seems to have only limited usefulness. See “The History of the 
Concept of Eclecticism,” especially pp. 31–33.
 7. Donini points out that most of Diderot’s definition is “derived from, or almost 
translated from, [Jakob] Brucker” (19). Neither Brucker nor Diderot originated the 
ideas presented in the Encyclopédie, however, as a positive orientation toward eclecti-
cism in philosophy had been building since the late Renaissance (20).
 8. Along with Casini and Donini, several other historians of philosophy have de-
tected in Diderot, and the Enlightenment more generally, a powerful strand of eclectic 
thought. Petr Lom looks at the element of skepticism in Diderot’s thought, which he 
traces back to ancient skepticism and the Pyrrhonists, arguing that Diderot intention-
ally rejects the destructiveness of their doubt in favor of the constructiveness of eclecti-
cism: “The eclectic free thinker [ . . . ] is to walk side by side with the sceptic, in order 
to pick up everything that his companion ‘has not reduced to dust by the severity of his 
inquiries’” (9). Although skepticism was an element of his thought, Diderot believed 
that “‘no philosopher [was] mad enough not to discern some element of the truth’” (qtd. 
in Lom 10)—there had to be a point where the doubting stopped. Wilhelm Schmidt-
Biggemann regards eclecticism, with rationalism, as one of the two mainstreams of the 
German Aufklärung: “They were both optimistic theories, they were both interested in 
the freedom of mankind: eclecticism in a practical way, rationalism in a theoretical way, 
a way which had to discover the possibility of freedom” (550).
 9. A professor of philosophy and Vico specialist, Joseph Ferrari, launched one 
of the most serious attacks on Cousin’s teachings in 1849 with Les philosophes salariés. 
Although he believes eclecticism to be a false philosophy riddled with errors, he does 
not specifically take issue with Cousin’s appropriation of Vico; rather Ferrari is more 
concerned to explore the links between the state and its quasi-official philosophy.
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 10. Sainte-Beuve’s relationship to Cousin was complicated throughout his life by 
his reliance on the prominent philosopher’s patronage. Literally saving Sainte-Beuve 
from a poverty that “kept his youth in chains,” Cousin, as Minister of Education, ap-
pointed him director of the Mazarine Library in 1840, but the 4,000 francs per annum 
constituted perhaps a new form of bondage. Sainte-Beuve’s respect for Cousin must 
have been sorely tested in the 1840s when the philosopher made use of some unpub-
lished material on Pascal and Madame de Longueville that Sainte-Beuve had brought 
to light. Enraged, he wrote a vicious letter to Cousin berating him for taking the food 
from his plate, but did not send it, remembering that he still needed a sponsor at the 
French Academy. Once elected in 1844 Sainte-Beuve no longer had to restrain criticism 
of his patron. When Villemain and Cousin resigned their government appointments 
in protest against restrictions that would be imposed by Louis Napoleon, Sainte-Beuve 
attacked them both publicly. His abuse of the liberals and their cause had the effect of 
alienating many of his former associates. Proust later contended that Sainte-Beuve’s 
criticism of Cousin never really hit its mark; to say that the philosopher’s egoism had got 
in the way revealed nothing of importance. See Harold Nicolson, Sainte-Beuve (1957).
 11. John Brooks offers an excellent account of the influence of Cousin’s eclectic 
spiritualism on the development of psychology and sociology in nineteenth-century 
France. Whereas Brooks convincingly recovers the suppressed history of eclecticism in 
the “human sciences,” I want to trace the influence of Cousin and a broader eclecticism 
on the literary history of the period.
 12. Taine blames the influence of German philosophy, imported by de Staël and 
Cousin, for much of the vagueness of eclecticism and for the collapse of philosophical 
inquiry in nineteenth-century France: “Les horribles substantifs allemands, les mots 
longs d’une toise, noyèrent la prose nette de d’Alembert et de Voltaire, et il sembla que 
Berlin émigré fût tombé de tout son poids sur Paris” (298) [“The horrible German sub-
stantives, the long words of a measuring apparatus, were embedded in the clear prose 
of d’Alembert and Voltaire, and it seemed that Berlin had fallen with all its weight on 
Paris” (my translation).]
 13. The art historian Albert Boime has written the most lucid account to date of 
the tremendous importance Cousin’s eclecticism had for the development of French 
Romanticism in all its aspects. In his view, all the major writers and artists of the first 
half of the nineteenth century were affected by Cousin including (in addition to those I 
discuss) Hugo, Vigny, Sand, Flaubert, and Merimée. See Thomas Couture and the Eclec-
tic Vision, pp. 3–22.
 14. In Racine et Shakespeare, Stendhal credits Cousin with converting the youth of 
France to Romanticism: “Mais, monsieur, l’immense majorité des jeunes gens de la 
société a été convertie au romantisme par l’éloquence de M. Cousin . . .” (151). He goes 
on to say that if Cousin were still permitted to teach (in 1824 he was in exile), he would 
convert any who remained unconvinced.
 15. At the time of his attack on Cousin, Hamilton occupied “an underpaid and 
undemanding Chair in Civil History” at Edinburgh, having been refused the post of 
the Chair of Moral Philosophy, which he had desired (Ryan xv). The article on Cousin 
was Hamilton’s first for the Edinburgh Review and made his name in intellectual circles, 
where he was previously unknown. As Ryan relates, it was “an editor’s nightmare, be-
ing late in arrival, much too long, and completely beyond the grasp of most readers of 
the Review. But it was a great success with Cousin himself, and it served notice on the 
outside world that someone in the British Isles was abreast of European philosophy” 
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(xv). It is the earliest review of Cousin that I have discovered in any British periodical, 
which accounts for the attention it receives here.
 16. While the reception of Cousin’s writings by the British public was largely nega-
tive, and I do tend to focus on those writers who best articulate the opposition to eclecti-
cism, it was not entirely so. J. D. Morell provides a critical defense of Cousin’s career in 
his review of a five-volume collection of the philosopher’s works in 1851. For example, 
he answers the charge of pantheism leveled against Cousin: “Indeed pantheism has al-
ways been the child of over-wrought speculation, the refuge of the recluse, when worn 
out with pondering over the mysteries of existence and the insoluble problems of hu-
man destiny; while the whole tendency of our author’s eclecticism is to depreciate mere 
individual speculation, to appeal to the sentiments of mankind at large, and to consider 
that no philosophical dogma has any authority whatever, until it is shown to be based 
upon and sustained by the massive foundations of common sense” (227). In conclu-
sion, Morell declares that Cousin had presided over “a remarkable era in the literary 
history of France” (228). Reviewing the works of Cousin’s biographers in 1890, John 
Owen agrees with them that Cousin was “the master critic of modern France” (459), 
talks of “his sturdy mental independence” (487), and believes, in spite of the failure of 
eclecticism, that “the spirit—the vis viva—of Cousin’s work still survives [ . . . ]. He still 
remains the greatest philosopher, the most eminent systematizer of philosophical and 
cultured thought, in the France of the nineteenth century” (487).
 17. Ryan reminds us that in the first half of the nineteenth century, philosophy and 
psychology had not yet attained their current meanings. “But whereas we now tend to 
draw a sharp distinction between the empirical inquiry into the mind and its powers 
which we call psychology, and the non-empirical inquiry into the possibility of knowl-
edge or into the intelligibility of knowledge-claims which we now call philosophy, no 
such distinction appears in [Mill’s] Examination” (ix), and nor did it in Cousin’s Cours de 
philosophie or Hamilton’s review of it.
 18. The phrase is Henry Calderwood’s. In The Philosophy of the Infinite (1854), he 
objected to Hamilton’s proposition that we can have no notion of an Infinite Being and 
actually sided with Cousin on this issue. Belief, he said, “rises above things of matter” 
and the mind looks upon a finite world and realizes that its powers are limited. None-
theless, the mind is conscious of the belief that the Infinite Being exists without limits. 
He agrees with Kant that our practical reason gives us the knowledge of “God as a nec-
essary postulate for proper moral action.” Calderwood acknowledges that the “balance 
of truth” is Cousin’s, but he makes it clear “that in upholding the French philosopher, 
we do so only to a limited extent, and that merely in reference to this individual doc-
trine, and not in reference to the relation which this doctrine holds in his system. [ . . . ] 
We admire the great central truth in the philosophy of M. Cousin, but we regard the 
various points of Eclecticism, which he has made to cluster around it, as so many out-
posts, worse than useless, which ought to fall to atoms, and which have so fallen under 
the effective assaults of the Scottish metaphysician” (14–15). Calderwood differentiates 
between being conscious of the Infinite (here used as synonymous with Absolute, as in 
Cousin) and being able to mimic its powers—assuming the position of God. Interest-
ingly, J. S. Mill, in his complete demolition of Hamilton’s philosophy, agreed with 
Hamilton that we have no direct knowledge of God. Whatever we know of God is by 
inference only (Examination 36). However, he uses Hamilton’s essay on Cousin to assert 
that “the most unquestionable of all logical maxims, [is] that the meaning of the abstract 
must be sought for in the concrete, and not conversely” (34).
Notes to Chapter 

 19. One of the sciences that Lewes saw as having potential for practical application 
and verifiability was phrenology, also a favorite of Comte’s (see Lewes, Biographical His-
tory of Philosophy 749–68, and Simon, “Two Cultures” 48).
 20. Lewes also tells a hair-raising story about Cousin’s exploitation of Hegel (372–
74). It is hard to overlook in Lewes’s vicious critique at least some degree of personal 
animosity he must have felt over Cousin’s treatment of Comte. The quarrel between 
the two philosophers was well known at the time. Born only six years apart in the final 
decade of the eighteenth century, Cousin and Comte yet seemed a generation apart in 
their professional success and cultural values. When Cousin was already teaching at the 
Sorbonne and the École Normale, Comte was still a student at the École Polytechnique; 
fifteen years later Cousin, the “idol of Parisian academic youth,” was appointed to an 
educational post in the new government, while Comte still held only a minor teaching 
post and began writing his Cours de philosophie positive in total obscurity. Cousin became 
director of the École Normale, wrote a syllabus for philosophical instruction that was 
adopted for use throughout the secondary system of the Université, and was the founder 
of the official philosophy, eclecticism, while Comte still pestered the government to cre-
ate a Chair for him in the History of Science. When he was refused by Cousin’s friend, 
Guizot, then Minister of Education, Comte turned against the government and the 
entire educational establishment (Simon, “Two Cultures” 46).
Chapter 3
 1. Coleridge’s career parallels Cousin’s rather remarkably: both men were attracted 
to eclectic styles of thought; both men wanted to rescue forgotten thinkers; both trav-
eled to Germany and studied philosophy; both espoused a vague spiritualism and both 
were condemned for pantheism; both were great talkers who seemed unable to fulfill 
their promise by publishing a magnum opus; both were addicted to reading and quota-
tion and both were accused of plagiarism; both valued poetry as the highest form of 
expression; both gained numerous, enthusiastic followers; and both were liberals with 
pragmatic conservative leanings accused of apostasy later in life.
 2. Coleridge is drawing upon Leibniz’s Trois Lettres à M. Remond de Montmort 
(1714) and Éclaircissement de difficultés que M. Bayle a trouvées [ . . . ] as they are quoted 
and translated in the German of F. H. Jacobi, Über die Lehre des Spinoza (1789). Leask 
points out the appropriateness of this heavily mediated paragraph (French text quot-
ed and translated in German text translated into English and, at the end, back into 
French), the subject of which is philosophical syncretism (Leask 402). Engell and Bate 
in their note on the same passage say that it should not be taken as Coleridge’s approval 
of eclecticism (Works 7.1: 245–46).
 3. Leask translates Leibniz: “I have found that most [philosophical] sects are right 
in a good part of what they assert, but not in what they deny” (403).
 4. A great number of publications billing themselves “eclectic” appeared in the first 
half of the nineteenth century as a means of collecting disparate areas of knowledge for 
easier consumption. The Eclectic Review was published in London from 1805 to 1868, 
but the vast majority of eclectic journals issued from American publishers: the American 
Eclectic, or Selections from the Periodical Literature of All Foreign Countries, and the Mu-
seum of Foreign Literature, Science and Art, which joined to become the Eclectic Museum 
and the Eclectic Magazine, was published in Boston. This journal continued under 
Notes to Chapter 
8
various titles through the turn of the century. Also in the United States, a number of 
eclectic medical publications appeared, including the Eclectic Medical Journal out of 
Cincinnati and the Eclectic Journal of Medicine from Philadelphia. Perhaps the best- 
remembered eclectic publication today is the McGuffey’s series of “Eclectic Readers.”
 5. Mill praises the efforts of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge as 
marking an important first attempt in combination. He imagines that ultimately, “au-
thors, as a collective guild, must be their own patrons and their own booksellers” (106).
 6. Perhaps the greatest proof of the link between eclecticism and democracy can 
be seen in the wider acceptance of Cousin’s teachings in America. Not only did most 
of the translations into English of Cousin’s works come from American publishers, 
but Transcendentalism, the most important philosophical system in the United States 
during the first half of the nineteenth century, was “eclectic in nature” and also “rep-
resented a phase of idealistic reaction” as French eclecticism had done. Following a 
survey of the sixty-six references to French philosophy in American periodicals between 
1828 and 1848, Georges Joyaux concludes that “Cousin’s doctrine was widely known in 
America and generally well received” and that “Much of the interest devoted to Cousin 
originated in the transcendentalist milieu, [and] most of it paralleled closely the rise and 
development of transcendentalism” (336–37).
 7. Vico’s 1744 New Science probably reached England by around 1827 via the 
French translation of Michelet. Cousin actually encouraged Michelet—who then count-
ed himself among Cousin’s followers—to undertake the translation, no doubt as part 
of Cousin’s effort to bring to light the greatest works in all fields of knowledge. Vico’s 
work influenced Michelet’s own historiography, and thus the entire historiographical 
effort of the later nineteenth century.
 8. Two modern studies of the idea of literary decline cover the major, pre-Ro-
mantic figures: Judith A. Plotz, Ideas of the Decline of Poetry, and W. Jackson Bate, The 
Burden of the Past and the English Poet. David J. DeLaura outlines the genealogy from 
Hazlitt to Carlyle, for which I am indebted in this section. See DeLaura, “The Future 
of Poetry,” pp. 148–80.
 9. Similarly, Peacock places Milton between the modern ages of gold and silver, 
“combining the excellencies of both” (13), and Dryden in the modern Silver Age, 
with its poetry of civilized life, authority, and the “exquisite and fastidious selection of 
words” (9).
 10. Moving beyond the battle of the Ancients and the Moderns, Dryden praised 
Milton in much the same terms as the Carracci painters had been praised in the early 
seventeenth century for their eclectic combinations of the best attributes of their precur-
sors:
Three poets, in three distant ages born,
Greece, Italy, and England did adorn.
The first in loftiness of thought surpassed,
The next in majesty, in both the last:
The force of Nature could no farther go;
To make a third, she joined the former two. (“Epigram on Milton” 1688)
Chapter 4
 1. Edgar Finley Shannon, Jr., tracks the early critical reception of The Princess in his 
Tennyson and the Reviewers: A Study of His Literary Reputation and of the Influence of the 
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Critics upon His Poetry, 1827–1851 (1952). In his chapter on The Princess, Shannon is at 
pains to debunk the notion that early reviewers misunderstood the genius of the poem 
and that only later critics read it rightly. On the contrary, he shows that the early reviews 
were generally positive and that by 1851, when The Princess reached its fourth edition, 
critical opinion had reached another high point. During these four years, however, 
negative reviews appeared with regularity, prompting Tennyson to make many changes 
to his work, primarily in the interest of improving the unity of the whole (Shannon 
97–140).
 2. Christopher Ricks downplays the significance of the Cambridge Apostles in 
shaping Tennyson’s worldview, noting that “Tennyson’s participation in the group was 
to be generally torpid—so torpid as to lead to his formal resignation when he failed to 
deliver his paper on ‘Ghosts’” (29). But as Ricks acknowledges, most of Tennyson’s close 
friends, including Arthur Henry Hallam, were also Apostles.
 3. In a brief survey of four “Cambridge poems”—the prize-winning “Timbuctoo,” 
“A Character,” “Lines on Cambridge of 1830,” and “The Palace of Art”—John Coyle 
and Richard Cronin characterize Tennyson’s engagement with the Apostles as part of 
a sustained effort to chart a poetic territory in which he can write about his age, but 
remain detached from it. They have suggested that “it was the point of transition that 
held Tennyson’s poetic interest,” that he was “fascinated by the process of waking” 
(114).
 4. In the Memoir Tennyson’s notes on The Princess record that “the ‘Tale from 
mouth to mouth’ was a game which I have more than once played when I was at Trin-
ity College, Cambridge, with my brother undergraduates” (Memoir I:253.) Nonetheless, 
this “game” of storytelling has much in common with debating, as each orator must 
be careful to take up points made by the previous speaker in order to advance his own 
interpretation of the material.
 5. In her recent Victorian Poetry article, Alisa Clapp-Itnyre argues that the inter-
polated songs are genuinely providing counterpoint, or antithesis, to the main verse-
narrative: “they tell the story that Ida might have told if the women had controlled her 
story: a more realistic portrait of Victorian women’s social roles and creative energies to 
counter the narrators’ parody of women’s social and creative aspirations” (230). While 
I do not make a strong distinction between the male and female voices that are telling 
the story of Princess Ida, except as they are involved in the broader dialectical effort 
of the poem, I do take Clapp-Itnyre’s point that these lyrics are integral to her story, 
particularly as they suggest the importance of finding the lost child in order to develop 
her complete womanhood and her creative power.
 6. For Johnston this usage of “mellay” or medley to describe the conflict between 
Arac and the Prince underscores the contest between Ida and the Prince, specifically 
war as “the unproductive convention of a superannuated social code” against which the 
Princess protests when she refuses to marry the Prince or anyone else (Johnston 563).
 7. Some of Tennyson’s remarks on the Princess, including this one, had originally 
appeared in a letter to and had been published by Canadian critic S. E. Dawson: “The 
child is the link thro’ the parts as shown in the songs which are the best interpreters of 
the poem” (Memoir I:254). When “the public did not see the drift” after publication of 
the first edition, Tennyson decided to include interpolated songs explaining it.
 8. Considering the readership and orientation of the periodicals in which these 
two reviews appeared, the divergence of opinion is not surprising. The Christian Re-
membrancer was, according to Alvar Ellegard, a quarterly “exponent of conservatively 
orthodox High Church views, [and] appealed chiefly to the High Church clergy” (30). 
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In 1860 its circulation was about 2,000. As a reviewer, however, Charles Peter Chre-
tien was prominent enough to attract Tennyson’s attention: he denounces Chretien’s 
review in a letter to De Vere of October 1849, because of the claim that Tennyson 
always represents the sea “dead asleep,” “which is a lie” (Letters I:305). Nevertheless, 
Chretien’s review offers a valuable counterpoint to De Vere’s inasmuch as religious 
beliefs often shaped responses to eclecticism—an element that is missing from De 
Vere’s analysis.
  The Edinburgh Review, also a quarterly and available at Mudie’s, was of course 
the chief organ of the Whig-Liberals. At its peak in 1818, it boasted a circulation of 
13,500 though by 1860 it had slipped to around 7,000 (Ellegard 27). In the contemporary 
press, it was generally considered second only to the Quarterly Review in importance. 
Naturally, this would have given Aubrey De Vere a much bigger readership than Chre-
tien could have hoped for, even with library circulation figured in. It is also important to 
recognize that Aubrey De Vere was a friend and admirer of Tennyson. In his diary De 
Vere records that he heard portions of the Princess in manuscript as early as April 1845. 
In May of the same year, Tennyson and De Vere again talked about his “University of 
Women,” and “discussed poetry, denouncing exotics, and saying that a poem should 
reflect the time and place” (Letters I:237–38). De Vere not only is responding to early 
negative reviews of the Princess, but is trying to work out a new direction for poetry of 
which Tennyson’s work is the harbinger.
 9. As Isobel Armstrong notes, Chretien borrows this extended metaphor from 
Wordsworth. In the preface to The Excursion, Wordsworth wrote that “all his work was 
essentially a whole,” that The Excursion was related to the unpublished Prelude, as the 
antechapel to the body of a gothic church, and “his minor Pieces will be found by the 
attentive Reader to have such connections with the main Work as do the little cells, ora-
tories, and sepulchral recesses, ordinarily included in these edifices” (qtd. in Armstrong 
200).
Chapter 5
 1. Morris and certainly Kingsley were also likely to have been influenced by Shake-
speare’s representations of Rome and Alexandria in Antony and Cleopatra (1606, 1607). 
Other possible influences on the Victorian idea of Alexandria covering the same mate-
rial as Shakespeare include John Dryden’s All for Love (1678) and G. F. Handel’s Giulio 
Cesare (1724).
 2. The OED quotes James Fitzjames Stephen’s 1858 review of Thomas Hughes’s 
Tom Brown’s Schooldays (1857) in defining “muscular Christianity”: “The principal 
character of the writer whose works earned this burlesque through expressive descrip-
tion, are his deep sense of the sacredness of all ordinary relations and the common duties 
of life, and the vigour with which he contends . . . for the great importance and value of 
animal spirits, physical strength, and hearty enjoyment of all the pursuits and accom-
plishments connected with them” (qtd. in Adams 108). As James Eli Adams notes, this 
“regimen marks a revival of aristocratic norms of manhood, and as such seems to have 
appealed to middle-class men (and boys) anxious to align themselves with more tradi-
tional sources of masculine identity” (108). This alliance between aristocratic ideals and 
middle-class manhood complicates Kingsley’s rejection of the aristocratic exclusiveness 
of Hypatia’s philosophy.
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 3. John C. Hawley’s account of Kingsley’s Anglican via media has strongly influ-
enced my interpretation of Hypatia, particularly his characterization of the struggle in 
Alexandria as a contest between atheism and dogmatism.
 4. Hypatia was first published serially in Fraser’s Magazine from 1852 to 1853 and 
as a book in the summer of 1853 (Baldwin 126). Kingsley’s biographer Susan Chitty 
locates the practical inspiration for Hypatia in a trip Kingsley made to Roman ruins in 
Germany in 1851, where “he imagined all the hellish scenes of agony and cruelty that 
the place had witnessed” (151); yet, for at least two years, Kingsley had been reading 
the early Church fathers and “contemplating a book about Alexandria after the sack 
of Rome, depicting the clashes between Christians, Jews, Greeks and barbarians in 
that dissension-rent city” (152). Kingsley probably first encountered the tragic story of 
Hypatia in chapter 47 of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, though he disagreed 
with Gibbon’s representation of fifth-century Alexandria: “And thus an age, which, to 
the shallow insight of a sneerer like Gibbon, seems only a rotting and aimless chaos of 
sensuality and anarchy, fanaticism and hypocrisy, produced a Clemens and an Atha-
nase, a Chrysostom and an Augustine” (Hypatia xi).
 5. Chitty also views this work as a crucial precursor of Hypatia. It was Kingsley’s 
first “practical sortie into the past,” and the two works share a common plan, wherein 
each of the major characters was to represent a school of thought (152); however, in 
Phaethon the intention was to demolish Neoplatonic Anythingarianism, and in Hypatia 
the goal is to forge from the combination of elements a Christian via media.
 6. In an exhaustive study of American periodicals published before 1850, Georges 
J. Joyaux has investigated the vexed question of the influence of French Eclecticism 
on American Transcendentalism. Many scholars would prefer that Emerson were in-
debted only to the German idealists and not at all to the “rational, urbane, compromise 
philosophy” of eclecticism. As Joyaux admits, however, “the two systems are both philo-
sophically eclectic in nature, and that, furthermore, both represented a phase of ideal-
istic reaction” (327). Joyaux concludes that Cousin, whose works were “widely known 
and generally well received” (336) in the United States, especially as the explicator of 
German philosophy, must at least have provided a catalyst to the study of metaphysics.
 7. Kingsley had taken this position some years earlier in The Saint’s Tragedy; or, The 
True Story of Elizabeth of Hungary (1848). The focus of the play is on the “agonising con-
tradiction” in the mind of Elizabeth, a pure and married woman who has been taught 
“the Manichean contempt with which a celibate clergy would have all men regard the 
names of husband, wife, and parent” (Project Gutenberg text, p. 6).
 8. Susann Dorman recounts the story of how Edward Pusey used Hypatia as 
grounds for derailing the Prince of Wales’s nomination of Kingsley for an honorary 
Oxford doctorate (192).
 9. Dorman points out that Kingsley borrows some of Newman’s own phrases in 
this passage (192).
 10. For further comparison and analysis see Duncan Forbes, The Liberal Anglican 
Idea of History, chapter 4, “Practical History,” especially pp. 102–11.
 11. See chapter 3, “Imagining the Science of Renunciation: Manhood and Abase-
ment in Kingsley and Tennyson,” pp. 105–47. Although Adams does not deal with 
Hypatia, his judgment that Kingsley’s novels betray “a powerfully masochistic impulse 
[ . . . ] where his heroes typically experience an unusually violent oscillation of desire and 
restraint” (110) could well apply to Kingsley’s representation of fifth-century Alexan-
dria as a contest between two undesirable extremes, abstinence and sensuality.
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 12. As Frederick Grant has argued, the “main characteristic feature of Hellenistic 
religion was syncretism: the tendency to identify the deities of various peoples and to 
combine their cults” (xiii).
 13. In tracing the fortunes of the concept of eclecticism throughout history, Pierluigi 
Donini distinguishes, as seventeenth-century eclectics also did, between syncretism and 
eclecticism. It is important to note that Kingsley wavered between a stance that might 
be described as syncretistic and one that might legitimately be designated eclectic. Eclec-
ticism is a method for choosing doctrines and seeking the truth; it is most frequently 
opposed to dogmatism and sectarianism. Thus, “anyone who becomes a faithful disciple 
of an eclectic philosophy loses by this very fact the right of being considered eclectic” 
(Donini 20). A syncretist “aimed to reconcile widely different opinions and [ . . . ] suc-
ceeded only in producing a ‘heap’ [or] ‘large shapeless mass’“ (Donini 21). The religious 
historian Brian Hatcher agrees that syncretism is distinguished from eclecticism by “the 
additional feature of reconciliation. That is, it is not sufficient, when speaking of syncre-
tism, to refer only to the process of encounter and appropriation; one must also speak 
of merging, accommodation, or amalgamation” (8). Donini does not see, however, that 
the distinction has any currency in philosophy, although syncretism is still used as “a 
technical term” in the history of religion. Indeed, in philosophy, the two terms are now 
used interchangeably.
 14. Both Victorian writers acknowledge Philo of Alexandria’s probable influence on 
Clemens and the first school of Christian theology. Another eclectic thinker, Philo, as a 
Jew, might well be another model for Raphael. Kingsley devotes a long chapter to Philo 
in Alexandria and Her Schools.
 15. Some years after Robert Milman published his article on Indian Brahmoism, 
John Murdoch published in the series “Papers on Indian Reform” a pamphlet titled 
“The Brahma Samaj and Other Modern Indian Eclectic Systems of Religion in India: 
Religious Reform, Part IV.” In introducing his readers to the Indian eclectic school, 
Murdoch paints them as reformers in religious matters: “The adherents of the new 
eclectic systems in India are far more enlightened than the greatest Hindu philosophers 
in former times. They have much clearer ideas of God than the authors of the Vedic 
hymns” (1). Furthermore, Murdoch writes, “The members of the Brahma Samaj are 
monotheists, and hold a pure system of morality. As protesters against idolatry and 
advocates of social reform, they are doing excellent service” (2). Murdoch attributes this 
reformist tendency to the influence of Christianity.
 16. In his guide to the city, E. M. Forster does not attempt to draw any parallel 
between Alexandria (ancient or modern) and Britain, which perhaps signals the dimin-
ished importance of the comparison by 1922. However, as Forster puts it, Alexandria 
had still “nourished imperial dreams” during the nineteenth century (91) and “Life 
flowed back into her” when “The eyes of Europe were again directed to the deserted 
shore” (93). James Stevens Curl’s fascinating study of the Egyptomania of the nineteenth 
century confirms that, for Europeans, interest in Egypt revived with the “imperial 
dreams” of Napoleon, Nelson’s victory at Aboukir Bay, and the building of the Suez 
Canal from 1859 to 1869. The mania for Egyptian design motifs and artifacts endured 
throughout the century. Curl observes that “eclecticism involving Egyptianising themes 
was one of the richest of tendencies in a century already rich in invention” (206). See 
chapter 9, “Aspects of the Egyptian Revival in the Later Part of the Nineteenth Cen-
tury,” pp. 187–206.
 17. A product of European Romanticism and German historicism, the “science of 
nations” offered a pseudoscientific justification for Europe’s domination over the native 
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peoples of Asia, Africa, and the Americas. The writer’s expression of this view is typical 
of Romantic nationalism: “The life and habits of a people are, to a large extent, mould-
ed by their climate and the peculiarities of their land. Orientalisms and Occidentalisms 
are not altogether capricious and arbitrary. Many of them are the offspring of the sky 
and soil. Certain features must always be peculiar to certain nations, not merely because 
of their ancestry, but because of their physical distinctions; and though, to some extent, 
there may be a fusion of these, an interchange of peculiarities, yet there are certain great 
ridges or outlines which must remain unobliterated and almost unsoftened” (“Egypt 
and Syria” 150). Kingsley, too, relied on such essentialist views of cultures and peoples. 
In the preface to Hypatia, he had judged the “races of Egypt and Syria” in ancient times 
to be “effeminate, over-civilized, exhausted by centuries during which no infusion of 
fresh blood had come to renew the stock. Morbid, self-conscious, physically indolent, 
incapable then, as now, of personal or political freedom, they afforded material out of 
which fanatics might easily be made, but not citizens of the kingdom of God” (xiv).
 18. In his review of Alexandria and Her Schools (1854), James Martineau accepts the 
“parallelism [ . . . ] in the broad features of the two ages”: “The decline of ancient faith 
without mature successor to take the vacant throne; the attempt of metaphysics to fit 
the soul with a religion; the pretensions of intuition and ecstasy; the sudden birth, from 
the very eggs of a high-flown spiritualism, of mystagogues and mesmerists, as larvae 
are born of butterflies; the growth of world-cities and world-science, with their public 
libraries and institutes, their botanic and zoölogic gardens, their cheap baths and open 
parks; the joint diffusion of taste and demoralization, of asceticism and intemperance; 
the increase of a proletary class amid the growing humanity of society and the laws; the 
frequency of frightful epidemics; the combination of gigantic enterprises and immense 
commerce with decay at the heart of private life” (295). Martineau refuses to accept, 
however, the analogy between “declining empire” and the “intellectual tendencies of 
the present age,” because “the cosmopolitanism of modern times is altogether differ-
ent” (298). Roman cosmopolitanism had led to the almost universal adoption of one or 
two languages; whatever was specialized became provincial and eventually servile: “All 
that was indigenous and characteristic was smoothed away; and over the wooded up-
lands and sequestered meadows of history, the paved roads of universal empire pushed 
their level way” (297). By contrast, modern cosmopolitanism arises from a “universal 
faith” that acknowledges “the common law and common kindred of the human race, 
in all the highest relations” (298). Like most of Kingsley’s contemporaries, Martineau 
believes that the spirit of world history is fulfilled in Christianity. While he praises the 
coexistence of different languages, he is unconcerned at the loss of diversity in reli-
gion.
Chapter 6
 1. In 1959 Victorian Studies published these early reading lists with commentary 
by Kenneth Allott. In establishing the importance of Cousin’s thought for Arnold’s 
intellectual development, I rely on Allott’s discussion of his reading during this period. 
Although monographs by Iris Sells and F. J. W. Harding treat Arnold’s relationship 
to French literature and culture in great detail, neither mentions Arnold’s reading of 
Cousin. Sells’s book appeared in 1935, before the early reading lists were published, but 
Harding’s 1964 Matthew Arnold the Critic and France should have taken Allott’s work 
into account.
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 2. Allott argues, therefore, that “Cousin seems to deserve a little of the credit for 
‘The Scholar Gypsy’” (260), since Glanvill is the source of the scholar-gypsy legend.
 3. In his diary entry for 9 April 1851, Arnold does record his reading of Cousin’s 
article on revolutions: “Des Principes de la révolution française et du gouvernement 
représentatif,” published in the Revue des deux mondes 10 (1851): 5–46 (Letters 202n14).
 4. Clinton Machann notes that Arnold was “eclectic in his reading of George Sand 
(whose liberal idealism appealed to him and whose version of feminine sentimentality 
may have reminded him of his mother), Goethe (who had largely displaced his earlier 
interest in Byron), the French poet Beranger (who reinforced his affectation of French 
culture), and the Hindu classic Bhagavad Gita (where he found a discipline of resigna-
tion congenial with his developing stoicism): he typically balanced his studies of Kant, 
Lucretius, Descartes, and the Epicureans and Stoics with critical refutations of their 
positions, following the dialogic impulse that would lead him to his later work as critic” 
(18). Allott remarks that “Arnold’s assent to the eclectic variety of Stoic ethics preached 
to Pausanias as practical wisdom in the second scene of ‘Empedocles on Etna’ was 
always more intellectual than emotional while he was still capable of writing poetry” 
(86). While both these critics perceive Arnold as eclectic, generally speaking, neither 
investigates the deeper significance of his eclecticism.
 5. While traveling in France as school inspector, Arnold met many of the leading 
intellectuals of the day including Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Mignet, Villemain, Guizot, 
Thiers, Sainte-Beuve, and Renan (SL 118–31). He first met Cousin in March 1859, 
at dinner and then at the Sorbonne (“Cousin well worth seeing.”) and he wanted to 
meet him again, though it is not clear that he ever did so: “My great inducement in 
going back [to Paris] would be to see and talk to Cousin who has himself had a Report 
to make much like that on which I am engaged” (Letters 426; SL 130). The report to 
which Arnold refers was completed in 1860 and published as The Popular Education of 
France with Notices of that of Holland and Switzerland (1861). During the 1830s Cousin 
had published reports on the state of elementary education in Holland, Prussia, and 
Germany; during the 1840s he focused his attention on France, coming out with the 
definitive report Instruction publique in 1850.
 6. Clough was not the only one to see the limits of Arnold’s imitations, architec-
tonic though they might be, of past styles and subjects of poetry. G. H. Lewes (among 
others) wrote reviews decrying Arnold’s new poetics. In directing young poets to study 
the classics and to “beware of the syren-charms which enervate the Moderns,” Arnold 
is recommending imitation (Lewes, “Schools of Poetry,” 82). As a positivist, Lewes con-
demns imitation: “the retention in our organism of the elements which have lived is in 
itself fatal as a source of destruction, poisoning the very life these elements once served, 
so in the onward progression of Humanity the old elements must pass away, transmit-
ting to successors the work they had to perform” (78). To imitate, apparently, is to eat 
the dead, and be poisoned unto death.
 7. For the eclectic sources of Arnold’s poetry, I am relying on Kenneth Allott and 
Miriam Allott’s edition of The Poems of Matthew Arnold. 
 8. In his reading of “The World and the Quietist,” George Forbes relates how in 
the Bhagavad Gita, Krishna tells the warrior Arjuna that he is “all-grasping death” 
and “Time, the destroyer of mankind” (157). Forbes sees Arnold’s “adverse voices” 
as reminders of Krishna and of death to human beings who have “their hearts set on 
the goals of their frantic and futile activity” (157). Krishna is Time and death, but he 
is also “generation and dissolution; the place where all things are reposited, and the 
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inexhaustible seed of nature” (159). Arnold would undoubtedly have found these im-
ages of incorporation in the body of time most appealing as a solution to the problem of 
the divided self, and to the dilemma of style.
 9. Sidney Coulling, in the best account of the development of the 1853 preface, 
identifies the writer of these words, the editor of The Spectator, Robert Stephen Rintoul, 
in a review of the poetry of Edwin Arnold, as Matthew Arnold’s immediate target. 
Arnold disagreed with the whole premise of The Spectator’s literary criticism, that “po-
etry must be both modern and moralistic.” The quoted comment is thus “typical of the 
criticism of the age—a specious criticism designed to confuse the reader and mislead 
the poet” (Coulling 235).
 10. In his 1956 monograph on Glanvill, Jackson Cope examines the sources of the 
eclecticism of the Cambridge Platonists. In tracing the sources of their eclecticism, Cope 
discovers traces of Skepticism, Stoicism, and Aristotelianism, mixed up with Platonism 
(139). It would be useful to trace Arnold’s eclecticism back from Cousin to Leibniz and 
the German Eclectics and to Glanvill and the Cambridge Platonists.
 11. In “Arnold and the Cambridge Platonists,” Ruth apRoberts traces the “Vi-
conian” influence back from Michelet and Herder (both influenced by the Italian 
philosopher of history), thus allowing for a French point of departure in his thinking, 
which I deem appropriate. She argues that Arnold imbibed Vico’s New Science from 
his father and from Rugby, where Vico’s “The Social Progress of States” was a textbook 
(139). She points to the odd periodization in texts such as the preface to Poems of 1853 
(where Arnold speaks of the age of the Greeks, and then of the moderns, Shakespeare 
and Goethe) as evidence of his “belaboring the three Viconian ages.” ApRoberts claims 
that Arnold sees “the dialogue of the mind with itself” as “an obverse side of Renais-
sance culture.” Again, in “On the Modern Element in Literature,” he posits recurrent 
modern ages, in keeping with Vico’s theory of historical cycles. In his excellent The 
Victorian Critic and the Idea of History, Peter Allan Dale also explores the connection 
between Arnold’s thought and Vico’s, emphasizing that Arnold shares with Vico “his 
high opinion of the healthy, fully developed modern age as a stage in the cycle” (94). 
Dale also explores Arnold’s assimilation of Carlyle and the German philosophers, par-
ticularly the concept of Zeitgeist; but in Arnold it is a radically different concept than it 
is in Hegel (128). In The Victorian Mirror of History, Dwight Culler entirely dismisses the 
role of Vico and traces Arnold’s thinking about the Zeitgeist and the Time-Stream to 
“the Philosophy of Clothes in Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus” (139). Arnold agrees with Car-
lyle that changes are initially spiritual, and that the forms of society—the Clothes—are 
continually lagging behind (138); nevertheless, as David DeLaura has written in “Ar-
nold and Carlyle,” Arnold would ultimately reject the example of the older writer as 
insufficiently disinterested.
 12. Lewis Mott, F. J. W. Harding, Flavia M. Alaya, and Stephen Prickett have all 
offered persuasive arguments for the French historian Ernest Renan’s key role in the 
development of Arnold’s critical principles. The parallels between Arnold’s career and 
that of Renan are indeed remarkable. Alaya and Prickett observe the similarities in 
their writings on the Celts and on religion, in particular their emphasis on the need 
for both the Hellenic and Hebraic principles. Not all critics who have examined the 
Arnold-Renan relationship agree on its importance in Arnold’s work. Sidney Coulling 
contends that the claims of influence have been exaggerated, providing evidence that 
Arnold had written about such key ideas as “disinterestedness” before he had read Re-
nan. Coulling would rather talk of resemblances. Rose Bachem, in her comparison of 
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the two writers’ views on perfection, also downplays the question of influence, agreeing 
with Saintsbury’s 1902 assessment: “Mr. Arnold needed no teaching from Mr. Renan” 
(229).
 13. In fact, so many of Victor Cousin’s English critics reacted violently against his 
eclecticism because they felt there would be no check on the individual eclectic’s deter-
mination of what was true and what was false. But of course, Cousin worked within 
the context of the French Academy and followed developments in philosophy and the 
history of philosophy around the world.
Chapter 7
 1. Hardy met Pater in London in 1886 (Donoghue 13), after the publication of the 
works I am considering here; but as Natarajan points out, he was well acquainted with 
Pater’s work by 1878 (849).
 2. Diane Elam takes up the question of the politics of romance from Fredric 
Jameson and Northrop Frye. All three critics see a revolutionary potential in romance 
that depends largely on its willingness to remake the world on a new pattern: “romance 
contains a transformative potential which allows the articulation of marginalized de-
sire” (20). See Elam, pp. 19–25; Frye, pp. 161–88; Jameson, pp. 157–62.
 3. Billie Inman points out that this idea—“the first step towards seeing one’s object 
as it really is, is to know one’s own impression as it really is”—derives from Hegel’s 
Aesthetik (Inman xiv, 56–57).
 4. The other influences cited by Inman are 1) Hegel’s and Schiller’s ideas on aes-
thetics, and 2) Quinet’s and Michelet’s orientation in history. She points out that Pater 
had “command of a general range of reference—classical, German, French, and Eng-
lish, quite astounding to one who realizes that it was primarily the fruit of only six 
years” (xi-xii). He had not, however, mastered whole subjects. As Inman puts it, “He 
was a highly literate dilettante” (xii). Furthermore, by 1869 “Pater’s mind was formed,” 
which makes it “inadvisable to speak of major influences from his readings after that 
time” (xii).
 5. In his notes to The Renaissance, Donald L. Hill identifies the echo of Sainte-
Beuve’s essay in “Two Early French Stories” (319).
 6. “Au reste, il ne s’agit véritablement de rien sacrifier, de rien déprécier. Le Tem-
ple du goût, je le crois, est à refaire; mais, en le rebâtissant, il s’agit simplement de 
l’agrandir, et qu’il devienne le Panthéon de tous les nobles humains, de tous ceux qui 
ont accru pour une part notable et durable la somme des jouissances et des titres de 
l’esprit” (Causeries du lundi 50).
 7. “Voilà nos classiques; l’imagination de chacun peut achever le dessin et même 
choisir son groupe préféré. Car il faut choisir, et la première condition du goût, après 
avoir tout compris, est de ne pas voyager sans cesse, mais de s’asseoir une fois et de se 
fixer” (Causeries du lundi 53).
 8. Instead of seeing here a choice between the historic method and the eclectic 
method, Carolyn Williams perceives a “graphic contrast between the historical method 
and the allegorical method” (Transfigured World 105). In Williams’s view, Pater is draw-
ing a distinction between “temporal and spatial modes of ‘reconciliation’” (105). “Alle-
gorical juxtaposition imitates ‘agreement’” in space, while the historical method would 
give priority to temporal differences. While I believe that Williams’s distinction is an 
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important one, I do not wish to take up the relationship between the allegorical and 
the eclectic in this study. For the moment, it is sufficient to acknowledge Pater’s own 
characterization of Pico’s allegorical approach.
 9. Donald Hill’s notes on the Pico essay (322–23) led me to the relevant passages in 
Plato and Platonism. John Conlon also deals with the Plato and Platonism passages and 
comes up against the inconsistency in Pater’s thought regarding critical practices “some-
what allied to ‘impressionism,’ the ‘dogmatic,’ the ‘eclectic,’ and ‘the historic method’” 
(Walter Pater and the French Tradition 148). Conlon notes that Pater is “by no means 
free” from eclecticism, “especially in his pursuit of the Romantic spirit from ancient 
Greek culture to the nineteenth century” (149), an assessment with which I heartily 
agree.
 10. In this account of Plato’s creation of an original philosophy, Pater makes it clear 
that all creation incorporates the ideas, images, and aspirations of others. This could ac-
count for that homesickness that so many of Pater’s critics have observed in him. Bullen 
claims that these “translations” of other cultures bring us back into contact with a world 
we’ve lost, “counteracting the homesickness of the modern condition” (279).
 11. Gerald Monsman’s 1980 study Walter Pater’s Art of Autobiography is probably the 
most thoroughgoing account of the creation of selfhood in all of Pater’s writings. He 
sees the shaping of self in these works as an ongoing dialectic “between the autobiogra-
pher shaping his life and the emergent work which reflects and enhances that identity” 
(36). The unity that emerges is a provisional one, since the “center is always in move-
ment away from the present toward layers deeper within or frames further outside” 
(36). Monsman’s characterization of Pater’s writing of self rings true, particularly since 
Pater so often wrote of the creations of others as involving a dialectic, or mixed, situa-
tion.
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